Reopening of the Rafah Crossing: The Geopolitical Game Behind the Humanitarian Corridor and the Fragile Peace

26/01/2026

In late January 2026, news emerged from the Gaza Strip, quickly becoming a global focus: Palestinian officials announced that the Rafah crossing, connecting Gaza with Egypt, would reopen next week. This is not merely a simple adjustment of border control, but a critical step that touches the fragile nerves of the Middle East region. Since the ceasefire agreement took effect in October 2025, this passage, seen as a lifeline by over 2 million Gaza residents, has remained closed. Now, its reopening is widely regarded as a symbolic signal that the U.S.-led 20-point plan has entered its second phase, behind which lies a complex interplay of forces involving the United States, Israel, Hamas, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and other parties.

Key milestones under the ceasefire framework

The reopening of the Rafah crossing is not an isolated event but is embedded within a complex political and security framework. On October 10, 2025, under the mediation of then-U.S. President Trump, Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement, ending the two-year-long Gaza war. The core of this agreement is the so-called 20-point plan, aimed at achieving long-term stability and reconstruction in Gaza. The plan is divided into multiple phases: the first phase focuses on halting hostilities and releasing hostages, while the second phase involves more complex arrangements—the disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from most areas of Gaza, the deployment of international monitoring forces, and the initiation of governance and reconstruction in Gaza.

The opening of the Rafah crossing is the most direct symbol of the second phase's commencement. For the Gaza Strip, which has been under blockade for many years, this crossing is almost the sole land route connecting its 2.3 million residents with the outside world. The United Nations and humanitarian agencies have long called for the reopening of the crossing to alleviate the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Since the outbreak of the war in October 2023, over 71,000 people have been killed in Gaza, with widespread destruction of infrastructure and extreme shortages of basic supplies such as medical care, food, and fuel. The opening of the crossing means humanitarian aid can enter more smoothly, and some residents may also have the opportunity to seek medical treatment abroad or visit relatives.

However, the Israeli government has consistently maintained a reserved stance on this matter. Israel has set the return of the last Israeli hostage—the body of deceased police officer Ran Gvili—by Hamas as a prerequisite for reopening the crossing. Gvili was killed during the October 7, 2023 attack, and his body was taken into Gaza. Although Hamas claims to have provided information about the body's location to Israel through mediators, Israel insists on seeing actual repatriation actions. This deadlock has kept the Rafah crossing closed for nearly four months since the ceasefire took effect.

U.S. Pressure and Israel's Internal Divisions

On January 24-25, 2026, Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law, Middle East advisor Jared Kushner, arrived in Jerusalem to hold talks with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. According to Israeli media reports, the U.S. envoy explicitly pressured Israel to advance the second phase of the ceasefire, including immediately reopening the Rafah crossing, even if the remains of Giv'ili have not been returned.

This pressure has triggered a strong backlash within Israel. An unnamed senior Israeli official sharply criticized Witkoff in media remarks, accusing him of becoming a lobbyist for Qatar's interests and condemning the U.S. proposal to place Turkey in a border management role, stating it would turn back the clock to confrontation with Turkey and pose a tangible danger to Israel's security. These remarks reveal the distrust of Israel's security establishment toward the American plan, particularly the fear that Turkey—a major Middle Eastern power with ties to Hamas and a complex relationship with Israel—would gain influence on the Gaza border.

More direct opposition comes from Givili's family. They issued a statement on January 25, questioning why pressure is being directed in the wrong place. The statement emphasized: President Trump stated in Davos this week that Hamas knows the whereabouts of our son. We want to know why the pressure is not being applied to Hamas, but rather to the Israeli government, demanding it continue to fulfill the agreement, while Hamas is deceiving the entire world and refusing to return the last abductee according to the agreement it signed. The family called on Netanyahu to tell the U.S. envoy that any progress in regional peace and Gaza reconstruction must be conditional on the return of their son.

This family-level grief stands in stark contrast to political-level calculations. At the hostage square in Tel Aviv, thousands gather every week, urging the government to prioritize the hostage issue. These gatherings are not merely emotional appeals but also constitute political pressure on the Netanyahu government. In Israeli society, the return of hostages is seen as a national responsibility and a moral obligation; any action perceived as compromise on this issue could trigger a domestic political storm.

