Saudi Arabia's $1 Billion Investment in Syrian Airport: Gulf Capital Reshapes the Geopolitical Landscape of the Middle East

On February 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia's Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih announced at the People's Palace in Damascus, the capital of Syria, that Saudi Arabia will launch a $2 billion investment fund for the phased development of two airports in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo. On the same occasion, the Saudi low-cost airline flynas signed an agreement with the Syrian Civil Aviation Authority to establish a joint venture, flynas Syria, which is scheduled to begin operations in the fourth quarter of 2026. Saudi Telecom Company (STC) has committed nearly $800 million to build a 4,500-kilometer fiber-optic network. These agreements were signed in the presence of Syria's transitional President Ahmed Sharaa, marking Saudi Arabia's deep involvement in Syria's post-war reconstruction process through capital leverage and its attempt to redraw the power map of the Middle East.

The specific content and strategic direction of the investment agreement.

Judging from the publicly available agreement text, this investment package demonstrates a clear infrastructure orientation and long-term strategic layout. The $2 billion committed by the Saudi side through the newly established Ilaf Fund will be specifically allocated for the expansion and construction of Aleppo International Airport. According to Azzam Gharib, the Governor of Aleppo Province in Syria, the newly designed airport is projected to handle an annual passenger throughput of 12 million. This figure is significant—for comparison, Syria's total air passenger volume in 2010, before the war, was approximately 5.5 million. Saudi Arabia's goal is evidently not merely to restore pre-war levels but to establish a regional aviation hub.

The equity structure of the joint venture airline flynas Syria has also been meticulously designed: the Syrian side holds 51% of the shares, while Saudi flynas holds 49%. This arrangement not only satisfies Syria's insistence on symbolic sovereignty but also ensures the actual dominance of Saudi capital at the operational level. The company is positioned as a low-cost airline, aiming to revitalize civilian travel and commercial exchanges between Syria and the Gulf countries, which have been suppressed by war for many years. At the press conference, Talal Hilali, Director of the Syrian Investment Authority, stated frankly that these projects target key areas affecting people's lives and serve as pillars for rebuilding Syria's economy.

Deeper strategic positioning is evident in the communications sector. The 4,500-kilometer fiber-optic network invested in by STC is officially described as connecting Syria at regional and international levels. From a technical perspective, this network likely uses Syria as a node, extending eastward to Iraq and even Iran, westward through Lebanon to connect with Mediterranean submarine cable systems, and naturally linking southward with Saudi Arabia’s domestic network. This essentially constructs a new digital-era Silk Road, with Saudi Arabia aiming to control the pipeline for Syria’s future data flow.

The Geopolitical Logic Behind Saudi Arabia's Strategic Shift

Saudi Arabia's massive investment in Syria cannot be viewed in isolation as a purely economic act. By the end of 2024, with the Bashar al-Assad regime being overthrown by the Islamic opposition alliance, Syria's political landscape underwent a fundamental shift. The fact that the new transitional president, Ahmed Sharaa, chose Saudi Arabia as his first foreign visit destination in February 2025 already signaled a warming of bilateral relations. Analysts point out that Saudi Arabia's move involves at least three layers of strategic considerations.

The first layer is to diminish Iran and Russia's traditional influence in Syria. During the 14-year Syrian civil war, Iran established a land bridge stretching from Damascus to Aleppo through the Revolutionary Guard Corps and its supported Shia militia forces; Russia secured a long-term military presence in the Mediterranean via the Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Naval Base. Saudi Arabia's investments focus on civilian infrastructure, particularly aviation and communications, which represents a form of soft power penetration. When Syrian airports are upgraded with Saudi capital, airlines operate according to the Saudi model, and networks connect to the world through Saudi companies, the influence of Tehran and Moscow will naturally be diluted at the economic level.

The second layer is a response to the adjustment of U.S. Middle East policy. Tom Barak, the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, explicitly stated on social media, praising the Saudi-Syrian investment agreement as a meaningful contribution to Syria's reconstruction. The diplomat, who also serves as the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, emphasized that President Trump's philosophy is that regional stability is best achieved when countries in the region take responsibility for their own future. In December 2025, the United States formally lifted sanctions on Syria, with a key provision being the repeal of the Caesar Act. This act had previously isolated Syria from the international U.S. dollar settlement system. Saudi Arabia's investment can be seen as aligning with the shift in U.S. policy, using Gulf capital to fill the gap left by the U.S.'s unwillingness to invest directly, while ensuring that the reconstruction process aligns with Western interests.

