Cuba's Darkest Hour: The Regime Survival Game Under America's "Stranglehold Strategy"

On January 3, 2026, U.S. Special Forces raided Caracas and arrested Venezuelan President Maduro. The explosions triggered an equally intense political earthquake in Havana, 1,400 miles away. When Donald Trump wrote on social media that Cuba was about to fall, the most vulnerable moment for this Caribbean island nation since the 1959 revolution officially began.

Washington's goal is clear and ruthless: to facilitate a regime change in Cuba by the end of 2026. Unlike the direct military intervention in Venezuela, the White House has chosen economic suffocation as its weapon this time—cutting off the oil lifeline from Venezuela and leveraging Cuba's severe energy, economic, and social crises to force the last leftist stronghold in its backyard to collapse from within. The stakes of this game are the survival of the Cuban Revolution and the ultimate test of U.S. geopolitical dominance in its backyard.

Oil Supply Cutoff: Strategic Strangulation of the Lifeblood

I don't know how they can sustain themselves; they have no income. All their past revenue came from Venezuela, from Venezuelan oil. In his speech in early January, Trump did not conceal the core of his strategy. This statement is not an empty threat; it points to a vulnerable artery in the Cuban economy that has persisted for a quarter of a century.

Since Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez signed a strategic alliance in 2003, Venezuela has been Cuba's most important political and commercial partner. The essence of this relationship is a classic barter trade: Venezuela supplies crude oil to Cuba on preferential terms in exchange for professional services such as doctors, teachers, sports coaches, and military personnel dispatched by Cuba. According to estimates by Sebastian Arcos, interim director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, even in 2025 when Venezuela's own economy is in trouble, Cuba still receives approximately 25,000 to 28,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil per day, meeting about one-quarter of its demand.

Oil is not merely fuel; it is the political lubricant that keeps Cuba's basic societal functions running under the harsh U.S. blockade. This crude oil supports the country's aging and under-maintained power generation systems, powers agricultural machinery and public transportation, and indirectly influences every aspect from food rationing to medical services. Losing Venezuela's preferential oil would force Cuba to purchase oil at market prices on the international market using its scarce foreign exchange reserves—a near-impossibility for a country with depleted reserves and a continuously shrinking economy.

The sudden collapse of the Maduro regime instantly transformed this structural dependency into an imminent survival crisis. Since January 3, there have been no records of Venezuelan oil tankers heading to Havana. U.S. Secretary of State, Cuban-American Marco Rubio, stated bluntly: If I were the Havana government, I would be worried. His remarks revealed a cold calculation: energy is the noose to strangle this regime.

Domino Effect: The Social Pressure Cooker Amidst Overlapping Crises

The oil supply cutoff is not a single blow to a healthy body, but rather the final straw that breaks the back of an already overburdened camel. Cuba is experiencing its most severe economic crisis since the 1959 revolution, with its severity even surpassing the special period following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Economic data paints a bleak picture: between 2020 and 2024, Cuba's Gross Domestic Product shrank by 11%. The government forecasts a mere 1% economic growth rate for 2026, a target widely considered difficult to achieve. Inflation is eroding purchasing power. Although the average wage in the state sector increased by 25.6% in 2024, reaching 5,840 Cuban pesos (approximately 12 euros at the official exchange rate), this amount is only enough to buy a carton of eggs and one kilogram of powdered milk. The monthly salary of an ordinary Cuban cannot even cover a family's basic food expenses for one week.

The energy crisis has directly translated into a persistent ordeal in daily life. Frequent power outages have become the norm nationwide. In the capital, Havana, residents need to arrange their day according to the blackout schedules released by the power company; in other provinces, outages are completely unpredictable. A YouTube blogger named Alejandro described in an interview: When I get up for breakfast, the first thing I do is check the Havana Electric Company's Facebook page to see what time the power will go out. Based on that time, I plan my day. The collapse of infrastructure is visible to the naked eye: streets are flooded with sewage, garbage piles up, and buildings are dilapidated.

