Pakistan's "Islamic NATO" Concept: Geopolitical Ambitions and Realistic Dilemmas
20/01/2026
In May 2024, Pakistan's Defense Minister Khawaja Asif proposed a groundbreaking initiative at a security conference in Islamabad, one that could reshape the geopolitical landscape of the entire Islamic world. He publicly called for expanding the existing bilateral strategic defense agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia into a multilateral collective security alliance, encompassing Turkey and other willing Muslim nations. Asif argued pointedly, citing the rising threat of Zionism as a key justification, and warned of the strategic vulnerability facing a fragmented Islamic world. He declared that Pakistan is ready to take on a leadership role within this framework.
This proposal, quickly labeled as the "Islamic NATO" by the outside world, did not emerge out of thin air. It acts like a prism, reflecting Pakistan's strategic anxieties amid drastic shifts in regional order, its desire for identity reshaping, and the complex intentions of a nuclear-armed nation seeking to reposition its leadership within the Muslim world. However, from conception to reality, there lies a chasm of historical grievances, divergences in practical interests, and the great power rivalry.
The underlying logic of the proposal: Pakistan's strategic calculations
Pakistan's promotion of this alliance concept is by no means a spur-of-the-moment idea. Analysis reveals it to be a set of combined strategies based on multiple strategic considerations, with motives intertwined between defensive needs and ambitious aspirations.
The primary driving force is the escalating sense of insecurity. Asif's speech clearly pointed to the Gaza war, the ongoing escalation of the Iran-Israel proxy conflict, and the strategic pressure arising from the normalization of relations between Israel and some Arab nations. From Islamabad's perspective, the Middle East and South Asia are entering a more turbulent and high-risk phase. The shift of U.S. strategic focus toward the Indo-Pacific and its declining willingness for direct military intervention in the Middle East have sparked widespread concern among regional allies about the reliability of security guarantees. When the traditional security umbrella becomes uncertain, seeking an endogenous collective security mechanism becomes a logical option.
Secondly, Pakistan aims to fill the strategic structural gap in the Islamic world. Existing platforms such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) primarily function at the level of diplomatic coordination and political solidarity, lacking binding military cooperation and collective defense provisions. This results in Muslim countries often fighting separately or even obstructing each other when facing major security crises. Pakistan's proposal directly addresses this structural weakness, attempting to establish an entity capable of joint planning, intelligence sharing, coordinated training, and even collective defense commitments. Its core logic is to seek deterrence through unity rather than direct confrontation, aiming to reduce security dependence on external major powers by enhancing internal cohesion.
More importantly, Pakistan sees this as a prime opportunity to revive its regional leadership. Pakistan prides itself on possessing unique capital to act as an alliance leader: it is the only nuclear-armed state in the Islamic world, with a large and battle-hardened military; it maintains traditional friendly relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Gulf states; meanwhile, it has skillfully avoided direct involvement in ground wars in the Middle East, maintaining an image of principled neutrality. This positioning allows Pakistan to view itself as a relatively detached security partner, rather than a partisan actor deeply entangled in regional factional struggles. By advocating for and leading such an alliance, Islamabad hopes to reverse its waning influence—diminished by economic difficulties, internal political strife, and ongoing confrontation with India—and reclaim a central position in the security narrative of the Muslim world.
Insurmountable Realistic Obstacles: The Long Road from Ideals to Consensus
Although Pakistan's proposal paints an enticing strategic blueprint, the obstacles to putting it into practice are almost as immense as the conception itself. The implementation of this Islamic NATO is far more complex than a joint statement.
The most fundamental challenge lies in the profound and complex political and sectarian divisions within the Muslim world. The envisioned potential core members—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan—share intricate and intertwined relationships, filled with historical grievances and contemporary rivalries. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran forms the central axis of Middle Eastern geopolitics, with both countries engaged in intense proxy competitions in places like Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Turkey and Saudi Arabia contend for regional leadership, often holding starkly different positions on issues such as the Qatar diplomatic crisis. Pakistan, meanwhile, walks a tightrope between Saudi Arabia and Iran, striving for a delicate balance. The political difficulty of having these nations entrust core national security commitments to an alliance that includes their rivals is self-evident. An Islamic alliance lacking Iran's participation would see its representativeness and effectiveness significantly diminished; whereas an alliance that includes Iran is almost politically unfeasible at this stage.
The stance of Saudi Arabia, a core variable, is crucial and fraught with uncertainty. Riyadh is envisioned as a founding partner in Pakistan's proposal. However, in recent years, Saudi Arabia's foreign and security policies have demonstrated a notable trend towards de-ideologization and pragmatism. The Vision 2030, championed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, prioritizes economic development, with its diplomacy focused on avoiding direct conflicts and minimizing risks. Saudi Arabia has not only deepened its traditional alliance with the United States but has also opened its security cooperation to diverse partners, including Russia and China. More importantly, although the normalization process with Israel has been hindered by the Gaza war, its long-term strategic direction has not fundamentally changed. Against this backdrop, whether Saudi Arabia would be willing to join a military alliance that publicly rallies against the threat of Zionism and could solidify bloc confrontation warrants a significant question mark. Riyadh is more likely to prefer maintaining flexible bilateral and small-scale multilateral security arrangements rather than locking itself into a rigid multilateral treaty that could constrain its strategic autonomy.
