The Olive Branch of Damascus and the Guns East of the Euphrates: The Geopolitical Game Behind the Syrian Presidential Decree.
19/01/2026
On the late night of January 16, 2026, Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa delivered a nationwide address via state television, particularly directed at his Kurdish compatriots. At the conclusion of his speech, he signed and announced a presidential decree, hailed by official media as historic. The core of the decree directly addressed a decades-old national scar within Syria: recognizing Kurdish as a national language, designating the Kurdish New Year, Nowruz, as a national statutory holiday, and restoring citizenship to approximately 20% of Kurds who had been stripped of their nationality due to the controversial 1962 census.
Syrian Kurdish citizens are an indispensable and genuine component of the Syrian people, and their cultural and linguistic identity is an inseparable part of the unified and diverse Syrian national character. The statement in the decree text would have been almost unimaginable if placed ten years ago.
However, in the same week, fierce clashes erupted between Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo, leading to the displacement of over 150,000 Kurdish civilians and at least 23 deaths. At 7:00 a.m. on January 17, SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi announced that, in response to calls from friendly nations and mediators, his forces would withdraw from the front lines east of Aleppo and redeploy to areas east of the Euphrates River. A few hours later, the Syrian army announced it had taken full control of the town of Deir Hafer, located approximately 50 kilometers east of Aleppo.
On one side, there is an unprecedented empowerment of rights; on the other, there is relentless military pressure. This seemingly contradictory combination forms a crucial slice for understanding state reconstruction and geopolitical struggles in Syria during the post-civil war era.
The "ice-breaking" significance of the decree and the settlement of historical debts.
From a legal text perspective, the breakthrough of Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2026 is substantive. It is not an empty political declaration but an operational document containing eight specific articles.
First and foremost, the recognition of linguistic and cultural rights carries both symbolic and substantive significance. This marks the first time since Syria's independence in 1946 that the Kurdish language has been granted official status as a national language. The decree permits the teaching of Kurdish as an elective course or as part of educational and cultural activities in both public and private schools located in regions where the Kurdish population constitutes a significant proportion. Nowruz becoming a nationwide paid holiday signifies the shift of Kurdish culture from the margins to the center of national celebrations. For an ethnic group long suppressed by Arabization policies, these provisions represent the most direct official endorsement of its cultural existence.
Secondly, the resolution of the unresolved issues from the 1962 census in Hasakah Governorate touches upon the historical roots of the infringement of Kurdish rights. That census registered tens of thousands of Kurds as illegal immigrants from Turkey (maktoumeen al-qayd), resulting in them and their descendants being rendered stateless and systematically excluded from political, economic, and social rights. The new decree explicitly abolishes all legal and special measures stemming from this, granting full Syrian nationality to all citizens of Kurdish origin residing on Syrian territory, ensuring complete equality in rights and obligations. Analysis indicates that this move aims to address a long-standing source of grievance and instability, attempting to re-anchor the Kurdish community within the framework of national citizenship.
President Salaha deliberately downplayed ethnic differences in his televised address, emphasizing that Arabs, Kurds, Turks... regardless of their ethnicity, no one is superior to another. He called on his Kurdish compatriots not to believe the narratives claiming that they intend to harm the Kurdish people, and invited all those who were forcibly displaced from their land to return safely and unconditionally, with the sole condition of laying down their arms. This shift in rhetoric stands in stark contrast to the tough stance on Kurdish rights demands during the Bashar al-Assad era.
However, the statement from the Syrian Kurdish Autonomous Administration following the decree's announcement highlighted another aspect of the issue. They described this decree as a first step, but insufficient to address the aspirations and expectations of the Kurdish people. They emphasized that rights must be protected through a permanent constitution that reflects the will of the people and all its components, rather than relying on temporary decrees. This implies deep-seated doubts within the Kurdish community regarding the sustainability of the decree and the political sincerity behind it.
Military Reality: The Artillery Fire in Aleppo and the Red Line of the Euphrates River
The timing of the decree's promulgation is by no means accidental. It is embedded within a series of tense military operations and negotiation deadlocks, resembling more of a politically-backed pacification backed by strength.
The implementation dilemma of the March 2025 agreement is the immediate context of the current crisis. At that time, the new government in Damascus signed an agreement with the Kurdish side, aiming to integrate Kurdish civil and military institutions into the Syrian state framework. In exchange, the Kurds would gain more rights. However, nearly a year later, negotiations have reached a deadlock. The core disagreement lies in the specific form of integration: the SDF demands to be independently incorporated into the Syrian army under the leadership of Kurdish commanders, while maintaining their presence in Kurdish-populated areas; whereas the Damascus side seeks more direct control.
The military conflict in Aleppo and Dayr Hafir is a display of force aimed at breaking the stalemate. In early January 2026, Syrian government forces clashed with the SDF in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo, successfully driving SDF fighters out of two neighborhoods. Subsequently, the government forces deployed large-scale reinforcements to the Dayr Hafir region and ordered the SDF to withdraw from an area between that region and the Euphrates River. The government forces warned civilians to evacuate and conducted intense bombardments on locations allegedly used by the SDF as military bases, from which drones and artillery shells were launched toward Aleppo. The Syrian military accused the SDF of preventing civilians from leaving and labeled them as PKK terrorist militias and remnants of the overthrown regime.
It was under such military pressure that SDF leader Abdi announced the decision to withdraw. The retreat was packaged as a goodwill gesture in response to calls from allies and mediators, aimed at supporting the implementation of the March 2025 unity and ceasefire agreement. However, in essence, this was a tactical withdrawal in the face of the advancing superior government forces. The SDF retreated east of the Euphrates River, temporarily consolidating its core area—the oil and gas-rich provinces in the northeast.
