Strategic Crossroads: The Urgency and Realistic Dilemmas of European Defense Autonomy After Losing U.S. Protection
23/01/2026
In early 2025, an absurd yet spine-chilling news emerged from Davos: then U.S. President Donald Trump issued a blatant threat regarding Greenland during a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister—if we cannot obtain it easily, we will resort to forceful means. Although a deal was eventually reached, a NATO ally leader openly threatening to use force against another NATO ally, with rhetoric akin to a mafia boss, completely shattered the cornerstone of Europe's post-war security architecture. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen bluntly stated that if the threat materialized, NATO and the entire post-World War II security order would collapse. This moment was described by David Cutler, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, as Europe's most dangerous period—the old order has already crumbled, while new rules have yet to be established.
The security of Europe, for the first time, genuinely needs to be built on the assumption of America's potential absence. This is not unfounded anxiety but a strategic reality that must be confronted directly. From Trump's repeated questioning of NATO to the conditional shift of America's strategic focus toward the Indo-Pacific, the nuclear umbrella that has sheltered Europe for nearly eighty years is becoming increasingly unstable. It is time for Europe to seriously consider a fundamental question: How do we defend ourselves without America?
Paper Strength and Harsh Reality: The Deep Rifts in European Defense
Judging purely from the data, Europe's defensive potential appears to be quite formidable. The combined active armed forces of NATO European member states total approximately 2 million, significantly surpassing Russia's 1.3 million. European air forces can assemble nearly 1,600 fast jet fighters, while Russia has slightly over 1,000. European navies possess more than 100 frigates and destroyers, whereas Russia has fewer than 25. The collective economic output of Europe is dozens of times greater than that of Russia. Theoretically, 500 million Europeans are fully capable of self-defense and do not need to rely on 340 million Americans.
However, behind the numbers lies a shocking structural weakness. Analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies points out that the core issue is not a lack of resources, but political fragmentation and organizational inefficiency. Europe's military capabilities heavily rely on U.S.-enabling assets—key support systems such as satellite surveillance, heavy transport aircraft, airborne early warning and control, and aerial refueling are almost entirely dominated and provided by the United States. More critically, while Europe's defense spending reached approximately 340 billion pounds in 2024, more than three times Russia's 110 billion pounds, after adjusting for purchasing power parity, the actual military investments of the two are nearly equal. Russia's military-industrial system is large-scale and lower-cost, and the ruble's purchasing power in the arms market far exceeds that of the euro.
This inefficiency is rooted in Europe's fragmented defense industrial landscape. The United States operates only 33 systems across 10 major weapon categories, while European countries maintain as many as 174 independent weapon systems. Each system entails a unique logistics chain, training system, and spare parts inventory. The result is a costly frenzy of duplication, where massive investments are diluted and fail to form a cohesive force. Former British Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal Edward Stringer pointedly noted that many capabilities exist only on paper: battalions are under-equipped, fighter squadrons lack ammunition and technicians, ships are poorly maintained, and missile stocks are insufficient.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis proposed the 30-30-30-30 readiness doctrine—deploying 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 warships within 30 days—which remains a distant goal for Europe today. Forces are scattered across the inventories of dozens of countries, yet there is a severe lack of operational readiness, material reserves, and industrial capacity to sustain prolonged conflicts.What Europe lacks is not weapons, but the political will and integrated mechanisms to transform these weapons into credible, immediate, and sustainable combat power.
Leadership Vacuum: Who Will Steer European Security in the Post-American Era?
The most intangible yet crucial contribution of the United States to NATO is its undisputed leadership. Stringer vividly described the past state with a metaphor: every major European power was happy to play second fiddle, as long as they were merely accompanying the United States. Militarily, the U.S. serves both as the coach deciding how the next war is fought and as the captain directing offense and defense on the field. The position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe has always been held by American generals. Former Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharp recalled that when British and French officers clashed, it was the Americans who knocked our heads together and made it clear: we provide 85% of the combat power—please stay aligned. This authority stems from strength, as well as from consensus.
Once the United States withdraws, who will fill this enormous leadership vacuum? No single European country can take on this role alone. The answer may lie in some form of collective leadership, perhaps inspired by the Concert of Europe that stabilized the continent after the Congress of Vienna in the early 19th century, where major powers shared the responsibility of maintaining peace.
Several key countries will have to step into the spotlight:
- Germany possesses the largest economy and defense budget in Europe (nearly 70 billion pounds in 2024). Chancellor Friedrich Merz has relaxed constitutional borrowing limits with the aim of building Europe's most powerful conventional military.
- France is a nuclear power with a well-trained military force and has historically been skeptical of U.S. leadership in NATO. President Macron's advocacy for strategic autonomy now appears remarkably foresighted.
- The United Kingdom possesses the Trident nuclear deterrent and a highly effective (though downsized) military. However, its post-Brexit context and its uniquely close ties with the United States in military, intelligence, and nuclear fields could be both an asset and an obstacle to leading Europe.
- Poland has become the fourth largest military power, with its defense spending accounting for 4.5% of GDP, the highest in NATO, and its military size ranking third in the alliance.
- Finland and Sweden, with decades of experience as neutral nations, deeply understand how to operate autonomous and credible militaries without American oversight.
- Ukraine is a special card, possessing the largest and most combat-experienced armed forces in Europe.
