The Undercover Battle on Both Sides of the Yellow Line: How Israel Fosters New Militias in Gaza to Counter Hamas

Last December, near Rafah in southern Gaza, a seemingly ordinary family feud resulted in the severe injury of an armed faction leader. However, the subsequent developments were highly unusual: the injured was urgently transported to a hospital in Israel. The wounded man, named Yasser Abu Shabab, is the leader of the Popular Forces Militia, a Bedouin armed commander who openly opposes Hamas. This public medical assistance by Israel, like a glaring searchlight, illuminated a long-shadowed strategy in the Gaza Strip: Israel is systematically supporting emerging local armed factions in Gaza through its intelligence agencies and military, aiming to erode the foundation of Hamas's rule from within.

Although the ceasefire agreement reached last October limited the scope of the Israeli Defense Forces' military operations in Gaza, the war has not truly stopped—it has merely shifted to more covert fronts. A recent series of in-depth reports by The Wall Street Journal, citing Israeli officials, military reservists, and militia leaders, outlines a complex picture of proxy warfare. Israel's support crosses the yellow line that demarcates control zones, providing these militias with drone air support, intelligence, weapons, and even food and cigarettes. This shadow war unfolding on both sides of the yellow line is not only about the future power structure in Gaza but also reflects the deep dilemmas and strategic risks Israel faces as it attempts to reshape Gaza's security order after achieving military victory.

The "Shadow War" Under the Ceasefire Agreement

After the ceasefire agreement took effect, the sound of gunfire in Gaza once became sparse, and the focus of the international community shifted accordingly. However, beneath the public calm, another conflict continues in a more covert manner. Israel's support for Gaza's militias did not begin today, but under the constraints of the ceasefire framework, the nature and significance of this support have undergone subtle yet crucial changes.

"The Yellow Line" as a new battlefield.

The yellow line is the current de facto demarcation line in Gaza. To the east is an area where the Israeli Defense Forces have control or predominant influence; to the west lies territory where Hamas can still exercise administrative and security functions. One of the core provisions of the ceasefire agreement is to restrict the Israeli military from entering areas west of the yellow line. This presents a dilemma for Israel: how to continue applying military pressure on Hamas while adhering to the agreement?

The answer lies in the use of local militias. According to reports, a militia led by Hussam al-Astal, consisting of dozens of armed personnel, typically resides in areas controlled by Israel. However, when carrying out missions, they cross the Yellow Line to enter Hamas-controlled territories and launch attacks. Earlier this year, Astal publicly claimed that his forces killed a Hamas police officer in the Muwasi area west of Khan Younis and threatened more similar operations. The Muwasi area is precisely the zone where Israeli troops are theoretically prohibited from entering. The existence of these militias essentially provides Israel with a pair of gloves that can reach beyond the Yellow Line and directly strike at Hamas's vital points.

The tactical advantages of this model are evident. Militia members are familiar with the local terrain, language, and community networks, enabling them to infiltrate neighborhoods that are difficult for the Israeli regular army to access. Their attacks—whether targeting Hamas security officials, infrastructure, or symbolic targets—are relatively low-cost, yet the political and psychological impact can be significant. As one Israeli source noted, while these militias have limited overall impact on Hamas, their operations are undermining the organization's image as an invincible ruler of Gaza.

Comprehensive Support System: From Weapons to Cigarettes

Israel's support goes far beyond tacit approval or verbal encouragement, building a rather comprehensive logistics and operational support system. Multiple Israeli officials and reservists described the details of the support to The Wall Street Journal:

• Combat Support: Provide drones for aerial surveillance and support, share critical intelligence to lock onto targets and avoid risks.
• Material Supplies: Transporting weapons and ammunition, along with daily necessities such as food, drinking water, and cigarettes. A reservist from the Israeli military who participated in a supply operation recalled that in the summer of 2025, the convoy he was escorting delivered food, water, and cigarettes to a militia in Rafah. Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) agents also placed a box with unknown contents in the vehicle.
• Medical Evacuation: Provides emergency medical assistance to injured militia members, even utilizing helicopters to transport them to hospitals within Israel. The most prominent example is Yasser Abu Shabab being taken to an Israeli hospital for treatment.

