Syria's Interim President Meets Putin in Moscow: Negotiations on the Continuation of Russian Military Bases and the Reshaping of the Middle East Landscape.

On January 28, 2026, the special aircraft of Syria's interim president, Ahmad Shara, landed at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport. This marked his second visit to the Kremlin in four months, following his leadership of opposition forces in overthrowing the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 and his first visit to Russia in October 2025. The agenda for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin was clear and sensitive: against the backdrop of Syria's regime change and the collapse of Russia's traditional ally, the discussions aimed to redefine the long-term presence of Russian forces in Syria, particularly the future of the Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Naval Base along the Mediterranean coast. This meeting not only concerned the normalization of bilateral relations but also touched upon the continuity of Russia's strategic foothold in the Middle East, as well as Syria's delicate diplomatic balancing act between the United States and Russia in the post-civil war era.

Moscow's Strategic Contraction and Adherence to Core Interests.

One week before the talks, the Russian Ministry of Defense quietly completed the withdrawal of troops from the Qamishli Airport in northeastern Syria. Located in the Kurdish-controlled area and occupied since late 2019 under the Russian-Turkish agreement, this airport witnessed the end of the Russian military's influence in the region. Analysts pointed out that this withdrawal represents Moscow's pragmatic adjustment to geopolitical realities. Recent military operations by the Syrian government forces have caused the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces to lose large territories in the northeast. Continuing to stay in Qamishli no longer holds strategic value for the Russian military and could instead risk entanglement in conflicts between the Syrian government forces and Kurdish armed groups.

However, contraction by no means signifies abandonment. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explicitly stated before the meeting that all issues concerning the presence of our military in Syria would be discussed during the negotiations. Russia's core demands are clear and non-negotiable: retaining the Hmeimim and Tartus bases. These two installations are Russia's only formal military outposts beyond the borders of the former Soviet republics, serving as the cornerstone for its power projection in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and for securing the southward passage of the Black Sea Fleet. Hmeimim is home to Su-35 and Su-34 fighter jets as well as the S-400 air defense system, while Tartus is the sole material and technical support station for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean. From a strategic perspective, losing them would mean a significant reduction in the geopolitical dividends Russia gained from its military intervention in Syria since 2015.

In his public address, Putin deliberately avoided military topics and instead emphasized economic cooperation. I know Syria has much to rebuild, and our economic operators, including the construction sector, are ready for this joint work. This statement is a carefully crafted negotiation strategy: linking the survival of military bases with Russia's economic interests in participating in Syria's post-war reconstruction to increase bargaining leverage. Data shows that the 14-year-long civil war has caused an estimated loss of over 400 billion dollars to Syria's infrastructure, and Russian companies are eager to secure a share of it.

Damascus's List of Demands and Balanced Diplomacy

Ahmed Sharif's agenda is equally complex and multi-layered. In public, he thanks Russia for its support of Syria's territorial integrity and praises Moscow's historic role. However, according to information disclosed by Syrian Foreign Ministry sources to the media, Sharif brought to Moscow a detailed list covering security, political, and judicial areas.

The foremost and most challenging issue is the extradition of Bashar al-Assad and his wife. Since the former president's downfall in December 2024, he has been under Moscow's protection, becoming the biggest obstacle to normalizing bilateral relations. The Shara government has repeatedly demanded his extradition publicly, but Peskov merely evaded the issue when pressed by reporters, stating that Russia does not comment on the Assad matter. Assad is not only a symbol but also involves tangible security threats. Syrian sources indicate that Shara hopes Russia will provide assurances to prevent exiled former regime officials and military personnel in Moscow from using Russia as a safe haven to fund or organize armed attacks against Syria, particularly in coastal areas.

On the security front, Shara sought Russia's deeper involvement in future arrangements for southern Syria. He proposed deploying Russian military police in the Quneitra province of the Golan Heights as a barrier against Israeli cross-border operations. This reflects the new regime's concerns about the security of its southern border and its intention to use Russia to counterbalance Israel. Meanwhile, the Shara government urgently hopes that Russia will play a coordinating role in responding to potential strikes against Iran. Iran has used Syrian airspace to attack Israel, and Damascus fears that any escalation of U.S.-Iran or Israeli-Iran conflicts will drag Syria into the fray.

