Axis Shift: How the New German-Italian Alliance Reshapes European Security and the Future of NATO

Rome, January 23, 2026, an ordinary winter day. Inside the magnificent Villa Doria Pamphili, not far from St. Peter's Basilica, a diplomatic ceremony is underway. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni smiles as she welcomes German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, with a kiss on the left cheek and a kiss on the right cheek. German media captured this detail, describing the meeting with headlines like "New Axis." Outside the villa, the heart of Europe seems to be changing its rhythm.

This is not an ordinary bilateral summit. With 21 ministers participating, over ten agreements signed, and an updated version of the "Germany-Italy Action Plan" on the table, what makes it even more remarkable is that this meeting takes place against the backdrop of transatlantic relations experiencing early tremors during Trump's second term and visible cracks emerging in the traditional Franco-German axis. When Merz stated at the joint press conference that Germany and Italy are closer than ever before, he was not only describing bilateral relations but also outlining a quiet restructuring of Europe's power landscape.

The Twilight of the Franco-German Axis and the Birth of the New Rome-Berlin Axis

The core engine of European integration—the Franco-German axis—is experiencing the most severe crisis of trust since the end of the Cold War. This crisis did not emerge overnight but is the result of multiple overlapping contradictions.

By the end of 2025, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, jointly developed by France, Germany, and Spain, was indefinitely postponed. This 100-billion-euro project, the largest defense program in Europe, was intended to be a symbol of European strategic autonomy but has reached a deadlock due to disagreements among aerospace companies such as Dassault, Airbus, and Indra over the allocation of project shares. Germany has even begun considering withdrawing from the project. Meanwhile, regarding the free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur, France attempted to block it, while Germany firmly supported it due to export interests. Italy initially had reservations to protect its own farmers' interests but ultimately chose to support the agreement after securing concessions, aligning itself with Berlin.

Analysis reveals that behind these divergences lie deeper strategic perception differences. French President Macron advocates for increased EU borrowing and more centralized fiscal control to promote European sovereignty building; Germany, on the other hand, maintains a cautious stance towards debt expansion, focusing more on fiscal discipline and export competitiveness. Bloomberg observes that as relations with the United States deteriorate, Franco-German interest divergences are intensifying, partly due to Germany's deeper economic reliance on the U.S. export market.

When the Trump administration threatened to impose tariffs on eight European countries that sent troops to Greenland, Macron publicly mentioned using the EU's trade bazooka to retaliate, while Merz openly criticized the French president's stance and chose to coordinate with Meloni in response. Such open disagreements are rare in the history of Franco-German relations.

Greek media describe this situation as the slow death of the Franco-German axis and refer to the meeting between Merz and Meloni as a marriage of convenience. From a political spectrum perspective, this combination is indeed surprising: one is the conservative leader of Germany's CDU, while the other is a right-wing politician from the Brothers of Italy party. However, realpolitik often transcends ideological labels.

The Three Pillars of the German-Italian Alliance: Security, Competitiveness, and Immigration

The agreement system signed on January 23, 2026, has laid a substantive foundation for the new cooperation framework between Germany and Italy. This framework revolves around three core pillars, each directly addressing the most pressing challenges currently facing Europe.

Security and Defense: A Pragmatic Path to Building a European Pillar within NATO

In the field of security, German-Italian cooperation demonstrates remarkable specificity. According to the agreement, the two countries will jointly produce drones, naval vessels, underwater systems, as well as air defense and missile defense systems, and deepen cooperation in the development of electronic warfare and air combat systems. Existing collaborative projects between defense companies such as Rheinmetall and Leonardo, KNDS Deutschland, among others, will receive new momentum.

More symbolic is Italy's decision: Meloni announced that Italy will join the existing multilateral arms export agreement already in place with Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. This move not only strengthens Italy's position in the European defense industry but also signifies Rome's alignment with Berlin on security policy.

The leaders of the two countries explicitly stated in the joint declaration that they remain fully committed to strengthening NATO's deterrence and defense, and to promoting the EU's defense preparedness. They called on the EU to adapt its structures, policies, and decision-making processes for the future. This wording skillfully strikes a balance between the NATO framework and European strategic autonomy—acknowledging the indispensable role of the U.S.-led security alliance while emphasizing Europe's need to take on more responsibility.

In the Greenland issue, this balancing strategy is particularly evident. Merz stated that Europe must and will do more in Arctic security, while emphasizing support for dialogue between Denmark, Greenland, and the United States based on territorial sovereignty. Although Meloni criticized the U.S. approach as debatable and aggressive, she acknowledged that the Arctic is one of the major strategic domains of the 21st century and believes this issue must be seriously addressed within the NATO framework.

