Syria's Largest Oil Field Changes Hands: The Political Chess Game and Regional Changes Behind a Military Takeover
19/01/2026
On the early morning of January 18, 2026, on the desert horizon of Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria, a government armored column drove into the gates of the Al-Omar oil field without encountering any resistance. As Syria's largest and highest-producing oil field, it had been under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces since its liberation from the extremist group Islamic State in 2017. Now, the transfer of control over the oil field signifies a fundamental shift in a geopolitical landscape that has persisted for over a decade.
This is not an isolated military operation. Almost simultaneously with the government forces entering the oil field, the Syrian Ministry of Defense announced in Damascus that a comprehensive ceasefire agreement had been reached with the Syrian Democratic Forces. According to the agreement, the Democratic Forces will completely withdraw from the west bank of the Euphrates River, and the administrative and military authority over the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, which they control, will be transferred to the central government. Armed personnel of the Democratic Forces will be integrated into the Syrian government army and security forces after review. Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara stated to reporters after signing the agreement: This is a victory for all Syrians, regardless of their background. It is hoped that Syria can end its state of division and move toward unity and progress.
On the surface, this appears to be a military operation through which the central government reasserts its authority. However, analysis reveals that the simultaneous occurrence of the oil field changing hands and the ceasefire agreement is, in fact, a meticulously calculated political transaction. Behind it lies the internal power restructuring in Syria, adjustments to U.S. Middle East policy, shifts in regional power balances, and the arduous process of a war-ravaged nation attempting to piece itself back together.
The Pace of Military Operations: From Aleppo to the Euphrates
The advance of the government forces was not a sudden attack, but the culmination of a series of well-paced military operations.
The fuse of the conflict can be traced back to early January 2026. In the northern stronghold of Aleppo, government forces clashed with the Democratic Forces in two neighborhoods controlled by Kurdish armed groups. After a brief conflict, government forces expelled the Democratic Forces combatants from these areas. Aleppo is Syria's second-largest city, and control over it holds strong symbolic significance. The actions of government forces here were interpreted by observers as a test of force against the Democratic Forces and a response to the slow progress of the integration agreement reached by both sides in March 2025.
In March 2025, the Shale government and the Democratic Forces signed a framework agreement, stipulating the integration of institutions and armed forces in the Kurdish-controlled areas into the national framework by the end of 2025. However, the implementation of the agreement has reached a deadlock, with both sides accusing each other of violating commitments. The government accused the Democratic Forces of delaying the integration process in an attempt to maintain de facto autonomy, while the Democratic Forces demanded more substantial decentralization and guarantees of cultural rights, including constitutional recognition of their autonomous status.
After the Aleppo conflict, military pressure quickly spread eastward. On January 16, government forces deployed additional troops to the town of Deir Hafer, approximately 50 kilometers east of Aleppo, and requested civilians to evacuate. The Syrian Democratic Forces reported intense shelling in the town. On the same day, President Assad signed a decree, described by Kurdish activists as the most comprehensive since Syria's independence in 1946, formally recognizing multiple rights for Kurds: Kurdish is recognized as a national language and can be taught as an elective or in cultural education activities in schools within Kurdish-majority areas; all special laws and measures resulting from the 1962 census are abolished, granting Syrian nationality to all Kurdish-origin citizens residing in Syria (including those with irregular registration status); Nowruz (March 21) is designated as a nationwide paid statutory holiday.
The timing of this decree is intriguing—it serves both as a conciliatory gesture toward the Kurds and as a political bottom line drawn before the escalation of military operations: the government is willing to grant cultural rights and citizenship, but firmly opposes any form of territorial autonomy or power-sharing.
On January 17, Mazlum Abdi, the leader of the Democratic Forces, announced on social media that, in response to calls from friendly nations and mediators, a decision has been made to withdraw all troops to areas east of Aleppo and east of the Euphrates River starting from 7:00 on that day. He stated that this move is intended to demonstrate our sincerity in completing the integration process and our commitment to the terms of the March 10 agreement. The Syrian Ministry of Defense welcomed this announcement and declared that government forces will move into the areas vacated by the Democratic Forces.
However, the withdrawal process did not quell the conflict. The Democratic Forces accused the government troops of violating the agreement by entering villages before the complete withdrawal of Democratic Forces fighters. Intense clashes erupted between the two sides at multiple locations, involving the use of heavy weapons. U.S. Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper called on the Syrian government to cease any offensive operations in the area between Aleppo and Tabqa, emphasizing that a Syria at peace with itself and its neighbors is crucial for the region's peace and stability.
Military pressure continues to intensify. On the night of January 17 to 18, government forces entered the city of Tabqa, gaining control over this strategic city located in Raqqa Governorate, adjacent to the Euphrates River and Syria's largest dam—the Tabqa Dam (also known as the Euphrates Dam). Subsequently, government forces continued to advance toward the city of Raqqa and the eastern part of Deir ez-Zor Governorate. It was under these circumstances that the Al-Omar oil field, along with the nearby Tank oil field, changed hands with almost no resistance.
