DPRK Rocket Artillery Directive: Systematic Restructuring of Tactical Deterrence and Revision of Military Trade Strategy
20/02/2026
North Korea showcases nuclear rocket artillery: Strategic intentions and regional impact of Pyongyang's "wonder weapon"
On February 18, 2026, during the military parade held on the eve of the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Jong-un personally drove a large multiple rocket launcher vehicle past the reviewing stand in Pyongyang. The following day, the Korean Central News Agency released related photos and reports, detailing this weapon: it is a 600mm caliber nuclear tactical rocket launcher capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Kim Jong-un referred to it as a unique and miraculous weapon in the world, suitable for carrying out special attack missions, and warned that once used, no one could expect divine protection. This high-profile display took place against the backdrop of deepening relations between North Korea and Russia and the normalization of military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, directly targeting the dual strategic objectives of the tacticalization of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and its external arms trade.
Weapon Performance and Tactical Positioning
According to the limited information disclosed by North Korea and external analysis, this 600mm multiple rocket launcher system represents a key upgrade for North Korea's long-range artillery forces. The 600mm caliber far exceeds that of traditional rocket artillery; for example, the South Korean K239 Chunmu rocket artillery has a caliber of 239mm, and the U.S. M270 rocket artillery has a caliber of 227mm. This super-large caliber design indicates that its rockets are closer to short-range ballistic missiles in terms of size, payload, and range.
Kim Jong Un stated that the system employs AI-assisted guidance technology, with accuracy comparable to that of short-range ballistic missiles. If true, it would blur the lines between North Korea's artillery and missile forces. Analysts point out that North Korea has long been committed to developing saturation strike capabilities that are difficult to intercept, in order to penetrate the missile defense systems of South Korea and the U.S. forces stationed there. This multiple rocket launcher can fire a large number of munitions in a single salvo, and combined with its claimed dual conventional and nuclear capabilities, poses an urgent threat to Seoul, which is only about 50 kilometers from the Military Demarcation Line. Tactically, it provides a lower-threshold yet still devastating strike option compared to launching intercontinental ballistic missiles, aiming to extend nuclear deterrence to the operational and tactical levels, forcing adversaries to face nuclear risks at every stage of conflict escalation.
Timing of Presentation and Domestic Political Considerations
The decision to showcase it on February 18, 2026, just before the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party, carries clear domestic political intentions. The Workers' Party Congress serves as a key occasion for North Korea to establish its policies, display achievements, and consolidate loyalty. By personally driving the new weapon, Kim Jong-un aims to portray himself as the direct leader of defense technology development and the guardian of national security. This propaganda imagery of integrating the supreme commander with the weapon is a classic pattern in North Korea's political narrative, designed to reinforce the leader's authority and link military accomplishments with the regime's legitimacy.
This display also continues North Korea's strategy of using military power to promote dialogue and exchanging strength for security. Since 2025, the situation on the peninsula has fluctuated between tension and tentative contacts. Pyongyang has repeatedly accused the joint military exercises by the United States and South Korea of intensifying confrontation, using this as a reason to accelerate weapons development. Showcasing advanced weapons at this juncture of the congress serves both as an internal tribute to demonstrate national strength and an external signal of firmness: regardless of the external atmosphere for dialogue, North Korea's determination to advance military modernization remains unshakable, and its so-called self-defensive nuclear deterrence construction has entered a new phase of tactical implementation.
Military cooperation and arms exports between North Korea and Russia may
Several Western analytical institutions speculate that this high-profile display may be intended to pave the way for the export of this weapon system, particularly to Russia. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, relations between North Korea and Russia have rapidly warmed, with cooperation in areas such as weaponry and food assistance becoming increasingly public. In 2023, the North Korean leader made a rare visit to Russia, touring the Far Eastern space launch site and fighter jet factory, sparking international concerns over deep military-technical cooperation between the two countries.
For Russia, the years-long conflict has depleted a significant portion of its conventional ammunition stockpiles. North Korea possesses large-scale artillery production lines and substantial ammunition reserves, with equipment such as rocket artillery and artillery shells exhibiting a degree of compatibility with the Russian military system. If this new 600mm rocket artillery truly possesses the high precision and dual conventional-nuclear capabilities as claimed by North Korea, it could attract interest from the Russian side, although its actual performance remains to be verified. For North Korea, weapons exports not only provide urgently needed foreign currency, energy, and food but also serve as a geopolitical lever to break international isolation and influence relations with major powers. Introducing advanced weapon systems to the international market, especially exporting to a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, constitutes an open challenge to the existing international sanctions regime, aimed at testing and breaching the red lines drawn by the West.
Impact on the Security of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia
The emergence of this weapon has further solidified the balance of terror on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's military strategy has shifted toward developing diversified, survivable, and rapidly responsive tactical nuclear strike capabilities. This mobile rocket artillery is more difficult to pre-locate and destroy compared to fixed missile silos, increasing the difficulty and risks of preemptive strikes by the United States and South Korea. The South Korean military and U.S. forces stationed in South Korea have been compelled to reassess their operational concepts for counter-artillery warfare, missile defense, and responding to tactical nuclear threats.
The deeper impact lies in its potential to stimulate an arms race and nuclear proliferation risks in Northeast Asia. Discussions about nuclear sharing and developing preemptive strike capabilities have long existed within Japan. Some political forces in South Korea also occasionally propose redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or pursuing independent nuclear capabilities. Every time North Korea demonstrates progress in the tacticalization of its nuclear arsenal, it provides justification for these voices, potentially forcing relevant countries to reassess their defense and deterrence policies. From a broader perspective, a North Korea that continuously crosses nuclear red lines and may proliferate advanced weapons to other conflict zones is making the security architecture of Northeast Asia more fragile and unstable. Traditional deterrence and diplomatic measures appear to be failing, while new crisis management mechanisms are far from being established.
This weapons display in Pyongyang, like a prism, reflects the complex reality of geopolitical maneuvering in Northeast Asia. It involves technology, domestic politics, major power negotiations, and more importantly, the difficult future of the entire region seeking a way out under the shadow of nuclear threat. The image of Kim Jong-un holding the steering wheel will be replayed repeatedly, but what truly determines the direction are the choices made by all parties next, at the negotiation table and on the edge of deterrence.