Economic Competitiveness: A Common Front Against Deindustrialization

If security cooperation is the geopolitical expression of the German-Italian alliance, then the issue of economic competitiveness serves as its domestic political foundation. Meloni stated bluntly at the press conference: "A certain ideological notion of green transition has put our enterprises in trouble without producing any real impact on the environment." This statement captures the anxiety at the core of the manufacturing sectors in both Germany and Italy.

In 2024, the bilateral trade volume between Germany and Italy exceeded 153 billion euros, and the total mutual direct investment surpassed 100 billion euros. The two economies are highly complementary: Germany serves as a provider of technology and capital, while Italy acts as a center for high-end manufacturing and design. This close interconnection leads them to share similar concerns regarding the European Union's industrial policies.

The non-paper jointly submitted by the two countries sets the tone for the EU Informal Summit on Competitiveness on February 12: simplifying the European bureaucracy, strengthening the single market, revitalizing the automotive industry under the principle of technological neutrality, and formulating an ambitious trade policy based on common rules and fair conditions. Observations indicate that these proposals directly target certain provisions within the EU Green Deal that are viewed as burdens by German and Italian industries, particularly the goal of phasing out internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035.

On the issue of the automotive industry, Germany and Italy share a highly consistent stance. Both countries have committed to jointly working towards achieving the EU's climate goals, while emphasizing support for a competitive transition and respect for the principle of technological neutrality. This essentially aims to secure space for alternatives such as internal combustion engine technology and synthetic fuels, in order to protect their automotive industries from the comprehensive impact of China's electric vehicle sector.

Migration and Africa: From Crisis Management to Structural Cooperation

Immigration policy is another area of high alignment on the German-Italian political agenda. The Italian government led by Meloni is known for its tough stance on immigration, while Merz's push for a rightward shift in the CDU's immigration policy has found common ground with Meloni.

According to the action plan, the two countries will cooperate under a comprehensive and innovative immigration approach that combines external operations and internal aspects, including strengthening mutually beneficial global partnerships with countries of origin and transit, more effectively protecting the EU's external borders, and enhancing repatriation operations. Italy's Mattei Plan and Germany's updated Africa Policy Guidelines will be advanced in synergy.

This cooperation has moved beyond rhetoric and entered the concrete project phase. The two countries will launch new projects in the central Sahel and the Lake Chad region, and establish a bilateral dialogue mechanism on humanitarian aid, stabilization, and development cooperation. This approach of integrating African development with migration management reflects a shift in Europe's policy towards Africa from aid-oriented to strategic partnership.

The "Meloni-Merz Channel" in Transatlantic Relations.

In the construction of the new German-Italian axis, a factor that cannot be overlooked is the special communication channels between the leaders of the two countries and the Trump administration in the United States. The German newspaper Die Zeit points out: While Macron is now publicly mocked by Trump, Meloni and Merz are considered among the few Europeans Trump is willing to listen to.

This special channel played a crucial role during the Greenland crisis. When Trump threatened to impose additional tariffs, both Merz and Meloni spoke with him over the phone and played a decisive role in coordinating Europe's response. Meloni's relationship with Trump is particularly noteworthy—she is one of the few leaders in Europe who maintains a solid relationship with this unpredictable American president.

This relationship has fostered a pragmatic diplomatic style. When asked whether it might be possible to award Trump the Nobel Peace Prize, Meloni responded: I hope we can give it to him. I believe he can also make a difference in bringing about a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. This statement stands in stark contrast to the public criticism of Trump by many European leaders.

On the issue of the Gaza Peace Committee, Germany and Italy have decided not to participate due to constitutional concerns, but Meloni stated that she has requested the United States to reopen this configuration to meet the needs of Italy and other European countries. She emphasized that self-exclusion is never the best choice, reflecting a fundamental stance of maintaining engagement rather than confrontation with Washington.

The core of this pragmatism is to acknowledge a simple fact: whether liked or not, Trump is the democratically elected President of the United States, and Europe must engage with his actual government. Meloni was annoyed by questions about Trump's mental health at the press conference: I do not believe this is a serious way to handle international politics. Trump is the democratically elected President of the United States, and I have heard these same discussions about Biden, even about myself... We must deal with leaders elected by their own citizens.

The Geopolitical Implications and Internal Tensions of the New Axis.

The rise of the German-Italian alliance is reshaping the power dynamics within Europe. Traditionally, Italy has often played a subordinate role in the power games among European nations, but the Meloni government is positioning itself as one of the central players in European politics through skillful diplomatic maneuvers.

