The Sweden Democrats propose deploying nuclear weapons: a new variable in Nordic security.

On the afternoon of February 18, 2026, during the foreign policy debate in the Swedish Parliament, Aron Emilsson, the foreign affairs spokesperson for the Sweden Democrats, proposed a suggestion that breaks decades of taboo: Sweden should consider allowing the deployment of NATO nuclear weapons on its territory in response to Russia. This proposal comes from the Sweden Democrats, currently ranked second in opinion polls and supporting the ruling coalition in parliament. Emilsson stated that the current security environment has entered a gray zone between war and peace, and Sweden should fully participate in NATO's nuclear planning. The government led by Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson still publicly adheres to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard also pointed out that in the face of serious threats from the East, Sweden needs the capability to deter irresponsible actors.

The Shift in Sweden's Security Policy

Sweden established a policy during the early Cold War period of not deploying nuclear weapons on its own territory in peacetime, which is closely linked to its tradition of neutrality. Even after officially joining NATO in March 2024, major political parties in Sweden have reached a consensus, ruling out the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons during peacetime. Morgan Johansson, former foreign affairs spokesperson for the Social Democratic Party, expressed surprise at the Swedish Democrats' proposal, noting that the cross-party agreement remains in effect.

However, geopolitical realities are altering this consensus. Russia has deployed Iskander-M missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in Kaliningrad, with a range covering the Baltic coast and most of Sweden's territory. The modernization of nuclear forces at the Northern Fleet's bases continues. In September 2025, Russia and Belarus simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons during the Zapad-2025 exercise, raising concerns among Nordic countries. According to a 2025 report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Russia's anti-access capabilities in the Baltic region have elevated the conventional and nuclear deterrence threats facing Sweden to a significant level.

The proposal from the Sweden Democrats is essentially testing a policy red line: when hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and border frictions become the norm, does the commitment not to deploy during peacetime still apply? The gray zone that Emilsson refers to precisely describes the current situation in the Baltic region—below the threshold of war but above the level of peaceful competition.

NATO's Nuclear Sharing Framework and Sweden's Choice

Sweden is not a nuclear weapons state. According to NATO's nuclear sharing policy, currently only the United States has deployed approximately 150 B61 tactical nuclear bombs in five non-nuclear member countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. These weapons are under the custody of the U.S. military and, during wartime, can be used by aircraft from the host country or allied nations with authorization from the allies. If Sweden were to introduce nuclear weapons, the most likely path would be through the NATO framework, allowing the United States to deploy B61 nuclear bombs on its territory.

But this will alter the power balance in Northern Europe. Finland joined NATO in April 2023, but its government has repeatedly stated that it does not seek to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory. Norway, as a founding member of NATO, has adhered to a base policy since 1949 that prohibits foreign troops or the deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil during peacetime. If Sweden breaks this taboo, it would become the first Nordic country to host forward-deployed nuclear weapons, potentially prompting Norway and Finland to reconsider their own policies.

From a military perspective, deploying B61 nuclear bombs at the Uppsala or Malmslätt air bases in central-southern Sweden would allow F-35A fighter jets to cover key facilities in Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and northwestern Russia within their combat radius. This would effectively push NATO's nuclear strike front eastward by 600 to 800 kilometers, directly threatening Russia's core regions. Moscow's strategic warning and response time would be significantly reduced.

Russia's response was almost predictable. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia's Security Council, had warned that NATO's military presence in Sweden or Finland would be viewed as a direct threat, and Russia would take all necessary measures. This could include increasing the deployment of Kalibr cruise missiles or Kinzhal hypersonic missiles in Kaliningrad, or even considering the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Baltic Fleet vessels—a step Russia has not taken since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Domestic Politics and Alliance Relations

The proposal of the Swedish Democrats is closely related to domestic politics. A general election will be held in the autumn of 2026, and the latest polls show that the party's support rate is about 22%, making it the dominant force within the right-wing alliance. Raising the nuclear weapons issue can not only strengthen its image as a defender of tough security policies, attracting voters concerned about Russia, but also test the limits of the ruling coalition, preparing for potential policy adjustments after the election.

But this reveals divisions within the ruling coalition. Prime Minister Kristersson emphasized that Sweden participates in all European discussions on nuclear weapons through NATO, but did not take a clear stance on deployment. Foreign Minister Stenegaard prefers to place the issue within the framework of NATO consultations and parliamentary discussions, which is a buffering strategy. Analysis suggests that the government is attempting to balance maintaining non-proliferation commitments with demonstrating a tough stance against Russia, while the Sweden Democrats are trying to break this balance.

The opposition reacted strongly. Håkan Svenneling, the Left Party's foreign affairs spokesperson, criticized the ruling coalition and the Sweden Democrats for rapidly shifting their stance without genuine transparency. The Social Democrats sought to uphold the existing cross-party agreement as a foundation for political stability. At the heart of this debate is whether the Swedish public is prepared to accept the risks and responsibilities that come with the country's transformation from a protected entity to a forward deterrence hub.

The deeper issue lies in alliance trust. Is the United States willing to deploy nuclear weapons to a country with internal political divisions, where policies could shift due to changes in government? NATO's nuclear deployments require a high degree of political stability and predictability. Washington has not yet given an official response to this proposal, but internal assessments within the State Department have indicated that while deploying nuclear weapons in Sweden holds military value, the resulting escalation of regional tensions and political costs require extremely careful weighing.

Impact on Baltic Sea Security

If Sweden ultimately deploys nuclear weapons, its impact will transcend national borders, reshaping the security landscape of the entire Baltic Sea region and even the Arctic.

First, this would effectively end the initiative for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Baltic Sea. Countries such as Poland and Lithuania have previously proposed similar ideas, but they lacked support from major powers. Sweden's move will close this possibility and explicitly designate the region as a frontline in the nuclear confrontation between the United States and Russia.

Secondly, Finland and Norway will face pressure. Helsinki may encounter domestic calls for reciprocal deterrence, as well as pressure from within the alliance to take on more forward responsibilities. Oslo's base policy will face its most severe test since the Cold War. A Sweden deploying nuclear weapons could force Norway to reassess its strategy.

Third, the fragile balance between Russia and NATO in the Arctic may be disrupted. Arctic Council cooperation has stalled due to the war in Ukraine, but military conflict has not yet spread to the region. If nuclear weapons infrastructure emerges in northern Sweden, it could prompt Russia to strengthen the nuclear capabilities of its Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula and encourage Moscow to conduct more frequent displays of nuclear force in the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. The low-tension state in the Arctic may be difficult to sustain.

Finally, this is a blow to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Sweden has long prided itself as a champion of humanitarian diplomacy and arms control advocacy. If such a country chooses to accept forward-deployed nuclear weapons, it will set a precedent for other nations facing security dilemmas and weaken the binding force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Emilson said in his parliamentary speech that Sweden must break free from the politics of prohibition. This statement highlights the current dilemma: as major power competition intensifies and security considerations outweigh other factors, the self-imposed restrictions of small and medium-sized nations, based on historical conditions, are being re-examined. Sweden's nuclear debate is not an isolated domestic political dispute; it is an early signal of another profound shift in Europe's post-Cold War security order. The winds in the Baltic Sea are changing.