Syria Ceasefire Extension Days: A Fragile Respite Amid Geopolitical Gamesmanship.

Late on the evening of January 24 local time, after the four-day ceasefire agreement officially expired, the Syrian Ministry of Defense issued a brief statement: the ceasefire will be extended by 15 days. The reason given in the statement is thought-provoking—this move aims to support the U.S. military’s operation to transfer detained Islamic State (IS) personnel from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq. Almost simultaneously, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) also confirmed the extension of the ceasefire, emphasizing their commitment to adhering to the agreement in order to promote de-escalation, protect civilians, and create the conditions necessary for stability.

This is not an ordinary ceasefire extension. Over the past three weeks, the most intense clashes have erupted between the Syrian government forces and the SDF since the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime at the end of 2024 and the rise to power of the Islamist government led by Ahmed Sharai. The government forces have seized large swathes of key territories such as Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor from the SDF, compressing the latter into its core area of Hasakah Governorate. The ceasefire extension, rather than a dawn of peace, is more like a forced pause button pressed by all parties under international pressure, internal power struggles, and urgent security challenges.

Multiple Logics Behind the Ceasefire

The stalemate in the battlefield situation and political negotiations.

The ceasefire extension must first be understood within the context of recent military developments. Since early January, the Syrian government forces have launched a swift offensive. The SDF was forced to withdraw after the bloody battles in Aleppo, subsequently losing the predominantly Arab-populated provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The government forces not only gained control of key oil fields and hydroelectric power stations but also took over some facilities detaining IS members and their families. The armed forces of the SDF, namely the Syrian Democratic Forces, have retreated to their stronghold of Hasakah, while government troops have completed deployments around the area.

Military superiority provides the government with leverage in negotiations. In fact, the framework for an agreement between the two sides has long existed. In March 2025, the Syrian interim government and the SDF signed an agreement requiring the SDF to transfer territory and ultimately integrate its fighters with the government forces. However, a new round of negotiations in early January this year failed to make progress on the integration issue, leading to a resumption of hostilities. Last weekend, the two sides signed a new version of the agreement, and a four-day ceasefire was announced on Tuesday. A key provision of the new agreement is that SDF members must be integrated into the army and police forces on an individual basis.

Gains and losses on the battlefield directly translate into bargaining power at the negotiation table. The government forces advancing to the outskirts of Hasakah paved the way for the al-Shar government to fulfill its promise of bringing all national territories under state control. Meanwhile, the SDF's statement revealed deep unease, accusing the government forces of conducting military buildups and logistical movements, clearly indicating their intent to escalate the situation and push the region toward new confrontations. The extension of the ceasefire is a reluctant move by the SDF to secure breathing room under military pressure, as well as a tactical pause by the government forces to further consolidate captured territories and digest their gains.

Key Intervention of International Factors: Prisoner Transfer

The Syrian Ministry of Defense explicitly linked the extension of the ceasefire to the U.S. military's transfer of IS prisoners in its statement, revealing another crucial external dimension. Approximately 9,000 IS members, including a large number of foreign militants, are held in prisons managed by the Kurds in northeastern Syria. These prisons have long been ticking time bombs for regional security, with numerous riots and prison breaks occurring.

This week, the U.S. military announced plans to transfer up to 7,000 detained ISIS members from Syria to detention centers in Iraq. On Wednesday, the first batch of 150 high-level ISIS prisoners, including European nationals, had already been transferred. According to Iraqi officials, on January 24, a second transfer group of up to 1,000 prisoners was in operation.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's statement on Friday was quite representative. He indicated that an extension of the ceasefire could be considered to complete the transfer of IS prisoners to Iraq. Turkey, a key supporter of the Syrian government, reflects the deep concerns of regional countries about the resurgence of IS. The issue of IS prisoners has become a transnational security challenge, forcing originally hostile parties to coordinate. For the U.S. military and its international allies, a stable environment is a prerequisite for the safe transfer of thousands of dangerous prisoners; for the Syrian government, cooperating in this matter not only showcases its image as a responsible actor but also secures valuable strategic time.

On January 24, government forces took over the Al-Akhtan prison near Raqqa province from the SDF and released 126 underage detainees under the age of 18, handing them over to their families. This move carries significant symbolic meaning, demonstrating the government's humanitarian stance while reinforcing the legitimacy of its takeover of security affairs.

The Plight and Demands of the Kurds

The Dream of Autonomy and the Reality of National Integration.