Stringer and his collaborator, Professor Phillips O'Brien of Strategic Studies at the University of St Andrews, once proposed a bold idea: in the post-American era, the first European Supreme Allied Commander of NATO should be a Polish general, thereby clearly signaling to Russia Europe's determination to defend its eastern flank; the civilian Secretary-General could then come from Western Europe. An informal council consisting of five or six countries might collectively assume the leadership responsibilities previously held by the United States.
However, merely conceiving such a plan highlights the level of diplomatic maturity and political unity it requires. For European governments currently grappling with internal and external challenges, this would demand a once-in-a-century level of statesmanship.
From Survival to Deterrence: The Capability Gap That Must Be Bridged
Even after resolving the leadership issue, Europe still faces a series of severe military capability shortcomings. These shortcomings have been fully exposed in the Ukraine war, particularly the ammunition shortages and insufficient industrial production capacity. Analysis indicates that while European armies may currently be able to effectively counter the Russian military, their ammunition stockpiles might only sustain combat for a few days or weeks before being depleted.
Rebuilding military capabilities sufficient to compensate for the absence of U.S. security guarantees is a monumental project that will take years, even decades, and cost hundreds of billions of pounds. This requires every European country to significantly increase its defense spending, forcing painful choices in priorities and potentially shaking Europe's high-welfare social model. Taking the United Kingdom as an example, its current defense spending of 2.4% of GDP is far below Poland's 4.5% and also lags behind Norway, Denmark, and the Baltic states (all exceeding 3%). Former British military attaché to Moscow, John Foreman, stated bluntly that if the U.S. withdraws, Europe may need to restore defense spending to the level of 5%-6% of GDP seen in the 1970s and 1980s, rather than the current approximately 2.5%.
At the nuclear deterrence level, the challenge is even more severe. If the U.S. nuclear umbrella is withdrawn, the UK will become the only nuclear power formally committed to defending NATO (France's nuclear arsenal is not currently pledged in the same way). The UK possesses only about 200 nuclear warheads, while Russia has nearly 6,000. Even if France changes its nuclear doctrine, it could only add approximately 300. To compensate for the absence of U.S. nuclear deterrence, Britain and France might have to significantly expand their nuclear arsenals and invest in developing more diverse nuclear options, including tactical nuclear weapons, to increase choices during crises. Forman believes that the existing British and French nuclear forces are sufficient to end Western Russian civilization, but this lacks a range of options.
Additionally, Europe must rebuild its logistics system, ranging from military medical services to strategic transportation, and even consider reintroducing conscription (as Sweden has done), preparing for the kind of protracted war of attrition that Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine. The defense industry requires large-scale expansion, and stockpiles of artillery shells and ammunition need to be rebuilt far beyond existing plans.
Russia's Abacus and Europe's Internal Troubles: Whose Side Is Time On?
A crucial and stark question is: Will Russia stand by and watch Europe complete this arduous defense transformation? Will the Kremlin seize the opportunity to deliver a fatal blow when Europe is at its weakest, or will it take advantage of internal conflicts to reap the benefits?
King's College London Professor of Russian Politics Sam Greene leans towards the latter assessment. Why would Russia take action? he counters, They could simply sit back and reap the benefits. If Russia were to open another land war in Europe beyond Ukraine, it would face a response from European militaries. That would be an uncertain reaction, with uncertain outcomes for Russia. In the short term, Russia is too risk-averse to attempt it.
However, former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk and others hold the opposite view. They believe that for a Europe abandoned by the United States, especially by testing its response through an invasion of the Baltic states, such temptation would be irresistible for Putin. If NATO faces a crisis, if European countries are at odds with the United States, Russia would see it as an excellent opportunity, and they might even take action without stopping the war in Ukraine.
Beyond external threats, potential conflicts within Europe could also reignite once American mediation efforts disappear. U.S. pressure within NATO has consistently restrained tensions between Greece and Turkey; its broader influence in the Balkans has also maintained peace in Kosovo and moderated disputes between countries like Hungary and Romania over historical territorial issues. Oana Popescu-Zamfir from the Global Focus Center (a Bucharest-based think tank) points out: For Romania, keeping Hungary within the EU and NATO is essential to prevent serious conflicts. Without the United States, Europe must prevent these old wounds from reopening on its own.
Conclusion: Awakening or Decline?
Trump's remarks did not create a new problem, but rather tore open a long-existing rift and exposed it under the spotlight. European leaders are standing at a strategic crossroads. One path is to unite, mobilize the necessary strength, and protect their own interests in a world where rules are collapsing; the other is to continue along the old track, remaining divided and fragile, content with a global influence far below what their geopolitical strength could achieve—a path that may seem easy but is increasingly dangerous.
Ukrainian President Zelensky's stern warning at Davos still echoes: Europe enjoys discussing the future but avoids taking action today. Europe has not become a true global power; it remains merely a beautiful yet fragmented kaleidoscope of small and medium-sized nations. If the continent's leaders fail to rise to the demands of the times, then, in Zelensky's words, Europe will forever remain in a state of passive reaction, struggling to keep up with new dangers and attacks.
Europe is not lacking in resources, nor is it without potential. What it lacks is the political determination, clear priorities, and practical coordination to transform that potential into credible operational capabilities. The greatest danger Cutler speaks of should not be seen as fearmongering, but as a wake-up call for action. The goal is not to break with Washington, but to build a defense system that can stand firm even in the absence of the United States. If the American security umbrella remains, all the better; but if it does not, Europe must not leave itself exposed in the storm. Time is no longer a luxury Europe can afford to waste.
Reference materials
https://ca.news.yahoo.com/europe-must-survive-without-america-093000289.html