The statement by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Yaron Buskila, former senior operations officer of the Israel Defense Forces Gaza Division and head of the right-wing Israel Defense and Security Forum, is quite representative: When they (the militia) go out to take action against Hamas, we will be there to monitor them and sometimes provide assistance. He further explained that assistance means providing information, and if we see Hamas attempting to threaten them or approach, we will actively intervene.

However, this cooperative relationship is not without reservations. Militia leader Astar himself denies receiving any assistance from Israel other than food, insisting that the actions against Hamas are entirely self-determined. This public denial, on one hand, may stem from the need to maintain his image as a resister rather than a collaborator among the people of Gaza; on the other hand, it reveals the inherent fragility and mutual distrust within this alliance.

Ally or Hidden Danger? Strategic Divisions Within Israel

Within Israel's decision-making circles and strategic community, there is far from a consensus on the strategy of supporting Gaza militias. Supporters view it as a flexible tool to maintain initiative under constraints, while critics see enormous, potentially even catastrophic, long-term risks.

The Abacus of the Pragmatist

The logic supporting this strategy is grounded in realistic military and political considerations. First, it serves as a creative circumvention of the limitations imposed by the ceasefire agreement. When the large-scale ground operations of the Israel Defense Forces are constrained, these local armed forces become an effective alternative to maintain continuous pressure on Hamas. Second, it represents a traditional divide-and-conquer tactic aimed at creating and exploiting internal divisions within Gaza to prevent Hamas from reconsolidating its monolithic rule. Finally, supporting these anti-Hamas forces may help cultivate potential local security partners in advance for the challenging post-war "day after" issues in Gaza.

The remarks of former senior officer Bouskela reflect this pragmatic approach: cooperation is a temporary alliance based on a common enemy (Hamas), with Israel providing support in exchange for the other party's actions on the battlefield, while maintaining close monitoring.

The Vigilant's Warning: The Ghosts of History and the Betrayal of Tomorrow

However, more calm voices have issued stern warnings. These warnings primarily revolve around two core issues: credibility and controllability.

The interests of the militia belong first and foremost to the militia itself, not to anyone else. It may backfire on you. This was the blunt reminder from Major General (Ret.) Sa'ar Tzur during an interview. Tzur retired in October 2024 after serving over thirty years in the Israel Defense Forces, and his views reflect the concerns of many senior security figures. The nature of militia forces is local and familial, with their primary goal being their own survival and expansion. Once the situation changes and their common interests with Israel disappear, former allies can very well become new enemies. Weapons, training, and intelligence support could ultimately be turned against you.

Former Israeli Defense Forces intelligence officer and leading Palestinian society scholar Michael Milstein sees an ominous sign from historical analogies. He compares the militias in Gaza to the South Lebanon Army, which Israel supported during the Lebanese Civil War. It is only a matter of time, he predicts, before they will have to choose between staying to be executed or arrested, or fleeing and joining the Israeli Defense Forces. He suggests that these armed groups, lacking broad popular support and a political agenda, will struggle to survive in the face of Hamas's powerful underground network. Ultimately, they will either be eliminated or completely turn to Israel for protection, thereby losing their symbolic significance as a local force.

The reaction from Hamas also confirms the extreme dangers these militias face. Hamas referred to the killers of its police officers as agents of the Israeli occupation forces and warned that the price of betrayal would be heavy and costly. Given that Hamas still possesses strong infiltration and retaliatory capabilities, the leaders and members of these militias, along with their families, are essentially living under significant threats to their lives.

The Power Struggle in Gaza and the Emerging Framework of Future Order

Israel's support for emerging militia operations must be viewed within the broader evolution of power structures in the Gaza Strip. This is not merely a counter-terrorism operation, but an early contest over who will govern Gaza in the future and how it will be governed.