The social service system is also collapsing. Pharmacy shelves are empty, forcing people to turn to the black market to purchase medicines; doctors no longer prescribe drugs because even if they do, there are no medicines available for dispensing. The black market trade of basic supplies such as food and medicine has moved from hidden corners into the open. Alejandro pointed out: In buying and selling groups on Facebook, or on the streets, you can find people selling medicines. This is prohibited, but without any scruples, there are people selling drugs on every street corner. There is nothing in the pharmacies.

Deeper still is the tearing of the social fabric. Wages in the state sector are insufficient for survival, leading to a lack of willingness to work for the government, yet the over 3.1 million state sector employees (constituting the majority of the nation's 4.7 million workforce) have no choice but to stay. Meanwhile, the private sector, allowed to sprout during Raúl Castro's era, is confined to non-strategic areas like catering and small retail, unable to become a true engine of the economy. The younger generation either works in private restaurants or seeks ways to leave. A 2023 study by the University of Havana's Center for Population Studies suggests that the officially claimed population of 11 million may be inflated, with the actual population possibly having dropped to around 8 million due to emigration waves.

All of this constitutes the perfect pressure cooker in the eyes of American policymakers. They believe that the combination of economic collapse, energy shortages, livelihood hardships, and the growing public discontent is sufficient to undermine the social foundation of the regime from within, creating conditions for a change in power. An anonymous American source told the media: Regardless of the means, Washington is determined to make the Cuban government yield, and this is '100 percent an event to be completed by 2026'.

Havana's Response: From "State of War" to Limited Resilience

Facing the impending storm of pressure, the Cuban government's response combines revolutionary-style tough declarations with pragmatic survival strategies.

President Miguel Díaz-Canel, in a public address, nearly teared up as he acknowledged that U.S. aggression against Venezuela had dealt a heavy blow to Cuba. However, he quickly assumed the demeanor typical of a revolutionary successor: No one can dictate what we should do. He insisted that Cuba would defend the homeland to the last drop of blood and refused to engage in any negotiations under coercion. Such rhetoric echoes Cuba's decades-long narrative tradition of David versus Goliath.

A more substantive action is the initiation of war readiness. The Cuban National Defense Council recently approved relevant plans, a doctrine dating back to the 1980s under Fidel Castro, aimed at mobilizing the entire population to respond to potential external aggression. This move serves both to convey a message of unity and resistance to the domestic public and to demonstrate to Washington the determination to defend the regime at all costs.

However, behind the tough stance, the regime also reveals the pragmatism it has repeatedly demonstrated throughout its history. Analysts point out that intense debates may be underway within the Cuban government to weigh the next steps. Opposition figure Manuel Cuesta Morúa believes that although the Díaz-Canel administration—which many believe is still under the real control of Raúl Castro—has always been quite pragmatic, as well as arrogant and proud, extreme pressure may force it to take steps toward reality.

The resilience of the regime should not be underestimated. Jorge Duany, a professor emeritus at Florida International University, analyzed that the possibility of a complete collapse of the Cuban regime in the short term is not high, due to its strong control over the military, security, and intelligence agencies. The regime's likely survival strategy is: while maintaining the core tenets of one-party rule, a centrally planned economy, and socialist welfare policies, it will make limited concessions to private enterprises, foreign investment, and the overseas Cuban community in exchange for economic breathing room and some international flexibility.

This limited resilience is also reflected in the efforts to seek alternative energy supplies. Mexico has become a temporary lifeline, delivering approximately 20,000 to 30,000 barrels of oil to Cuba daily. Although the United States has not yet requested Mexico to halt the deliveries, and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has stated that the volume does not exceed historical contracts and the scope of humanitarian aid, this is far from sufficient to compensate for the gap left by Venezuela's supply cut. Other traditional allies, such as Russia and China, are currently adopting a cautious wait-and-see approach. Economist Ricardo Torres warns: There is no scenario in which the loss of Venezuelan oil can be fully replaced by supplies from other allies.

Washington's Calculation: The Complex Chess Game from "Strangulation" to "Deal"

The U.S. strategy towards Cuba is not monolithic; there are differing voices and risk considerations within it.