For the Syrian Kurds, the current situation signifies a severe challenge to their decade-long experiment in autonomy. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Kurds have established de facto autonomous regions in the north and northeast, with independent civil and military institutions. The SDF, as their armed force, was once the primary ground partner of the United States in combating ISIS.

However, after the Seray government came to power, the logic of centralization fundamentally clashed with the Kurdish demand for autonomy. The broader agreement announced last Sunday aims to integrate Kurdish civil and military institutions into the national system. This deals a direct blow to the hopes for autonomy among the Kurdish minority. They are required to submit an integration plan, with their core armed forces facing dismantlement and being incorporated into the national military and police on an individual basis.

The Game of Economic Lifelines and Border Control Rights

Beyond political and military integration, the allocation of economic resources is another core point of contention. According to Agence France-Presse citing Kurdish sources, the SDF has submitted a proposal to Damascus through the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, Tom Barak. The proposal accepts the government's demand to control border crossings but, in exchange, requests that a portion of the revenue—particularly from oil—be allocated to regions with a Kurdish majority population.

Northeastern Syria possesses the country's most important oil and gas resources. During the period of autonomy, these resources provided a significant financial foundation for the Kurdish authorities. Today, with government forces controlling the oil-producing areas, the Kurds have lost a crucial economic leverage. Their demands have partially shifted from political autonomy to securing economic rights and interests, which represents both a compromise and a practical survival strategy. Whether they can obtain a stable financial share in the future national structure will directly impact the long-term stability and development of the Kurdish region.

Fragile Future and Regional Impact

The temporariness of the ceasefire and the risk of renewed conflict.

Despite a 15-day extension, the current ceasefire remains exceptionally fragile. The SDF has explicitly stated that the ceasefire was achieved through international mediation, while dialogue with the government continues. This indicates that the fundamental differences between the two sides are far from resolved. Government forces are still mobilizing around Hasakah, and the SDF is reinforcing defenses in cities such as Kobani and Hasakah, preparing for potential confrontations.

Senior officials from Western countries such as the United States and France have urged Shara not to deploy troops to Kurdish-controlled areas, fearing that renewed fighting could lead to large-scale atrocities against Kurdish civilians. Diplomatic sources reveal that this concern stems from last year's violence by regime-affiliated forces against Alawite and Druze minorities, resulting in nearly 1,500 deaths. Historical lessons have kept the international community highly vigilant against potential sectarian violence.

Subtle shifts in regional dynamics

The evolution of the situation in Syria also affects the nerves of regional countries. Turkey has always been wary of the growing strength of Kurdish armed forces, but its current support for the government's extension of the ceasefire to facilitate the transfer of IS prisoners shows Ankara's priority considerations on security issues. Traditional allies of the Syrian government, such as Iran and Russia, are pleased to see Damascus reconsolidate control over the national territory.

For the United States, the situation is particularly complex. The SDF was once its most reliable partner in the counter-terrorism war in Syria. Today, on one hand, the U.S. needs to develop relations with the new government (the Shara government) that came to power after overthrowing Assad. On the other hand, it attempts to protect its Kurdish allies from being purged and ensure the smooth completion of the challenging task of transferring IS prisoners. The mediation by envoy Tom Barak reflects the U.S. efforts to maintain influence and address specific issues amid this complicated scenario.

Conclusion: The Path to the Unknown

This 15-day ceasefire extension is a brief interlude in Syria's prolonged conflict. It was born out of military stalemate, international intervention, and pressing security challenges, rather than from a genuine willingness for reconciliation among the warring parties.

For the government of Ahmed Sharif, this is a window to consolidate gains, digest newly controlled areas, and demonstrate its ability to address international concerns such as the transfer of IS prisoners. For the Kurds, this is a critical breathing space for survival—they must make a final effort in negotiations to preserve as much autonomous rights and economic security as possible. For the international community, particularly the United States and its allies, this is a limited time to manage security risks, prevent humanitarian disasters, and painfully adjust their policies in Syria.

After the ceasefire ends, will Syria head towards a decisive, potentially bloody final showdown, or can it find a difficult path under international mediation to integrate the Kurds into the national structure while safeguarding their basic rights? The answer remains uncertain. The only certainty is that the fate of the people in this war-torn land of northeastern Syria remains deeply entangled in the complex vortex of geopolitics, ethnic conflicts, and security dilemmas. Are these 15 days the final calm before the storm, or a glimmer of light at the tortuous starting point of a long reconstruction journey? Time will deliver a cruel or merciful verdict.