This advance and retreat clearly delineates a new line of power division. Through limited yet efficient military operations, the government forces have reasserted their authority in key areas around Aleppo, preventing Kurdish forces from infiltrating westward or connecting with the Kurdish community in Aleppo. The withdrawal of the SDF signifies their temporary acceptance of the reality that their influence is primarily confined to the east of the Euphrates River. The mediation by the envoy of the U.S.-led multinational coalition appears more aimed at de-escalation and preventing conflict escalation, rather than altering this established fact.
Geopolitical Chessboard: The Calculations of the New Government and the Shadow of Regional Powers
To understand why the Salar government chose to adopt a combination of carrot and stick at this moment, it must be placed within a broader geopolitical landscape.
First and foremost, this is a crucial step for the Saladin regime to consolidate its legitimacy and achieve a unified national narrative. After leading an Islamist coalition to overthrow Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Saladin's greatest challenge has been integrating the fragmented territory. The Kurdish-controlled area accounts for approximately one-quarter of Syria's territory and holds most of the country's oil and gas resources. A purely military reconquest would be costly and could trigger direct confrontation with the backers of the SDF, particularly the United States. By granting cultural rights and citizenship, Damascus aims to dismantle the separatist demands within the Kurdish region from within, shifting the struggle from the level of national self-determination back to the framework of local autonomy or rights protection. This represents a relatively low-cost strategy for national integration.
Secondly, the decree aims to divide the Kurdish community and win over moderates. The decade-long civil war and autonomous practices have prevented Syrian Kurdish society from being monolithic. Analysis indicates that approximately 2 million Kurds are distributed across various regions of Syria, with about 1.2 million concentrated in the northeast, while around 300,000 each reside in Damascus, Aleppo, and other areas. Their demands and relationships with the central authority are not uniform. Granting equal civil and cultural rights to Kurds nationwide may weaken the northeastern autonomous institutions' status as the sole representative of all Kurds, attracting those who prioritize national citizenship over ethnic autonomy.
Furthermore, the potential reactions of regional powers, particularly Turkey, are factors that the Syrian government must weigh. Turkey views the Syrian Kurdish armed forces as a branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and a threat to national security. The Bashar regime has previously used the Kurdish issue as a bargaining chip in its dealings with Turkey. Although the new government in Shaara has changed its ideological tone, the logic of national security persists. On one hand, Damascus asserts its sovereign jurisdiction over all Kurds within its territory through decrees (implying that Turkey should not intervene across the border); on the other hand, it deliberately labels the SDF as terrorists linked to the PKK during military operations. This ambiguity may represent a dual narrative played to different audiences.
Finally, the uncertainty of the American role forms the backdrop. The United States supports the SDF in combating ISIS through multinational coalitions and maintains a small military presence in the northeast. However, as the priority of the war on terror diminishes, the durability of America's commitment to the Syrian Kurdish forces has remained in question. The SDF's retreat under pressure partly stems from a lack of confidence in whether the U.S. military would directly intervene to protect its interests in the Aleppo region. Damascus's choice to act in Aleppo rather than the SDF's core areas may also be a test of America's red lines.
Forward Look: A Fragile Balance and Unfinished Negotiations
This series of events in January 2026 did not resolve the fundamental contradictions of the Kurdish issue in Syria, but rather established a new, and potentially still fragile, balance point.
In the short term, the conflict de-escalates, and negotiations return to the table. The SDF withdraws east of the Euphrates River, while government forces consolidate their gains on the west bank, establishing a relatively clear line of contact between the two sides. External mediators such as the United States will push both parties back to the negotiation track of the March 2025 agreement. However, none of the core disagreements—the model for military integration, the extent of local autonomy, and the distribution of oil and gas resource revenues—have been resolved. The presidential decree grants cultural rights but avoids addressing the political arrangements and autonomous status that the Kurds are most concerned about.
In the medium term, the future of the northeastern autonomous region is the biggest suspense. This area possesses approximately 90% of Syria's oil and gas resources and vast agricultural land, serving as the economic lifeline of the SDF. Damascus will absolutely not allow it to remain in a de facto independent state for the long term. Future contests may revolve around constitutional arrangements such as federalism and decentralization. The Kurdish autonomous administration's statement emphasizes a permanent constitution rather than provisional decrees, precisely hitting the crucial point. Meanwhile, the region also hosts U.S. troops and Russian military police, further complicating the situation.
From a longer historical perspective, this decree marks a significant adjustment in Syria's nation-building narrative. For the first time at the official level, it acknowledges the diversity of Syria's ethnic composition and attempts to incorporate Kurdish identity into the national identity. To some extent, this is a revision of the decades-long policy of singular Arab nationalism. However, this revision occurs against the backdrop of a devastating civil war and the collapse and subsequent reshaping of state authority, with its motivations driven far more by pragmatic considerations than by ideological innovation.
The rights bill extended by the Syrian president amid the smoke of gunfire serves both as an acknowledgment of historical wrongs and a bargaining chip in realpolitik. It opens a door to cultural recognition for the Kurds, yet it has not ventured into the deeper waters of political power-sharing. The Euphrates River has become a temporary military demarcation line, but whether it can evolve into an administrative boundary within a future, fairer, and more stable Syrian federation hinges on the difficult negotiations over interests at the table and the delicate interplay between regional and international forces. For the Kurds in Syria, this is a moment filled with both hope and pitfalls. They have gained some long-sought recognition, but the path toward genuine autonomy or equal federal status still winds through the mist east of the Euphrates, with no end in sight.
Reference materials
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/16/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-rights-decree-clashes.html
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