Trump signs the "America First" new arms sales policy: Redefining ally tiers through defense investment.

On February 7, 2026, in the West Wing of the White House, Washington D.C., U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order titled the "America First Arms Transfer Strategy." This document ended the decades-long "first-come, first-served" principle for U.S. foreign arms sales, establishing instead a new priority system centered on partner countries' own defense investments and strategic value. According to the order, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Commerce Howard Ratnick are required to submit a catalog of prioritized sales platforms and systems within 120 days, specifying the list of weapons the United States will encourage its allies to prioritize for procurement. This is not merely an adjustment to the arms sales process but a redefinition and capitalization-based ranking of global security alliance relationships.

Core of the New Policy: A Paradigm Shift from "Partnership First" to "Investment First"

The wording in the policy statement released by the White House is straightforward: future arms sales will prioritize safeguarding U.S. interests, leveraging foreign procurement and capital to expand American production and capacity. This positioning clearly reveals the dual core of the new policy: the high degree of integration between security policy and industrial policy.

The previous model was internally referred to by the White House as "partner-first." Under years of pressure from the Ukraine crisis, ongoing tensions in the Middle East, and the advancement of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the order books of American arms manufacturers have already been scheduled for several years ahead. Lockheed Martin's F-35 production line, Raytheon's Patriot air defense missile systems, and General Dynamics' Abrams main battle tank upgrade lines all face severe delivery backlogs. An unnamed Department of Defense official disclosed to Reuters that the waiting period for conventional weapons procurement for certain non-NATO partners has exceeded 36 months, which undermines the timeliness of the U.S. in shaping regional security dynamics through arms sales.

The new strategy clearly defines three screening criteria: whether the partner has made significant investments in its own defense; whether it plays an important role or occupies a key geographical location in U.S. global or regional plans and operations; and whether it contributes to U.S. economic security. Although the directive does not name specific countries, its implications are self-evident. Against the backdrop of the 2025 NATO summit reaffirming and raising the defense spending target to 5% of GDP, allies that meet or exceed the military spending benchmark—such as Poland (with defense spending accounting for approximately 4.8% of GDP in 2025), the United Kingdom (around 3.1%), and Japan, which actively purchases American equipment (with defense budget reaching a new high in fiscal year 2026)—will undoubtedly secure front-row positions in the new prioritization sequence.

Restructuring the Bureaucratic System and Industrial Logic

The new policy is far from being a mere statement of principles; it comes with a concrete timetable for bureaucratic system reforms. According to details obtained by the U.S. military news website Breaking Defense, Heggseth and Rubio must complete a critical task within 90 days: redefining which weapon systems need to be included in the Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM) list. EEUM is a stringent regulatory procedure designed to ensure that sensitive U.S. technologies are not transferred or misused, but its complex review process is also one of the significant reasons for delivery delays. Removing some non-core sensitive equipment from EEUM or simplifying its procedures means that systems like Javelin anti-tank missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and even certain models of armored vehicles can be delivered more quickly to eligible priority allies.

The directive also calls for the establishment of a standing working group to promote U.S. arms sales, institutionalizing and regularizing the cross-departmental coordination mechanism. Its goal is to shift from passive review to active promotion. Previously, the arms sales process began with a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) submitted by a foreign government through the U.S. embassy, followed by lengthy security and policy reviews by the State Department and the Department of Defense. In the future, this working group will proactively recommend packages that meet the strategic needs of target allies based on a priority sales catalog and preemptively address potential obstacles in the domestic approval process.

The deeper industrial logic lies in capital guidance. The White House document explicitly states the intention to leverage foreign procurement and capital to expand domestic production capacity in the United States. This implies that partners willing to make substantial advance payments or agree to invest in the construction of domestic ammunition production lines and maintenance facilities in the U.S. may have their orders assigned higher priority. For example, Poland's procurement in 2025 of Apache attack helicopters, M1A2 SEPv3 main battle tanks, and the accompanying local maintenance center project, involving tens of billions of dollars, perfectly aligns with this new logic—it represents both a large-scale order and directly stimulates U.S. domestic employment and industrial chains.

Potential Fission of Geopolitical Security Landscape and Allied Responses.

This policy has cast a stone at the geopolitical level, and the ripples are spreading. It essentially establishes a quantifiable ranking system for the contributions of U.S. allies. Military spending, strategic location, the extent of logistical support for U.S. military operations, and the depth of economic cooperation have all become measurable points.

In Eastern Europe, Poland and the Baltic states may benefit as a result. Not only are their military expenditures approaching or exceeding 2.5% of GDP (the old NATO standard), but they are also located on the eastern flank of NATO, actively inviting and investing in the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases. Poland's Wisła and Narew programs involve substantial costs, aiming to fully replace equipment with American-made systems. Conversely, some Western European countries that have long failed to meet defense budget targets may see their positions in the F-35 procurement queue adjusted.

In the Indo-Pacific region, the status of Japan, Australia, and South Korea as core allies of the United States will be strengthened. India, as a partner with significant procurement of U.S. equipment (such as P-8I anti-submarine aircraft and MH-60R helicopters) and crucial strategic importance, will become a key focus for encouragement under the new policy. Meanwhile, some Southeast Asian countries, with their limited defense budgets and diversified sources of weapon procurement (including purchases from Russia and Europe), may face longer waiting times or stricter conditions when acquiring certain high-end U.S. systems.

The situation in the Middle East is more complex. Israel has consistently held a de facto top priority status due to its special strategic relationship and substantial domestic defense industry, and the new policy has little impact on it. Gulf Cooperation Council countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are major arms purchasers, but some of their acquisitions have been obstructed by the U.S. Congress due to the Yemen war and human rights issues. The new policy emphasizes alignment with U.S. plans and actions, which may imply that future arms purchases by Gulf countries will be more closely tied to whether they coordinate with U.S. steps in regional security affairs for faster approval.

Long-term Impact: The "Clubification" of Arms Trade and the Paradox of Strategic Autonomy

In the long run, the U.S. priority arms sales strategy may accelerate the club-based and stratified nature of global defense cooperation. A core circle of allies, defined by thresholds such as the level of defense spending and the depth of strategic alignment, is being outlined by policy tools. This could incentivize some allies to increase their investments, but it may also compel other nations to reconsider their security dependencies.

The call for strategic autonomy within the European Union may gain new momentum as a result. If access to critical U.S. equipment becomes more conditional and uncertain, the urgency for Europe to advance projects under the European Defence Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) will further intensify. French company Dassault's Rafale fighter jets and MBDA's series of products may find new market opportunities in some European countries and among non-priority U.S. partners.

For the United States itself, this policy is an actuarial calculation. It attempts to address the insufficient allocation of strategic resources (defense industrial capacity) through market and economic means, transforming the wealth of allies into figures that support the U.S. military-industrial base and employment. The risk lies in the overly blatant commodification of security relationships, which may erode the foundation of political mutual trust within the alliance. When the delivery timeline of a Patriot missile depends not only on production line capacity but also on the contribution points of the purchasing country, the narrative of alliance solidarity will face a severe test of realism.

Trump's pen stroke has altered far more than just the approval flowcharts at the Pentagon and the State Department. On the map of global arms trade, it has redrawn a new contour line with capital and investment—on one side are the prioritized investors, while on the other are partners who must wait patiently. The rules of the game for global security cooperation are now being integrated with a brand-new pricing system.