The deeper reason is that the Assad regime is walking a tightrope between the United States and Russia. Just one day before the visit to Russia, U.S. President Donald Trump praised Assad as highly respected and stated that the situation in Syria was progressing very smoothly. This cross-border interaction shows that Damascus is attempting to maintain necessary cooperation with Moscow while also showing goodwill toward Washington to gain broader international recognition and economic assistance, thereby avoiding diplomatic isolation.

The Kurdish Dilemma and the Spillover Risk of Terrorism

During the meeting, Putin congratulated Assad on the gaining momentum in the process of restoring Syria's territorial integrity, which is widely interpreted as tacit approval of the recent offensive by Syrian government forces against Kurdish forces in the northeast. Since the end of 2025, Syrian government forces have recaptured large areas in the north and northeast from Kurdish forces, leading to significant changes in the actual line of control between the two sides.

However, military advances have created new security vacuums. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces have managed dozens of camp prisons in the northeast for years, detaining at least 10,000 captured ISIS extremists and their family members. As government forces advance and Kurdish fighters retreat, the management of these detention facilities has fallen into chaos. In early January 2026, multiple prison break incidents had already been reported. France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States have jointly called on Syrian government forces and Kurdish fighters to avoid any security vacuums that could benefit ISIS terrorists.

Currently, although there is a ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government forces and the Kurdish armed groups, which was extended by 15 days on January 24, both sides accuse each other of violating the agreement. Russia's withdrawal from Qamishli is interpreted by Damascus as a gesture of goodwill on one hand, indicating that Moscow will not directly intervene in the conflict between the Syrian government and the Kurds; on the other hand, it also reflects Russia's unwillingness to take responsibility for the potential security crisis that may erupt locally. European and American intelligence agencies assess that the collapse of the security architecture in northeastern Syria is one of the most severe risks of terrorism resurgence facing the Middle East in 2026.

The Recalibration of Power Dynamics in the Middle East in the Post-Assad Era

The downfall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 dealt a heavy blow to Russia's Middle East policy. Moscow had invested significant military and diplomatic resources during the Syrian civil war. From 2015 to 2020 alone, the Russian military conducted over 63,000 combat sorties. The collapse of the Assad regime once put Russia's massive investments and strategic arrangements in Syria at risk of being completely wiped out.

But the Kremlin demonstrated remarkable pragmatic flexibility. It quickly embraced Assad while extending an olive branch to Shaleh's new regime. This hedging strategy aimed to maximize the preservation of influence. Shaleh's two visits to Moscow indicated that, despite the core disagreement over extraditing Assad, both sides had strong practical needs driving the relationship forward. For Shaleh, Russia is a potential reconstruction partner and leverage for bargaining with the West; for Putin, Syria is an indispensable stage for Russia as a global power to maintain its voice in the Middle East.

This meeting also revealed the limitations of Russia's military capabilities. As the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues, Russia's military presence in Syria has been reduced to a level sufficient only for maintaining the operation of key bases. Analysts point out that Russia is no longer capable of intervening in regional conflicts on a large scale as it did in 2015, and its strategy is shifting from power projection to stronghold maintenance. Hmeimim and Tartus are not merely military facilities but also symbols of Russia's qualification as a participant in Middle Eastern affairs.

From a broader perspective, the talks between Shale and Putin are a microcosm of the ongoing evolution of the power landscape in the Middle East. Iran's influence has relatively diminished due to the contraction of its regional proxy network; Turkey has consolidated its sphere of influence in northern Syria; while the United States has reduced its direct military presence, it maintains influence by supporting Kurdish forces and engaging with the Shale regime. Russia, by engaging with both old and new powers simultaneously, seeks to preserve its geopolitical assets amid the complex situation.

Under the lights of the St. George Hall in the Moscow Kremlin, the handshake between Putin and Shaley was captured by the camera. Neither publicly mentioned military bases or Assad, but all key issues were fiercely debated behind closed doors. The outcome of the negotiations will determine whether Russian warships can continue to dock in Tartus, whether Russian military aircraft can continue to patrol the Mediterranean from Hmeimim, and whether the Shaley regime can find a balance between internal stability and external recognition. On the land of Syria, the scars of war have not yet healed, and a new game has already begun. This meeting is not an endpoint, but another chapter full of calculation and compromise in the long and winding process of power restructuring in the post-civil war era.