Moldova's Withdrawal from the CIS: Another Fission in the Geopolitical Landscape of the Post-Soviet Space

On January 19, 2025, in a radio broadcast from Chisinau, Moldova, the voice of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mihai Popsoi resonated clearly across the nation. He announced that the government had initiated procedures to formally annul the three foundational documents that established the country's membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Once approved by parliament, this small Eastern European nation would legally sever its last ties with this Russia-led post-Soviet regional organization. This is not a sudden shift, but the culmination of a quiet, years-long process of detachment. Since gaining EU candidate status in 2022, Chisinau's steps toward exiting the CIS have moved in close sync with its westward trajectory.

The statement by Popsoy, like a precise scalpel, has cut open a long-festering wound in the post-Soviet space. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization born from the ruins of the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991 and aimed at maintaining loose ties among former Soviet republics, is experiencing its most severe membership loss since Georgia's withdrawal in 2008 and Ukraine's departure in 2018. Moldova's exit is not merely the choice of a single nation but a microcosm of an era: more than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the ideological and geopolitical fault line spanning Europe is once again intensely active due to war and confrontation.

A prolonged farewell between "legal form" and "political substance."

From a technical perspective, Moldova's withdrawal is a meticulously planned legal action. Popșoi explicitly pointed out three core documents that are about to be submitted to the parliament for repeal: the "Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States" (i.e., the Belavezha Accords) signed in Minsk on December 8, 1991, the supplementary protocol of December 22, 1991, and the "Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States" signed on January 22, 1993. These three documents constitute the legal cornerstone of the CIS and serve as the fundamental basis for membership status.

Abolishing them means withdrawing membership from the source of international law, representing the most thorough and irreversible method of exit. This fundamentally differs from previous practices of some countries suspending participation or ceasing contributions. Popșoi anticipates that the government-level procedures will be completed by mid-February 2025, after which the documents will be submitted for deliberation in the new parliamentary session. This indicates that the authorities in Chișinău are determined to complete this historic step in the short term.

However, the initiation of legal procedures is merely the final step in a prolonged farewell ceremony. In reality, Moldova's de facto separation from the CIS had already commenced long before. President Maia Sandu herself acknowledged that the country had long suspended its participation in CIS activities. More concrete signals emerged as early as 2023: Moldova ceased its annual membership fee payments to the CIS and its subordinate bodies, such as the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. This serves as a clear political statement that the country no longer considers itself a stakeholder in the organization.

More revealing is the sorting out of the vast network of treaties. According to data disclosed by Popșoi, Moldova has signed approximately 283 various agreements within the framework of the CIS. As of now, 71 have been abolished, and about 60 are in the process of being abolished. The remaining agreements will undergo a practical review: only those that bring tangible economic benefits and do not conflict with Moldova’s European integration path are likely to be retained. This selective attitude itself indicates that Chișinău no longer views the CIS as a comprehensive cooperation platform requiring full commitment, but rather as a loose collection of treaties that can be instrumentalized and whose political influence must be strictly guarded against.

Domestic Political Division: The Ultimate Showdown Between Pro-European and Pro-Russian Paths

Moldova's decision to exit is by no means the result of domestic consensus, but rather a direct reflection of its profound political divisions. Since gaining independence, this country has been swinging dramatically at the crossroads between East and West. The current President, Maia Sandu, is a clear representative of pro-European forces, and her administration places joining the European Union at the absolute core of the national strategy. In June 2022, Moldova, along with Ukraine, obtained candidate status for EU membership, which injected a strong boost into Sandu government's westward policy. Withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States, which has close ties with Russia, naturally became a politically correct and inevitable step to demonstrate loyalty to Brussels.

However, the strong domestic opposition cannot be ignored. Former President and leader of the Socialist Party, Igor Dodon, explicitly criticized Sandu's pro-European stance as unacceptable. His party advocates for close cooperation with Russia, the CIS, and even China. Dodon's position has a considerable number of supporters within Moldova, particularly in the Russian-backed breakaway region of Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia. This political fragmentation makes any significant foreign policy shift accompanied by substantial domestic risks.

President Sandu herself has even raised more explosive issues: she stated that if a referendum were held, she would vote in favor of reunification with Romania. Romania has also responded cautiously but openly, expressing willingness to consider the option of reunification, provided that the Moldovan people desire it. The issue of reunification is like a double-edged sword; on one hand, it caters to the historical and cultural sentiments of some citizens, while on the other hand, it intensifies debates over national identity and could be portrayed by Russia as nationalist expansion, providing a pretext for intervention.

