Monthly CPI print for June, the headline inflation gauge tracked against the central bank's disinflation path. TÜİK releases CPI around the 3rd of each month at 10:00 Ankara time.
Heads of state and government of NATO members meet at the Beştepe Presidential Complex in Ankara on 7-8 July. The 36th NATO summit and the second hosted by Türkiye; agenda includes defence spending, the Alliance's southern flank and the largest-ever NATO defence-industry forum.
Monthly unemployment and employment data for June. TÜİK publishes Labour Force Statistics on the 15th of each month (or the next working day) at 10:00 Ankara time; 15 July falls in the release window.
Seventh of eight 2026 MPC meetings. Policy-rate decision and statement published at 14:00 Ankara time.
Monthly CPI print for July. Released around the 3rd of the month at 10:00 Ankara time.
Third of the CBRT's four quarterly Inflation Reports for 2026, presented at a Governor's briefing. Updates the bank's inflation forecasts and outlook, closely watched for any revision to the year-end inflation projection.
Monthly unemployment and employment data for July, released in the mid-month window (around the 15th) at 10:00 Ankara time.
Second-quarter gross domestic product print, the headline growth reading. TÜİK publishes quarterly GDP roughly two months after the quarter ends; the Q2 release lands around 1 September.
Monthly CPI print for August. Released around the 3rd of the month at 10:00 Ankara time.
Eighth scheduled 2026 MPC meeting (counting from January). Policy-rate decision and statement published at 14:00 Ankara time.
Monthly CPI print for September; the 3rd falls on a weekend so the release shifts to the first working day. Published at 10:00 Ankara time.
Penultimate 2026 MPC meeting. Policy-rate decision and statement published at 14:00 Ankara time.
Monthly CPI print for October. Released around the 3rd of the month at 10:00 Ankara time.
Final quarterly Inflation Report of 2026, presented at a Governor's briefing. Sets out the bank's updated inflation forecasts heading into 2027.
Monthly unemployment and employment data for October, released in the mid-month window (15th falls on a weekend, shifting to the next working day) at 10:00 Ankara time.
Second of the CBRT's two semi-annual Financial Stability Reports for 2026, assessing risks in the banking system, credit, FX and external balances.
Monthly CPI print for November. Released around the 3rd of the month at 10:00 Ankara time.
Final 2026 MPC meeting. Policy-rate decision and statement published at 14:00 Ankara time; the last rate-setting decision of the year.
Annual monetary-policy framework document for the coming year, which also publishes the full 2027 schedule of MPC meeting and report dates. Sets out the inflation target and policy approach for 2027.
Third-quarter gross domestic product print. TÜİK publishes quarterly GDP roughly 80 days after the quarter ends; the Q3 release lands in late December. (provisional date pending TÜİK release calendar)
Monthly CPI print for December and the full-year 2026 inflation figure; 3 January falls on a weekend so the release shifts to the first working day. Published at 10:00 Ankara time.
First MPC meeting of 2027, expected in the fourth week of January in line with the CBRT's usual cadence. (provisional date; the official 2027 schedule is published with the December 2026 monetary-policy text)
Monthly CPI print for January 2027. Released around the 3rd of the month at 10:00 Ankara time. (provisional; based on TÜİK's standard ~3rd-of-month cadence)
First quarterly Inflation Report of 2027, presented at a Governor's briefing with updated inflation forecasts. (provisional date; the 2026-I report was published on 12 February 2026 and the exact 2027 date is confirmed with the December 2026 schedule)
AKP signals a possible referendum on a new constitution, linked to the renewed Kurdish peace process and a potential reset of presidential term limits. Targeted for autumn 2026 or, more likely, spring 2027. (provisional; no official date called, exact date is speculative)
Orhan Uzuner, father-in-law of President Erdogan's younger son, has built a nationwide civilian network resembling a paramilitary structure, according to internal records reviewed by Nordic Monitor. Operating through Kardeş Kal Türkiye and Yara Sar associations, the network conducts training camps with combat, surveillance, and communications instruction, and maintains close ties with state institutions. Since 2016, the network has expanded with government support. Critics warn it could be used to suppress dissent, while the network denies paramilitary activities.
Orhan Uzuner, father-in-law of President Erdogan's younger son, has built a nationwide civilian network resembling a paramilitary structure, according to internal records reviewed by Nordic Monitor. Operating through Kardeş Kal Türkiye and Yara Sar associations, the network conducts training camps with combat, surveillance, and communications instruction, and maintains close ties with state institutions. Since 2016, the network has expanded with government support. Critics warn it could be used to suppress dissent, while the network denies paramilitary activities.
Background: Türkiye and Saudi Arabia had signed memorandums of understanding on railway and logistics cooperation. On June 15, 2026, it was reported that the agreements also include a terrestrial fiber-optic route along the Hejaz Railway alignment, part of a broader Turkish strategy to create redundant land corridors for freight, energy, and data between Asia and Europe, reducing dependence on maritime chokepoints. A joint feasibility study is due by end of 2026, with a long-term vision extending the line toward Oman and the Indian Ocean. The fiber component is driven by Gulf operators financing at least six terrestrial fiber corridors toward the Mediterranean, including an $800 million Saudi-led line across Syria connecting to Türkiye, in response to the vulnerability of submarine cables in the Red Sea.
