Greenland Crisis: How Trump's Acquisition Ambition Tears Apart the Transatlantic Alliance

On a chilly Saturday in January 2026, Washington D.C. was bitterly cold. Outside the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Greenland's Foreign Minister Vivian Motzfeldt stood smoking with grim expressions, having just concluded a one-hour meeting with U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The air was thick not only with the scent of tobacco but also with the atmosphere of the most severe crisis in transatlantic relations in over seventy years. A few hours later, Donald Trump dropped an economic bombshell on Truth Social: announcing the imposition of tariffs on eight countries—Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland. The initial tariff rate would be 10%, but if the United States could not purchase Greenland completely and outright, it would rise to 25% starting June 1.

This is far from a whim. Since his old friend and Estée Lauder heir Ronald Lauder first proposed it in 2019, Trump's obsession with the world's largest island has only grown. While the White House claims it is primarily for national security reasons, Trump himself admitted to The New York Times that owning Greenland is something I psychologically feel is necessary for success. Now, this personal obsession has evolved into a comprehensive challenge to European sovereignty, international law norms, and NATO unity.

Sovereignty Red Line: Why Europe Cannot Back Down on Greenland

European leaders have tolerated Trump's unconventional demands for nearly a year. From pressuring NATO allies to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, to threatening to withdraw support for Ukraine to promote a peace process seemingly favoring Russia, and even showing restraint in response to overseas adventures such as the capture and extradition of Venezuelan President Maduro. However, Greenland has become the insurmountable red line.

When it comes to Greenland, Europeans have drawn a line they genuinely want to hold. Kristine Berzina, Senior Fellow for U.S. Defense and Transatlantic Security at the German Marshall Fund, analyzes that everything else is negotiable... but Greenland is different because it touches on issues of sovereignty, on whether Europe is capable of standing up for itself in terms of its own territory and rights.

Rasmussen made a clear statement in an interview with Fox News: The president's ambitions are on the table. We certainly have our own red lines. This is 2026. You can trade with people, but you cannot trade people. This stance has resonated strongly among the public in Greenland and Denmark. In Nuuk, people braved near-freezing temperatures, rain, and icy streets to gather, holding signs that read "Greenland is not for sale"; in Copenhagen, thousands marched, with some carrying signs saying "Make America Smart Again" and "Hands Off." Protester Elise Rich told the Associated Press: "This is important for the whole world. There are many small countries in the world, and none of them are for sale."

Europe's dilemma lies in its security dependence. Former Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš pointed out that Europe is at a diplomatic disadvantage because it relies on the United States for security. Unfortunately, Europe does not have a strong enough position to oppose strongly because, for example, if Europe expands the dispute to the trade field, I am sure the United States would retaliate in kind, or even more. Ultimately, Europe still needs the United States.

However, this dependency is currently under unprecedented pressure due to the Greenland issue. Marisol Maddox, a senior researcher at the Arctic Institute of Dartmouth University, pointed out: Denmark has always been a very good ally for the United States. That is what makes this matter so extraordinary. It's like walking up to your best friend and slapping them in the face for no reason... There is no justification that triggered this.

Tariff Stick: Trump's Coercive Strategy and Alliance Rifts

Trump's tariff threat is not without basis. He claims it is retaliation for recent visits to Greenland by representatives from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, and other countries, as well as widespread opposition to his purchase efforts. Currently, EU goods entering the United States are subject to a 15% import tax. If the additional 10% tariff takes effect on February 1, the rate will jump to 25%. Trump warned that these countries are playing a very dangerous game and stated that China and Russia want Greenland, while Denmark can do nothing about it.

This economic coercion immediately triggered a strong backlash across the Atlantic. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer called the move completely wrong and stated that he would directly raise the issue with the U.S. government. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said intensive discussions are underway with European countries to coordinate a response, insisting that we will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed. French President Emmanuel Macron declared that he would not yield to intimidation, while Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo pointed out that tariffs are in no one's interest. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre wrote on social media: Threats have no place among allies.

The response at the European Union level is more systematic and restrained. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa issued a joint statement, emphasizing that Denmark's pre-coordinated exercises with allies are aimed at enhancing Arctic security needs, pose no threat to anyone, that tariffs would undermine transatlantic relations, and could trigger a dangerous downward spiral. The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, highlighted the geopolitical risks: China and Russia must be overjoyed. They are the ones who benefit from disagreements among allies. Tariffs could make Europe and the United States poorer and undermine our shared prosperity.