Meanwhile, the Israeli military is conducting targeted operations in a Muslim cemetery in the Shejaiya area of northern Gaza, searching for the remains of Hadar Goldin. Abu Obeida, a spokesperson for Hamas's military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, claimed that all details regarding the location of the remains have been provided through mediators and noted that the Israeli forces are conducting the search based on this information. This ambiguous situation—where information has been provided, the search is underway, but the remains have not been returned—leaves room for maneuvering and interpretation by all parties involved.

Limited Opening and Israel's Security Obsession

Facing pressure from the United States and dual constraints domestically, the Israeli government finally announced a compromise plan on January 26: agreeing to partially reopen the Rafah crossing. The statement released by the Prime Minister's Office on social media platform X was carefully worded, reflecting typical Israeli security logic.

The statement indicated that within the framework of President Trump's 20-point plan, Israel agreed to partially reopen the Rafah border crossing, limited to pedestrian traffic only, and subject to a comprehensive Israeli inspection mechanism. The statement emphasized that the opening of the crossing is contingent upon the return of all surviving hostages and Hamas's 100% effort to locate and return all deceased hostages. Finally, the statement set an operational condition: once the current (search for Givili) operation is completed, and in accordance with the agreement reached with the United States, Israel will open the Rafah crossing.

Limitation and control are the key terms of this statement. According to details disclosed by Israeli media, this limited opening will be reflected in multiple control mechanisms: First, the crossing will only allow the passage of personnel, while cargo transportation may still be restricted; second, Israel will not deploy troops inside the crossing but will establish checkpoints nearby to conduct remote monitoring and pre-approval of individuals entering and exiting; third, all personnel and electronic devices entering Gaza will undergo Israeli scanning to prevent weapons smuggling; fourth, Israel aims to limit the number of Palestinians entering Gaza from Egypt, ensuring that the number of departures exceeds the number of arrivals, likely to prevent the infiltration of Hamas personnel or materials.

The daily operation of the port will be managed by non-uniformed personnel from the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) and the intelligence department of the Palestinian Authority. This arrangement is not new; as early as 2005, after Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, EUBAM oversaw the operation of the Rafah crossing and briefly resumed during the temporary ceasefire in January 2025. Israel's underlying intention is clear: to maintain substantive control over the border through technical means and proxy forces while avoiding direct military presence that could cause friction.

This arrangement reflects Israel's enduring anxiety over security threats from Gaza. Despite the ceasefire lasting for several months, the Israeli military discovered and destroyed a 4-kilometer-long Hamas tunnel in the Rafah area of southern Gaza, which contained weapons and living facilities. Small-scale clashes also occur from time to time: on January 24, the Israeli military claimed to have killed terrorists installing explosive devices near the Yellow Line (the boundary separating Israeli-controlled areas from the rest of Gaza), while the Palestinian side stated that two teenagers gathering firewood were killed by a drone within the security zone. These incidents constantly remind all parties that the ceasefire is fragile and the security dilemma is far from resolved.

Regional Chessboard and Great Powers' Strategic Projection

The reopening negotiations of the Rafah crossing essentially serve as a microcosm of geopolitical dynamics, where major regional powers project their influence.

Egypt, as a country bordering Gaza, holds a crucial position. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty spoke by phone with Nikolay Mladenov, a Bulgarian diplomat and senior representative of the newly established Gaza Peace Commission under Trump, explicitly demanding the immediate two-way opening of the Rafah crossing. Egypt's concerns are multi-layered: on one hand, it hopes to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and prevent a refugee influx from impacting the Sinai Peninsula; on the other hand, it also seeks to maintain influence in Gaza's future arrangements, balancing against competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Turkey's role is more nuanced. Turkish National Intelligence Director Ibrahim Kalin met with the Hamas political leadership in Istanbul to discuss the second phase of the ceasefire and the opening of the Rafah crossing. The Hamas delegation expressed gratitude for Turkish President Erdogan's role as a guarantor and his stance in supporting the Palestinian people. Israeli officials were angered by the U.S. proposal potentially involving Turkey in border management, highlighting the historical grievances and strategic distrust between Turkey and Israel. Turkey's close ties with Hamas make it a key player in the mediation process, but also a source of security anxiety for Israel.

Qatar, as the primary financial backer and political supporter of Hamas, has wielded significant influence throughout. Israeli officials have accused U.S. envoy Whitkov of lobbying for Qatar's interests. While this appears emotional, it highlights Doha's substantial leverage in the Gaza issue. Qatar's funding and diplomatic channels are indispensable for maintaining Hamas's cooperative stance in ceasefire agreements.

