From Ally to Pawn: The Shift in U.S. Strategy and the Disintegration of the Syrian Democratic Forces
22/01/2026
On January 20, 2026, when Syrian Democratic Forces commander Mazloum Abdi signed the ceasefire agreement, an era officially came to an end. This agreement required the SDF to submit a dissolution plan within four days, with its fighters to be integrated into the Syrian government forces as individuals. The autonomous entity, which once controlled nearly one-third of Syria's territory, thus moved toward its conclusion. The entire process took only two weeks.
The core driving force behind this dramatic change does not stem from Damascus's military superiority, but rather from Washington's strategic shift. The statement by U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack that the SDF's role as the primary anti-ISIS force is largely obsolete marked the conclusion of this months-long game. The Kurdish forces, once fighting alongside the United States in the battle against the Islamic State, ultimately found themselves as sacrificial pawns on the geopolitical chessboard.
The Establishment and Rifts of Strategic Alliances.
The rise of the Syrian Democratic Forces is closely tied to the United States' counter-terrorism strategy in the Middle East. In 2015, with the support of the U.S.-led international coalition, the SDF was established with the Kurdish People's Protection Units at its core, with the explicit mission of combating the Islamic State in northeastern Syria. In the following years, this force proved its combat effectiveness—recapturing Raqqa in 2017 and achieving the final major victory against IS in Baghuz in 2019.
However, this alliance was fundamentally contradictory from the very beginning. For the United States, the SDF was a tactical tool in the fight against terrorism; for the Kurdish leadership, it represented a strategic opportunity to achieve long-term autonomy or even independence. Washington never formally recognized or supported the SDF's political goal of establishing a highly autonomous Kurdish entity. This cognitive gap laid the groundwork for the subsequent split.
The turning point occurred in December 2024. After years of civil war, the Bashar al-Assad regime collapsed, and former opposition leader Ahmad al-Sharaa formed a transitional government. This former rebel commander, who once led the Sham Liberation Organization, quickly demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the United States. In early 2025, the al-Sharaa government joined the global coalition against ISIS, a move that altered Washington's strategic calculus.
Deadlock and miscalculation at the negotiation table.
In March 2025, Sha'ala and Abdi reached a principled agreement: tens of thousands of combatants from the SDF would be integrated into the newly formed Syrian army, and the government would take over key institutions in the northeast, including border crossings, oil fields, and detention centers holding thousands of IS suspects. On the surface, this appears to be a win-win arrangement.
However, subsequent negotiations fell into a stalemate lasting several months. According to details revealed by multiple sources, the core of the stalemate lies in two fundamental disagreements.
First is the dispute over governance models. The Shara government seeks to establish a centralized, Sunni Arab-dominated state system, which aligns with its Islamist background. In contrast, the Kurdish leadership hopes to maintain the highest degree of local autonomy through decentralization and institutionalized protection of minority rights. Noah Bonsey, Senior Advisor on Syria at the International Crisis Group, described the political ideological gap between the two sides as astronomical.
Secondly, the specific arrangements for military integration. Negotiation details reveal that the SDF leadership once proposed integrating Syrian government military groups into their own forces—a suggestion that was firmly rejected by Damascus. The government's proposal was to allow the SDF to retain three battalions in the northeast, plus a border brigade, a women's brigade, and a special forces brigade. In exchange, non-SDF military forces should be free to operate in the northeast, and SDF units must report to the Ministry of Defense and cannot be mobilized without orders.
The Syrian Ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Orabi, revealed a key detail: Abdi had agreed to certain proposals multiple times, but was later overruled by more hardline factions within the organization. "Then he stopped agreeing to anything and started saying, 'I have to go back and consult,'" Orabi recalled, "which obviously didn't work for us or the Americans. We wanted to stay in one room for a week and get everything done."
Internal factional divisions within the SDF have severely weakened its negotiating position. Hardliners, represented by Commander Sipan Hamo, insist that brigades and battalions in the northeast report to personnel designated by the SDF, while other units may only enter the area in the form of small patrols and with SDF approval. These demands are viewed by the government as unacceptable.
Aleppo: Military Turning Point and Diplomatic Breakthrough
On January 6, 2026, conflict erupted in Aleppo, becoming a turning point in the overall situation. Government forces quickly took control of the Kurdish-controlled areas of the city, but this operation differed from previous ones.
Ambassador Olabi pointed out that the success of the Syrian military in limiting civilian casualties in Aleppo was key to achieving a diplomatic breakthrough with the SDF. "If Aleppo had gone wrong, I think we would be in a very different situation," he admitted. The military opened humanitarian corridors to allow civilians to evacuate, demonstrating lessons learned from past sectarian reprisal attacks on civilians by government-affiliated militias.
Military success has shifted the balance of power in negotiations. After capturing the oil-rich provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, where Arabs form the majority, Damascus has taken the initiative. The SDF has been forced to retreat to Hasakah province—the Kurdish heartland of Syria.