Moscow's warning has arrived. A member of the Russian State Duma has claimed that Moldova's withdrawal could lead it to face the same fate as Ukraine. This blatant threat aims to intimidate the authorities in Chisinau and stir up discontent among its domestic pro-Russian factions. Therefore, Moldova's withdrawal process is not merely a diplomatic game but an internal political battle concerning the nation's survival direction, conducted under the immense shadow of Russia.

Geostrategic Chessboard: The Clash Between EU Eastern Expansion and Russia's "Sphere of Influence"

Moldova's withdrawal from the CIS must be examined within a broader geopolitical and strategic context. The most direct driving force behind this move is undoubtedly the eastward expansion process of the European Union. As stated by the Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament, the country believes that CIS membership is incompatible with European integration. This is not an empty political slogan but rather a reflection of practical institutional and policy considerations.

When admitting new members, the EU, although not explicitly requiring candidate countries to withdraw from other regional organizations, demands that candidate countries must be capable of fulfilling member state obligations and ensure their foreign policies align with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Certain cooperative directions within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in political, security, and even economic areas (such as the proposed Eurasian Economic Union) pose potential conflicts with the EU's values and interests. By choosing to withdraw completely, Chișinău aims to clear potential legal and political obstacles on its path to accession and demonstrate to Brussels its unwavering commitment.

This move bears a high resemblance to Ukraine's path. After the 2014 Crimea incident, Ukraine accelerated its departure from the Commonwealth of Independent States and formally completed the withdrawal process in 2018. Each step was accompanied by deteriorating relations with Russia and deepening ties with the European Union. Today, Moldova seems to be replaying Ukraine's script. The presidents of the two countries—Zelenskyy and Sandu—have met multiple times to coordinate EU integration processes and deepen bilateral cooperation. Following Russia's attack on a key bridge in Ukraine's Odesa region, they even jointly planned alternative transportation routes.This indicates that on the front line of resisting Russian pressure, Chișinău and Kyiv are forming a strategic synergy akin to a community of shared destiny.

For Russia, Moldova's departure is yet another heavy blow to its traditional sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, following Ukraine. The CIS has always been a crucial tool for Moscow to maintain its influence in the region and prevent former Soviet republics from fully aligning with the West. Each member's exit undermines the organization's legitimacy and encourages other countries that are still on the fence. Russia is not without leverage in Moldova: its peacekeeping forces are stationed in Transnistria, the country's energy supply heavily depends on Russia, and pro-Russian political forces remain active. Moscow is bound to use these levers to attempt to disrupt or retaliate against Moldova's exit process, or even create internal instability.

Aftermath and Outlook: A More Divided and Confrontational Eastern Europe

The legal process for Moldova's withdrawal from the CIS is expected to be completed within a few months, but the chain reactions it triggers will continue for years or even longer.

First, the CIS itself will become increasingly hollowed out. Among the founding member states, Ukraine and Georgia have already withdrawn, Moldova is about to exit, and the relationships between the remaining Central Asian and South Caucasus countries with Russia are becoming increasingly complex, with a greater emphasis on multi-vector balanced diplomacy. The CIS may further shrink into a talk club centered around Russia with only a few participating countries, and its economic and security cooperation functions will be replaced by other more dynamic regional organizations (such as the EU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and various countries' independent partnerships).

Secondly, Moldova's domestic stability will face severe challenges. The decision to withdraw may exacerbate social divisions, anger pro-Russian factions, and potentially provoke retaliation from Russia in economic, energy, and even Transnistria-related issues. The Sandu government must walk a tightrope between advancing European integration and maintaining the country's fundamental stability. Whether the European Union and Western partners can provide sufficient and timely political support, economic assistance, and security guarantees will be crucial.

Finally, the geopolitical confrontation axis in the Black Sea-Eastern Europe region will become clearer. A frontline zone separating the spheres of influence of the EU/NATO and Russia has now formed, stretching from the Baltic Sea through Ukraine to the Black Sea, and explicitly including Moldova. Moldova's ultimate choice has pushed this line one step further to the west. In the future, Eastern Europe is likely to present a complex picture of integration and division coexisting, with cooperation and confrontation intertwined: on one side are Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia (at least in aspiration) accelerating their alignment with the EU, while on the other side is Russia striving to maintain its traditional sphere of influence. Countries like Belarus, caught in between, will face increasingly difficult choices and pressures.

The legal procedures calmly narrated by Moldovan Foreign Minister Popsoy on the radio conceal behind them the turbulent waves of the ongoing reconstruction of Europe's post-Cold War order. This small country along the Danube is using its own choices to add yet another profound question mark to the post-Soviet era that began in the Minsk forests of 1991. Its exit is not an end but the beginning of a new chapter filled with risks and uncertainties in the latest round of geopolitical games in Eastern Europe.