Post-war Arrangements in Gaza: Israel Sets Red Line for Disarmament and Rejects Palestinian Statehood

On the evening of January 27, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu clearly stated during a televised press conference in Jerusalem that with the return of the last hostage's remains from the Gaza Strip, Israel's focus has shifted to disarming Hamas and demilitarizing Gaza. He simultaneously ruled out any possibility of reconstruction before completing these two tasks and firmly rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, emphasizing that Israel will maintain security control from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. This statement sets a clear and firm baseline for the second phase of the ceasefire agreement mediated by the United States and also marks the entry of the Gaza war, which has lasted for over two years, into a new phase of game characterized by forced peace.

Strategic Turning Point After the Opening of the Rafah Crossing and the Return of Hostages.

On January 26, the Israeli Defense Forces announced that they had located and identified the remains of Israeli police officer Ran Gevili. Gevili was the last of the 251 hostages taken by Hamas and other armed groups during the October 7, 2023 attack. His return fulfills a core requirement of the first phase of the U.S.-led ceasefire agreement. According to the agreement, which took effect on October 10, 2025, the first phase includes a ceasefire and hostage exchange, while the second phase involves the disarmament of Hamas, further withdrawal of Israeli troops, and the initiation of reconstruction.

With this obstacle cleared, the path to opening the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt is theoretically unobstructed. Rafah is the only crossing from Gaza to the outside world not directly controlled by Israel and is considered a lifeline for the territory. Egypt hopes for immediate two-way opening, allowing Palestinians stranded in Egypt to return to Gaza and enabling humanitarian supplies and commercial goods to enter. The Israeli Prime Minister's Office stated on the evening of January 26 that it agreed to reopen the crossing, but only for the passage of individuals, subject to a full Israeli inspection mechanism. Some Israeli media speculate that passenger transit may begin on January 29, initially allowing 100 to 150 people to cross daily.

However, Netanyahu's speech on January 27 closely linked the opening of the crossing to broader strategic objectives. He made it clear that the next phase is not about reconstruction but rather disarmament and demilitarization. This essentially sets a political precondition for the full operation of the Rafah crossing and the subsequent inflow of reconstruction aid: Hamas must lay down its weapons. On January 26, UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric stated that efforts are underway to clarify the exact meaning and implementation of the Rafah opening, highlighting the concerns of international humanitarian agencies over the uncertainty of the situation.

Strategic Considerations and Implementation Dilemmas of the "Demilitarization" Objective

Netanyahu has listed disarming Hamas and demilitarizing Gaza as unwavering priorities, claiming they will be accomplished either the easy way or the hard way. This stance has received public support from U.S. President Trump. In an interview with Axios on January 26, Trump praised Hamas for working hard to locate the remains of Hadar Goldin and for cooperating with Israel, but he also emphasized that Hamas must now disarm—as they have pledged. Two U.S. officials revealed to the media that they believe Hamas will agree to disarm, possibly accompanied by amnesty for its members.

However, there is a significant gap at the implementation level. Hamas reiterated its commitment to the agreement in a statement on January 26, but at the same time demanded that Israel fulfill its obligations without delay, particularly by opening the Rafah crossing in both directions without restrictions. Hamas has repeatedly stated that disarmament is a red line, though it has also hinted at a willingness to hand over weapons to a Palestinian governing body. Currently, a transitional government consisting of 14 Palestinian technical experts unaffiliated with Hamas has been appointed to oversee daily affairs in Gaza. The head of this government, Ali Shas, announced on January 22 that the Rafah crossing would open this week to facilitate passage.

The deeper conflict lies in the fundamental disagreement between the two sides over the definition and path of demilitarization. Israel demands the complete dissolution of Hamas as a military organization and the elimination of all weapons and tunnel networks. In contrast, Hamas may seek an arrangement that formally hands over weapons while preserving its organizational structure and potential mobilization capabilities. Netanyahu has explicitly ruled out the possibility of initiating reconstruction before demilitarization is completed. The United Nations estimates that the reconstruction of Gaza requires approximately 70 billion U.S. dollars, with about 90% of civilian infrastructure already destroyed in the war. This approach, which directly links humanitarian reconstruction to highly politicized security objectives, may exacerbate the suffering of Gaza's 2.3 million people and create new factors of instability.

Rejecting the State of Palestine and the Reshaping of the Regional Security Landscape

In his speech, Netanyahu made another declaration with far-reaching implications: a categorical rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza. He claimed to have repeatedly prevented the creation of a Palestinian state and emphasized that he would not allow it today or in the future. He further defined Israel’s long-term security boundaries: Israel will exercise security control over the entire area from the Jordan River to the sea, which also applies to the Gaza Strip. The phrase "from the river to the sea" encompasses Israel proper as well as all Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This essentially negates any political resolution based on the two-state solution, even though the Gaza war has prompted several Western countries to formally recognize the state of Palestine in 2025.

This stance potentially conflicts with the framework of the peace process promoted by the United States. According to the arrangements in the second phase of the agreement, an institution called the Gaza Implementation Committee has been established. Its members include U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and senior Qatari diplomat Ali Al-Sawadi, among others. This committee will oversee the transitional government, while its superior body is the Peace Commission, led by Trump and composed of global political figures, aimed at supervising the Gaza peace process. The participation of Turkey and Qatar has displeased Israel, as both countries are seen as supporters of Hamas, but media reports indicate that they persuaded Hamas to agree to the Gaza agreement.

Netanyahu's tough stance is partly driven by domestic political pressure. He faces a situation where the national budget must be passed by March 31, 2026, otherwise it could trigger early elections. In his speech, he stated that holding elections now would be a mistake. The absolute rejection of the Palestinian demand for statehood is a key strategy to consolidate his right-wing support base.

The Iranian factor and the broader regional confrontation dynamics

Netanyahu's speech was not limited to the Israeli-Palestinian issue; he also issued a direct warning to Iran. If Iran makes the grave mistake of attacking Israel, we will respond with a force Iran has never seen before. These remarks echo the recent escalation of tensions in the region. The United States has deployed an aircraft carrier strike group to the area, and President Trump stated that the U.S. has a massive fleet near Iran but still believes negotiation is an option.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a phone call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on January 27, criticized U.S. threats, stating that they aim to undermine the security of the region. In June 2025, Iran and Israel engaged in a 12-day war, during which Israel attacked military targets within Iran, killing several senior Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists. Iran responded with ballistic missile strikes on Israeli cities. The United States briefly joined the conflict and targeted key Iranian nuclear facilities.

Netanyahu's emphasis on the Iranian threat at this time serves two purposes: on one hand, it frames the Gaza issue within the broader context of the Iran-Resistance Axis confrontation, providing a security justification for Israel's hardline stance; on the other hand, it may also aim to remind the United States that Israel remains a frontline ally in the regional confrontation with Iran, thereby gaining more leverage in negotiations. The interconnectedness of regional security dynamics means that the demilitarization process in Gaza cannot occur in a vacuum—it will interact with tensions involving Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and even the Red Sea.

The future of Gaza is hovering at a fragile crossroads. The opening of the Rafah crossing may bring a brief humanitarian respite, but Netanyahu's red line of disarmament as a precondition, coupled with Hamas's unwavering refusal to relinquish its core survival demands, constitutes the most fundamental contradiction in the second phase of any agreement. When the call for demilitarization meets the outright denial of the right to statehood, the reconstruction and peace of Gaza are not only delayed but also steered onto a perilous path fraught with uncertainty. The international community, including the newly formed peace committee led by Trump, will have to confront a most fundamental question: under a security framework devoid of political prospects, how long can any peace built upon ruins truly last?