The Cracks and Resilience of Hamas Rule

The emergence and activities of these militias indeed expose the cracks in Hamas's rule following significant military blows. Their ability to recruit members, gain support (even partially from Israel), and successfully carry out attacks against Hamas officials indicates that within Gazan society, particularly in certain tribes or regions, dissatisfaction and opposition toward Hamas are real. Yasser Abu Shabab (of Bedouin background) and the forces he leads themselves represent the fragmented ethnic and political landscape within Gaza, which is not monolithic.

However, it is premature to assert that Hamas's rule is on the verge of collapse. Through nearly two decades of governance, Hamas has established administrative, welfare, and security networks deeply embedded at the grassroots level of society. Its military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, despite suffering significant losses, still retains considerable underground organizational capabilities and guerrilla warfare experience. Sporadic attacks by militias can create trouble and undermine morale, but they are far from shaking the organizational foundation of Hamas. Al-Astal's claim that Hamas has come to an end on the 38th anniversary of its establishment resembles more of a propaganda slogan than a realistic assessment.

Israel's "Gaza Dilemma" and Strategic Ambiguity

Israel's support for militias profoundly reflects the fundamental dilemma it faces regarding the Gaza issue: militarily capable of defeating Hamas, but politically unable or unwilling to bear the cost of direct, long-term governance of Gaza. Neither wanting Hamas to regain power, nor accepting the takeover by the Palestinian Authority (PA), and further rejecting the long-term stationing of international forces, Israel has effectively fallen into a governance vacuum in the post-Hamas era.

In this context, supporting decentralized, non-ideological (or at least not explicitly advocating for the elimination of Israel) local armed forces has become a low-cost trial-and-error option. Israel may hope that, through the mutual checks and balances among these local forces, a fragmented, weakly centralized Gaza security landscape will emerge, thereby permanently eliminating the threat of any single powerful hostile entity to its borders. This is essentially a strategy of controlled chaos.

However, the risks of this strategy are extremely high. It could give rise to multiple armed, separatist warlord territories, further deteriorating the humanitarian situation in Gaza, fostering crime and extremism, and ultimately potentially breeding armed groups that are even more unpredictable and harder to negotiate with than Hamas. The histories of both Lebanon and Afghanistan demonstrate that external powers' efforts to cultivate local proxies to maintain their own security often end up creating long-term instability and backlash.

Conclusion: A high-stakes gamble

The ceasefire line did not bring peace; it merely altered the form of the conflict. The shadow war supported by Israel on both sides of the Gaza Yellow Line is a meticulously calculated yet uncertain strategic gamble.

From a short-term tactical perspective, it has achieved certain results: while adhering to the literal provisions of the ceasefire agreement, it has maintained military pressure on Hamas, depleted the opponent's resources, and created unease within its ruling areas. The support operations themselves have also become a way for Israel to send a message to Hamas—even during the ceasefire, the confrontation will not stop.

However, from a long-term strategic perspective, the risks of this gamble are continuously accumulating. Israel's relationship with these militias is built on an extremely fragile foundation—a common and temporary enemy. Once this foundation is shaken, the weapons, intelligence, and training could become new threats directed at Israel. These militias lack political legitimacy, a unified agenda, and broad public support, making it difficult for them to grow into stable alternative forces within Gaza's complex social ecosystem. More importantly, this strategy deepens the fragmentation of power in Gaza, creating more obstacles for any future efforts to rebuild stability and order.

The future of Gaza cannot be built upon militias fueled by mutual hatred and supported by external forces. Israel's security ultimately requires a political solution—a vision that offers hope and a normal life for the people of Gaza. The current approach of using militias to counter Hamas may secure some tactical breathing room, but it is more like piling up dry firewood than extinguishing the flames. When these armed and funded local forces fight each other for survival, or eventually turn their guns elsewhere, Israel may find that the seeds it sows today will bear even more bitter fruit tomorrow.

The covert struggle on both sides of the Yellow Line ultimately tests not only military strategy but also political wisdom. And time does not always favor the gamblers.