Content of the Ceasefire Agreement: An Asymmetric Integration
The ceasefire agreement announced on January 18 outlines a detailed roadmap for the transfer of power. According to the key points of the agreement released by the Syrian official news agency SANA, its core content can be summarized as follows:
First, the comprehensive transfer of territorial control. The Democratic Forces will immediately and completely transfer the administrative and military control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces to the central government. This means that these two vast, resource-rich provinces will completely break away from the Kurdish autonomous system and return to central jurisdiction. The agreement specifically emphasizes that control over all border crossings and all oil and gas fields in the region will be handed over to the government, which will be protected by the government's regular army to ensure these resources are returned to the state.
Second, Integration and Disbandment of Armed Forces. All military and security personnel of the Democratic Forces will be integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior on an individual basis after passing the necessary security vetting. They will receive corresponding military ranks, financial entitlements, and logistical support. The agreement explicitly requires the Democratic Forces leadership to commit to not incorporating remnants of the former regime into their ranks and to submit a list of former regime officers currently present in northeastern Syria. This essentially signifies the end of the Democratic Forces as an independent military organization.
Third, the takeover of civil institutions. The government will take over all civil institutions and facilities in the two provinces and reintegrate existing employees into relevant national ministries by decree. The government pledges not to target employees of the Democratic Forces, fighters, or members of the existing civil administration in these areas. Furthermore, all civil institutions in Hasakah province will also be incorporated into the official Syrian state agencies and administrative structures.
Fourth, the handover of sensitive facilities. Damascus will take responsibility for the prisons and detention camps operated by the Kurdish-led administration, which hold tens of thousands of foreign Islamic State militants and their family members. This is an extremely challenging and internationally focused issue.
Fifth, reaffirmation of cultural rights. The agreement reiterates the commitment from President Saleh's previous decree regarding the recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, including granting the Kurdish language official language status and designating the Kurdish New Year as a national holiday.
From the analysis of the agreement text, this is clearly an unequal document. The Democratic Forces have relinquished most of the territories under their control, key resources, and military independence in exchange for security guarantees for personnel, individual-level integration, and long-announced promises of cultural rights. The agreement does not mention any content regarding political autonomy, decentralization, or constitutional guarantees, which are precisely the core demands that the Kurdish side has long advocated for.
The Role of the United States: From Supporter to Mediator
In this development, the role played by the United States has undergone a subtle yet significant shift.
Over the years, the United States has been the primary supporter of the Syrian Democratic Forces. During the war against ISIS, the U.S.-led multinational coalition provided the SDF with weapons, training, and direct military support, making it a key partner for U.S. ground operations in Syria. The areas controlled by the SDF once housed important U.S. military bases, including the coalition's main base that was previously located in the Al-Omar oil field. This relationship has afforded the SDF de facto protection and political capital over the past decade.
However, with the defeat of the Islamic State at its last stronghold in 2019, the strategic priorities of the United States in northeastern Syria shifted. Domestic political pressure to maintain a large-scale military presence increased, while the overall evolution of the situation in Syria—particularly the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 and the rise of a transitional government led by former Islamist Ahmad Sharai—prompted Washington to reassess its approach to engagement.
Although Sharif was born from an anti-Assad Islamist armed group, after taking office, he has shown a pragmatic stance, seeking reconciliation with the international community and rebuilding state authority. The United States seems to judge that dealing with a Damascus government capable of controlling the entire country, potentially bringing stability, and continuing cooperation in counter-terrorism aligns more with its interests than indefinitely supporting a local armed group.
On January 17, amid the escalation of military operations, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barak met with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leader Mazloum Abdi and President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Nechirvan Barzani in Erbil, Iraq. The following day, Barak flew to Damascus for a meeting with President Bashar al-Assad. Abdi had originally planned to accompany him but reportedly could not make the trip due to weather conditions and instead participated via telephone.
Barack praised the ceasefire agreement on social media, stating that it would lead to renewed dialogue and cooperation for the establishment of a unified Syria, and described the agreement and ceasefire as a critical turning point, where former adversaries chose cooperation over division. The public endorsement from the United States provided significant external legitimacy to the agreement and essentially recognized the achievements of the government forces in this operation.
Analysis indicates that the role of the United States has shifted from being a protector of the Democratic Forces to a mediator promoting their integration with the central government. Behind this shift lies Washington's new assessment of the Syrian situation: a divided Syria is detrimental to regional stability and may provide a continuous pretext for intervention by countries such as Iran and Turkey; whereas a Syria led by Assad, maintaining counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S., and gradually reintegrating into the Arab state camp, may better align with America's long-term interests.