It is worth noting that Trump's tariff threats are also on shaky ground domestically in the United States. A recent YouGov poll shows that only 28% of Americans support purchasing Greenland, with support for military conquest dropping as low as 8%. There is also significant resistance within Congress. A bipartisan delegation of lawmakers flew to Copenhagen specifically to express support for Denmark, including even Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski and Tom Tillis, who frequently criticize Trump. Tillis wrote on X that Trump's reaction to the small-scale troop deployments in Europe is detrimental to the United States, its businesses, and its allies. This is excellent news for Putin, Xi Jinping, and other adversaries who wish to see NATO divided.

On the legal front, there are also variables. The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to issue a principled ruling soon on the legality of most tariffs imposed by Trump under an emergency law that never mentions tariffs. During the fall hearings, the justices posed sharp questions to government lawyers, and most observers believe the Supreme Court will at least restrict Trump's authority. If this path is blocked, the president will face greater constraints in using other laws to impose new tariffs—either the scope and duration of the tariffs will be limited, or the government will need to conduct extensive assessments before implementation.

Europe's Countermeasures: From Military Deployment to the "Nuclear Option" in Trade

Faced with Trump's relentless pressure, Europe has not remained passive but has adopted a comprehensive strategy aimed at depriving the United States of excuses for action while demonstrating unity and strength.

Militarily, Europe is taking action to dispel the excuse of Greenland's inadequate defense. A small military task force led by France, including troops from Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, has recently arrived in Greenland as part of a limited reconnaissance mission deployment. Germany dispatched 13 soldiers on Friday. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen emphasized: The defense and protection of Greenland is a shared concern for the entire NATO alliance. Major General Søren Andersen, Commander of the Danish Joint Arctic Command, clearly stated that the deployment of European forces is for Arctic defense training and is not a signal to the Trump administration, noting that during his two and a half years in command, he has not seen any Chinese or Russian combat vessels near Greenland's coast. Kalinsh believes that by deploying troops and assets, European leaders can eliminate the Trump administration's pretext for annexing the territory, namely the argument that Greenland is unprotected and vulnerable to Russian and Chinese aggression.

Diplomatically and legally, Europe is exploring a series of upgraded response plans. Relatively moderate proposals include convening an international Arctic security summit in Nuuk, jointly organized by Denmark, Greenland, the European Union, and non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and the United States. More radical plans are already circulating in Brussels. The European Parliament is currently debating whether to freeze the approval process for the US-EU trade agreement reached last year at the Trump Turnberry Golf Resort in Scotland. Originally scheduled for a vote in February, the agreement requires the EU to eliminate most import tariffs, while the United States maintains broad 15% tariffs on European goods. Trade Committee Chairman Bernd Lange has expressed support for a suspension, stating that Trump's actions are an incredible insult and not the way to deal with partners. A group of Socialist and Green MEPs believe that approving the agreement under the current circumstances could easily be seen as a reward for his behavior.

The most potentially deterrent tool is the European Union's Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI)—dubbed the trade nuclear option. This mechanism allows the EU to impose penalties such as tariffs, trade restrictions, and foreign investment bans on non-member countries, provided it determines that the country is employing coercive economic measures. Although the regulation defines coercion as measures affecting trade and investment, Otto Svensson, Deputy Research Fellow of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, suggests that it could also be activated in cases involving diplomatic or territorial disputes. EU lawyers have demonstrated considerable creativity in recent years. However, David Perry, Director of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, points out that given the significant asymmetry in defense and economic relations between the United States and other Western nations, the likelihood of taking economic measures against the U.S. is low. Any form of sanctions against the U.S. would be meaningless for the same reason they can impose tariffs on others: they possess the power.