The integration of military and command structures for the alliance is even more unattainable. It took NATO over seventy years to establish a complex joint command system, standardized military doctrines, and a shared defense culture. Muslim nations' militaries differ vastly in equipment systems (American, Russian, or Chinese), training models, and operational philosophies. Who would take the lead in command? How would military expenditures be shared? How would common threats be defined (Israel, terrorism, or internal subversion)? What conditions would trigger the collective defense clause? Each of these practical operational issues could become a graveyard for negotiations. Furthermore, how such an alliance would coordinate with member states' other security commitments (such as the Gulf Cooperation Council Defense Treaty, or bilateral defense agreements between the United States and individual countries) remains an unsolvable dilemma.
Regional and Major Power Responses: A Multi-Faceted Prism
Pakistan's proposal is like a stone thrown into the geopolitical lake, with the ripples it stirs reflecting the varied calculations and concerns of all parties involved.
India's perspective is filled with vigilance and disdain. New Delhi almost instinctively views this as Pakistan's latest attempt to strategically encircle India. Indian analysts tend to downplay the feasibility of the proposal, considering it a political balloon released by Pakistan to seek relevance and leadership amid domestic and diplomatic predicaments. They point out that a military alliance led by Pakistan would inevitably deepen the security dilemma between India and Pakistan, potentially forcing India to move closer to countries like the United States and Israel, thereby intensifying strategic confrontation in South Asia. However, in private, India's security agencies are bound to conduct rigorous assessments of any progress regarding this concept, particularly its potential to strengthen the strategic triangle between China, Pakistan, and Turkey.
The U.S. response will be complex and contradictory. On the surface, a Muslim alliance aimed at reducing dependence on U.S. security does not fully align with Washington's interests in maintaining its regional dominance. Traditionally, the United States has preferred a hub-and-spoke alliance system with Middle Eastern allies on a one-to-one basis, which facilitates its control and coordination. However, in the context of great power competition, the U.S. may also recognize its potential instrumental value. If such an alliance can effectively contain Iran, stabilize energy corridors, combat terrorism, and not harm U.S. relations with core allies (such as Saudi Arabia and Israel), Washington might adopt an attitude of tacit acquiescence or even limited support. The key depends on the alliance's actual orientation and in whose hands the ultimate control lies.
China will adhere to its consistent diplomatic philosophy of non-interference in internal affairs and conduct cautious observation. Beijing is an all-weather strategic cooperative partner of Pakistan and also a significant economic and political partner to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. China welcomes regional countries maintaining stability through dialogue and cooperation, which aligns with the security needs of its Belt and Road Initiative. However, as long as this alliance does not explicitly target China and does not affect China's bilateral relations with each member state, Beijing is likely to remain neutral and avoid taking sides. China is more concerned about whether this proposal will intensify conflicts in the Middle East, thereby affecting its energy security and economic interests.
Vision of the Concept: More Symbolic Than Substantive?
Looking at the overall picture, the proposal by Pakistan's Defense Minister Khawaja Asif holds far greater symbolic and political signaling value in the foreseeable future than the likelihood of evolving into a tangible military alliance.
It is first and foremost an important political statement. At a time when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deeply affecting Muslims worldwide, this proposal precisely addresses the widespread sense of frustration and the call for unity within the Islamic world. It allows Pakistan to stand on the moral and political high ground, showcasing its role as a leading power in the Islamic world, regardless of the economic challenges it currently faces domestically.
It is also a strategic probe to gauge reactions from various parties. By publicly proposing this idea, Pakistan can observe the genuine interest of key countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, understand the bottom lines of the United States and China, and assess the potential responses from India. This feedback is crucial for Islamabad in adjusting its future regional diplomatic strategies.
From the perspective of realistic evolutionary pathways, the most likely outcome is the gradual strengthening of existing bilateral and small multilateral cooperation, rather than the immediate establishment of an Islamic NATO. The defense relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is likely to continue deepening and may adopt a "2+X" model, inviting third countries to participate in specific areas such as counter-terrorism, maritime security, and military training. Existing trilateral cooperation mechanisms among countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan may also be reinforced. Such flexible and pragmatic issue-based alliances or functional cooperation align better with the current political realities of Muslim-majority countries than a grand, treaty-based collective defense organization.
On the stage of geopolitics, ambitious blueprints are never in short supply, but what ultimately transforms these blueprints into reality is always the cold calculation of national interests and difficult political compromises. Pakistan's vision of an Islamic NATO illuminates the path of exploration for the security architecture of the Middle East in the post-American era, while simultaneously revealing the thorns that lie along this road. It may not succeed in building a towering alliance edifice, but the very discussion it has sparked already signals that the Muslim world's internal contemplation on how to master its own security destiny is entering a deeper yet more contradictory phase. The outcome of this contemplation will profoundly shape the future landscape of the vast territories stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.