The third layer is the regional extension of Saudi Arabia's own Vision 2030. The economic transformation plan promoted by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman requires exporting Saudi capital, technology, and business models to broader markets. War-torn and reconstruction-seeking Syria is an ideal testing ground. From aviation operations to seawater desalination (the agreement includes water cooperation with ACWA Power), Saudi enterprises gain tangible project experience and regional influence. Benjamin Fève, a Middle East expert at the French Institute of International Relations, believes that in the short term, these projects carry more significance as political signals than as drivers of economic change, but they pave the way for the Saudi private sector to enter Syria on a larger scale in the future.

Syria's Economic Reality and Reconstruction Challenges

The Syrian government has shown great enthusiasm for Saudi investments, stemming from its severe economic reality. The World Bank estimates that the total cost of rebuilding Syria could exceed 216 billion dollars. According to President Sharaa's statement in Saudi Arabia in October 2025, since the fall of Assad, Syria has attracted a total of approximately 28 billion dollars in investment commitments. Saudi Arabia's current 2 billion dollar airport investment, along with the 6.4 billion dollar investment package announced in July last year, makes it the largest external financier for Syria's new regime.

However, there is a vast chasm between promises and implementation. Syria's economic predicament is systemic. Over a decade of war has destroyed approximately one-third of the nation's housing stock, industrial capacity has shrunk by more than 60%, and oil production has plummeted from a pre-war daily average of 380,000 barrels to less than 20,000 barrels. Although U.S. sanctions have been lifted, the international banking system remains highly cautious towards Syria. Benjamin Fève points out that many international banks still view Syria as a high-risk environment, and both the private sector and foreign entities face significant obstacles when transferring large sums of money into or out of Syria.

The Aleppo Airport project itself carries both symbolic and practical pressures. Aleppo was once Syria's industrial and commercial hub, contributing approximately 30% of the nation's industrial output before the war. However, during the siege from 2012 to 2016, over 60% of the city was reduced to ruins, including its historic ancient district. The modernization of the airport serves as a beacon for the city's revival, yet the supporting road networks, electricity, and water supply systems around the airport also require massive investment. At the press conference, Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad Bashir revealed that both parties have already developed a roadmap for constructing a desalination plant and transporting fresh water from the Syrian coast to the southern regions, which precisely highlights the scarcity of basic services.

Another potential risk is that Syria is not fully unified. Although in early February 2026, government forces entered parts of the northeastern Hasakah Governorate based on an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in Damascus, the Druze community area in the southwestern Suwayda Governorate remains autonomous. Investment security requires a stable political environment as a guarantee, yet Syria's peace process remains fragile.

Evolution of Regional Patterns and Future Directions

Saudi Arabia's actions in Syria are part of a broader restructuring of the regional landscape. Just days before Saudi Arabia and Syria signed an investment agreement, Syria also hosted a ceremony for the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the American company Chevron and Qatar's Power International Holding. The two sides will cooperate in exploring oil and natural gas in Syrian waters. In May 2025, a consortium of four companies signed a $7 billion energy agreement with Syria, involving four power plants with a total installed capacity of approximately 4,000 megawatts.

These dynamics sketch a new picture: an economic reconstruction framework for Syria, led by Gulf Arab states (particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar), with behind-the-scenes support from the United States and tacit approval from Turkey, is taking shape. Its core logic is to use capital and infrastructure projects to re-anchor Syria within the Gulf-Mediterranean economic sphere, gradually disentangling its deep ties with Iran.

For Russia and Iran, this constitutes a strategic squeeze, but their responses may be limited. Russia is deeply mired in the Ukrainian battlefield with strained resources; Iran faces domestic economic difficulties and social unrest. They may be able to hold onto their vested interests in the military and security spheres, but it is difficult for them to match the Gulf countries' economic investments, which often amount to billions of dollars. One possible scenario is a division of influence: security falls to Moscow and Tehran, while economics goes to Riyadh and Doha.

From a longer-term perspective, the success of Saudi Arabia's investment in Syria depends on two variables. First is the depth of internal political reconciliation in Syria. If various factions cannot establish a lasting power-sharing mechanism and security conditions remain unstable, any infrastructure investment will be exposed to risks. Second is the trend of the global economy and energy markets. Saudi Arabia's investment capacity is closely tied to its oil revenues, and fluctuations in international oil prices will directly affect the pace and scale of its overseas investments.

The lights at the signing ceremony in the People's Palace of Damascus have dimmed, but the geopolitical game behind the $2 billion check has just begun. When the first passenger aircraft painted with the words "flynas Syria" takes off from the newly built runway of Aleppo Airport, it will carry not only passengers but also the hope of a nation's rebirth and the tentative steps of a region seeking a new balance.