German Nuclear Weapons Debate: Merz Rules Out Domestic Development Option and Proposes New Concept for European Deterrence

In February 2026, during the Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated in an interview with the Power Shift Podcast: I do not want Germany to consider possessing independent nuclear arms. He cited the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as legal foundations. At the same time, Merz proposed an alternative idea: Germany could provide platforms such as Tornado fighter-bombers to carry French or British nuclear weapons. He confirmed that discussions on the topic of European common deterrence have already been initiated with French President Emmanuel Macron. These remarks were made against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, rising security concerns in Europe, and questions about the reliability of U.S. strategy, indicating potential new directions in German security policy.

The Dual Constraints and Strategic Ambiguity of Merz's Statement.

Merz's stance is constrained by both legal and practical factors. Legally, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany prohibits Germany from producing or possessing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, which forms the political foundation for Germany's regained full sovereignty. In practice, approximately 20 American B61 tactical nuclear bombs are currently deployed at Germany's Büchel Air Base, carried by the German Air Force's Tornado aircraft, as part of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement. Merz's proposal essentially extends the existing nuclear sharing model with the United States, in theory, to include the United Kingdom and France.

The concept of nuclear sharing in this extension carries a distinct ambiguity. It avoids the domestic political taboo and historical burden of Germany possessing nuclear weapons while attempting to address immediate security pressures. After Donald Trump was re-elected as U.S. President in 2024, his conditional statements on defending NATO allies shook the long-standing European consensus on relying on the American nuclear umbrella. In Munich, Merz candidly admitted that deterrence cannot be entirely entrusted to Trump, reflecting widespread unease within Berlin's decision-making circles. The dialogue with Macron is precisely a result driven by this anxiety. In fact, Macron had proposed the idea of European nuclear deterrence cooperation to then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel as early as 2020, but it received no response at the time. Now, with Merz reopening the dialogue, the timing is particularly noteworthy.

Capabilities and Divisions Behind the European Nuclear Cooperation Concept

Turning vision into reality faces a series of severe capability challenges and internal alliance disagreements. First is the issue of technical compatibility and cost. The German Air Force's Tornado fighter jets are set to retire in the 2030s, with their intended replacement being the Future Combat Air System jointly developed by Germany, France, and Spain. However, in the same interview, Merz openly expressed skepticism about the FCAS project. He pointed out that France requires a fighter jet capable of both nuclear weapon deployment and aircraft carrier takeoff and landing, while the German Air Force currently has no need for the latter. The total cost of the FCAS project is estimated to reach hundreds of billions of euros. If it splits into two models due to differing core requirements, its economic viability and feasibility will be significantly compromised.

Deeper disagreements lie in strategic culture and command authority. The French nuclear arsenal is a symbol of Gaullist independent defense policy, with decision-making power entirely in the hands of the French president. The British nuclear force, though smaller in scale, is highly integrated with the United States in essence and operates through NATO mechanisms. Having German aircraft carry French nuclear bombs would mean that German pilots could potentially execute nuclear strike missions under the authorization of the French president, involving unprecedented levels of trust, command chains, and legal liability divisions. The U.S. nuclear sharing mechanism within the NATO framework already has mature joint operational procedures and multi-layered political control mechanisms, whereas bilateral arrangements between Germany and France or Germany and the UK are almost non-existent, requiring the building of political and military trust from scratch.

Chain reactions under the shifting geopolitical security landscape.

If Merz's proposal makes progress, it could trigger a series of complex reactions both within and outside Europe. Within the EU, this might exacerbate existing rifts between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Frontline countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland, have long called for the United States to deploy more tactical nuclear weapons on their territory to deter Russia. If Germany deepens nuclear cooperation with Britain and France, it could be perceived as forming a small, Germany-France-centric nuclear decision-making circle within the EU, thereby weakening the cohesion of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. Other NATO European members participating in the U.S. nuclear sharing arrangement, such as Italy and the Netherlands, will also closely monitor whether this move dilutes or shifts the focus of NATO's nuclear deterrence.

For Russia, any enhancement of nuclear cooperation mechanisms among European countries will be interpreted by Moscow as an escalation of NATO's aggressiveness. The Kremlin is likely to use this as a justification to defend its actions, such as deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, and may even announce a suspension of follow-up arrangements under the New START Treaty, thereby triggering a new round of arms race in Europe. Regarding transatlantic relations, the stance of the United States is crucial. Washington may welcome Europe taking on more defense responsibilities to alleviate its own burden; at the same time, it may also be wary of the emergence of a European nuclear force framework led by France and Germany outside the NATO structure, which could potentially weaken U.S. dominance in European security affairs.

The Slow Evolution and Future Path of Germany's Security Philosophy

From a longer historical perspective, Merz's discussion reflects another slow evolution in Germany's post-war security philosophy. From the complete reliance on NATO during the Adenauer era, to Brandt's Ostpolitik, and then to its role as a "civilian power" in the period following the Cold War, Germany has consistently maintained a high degree of restraint regarding military power, especially nuclear capabilities. After the 2014 Crimea crisis, Germany began to increase defense spending; with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, the Scholz government announced the establishment of a 100-billion-euro special defense fund and decided to procure F-35 aircraft to maintain nuclear sharing capabilities. Merz's current proposal is a new node on this evolutionary path: while rejecting the ultimate taboo of national nuclear weapons, it actively explores deeper integration within the framework of alliance nuclear weapons.

The future of this path is fraught with uncertainty. It depends on the interplay of multiple variables: whether U.S. policy toward Europe will shift further toward isolationism after the election; whether France can strike a balance between maintaining its independence in nuclear decision-making and meeting the security needs of its allies; whether key defense cooperation projects like FCAS can overcome differences and continue to advance; and the extent of backlash from pacifist political parties in Germany, such as the Greens, regarding any nuclear-related issues. Merz has opened a door for discussion, but the road beyond remains shrouded in mist. The ultimate form of European nuclear deterrence may not be a single solution to replace NATO but rather a nested structure: with NATO as the cornerstone, while developing closer nuclear consultation and capability cooperation mechanisms within the EU. This would enhance Europe’s own strategic resilience and voice while preserving the ultimate guarantee from the United States. This process will be filled with debate, compromise, and reversals, and the remarks at the Munich Security Conference have already accelerated this debate.