Another more targeted and potentially less self-damaging form of retaliation would be aimed at large U.S. technology companies. Svensson points out that the Trump administration was particularly focused on preventing foreign governments from attacking American companies through regulating online content or imposing taxes, which led it to call on Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union to repeal laws such as digital services taxes. Imposing fines or bans on the operations of companies like Google, Meta, and X in Europe would be a very clever and targeted approach, striking at economic interests closely tied to the president while minimizing direct impact on the European economy—akin to low-hanging fruit. He compares this to Europe's process of reducing dependence on Russian natural gas after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war. If someone had said back then that Europe could largely free itself from dependence on Russian natural gas within two years... it would have been considered utterly impossible. While weaning the European economy off American technology may be painful in the short term, they have proven in the past that with political will, they can swiftly break free from such dependencies.

The Survival Test of NATO and Its Impact on the Global Order.

The most profound impact of the Greenland crisis lies in its direct challenge to the very foundation of the NATO alliance. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez issued the sternest warning in an interview with *La Vanguardia*: If we focus on Greenland, I must say that a U.S. invasion of that territory would make Vladimir Putin the happiest person in the world. Why? Because it would legitimize his attempt to invade Ukraine. If the United States resorts to force, it would be the death knell for NATO. Putin would be doubly delighted.

There is no provision in the NATO treaty that addresses the possibility of one member state seizing the territory of another, nor how the alliance should respond to such actions. A NATO spokesperson merely stated they would not speculate on hypothetical scenarios. Perry stated bluntly: None of this is operable at the NATO level. It is an alliance designed to bind American and European security together and revolves around the United States. There is no scenario where NATO takes action against the United States. Experts widely agree that a hostile takeover of Greenland by the United States would signify the end of the NATO alliance. Possible responses from Denmark and other European nations could include reducing or closing U.S. military bases on their soil.

For Arctic neighboring countries like Canada, the crisis will compel a fundamental shift in defense policy. Barkan Devlen, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Director of the Transatlantic Program, points out that the U.S. annexation of Greenland would force Canada to focus entirely on strengthening its defenses in the Arctic. This could include attempts to break away from the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) with the United States and instead establish a purely domestic Arctic command. However, this process would take years and require Canada to further increase its defense spending. Forget 5% of GDP—we might need to raise defense spending to 7%, 8%, 9% to achieve this. It is not even clear if we have sufficient manpower to accomplish it.

DeFron emphasized that any retaliatory action, whether military or economic, needs to be targeted and proportionate to the actions of the United States. The problem with the nuclear option is that once used, it disappears. If it does not cause damage to the other side or change their behavior, you essentially lose a lot of leverage and may end up suffering more losses yourself.

At the same time, the European Union is also seeking diversified paths for strategic autonomy. On the same day that Trump issued tariff threats, von der Leyen signed a trade agreement with the Southern Common Market countries (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay) in Paraguay. Although this agreement is controversial in Europe, particularly among farmer groups, the European Commission and most EU countries hope to advance it, partly to achieve greater economic independence from unpredictable allies like the United States. The Greenland crisis undoubtedly provides new momentum for this argument.

On the ice and snow of Greenland, a storm far beyond territorial disputes is brewing. This is not just about the sovereignty of an island, but also about the reliability of the Western alliance system since World War II, the binding force of fundamental norms in international relations, and the fate of medium-sized nations and the principle of sovereignty in an era marked by the return of great power politics. Trump's tariff threats loom in the air, yet their domestic legal foundation, public support, and congressional backing appear fragile; Europe has rallied a united front, but its vulnerabilities in security dependence remain exposed. Both sides are testing each other's limits, as well as probing the resilience of the current era's order.

The operational rules for Danish soldiers perhaps best reflect this absurd yet severe reality: According to a Cold War-era law, if attacked on Danish territory, Danish soldiers are obligated to return fire. When asked whether this applies to American forces, Major General Andersen confirmed: You are correct. Danish law stipulates that if Danish soldiers are attacked, they have a duty to fight back. This calm statement reveals the most unthinkable yet emerging possibility within the transatlantic partnership: allies pointing their guns at each other.

The Greenland crisis may ultimately be defused through diplomatic channels, or it could remain at the threat stage due to domestic politics or legal challenges. However, the rifts it has revealed are irreparable. It marks the formal intrusion of a transactional, coercive power politics into the alliance, forcing Europe—and indeed the entire liberal international order—to confront a fundamental question: How can the system survive when its most powerful ally becomes its greatest challenger to the rules? The answer may lie buried in the cold polar winds of Nuuk and the silence of Brussels’ emergency meeting rooms.