It is worth noting that the role of the United States in this conflict has undergone subtle changes. SDF senior official Elham Ahmed told reporters that they called for intervention by the U.S.-led coalition, but received no response. In fact, Washington did not engage in military intervention but focused on mediating a ceasefire. The withdrawal of U.S. armored forces from Dayr Hafir sent a clear signal to Kurdish commanders: they now face Damascus alone.
America's Strategic Shift: From Pragmatism to Realpolitik
To analyze this dramatic change, it must be examined within a broader geopolitical context. The shift in U.S. policy is not a whim, but the result of multiple factors.
First is the Turkish factor. Ankara has consistently viewed the YPG as an extension of the illegal Kurdistan Workers' Party and has deployed troops into Syria multiple times to contain its influence. As a NATO member, Turkey's concerns have always been a significant consideration in U.S. policy. In early 2025, Turkey initiated a peace process with the PKK, and developments in northern Syria were seen by Ankara as an opportunity to advance this process. Turkish officials explicitly stated that Kurdish armed groups must lay down their weapons and disband to avoid further bloodshed.
Secondly, it is the strategic operation of the Shara government. The former rebel leader has demonstrated surprisingly adept diplomatic skills. The visit to Washington in November 2025, facilitating Syria's entry into the anti-IS coalition, and establishing close counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States—Shara has successfully positioned himself as a reliable partner for the U.S. in Syria. Aaron Zelin, a researcher at the Washington Institute, concluded: Shara has outmaneuvered ISIS, Al-Qaeda, other opposition rebel groups, the Assad regime, Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and now the SDF in terms of strategic acumen.
Third is the shift in U.S. strategic priorities. With the collapse of the Islamic State as a territorial entity, the strategic necessity of maintaining an independent Kurdish armed force has diminished. The Trump administration focused more on Syria's stability and unity, as well as containing the influence of Iran and Russia. The Assad government holds greater potential than the SDF in achieving both of these objectives.
According to undisclosed information obtained by Reuters from nine sources, the green light for this offensive was given as early as the beginning of January. During U.S.-mediated talks held in Paris, Syrian officials proposed a limited operation to recapture some areas controlled by the SDF, which did not face opposition. A Syrian official revealed that Turkey also conveyed a message: if Kurdish civilians were protected, Washington would approve actions against the SDF.
Consequences and Prospects: The Unstable New Balance
The dissolution of SDF has left a series of complex issues, the most urgent of which are the security vacuum and the resurgence of the threat from the Islamic State.
The security of detention facilities is the foremost concern. The SDF controls the main IS detention camps in Syria, including the Al-Hol camp, which holds approximately 25,000 people (primarily women and children under 12). As the SDF withdraws from these facilities, large-scale prison breaks have occurred. Government forces have announced the recapture of about 81 escapees, but dozens remain at large. These detention centers have long been described as lawless zones, with human rights organizations condemning their deplorable humanitarian conditions, while IS continues to exert influence within them.
The political future of the Kurds is fraught with uncertainty. According to the final agreement, the SDF will only maintain a presence in Hasakah Governorate, and its fighters will be integrated into the army on an individual basis. Although the government of Sha'ara has pledged to recognize Kurdish as a national language, designate Nowruz as a national holiday, and grant Kurds full citizenship rights, the extent of decentralization remains unclear. Whether the Kurds can preserve their cultural identity and political representation within a centralized system will pose a long-term challenge.
The coordinated response of regional Kurdish forces warrants attention. PKK military leader Murat Karayilan has called on the people of Rojava to resist, and Iraqi Kurds have indicated the possibility of cross-border operations. Although Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani promised Sha'ala stability and cooperation just a week ago, the evolving situation may alter this stance.
From a broader perspective, this upheaval reveals the core characteristics of U.S. Middle East policy: pragmatism over principles, strategic interests surpassing alliance commitments. The SDF leadership misjudged the extent of U.S. support, believing that Washington would back them as it did during the fight against IS once military conflict erupted. This miscalculation came at a heavy cost.
Although the government of Shahala has achieved a tactical victory, the challenges remain severe. Unifying a country that has been divided for 14 years, balancing the interests of various sects and ethnic groups, and rebuilding an economy devastated by war—these tasks are far more complex than military offensives. Whether the government forces can maintain discipline in the Kurdish region and avoid sectarian violence will directly impact the stability of the new order.
The United States has gained a partner that better aligns with its current strategic priorities in this game, but at the cost of credibility. Discussions of betrayal towards the Kurds have spread across social media, which may affect the U.S.'s ability to establish cooperative relationships with other armed groups in the future.
The map of Syria has been redrawn, but peace remains far from achieved. In this deeply traumatized nation, shifts in the balance of power often signal the beginning of a new cycle of uncertainty. The dissolution of the SDF is not an endpoint, but rather another perilous turning point on Syria's long road to transformation.
Reference materials
https://ca.news.yahoo.com/syrias-sharaa-captured-kurdish-held-164516281.html
https://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2026/01/21/news/in-siria-i-curdi-sono-sotto-assedio-8551149/
https://www.newsweek.com/syrias-kurds-lose-out-opinion-11390127