Internal Reactions and Future Challenges
After the agreement was signed, reactions across Syria were complex and diverse.
In the recently government-taken towns with Arab majorities, such as Dayr Hafir, Tabqa, and others, many residents have welcomed the arrival of government forces. In Tabqa, an AFP journalist witnessed some residents toppling a statue erected in memory of a Kurdish female fighter who died in the battle to liberate Raqqa. A resident named Ahmed Falah told the reporter, "Today is the first day of our liberation." Another resident stated, "The Syrian Arab Army has liberated us from terrorist organizations." These reactions reflect the dissatisfaction of some Arab communities with the prolonged rule of Kurdish forces, especially in traditional Arab areas like Deir ez-Zor Province.
However, in regions with a Kurdish majority, the sentiment is more cautious and even resistant. In the northeastern city of Qamishli, hundreds of Kurdish residents held demonstrations, shouting that Kurds will always be a thorn in the eyes of their enemies. 48-year-old resident Muhyiddin Hassan told AFP in Kurdish that President al-Shara's decree feels like a joke, stating bluntly: What we want is democracy that all Syrians can embody. He emphasized: If he wants to achieve equality, all components of Syria must live together, and the killing must stop.
The Kurdish Autonomous Authority issued a statement, stating that the decree from Shara is the first step, but it cannot satisfy the aspirations and hopes of the Kurdish people. They insist that the fundamental solution lies in a democratic, decentralized constitution—a governance model that Damascus has consistently rejected, while the Kurds have persistently advocated for it.
International Crisis Group's Syria analyst Nanaar Hawash pointed out that while Sharaa's decree consolidates military control, it offers cultural concessions and does not address the demands for self-governance in the northeast. He believes that the president agreed to grant cultural rights but drew a red line when it comes to power-sharing.
The future challenges are already clearly visible.
First, the implementation of the integration process will be exceptionally complex. Integrating tens of thousands of Democratic Army personnel who have experienced years of war into the government military and security forces involves intricate vetting, organizational arrangements, treatment guarantees, and potential trust-building issues. Any mishandling could trigger new grievances or even violence.
Secondly, the allocation of economic resources will become the focus. The return of oil fields such as Al-Omar could theoretically enhance the central government's fiscal revenue. However, how will these resources be utilized for the reconstruction of the war-torn northeastern regions? Can local communities benefit from them? This relates to the public's acceptance of the new authorities.
Third, the political demands of the Kurds have not disappeared. While the recognition of cultural rights is undoubtedly a historic step forward, Kurdish political forces aspire to secure guaranteed political representation and a certain degree of local administrative authority within the framework of the Syrian state. If these demands continue to be marginalized in future political processes, discontent may once again accumulate.
Fourth, the issue of Islamic State detainees poses immense pressure. Taking over prisons and camps holding tens of thousands of foreign militants and their families presents a significant test for the Syrian government's security capabilities and resources, and also brings ongoing international security risks.
Fifth, the reactions of regional countries are worth noting. Turkey has consistently viewed the Syrian Kurdish armed forces as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party within its borders, considering them a security threat. With the integration of the Democratic Forces, how will Ankara respond? Will it perceive the threat as eliminated, or will it worry that Kurdish influence persists in another form? The attitudes of traditional allies of the Syrian government, such as Iran and Russia, will also impact subsequent developments.
The transfer of control over the Al-Omar oil field is far more than a mere change in military authority. It is the culmination of a series of political, military, and diplomatic maneuvers, signaling the beginning of the end for the de facto fragmentation that emerged in the later stages of the Syrian civil war. Through a combination of military pressure, political concessions, and external mediation, the government in Damascus has reclaimed key territories and resources at a relatively low cost, reinforcing its status as the national authority.
However, seizing oil fields may be easier than managing peace. The real test lies in whether Damascus can reunite a country deeply divided along ethnic, sectarian, and political lines, with shattered infrastructure and an economy on the brink of collapse. The ceasefire agreement provides a rare window of opportunity, but beyond it lies Syria's long and rugged road to national reconstruction. Whether this path can succeed depends not only on the political wisdom of Damascus but also on whether the Kurds can find their rightful place within a unified national framework, and on whether the international community will continue to support an inclusive peace process or once again turn Syria into a chessboard for great power rivalry.
The machines in the oil fields may soon roar again, powering the reconstruction of Syria. But more precious than oil is the hope for this long-suffering nation to heal its divisions and move toward coexistence. This hope now resembles a seedling in the desert—both fragile and imbued with tenacious vitality.
Reference materials
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gwk37ewvwo
https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c20dz6n3k3qo
https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/syria-us-backed-kurdish-group-sign-deal-to-end-fighting
https://english.mathrubhumi.com/news/world/syria-kurdish-forces-agree-ceasefire-w0vy0qot