Background: Türkiye and Saudi Arabia had signed memorandums of understanding on railway and logistics cooperation. On June 15, 2026, it was reported that the agreements also include a terrestrial fiber-optic route along the Hejaz Railway alignment, part of a broader Turkish strategy to create redundant land corridors for freight, energy, and data between Asia and Europe, reducing dependence on maritime chokepoints. A joint feasibility study is due by end of 2026, with a long-term vision extending the line toward Oman and the Indian Ocean. The fiber component is driven by Gulf operators financing at least six terrestrial fiber corridors toward the Mediterranean, including an $800 million Saudi-led line across Syria connecting to Türkiye, in response to the vulnerability of submarine cables in the Red Sea.
Turkey's Constitutional Court ruled on June 11, 2026, that the main opposition CHP must pay compensation to former Minister Berat Albayrak for a defamation campaign alleging misuse of central bank reserves. The court found the CHP failed to link the declining reserves to Albayrak, and noted the campaign was amplified by the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ). The ruling balances freedom of expression with protection of reputation.
Turkey's Constitutional Court ruled on June 11, 2026, that the main opposition CHP must pay compensation to former Minister Berat Albayrak for a defamation campaign alleging misuse of central bank reserves. The court found the CHP failed to link the declining reserves to Albayrak, and noted the campaign was amplified by the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ). The ruling balances freedom of expression with protection of reputation.
Türkiye's exports to Ukraine increased by $339.6 million year-on-year in May 2026, reaching over $600 million, the largest value increase among all export destinations. The growth is attributed to rising Ukrainian demand for industrial and technology products, particularly energy equipment and machinery, as the war with Russia continues to damage Ukraine's infrastructure. Key sectors driving the increase include electrical and electronics (up $19.7 million), chemicals (up $11.4 million), and iron and non-ferrous metals. Top exporting provinces were Ankara ($398.2 million), Istanbul ($152.2 million), and Kocaeli ($19.4 million).
Türkiye's exports to Ukraine increased by $339.6 million year-on-year in May 2026, reaching over $600 million, the largest value increase among all export destinations. The growth is attributed to rising Ukrainian demand for industrial and technology products, particularly energy equipment and machinery, as the war with Russia continues to damage Ukraine's infrastructure. Key sectors driving the increase include electrical and electronics (up $19.7 million), chemicals (up $11.4 million), and iron and non-ferrous metals. Top exporting provinces were Ankara ($398.2 million), Istanbul ($152.2 million), and Kocaeli ($19.4 million).
Turkey's National Security Council (NSC) has launched a series of conferences to broaden its outreach, marking a continued transformation from its past as a tool of military tutelage, notably during the 1997 'postmodern' coup. Analysts and President Erdogan highlight constitutional and legal reforms since the early 2000s that have shifted the NSC from a platform of military-civilian confrontation to an advisory body focused on genuine national security threats, including counterterrorism operations against the PKK, YPG, FETÖ, and Daesh, as well as cyber threats and energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey's National Security Council (NSC) has launched a series of conferences to broaden its outreach, marking a continued transformation from its past as a tool of military tutelage, notably during the 1997 'postmodern' coup. Analysts and President Erdogan highlight constitutional and legal reforms since the early 2000s that have shifted the NSC from a platform of military-civilian confrontation to an advisory body focused on genuine national security threats, including counterterrorism operations against the PKK, YPG, FETÖ, and Daesh, as well as cyber threats and energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) coordinated a multi-agency operation that dismantled a cybercrime network testing stolen credit card information through automated systems. Three suspects were detained in Istanbul and Kocaeli. The investigation began after a surge in SMS alerts and involved the Cybersecurity Directorate, Gendarmerie, and Financial Crimes Board. No financial losses were reported.
Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) coordinated a multi-agency operation that dismantled a cybercrime network testing stolen credit card information through automated systems. Three suspects were detained in Istanbul and Kocaeli. The investigation began after a surge in SMS alerts and involved the Cybersecurity Directorate, Gendarmerie, and Financial Crimes Board. No financial losses were reported.
Turkey's cybersecurity teams, led by the National Cyber Incident Response Center (USOM), blocked more than 101,500 malicious links in 2025. The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) reported that 8,393 cybersecurity specialists now serve across 2,415 response teams. USOM issued 6,805 alerts, and authorities assigned 519 CVE identifiers to local vulnerabilities. Over 837,000 users completed online cybersecurity courses through BTK Academy, with 1,500 receiving hands-on training. This reflects Turkey's ongoing investment in digital security infrastructure and workforce development.
Turkey's cybersecurity teams, led by the National Cyber Incident Response Center (USOM), blocked more than 101,500 malicious links in 2025. The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) reported that 8,393 cybersecurity specialists now serve across 2,415 response teams. USOM issued 6,805 alerts, and authorities assigned 519 CVE identifiers to local vulnerabilities. Over 837,000 users completed online cybersecurity courses through BTK Academy, with 1,500 receiving hands-on training. This reflects Turkey's ongoing investment in digital security infrastructure and workforce development.
Slovenian MEP Vladimir Prebilic threatened to propose EU sanctions against Turkish Justice Minister Akın Gürlek over his role in corruption investigations targeting opposition municipalities. AK Party spokesperson Ömer Çelik denounced the remarks as colonial and disrespectful, and accused the European Parliament of bias, citing its stance on Gaza. Gürlek dismissed the threat as an attack on Turkish sovereignty.
Slovenian MEP Vladimir Prebilic threatened to propose EU sanctions against Turkish Justice Minister Akın Gürlek over his role in corruption investigations targeting opposition municipalities. AK Party spokesperson Ömer Çelik denounced the remarks as colonial and disrespectful, and accused the European Parliament of bias, citing its stance on Gaza. Gürlek dismissed the threat as an attack on Turkish sovereignty.