German media refer to Merz and Meloni as Europe's dream team, while Italian media have noted that documents from both countries describe Germany and Italy as the two major industrial nations in Europe—this clearly excludes France from the list of major industrial countries, despite France being the second-largest economy in the EU.

This new axis is not without internal tensions. Politico notes that this is essentially a marriage of convenience. The two leaders have disagreements on several key issues: Meloni initially refused to support Merz's proposal to use frozen Russian assets to fund military aid for Ukraine; regarding the Mercosur agreement, she once withdrew her support to seek concessions for Italian farmers; Italy has long advocated for more relaxed European fiscal policies, while Germany has consistently been a strict overseer of EU spending.

However, these differences are overshadowed by a broader strategic consensus. Meloni has shifted her nationalist party toward the center, particularly on foreign policy; while the rise of Germany's AfD has forced Merz to steer his conservative party to the right on immigration issues. Politico analysis suggests: Much of the alliance between Merz and Meloni is a product of the changes they have made for domestic political survival.

Criticism from the left wing cannot be ignored either. Sören Pellmann, leader of the German Left Party, criticized: Since taking office, the right-wing Meloni government has intensified the suppression of minority groups... The federal government led by Merz does not care about this. He warned against further deepening relations to avoid normalizing the Italian Prime Minister and her policies.

Two Visions for Europe's Future

The emergence of the German-Italian new axis essentially reflects two competing visions for Europe's own future.

One vision is the sovereign Europe represented by France, emphasizing political integration, strategic autonomy, and fiscal capacity building, sometimes even at the cost of maintaining a certain distance from the United States. The other is the competitive Europe vision represented by the German-Italian alliance, prioritizing economic growth, industrial competitiveness, and pragmatic cooperation with the United States, even if it means accepting Washington's leadership in certain policy areas.

These two visions are not entirely opposed, but their emphases are clearly different. In the field of security, France is more inclined to develop independent European defense capabilities, while Germany and Italy promote cooperation within the framework of strengthening the European pillar of NATO. In the economic sphere, France focuses more on strategic autonomy and nurturing European champions, whereas Germany and Italy place greater emphasis on global competitiveness and market openness.

The strengthening of the Germany-Italy alliance does not signify the end of the Franco-German axis—which remains deeply entrenched in the mechanisms of European integration. However, it does indicate that the centers of power within Europe are becoming more diversified. Beyond the traditional divisions between East and West, as well as between Northern and Southern Europe, a new divide is now emerging between manufacturing powerhouses and service/agriculture-oriented nations.

This new landscape has profound implications for the future of NATO. Germany and Italy's call for a stronger European role essentially advocates for a NATO with a reinforced European pillar, rather than a European defense system that replaces NATO. This differs from the European strategic autonomy agenda promoted by France and is more acceptable to Central and Eastern European member states as well as the United States.

Conclusion: Europe's Choice at a Historical Turning Point

The Rome Summit in early 2026 may become an iconic moment in the evolution of Europe's post-war order. It occurs at a unique historical intersection: U.S. leadership has become unpredictable, the Russia-Ukraine conflict enters its fourth year, the rise of the Global South is altering the balance of power, and climate change along with energy transition are reshaping the economic foundation.

Meloni's opening remarks at the press conference accurately summarized the moment: Europe must choose whether to become the protagonist of its own destiny or to endure it. This statement serves both as a call to Europe and as a mission declaration for the new German-Italian alliance.

Whether the German-Italian alliance can endure depends on multiple factors: the domestic political fortunes of the two countries' leaders, the ability to repair Franco-German relations, the direction of transatlantic relations after the U.S. election, the EU's internal reform process, and so on. However, one thing is clear: Europe is entering a more multipolar era, where traditional axes are no longer the sole centers of decision-making.

From a Broader Perspective, the strengthening of German-Italian cooperation reflects a fundamental reality: in a world where great power competition is resurgent and rules are being challenged, middle powers are seeking influence and security through flexible alliances. This trend is not only evident in Europe but also in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions.

The future of Europe will no longer be determined by a single axis, but will be shaped by a series of overlapping and sometimes competing networks of cooperation. The new German-Italian axis is a significant piece in this complex puzzle, serving both as a complement to the traditional Franco-German leadership and as an alternative in certain areas. For NATO, this internal multipolarity in Europe could present both challenges and opportunities—challenges in terms of more complex coordination, and opportunities in achieving a more balanced sharing of responsibilities.

When Merz and Meloni signed the agreement in Rome, they were not only strengthening bilateral relations but also charting a new navigation map for Europe in a turbulent era. The final outline of this map has yet to be determined, but one thing is already clear: the heart of Europe is indeed changing its rhythm, and this time, the metronome is set by the Tiber River.