Russian military casualties surpass those of World War II: The strategic dilemma behind a war of attrition.

In late January 2025, an assessment report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States sent shockwaves through the international military analysis community. The report indicated that from the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to December 2025, the Russian armed forces had suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties, with as many as 325,000 fatalities. This means that the total number of Russian casualties on the Ukrainian battlefield has already exceeded the overall losses sustained by the Soviet Union during the nine-year-long war in Afghanistan, and is approaching—or in some dimensions has even surpassed—the casualty scale of certain Soviet campaigns in World War II. For a country that views itself as a global power and possesses a vast nuclear arsenal, this rate of attrition in conventional warfare is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War.

The Strategic Weight and Historical Echoes of Casualty Figures

The core conclusion of this CSIS report did not emerge out of thin air. The think tank employed various methods such as open-source intelligence analysis, satellite imagery interpretation, cross-verification of frontline combat reports, and statistics from local Russian obituaries to construct a relatively comprehensive assessment model. Data indicates that the average monthly number of Russian military fatalities is close to 7,000, peaking between December 2024 and January 2025. Extending the timeline, this nearly four-year-long conflict is projected to surpass a cumulative casualty count of 2 million (including both Russian and Ukrainian sides) by the spring of 2025. Ukrainian losses are also severe, estimated between 500,000 and 600,000 casualties, with approximately 140,000 fatalities. However, considering Ukraine's significantly smaller population base and military scale compared to Russia, the pressure it endures is substantially greater.

The historical frame of reference for these numbers is chilling. During the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, the officially announced death toll was approximately 15,000. Even in the massive scale of World War II, Soviet casualties in single battles provide a certain comparison: for example, during the Battle of Stalingrad from 1942 to 1943, the total Soviet casualties (including deaths, injuries, and captures) amounted to about 1.13 million. Today in Ukraine, the total casualty figures for the Russian military have already surpassed this number. This clearly indicates that the brutality and intensity of the current conflict have reached a level rarely seen in modern warfare between major powers. The Kremlin has consistently denied Western assessments, calling them unreliable, but the slow and bloody pace of advancement on the front lines, along with the continuous raising of conscription ages in Russia and the implicit increase in the number of funerals, all indirectly confirm the severity of the attrition.

Limited territorial gains and the reality of "World War I-style" attrition warfare.

In stark contrast to the staggering casualties is the limited territorial gains made by the Russian forces. By early 2025, after nearly four years of intense fighting, Russia controlled approximately 18% of Ukraine's territory, primarily concentrated in the Crimean Peninsula—already seized in 2014—and much of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. Along a frontline stretching about 1,000 kilometers, advances over the past year have often been measured in meters. This scene—an extensive trench system, human attrition reliant on artillery and infantry, and the cost of thousands of casualties for the capture of a small town or village—has reminded many military observers of the Western Front during World War I.

Multiple battlefield assessments from institutions such as the Institute for the Study of War in Washington and the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London have pointed out that since the summer offensive of 2023, the Russian military's capability for large-scale mechanized breakthroughs has significantly declined. The current mode of operation relies more on superior artillery firepower and costly infantry assaults to deplete Ukraine's manpower and resources. The core logic of this strategy is the belief that Russia possesses greater endurance in terms of population and military-industrial capacity. President Putin has repeatedly stated publicly that Russia's goal is the complete liberation of the Donbas region. Currently, Russia controls approximately 90% of the territory in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. However, to capture the remaining 10% of areas, such as the strategic stronghold of Avdiivka (which fell in 2024) and the defensive lines further west, the Russian military has paid an extremely high price.

Multiple Weakenings: Economic, Demographic, and Long-Term Military Concerns

The authors of the CSIS report depict a Russia severely weakened on multiple fronts—an amalgamation of economic, demographic, and military challenges. Economically, although the war economy model has temporarily sustained military production and boosted certain industrial indicators, long-term sanctions have led to restrictions on technology imports, a loss of highly skilled labor, and a depletion of investment in the civilian economy, all of which are eroding the country's long-term development foundation. With over one-third of its fiscal budget allocated to defense and security, this distorted resource allocation is unsustainable.

The population crisis is even more profound and challenging. Among the 325,000 fallen soldiers, a significant portion were educated men in their prime childbearing years. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of disabled veterans will require long-term medical and social resource support, while it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of men of military age have left the country to avoid conscription since the outbreak of the war. These factors, combined with an already low birth rate, will severely impact Russia's labor structure and social vitality for decades to come. Some Russian local media and independent demographers have begun discussing the potential social impacts of a lost generation.

Militarily, the Russian armed forces have undergone a painful modernization. The elite contract soldier units equipped with large numbers of modern tanks, armored vehicles, and precision-guided munitions at the beginning of the war suffered heavy losses in the battles from 2022 to 2023. The main force currently holding the frontline consists of conscripts and mobilized personnel who have undergone short-term training, as well as various assault teams evolved from the Wagner Private Military Company model. Although Russia's military-industrial complex is operating at full capacity, restoring Soviet-era artillery shell production and accelerating the manufacturing of equipment such as tanks and drones, the quality of its technical equipment has declined compared to the early stages of the war, heavily relying on the refurbishment and upgrading of older equipment. The enormous losses among officers and professional non-commissioned officers will take years to replenish.

Deadlock in Peace Talks and the Possible Trajectory of Future Warfare

Just before and after the release of the CSIS report, the third round of direct Russia-Ukraine negotiations mediated by the United States is about to take place. The territorial issue, particularly the final status of the Donbas region, remains a very difficult bridge to cross between the two sides, as described by U.S. Senator Marco Rubio. Kyiv's position is clear: it will not cede territories that Russia has failed to fully capture on the battlefield. Meanwhile, Moscow insists that Ukraine must acknowledge the new territorial reality. This fundamental disagreement makes any ceasefire agreement extremely fragile.

The bloody stalemate on the battlefield is directly reflected at the negotiation table. The Putin regime currently does not seem to be in a hurry to seek a political resolution, betting instead on Western fatigue in aiding Ukraine and the eventual depletion of Ukraine's human resources. Recently, the Russian military has intensified strikes on Ukraine's rear energy infrastructure and civilian targets, such as the sustained airstrikes on Odesa in January 2025 and missile attacks on residential areas near Kyiv, aiming precisely to weaken Ukraine's war potential and public morale. Attacks on places like the Black Sea port of Pivdennyi in southern Ukraine also demonstrate the Russian military's efforts to increase Ukraine's economic costs.

However, Ukraine's will to resist has not collapsed. President Zelensky responded to the attack on social media, stating that Russia will be made to pay the price. After receiving a new round of Western aid, the Ukrainian military continues to organize counterattacks in certain areas and utilizes long-range drones to persistently strike deep Russian targets, including military facilities in Crimea and refineries within Russian territory.

The conflict has evolved into a marathon testing the endurance of both sides and their supporting systems behind them. Russia's casualty figures have surpassed the threshold of World War II, sending a strong strategic signal: even with conventional military advantages, a major power may become mired in a costly war of attrition when attacking a determined medium-sized country receiving continuous external support. Regardless of how this war ultimately concludes, the Russian military and nation have already paid the heaviest price since World War II. Yet, the geopolitical and security gains obtained in exchange for this cost remain ambiguous and uncertain. History will judge whether the Kremlin's strategic decision-makers truly weighed the countless individual destinies and the nation's future represented by these numbers.

Reference materials

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-losses-ukraine-war-casualties-b2910674.html

https://www.letemps.ch/articles/agression-russe-48-mois-et-2-millions-de-victimes-plus-tard