The United States is the driving force and architect behind all of this. At the Davos Forum, Trump grandly announced a new vision for Gaza, painting a future picture featuring high-rise residential buildings, data centers, and seaside resorts. The shuttle diplomacy of envoys Wittkoff and Kushner—from Davos to Moscow to discuss the Ukraine issue, then to Abu Dhabi for U.S.-Russia-Ukraine trilateral negotiations, and finally flying to Jerusalem—demonstrates the Trump administration's unique approach of attempting to reshape the Middle East conflict through a commercial and transactional mindset. The concurrent visit to Israel by Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of U.S. Central Command, who held a lengthy private meeting with Israeli Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir, underscores that military coordination remains the cornerstone of the U.S.-Israel alliance, especially against the backdrop of regional tensions (the text mentions a potential crisis with Iran).

It is noteworthy that Trump originally hoped for Israeli President Herzog to attend the Davos Peace Committee establishment ceremony, sharing the stage with Arab and Muslim leaders to demonstrate broad support for his peace plan. However, Netanyahu vetoed the idea, reportedly leading to tense and difficult phone exchanges. This episode revealed subtle differences between the United States and Israel, as well as within Israel (between the Prime Minister's Office and the President's Office), regarding how to showcase diplomatic achievements.

A Fragile Path Forward and Unresolved Challenges

The limited reopening of the Rafah crossing is, at best, a small step toward an uncertain future. Each of the remaining elements of the second phase of the ceasefire is more challenging than opening the crossing.

Disarming Hamas is an almost impossible task. As an organization founded on armed resistance, abandoning weapons would be equivalent to political suicide. Hamas has publicly refused to lay down its arms on multiple occasions. Without disarmament, any talk of Israel's complete withdrawal and the deployment of international forces is moot. In that case, the so-called new Gaza reconstruction plan, no matter how beautifully portrayed, could become nothing more than a castle in the air.

The Governance Vacuum in Gaza is another challenging issue. The United States supports the establishment of an interim management committee composed of technocrats, with Ali Sha'as appointed as its head. However, this committee lacks a popular mandate, and its authority and enforcement capabilities are questionable given that Hamas still holds actual control and enjoys public support. Whether it can gradually marginalize Hamas while providing essential services and coordinating reconstruction efforts remains uncertain.

Competition among regional powers may erode any fragile agreements. Countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have different interests and allies regarding the Gaza issue. The United States attempts to integrate all parties through a peace committee, but the committee's own representativeness has already sparked controversy (Israel was absent from its founding ceremony). In the absence of an inclusive political process, the external scramble for Gaza could resurface in the form of proxy competition or influence fragmentation.

Israeli domestic politics is one of the biggest variables. The Netanyahu government faces pressure from its far-right coalition partners, who oppose making any concessions to Hamas. The demands of the hostages' families carry strong moral weight. Meanwhile, pressure from the Trump administration concerns the strategic alliance. Netanyahu must walk a tightrope between these conflicting forces. Any move perceived as weak on security or the hostage issue could endanger his ruling coalition.

Additionally, other tensions in the background have not disappeared: Israel has extended its ban on Qatar's Al Jazeera for another 90 days on national security grounds; the head of Israel's Civil Aviation Authority warned foreign airlines that the region may enter a more delicate period, hinting at a potential escalation of tensions with Iran; the headquarters of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in East Jerusalem was set on fire after being seized and partially demolished by Israeli authorities, further straining relations between the UN and Israel. These incidents remind us that Gaza is only one part of the Middle East powder keg.

The opening of the Rafah crossing may offer a brief respite for the people of Gaza, allowing more aid to enter and enabling a fortunate few to leave. However, from a broader perspective, this appears more like a thin layer of ice covering old conflicts. Without a political solution addressing core issues such as Gaza's political status, the final borders between Palestine and Israel, Jerusalem, and the return of refugees, any arrangements confined to Gaza itself are unlikely to endure. When humanitarian corridors reopen, what people witness is not just the entry of trucks, but also the arduous journey of a region struggling amidst the scars of war, geopolitical calculations, and the longing for peace. The true foundation of peace cannot be laid merely by the opening or closing of a border crossing.

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