Hardliners represented by Trump and Rubio advocate for exerting maximum pressure, particularly through a comprehensive blockade on oil imports, to accelerate Cuba's economic collapse and force the regime to either collapse or accept a deal under U.S. terms. Rubio was even half-jokingly mentioned by Trump as a potential president of Cuba, reflecting the profound influence of Florida's powerful anti-Castro Cuban-American lobbying groups on policy. Their logic is direct and brutal: leverage Cuba's unprecedented period of vulnerability to resolve this historical issue once and for all.

However, there are also more cautious voices within the government. Some diplomats believe that, given the severe blow to Cuba's economy after the change in Venezuela, further extreme pressure could trigger uncontrollable humanitarian disasters or social upheaval, which would instead put the United States in a passive position. They prefer to leverage the existing crisis, engage with potential defectors or pragmatists within the Cuban regime through secret channels, and facilitate a managed transition. Reports from The Wall Street Journal confirm that Washington is seeking individuals within the Cuban regime who can provide privileged information and assist in reaching agreements, following a script similar to the operation that led to Maduro's arrest in Venezuela.

Professor Pedro Feliu, an international relations scholar at the University of São Paulo, highlighted the potential priorities of the Trump administration in his analysis: the effect of Venezuela's collapse and the credible threat itself might be sufficient to bring about the downfall of the (Cuban) regime. A 'peaceful victory' is always preferred. In other words, what the United States hopes to see most is a regime change triggered by internal crises, without the need for direct military invasion by U.S. forces. This would both fulfill political commitments and minimize costs and geopolitical risks.

However, this strategy is fraught with uncertainties. First, the Cuban regime has over sixty years of experience surviving under adversity, and its mechanisms for controlling society are far more rigorous and effective than those of Venezuela's Maduro regime. Second, excessive pressure could trigger a massive refugee crisis heading toward Florida, which is only 90 miles away, potentially causing a political disaster within the United States. Furthermore, the presence of global rivals such as China and Russia in the Caribbean region means that a crisis in Cuba could be exploited in the context of great power competition.

The Unknown Path Ahead: Collapse, Stalemate, or Transformation?

This is the million-dollar question... It's impossible to make predictions based on public information. This statement by economist Ricardo Torres captures the greatest uncertainty regarding Cuba's future direction.

Collapse Theory advocates observe a cliff-like decline in economic data, the rupture of energy supply chains, the exhaustion of social endurance, and the potential public resentment foreshadowed by the large-scale protests in 2021. They argue that, having lost the external crutch of Venezuela, Cuba's frail economy will be unable to stand independently. The legitimacy of the regime will rapidly erode as living standards sharply deteriorate, ultimately triggering a political upheaval.

Stalemate Theory proponents emphasize the regime's adaptability and control. They point out that Cuba possesses the strongest network of security institutions in Latin America, and the regime can maintain basic order through rationing, propaganda mobilization, and limited repression. Simultaneously, the regime may undertake defensive reforms, further liberalizing certain economic sectors, allowing more private activities and foreign investment, trading minor economic concessions for political survival. This mode of survival with problems has played out multiple times in Cuban history.

The Transformation Theory advocates, including some opposition figures, anticipate that pressure could foster a peaceful and stable transition. They believe that society is gradually reorganizing itself after the major crackdown in 2021, and different Cuban forces both domestically and internationally are generating a positive social pressure that might push the government toward necessary political openness. However, the path, the leading actors, and the ultimate form of this transformation remain shrouded in uncertainty.

Whether the U.S. strategy can succeed ultimately depends on one core question: Will the ordinary people of Cuba, in the midst of extreme hardship, blame their suffering on the U.S. blockade or on the incompetence of their own government? In the face of a survival crisis, does the regime’s decades-long narrative of attributing all problems to the U.S. blockade still hold? When power outages become daily, food becomes a luxury, and medicine must be bought on the black market, to what extent can slogans of revolutionary ideals and national dignity continue to unite the people?

In the year 2026, Cuba stands at a historic crossroads. On one side is the meticulously crafted suffocation strategy by the United States, aimed at leveraging economic tools to drive political change; on the other is a revolutionary regime with profound resilience and strong control, yet nearly depleted resources. The outcome of this contest will not only determine the fate of 11 million Cubans but also redefine the geopolitical influence and operational logic of the United States in its backyard. Regardless of the result, one thing is certain: the turbulence and struggles of this island nation in the Caribbean are far from over.