European Nuclear Shield Concept: Strategic Anxieties Behind Secret German-French Talks

From February 14th to 16th, the Munich Security Conference was held at the Bayerischer Hof Hotel in Germany. During the conference, German Chancellor Merz revealed that he had held secret talks with French President Macron regarding the establishment of a joint European nuclear deterrent. Almost simultaneously, Estonian Deputy Minister of Defense Tuli Duneton and Latvian Prime Minister Silinia publicly expressed their willingness to join the early negotiations, while Belgian Defense Minister Franken also participated in closed-door discussions during the conference. These developments indicate that the long-taboo topics of European strategic autonomy and nuclear deterrence, which have been avoided since the end of the Cold War, are now being formally placed on the negotiation table.

Munich Conference: Transatlantic Trust Crisis

The Munich Security Conference has always been a window for observing transatlantic relations. The atmosphere of the 2026 conference was described by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as a point of no return once certain boundaries are crossed. The direct reason is that one year after Trump's return to the White House, his transactional foreign policy has continued to undermine European confidence in NATO's collective defense commitments. Furthermore, the Trump administration's push to annex Greenland has further intensified European doubts about Washington's protective promises.

U.S. Secretary of State Rubio failed to provide sufficient reassurance in his conference speech. His tone was milder than that of Vice President Vance last year, yet throughout his address, he made no mention of NATO, Russia, or the war in Ukraine—precisely the core issues where cracks have emerged in the U.S.-European alliance. Analysts believe that this selective silence itself sends a signal: the shift in U.S. strategic focus is already a reality. Data displayed by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy on the conference screen showed that Ukraine suffered attacks from over 6,000 drones and 150 missiles in the past month alone. In this war, the evolution of weaponry has outpaced the political decisions aimed at stopping them, his remarks directly pointed to the lag in Europe's security mechanisms.

In this context, the statements of European leaders echoed each other. Merz, Macron, and British Prime Minister Starmer jointly pledged to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. However, the deeper motivation lies in hedging risks. Merz frankly stated: If the United States continues to distance itself, this new beginning is correct; as long as we cannot guarantee our own security, it is correct. Data confirms this shift: Since before the Ukraine war, European countries' defense spending has increased by nearly 80%, and NATO members further agreed last year to raise core defense spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP, plus an additional 1.5% for other security investments.

Nuclear Option Assessment: The Difficult Leap from Theory to Reality

European nuclear deterrence is not a new concept, but it has long been constrained by political sensitivity and technological dependence. Currently, only France and the United Kingdom on the European continent possess nuclear weapons, with a combined total of approximately several hundred warheads, creating an order-of-magnitude gap compared to the thousands held by the United States and Russia respectively. France possesses Europe's only truly independent nuclear deterrent force, with its Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines and ASMP-A air-launched cruise missiles forming a sea-air dual-system framework. The United Kingdom's Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles are entirely reliant on American manufacturing and maintenance, resulting in inherent limitations in the independence of its nuclear deterrence.

An expert report during the Munich Conference pointed out that Europeans can no longer outsource nuclear deterrence to the United States. The report defines Russia's behavior as ongoing nuclear revisionism, where Moscow attempts to use its nuclear arsenal as a backing to forcibly alter borders or geopolitical balances. The report outlines five options facing Europe, acknowledging that none are perfect: maintaining reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence; building a European framework based on British and French nuclear weapons; jointly developing a shared European nuclear arsenal; increasing the number of European countries possessing nuclear weapons; and significantly enhancing conventional military capabilities to establish non-nuclear deterrence.

In the short term, maintaining the current arrangement—relying on U.S. military superiority—is still considered the most credible and feasible option. Finnish Defense Minister Hakkanen's view is representative: increasing European investment in the French and British nuclear arsenals is a positive step, but completely replacing the U.S. nuclear umbrella is not currently realistic. Researcher Fayet from the French Institute of International Relations points out that the discussion becoming serious is a positive step, but now we need action.

Technological barriers are as formidable as political thresholds. Extending the French or British nuclear umbrella involves enormous costs, technical adaptation, and most crucially, the issue of ultimate launch authority—which country or entity has the right to decide the use of these nuclear weapons? Macron plans to deliver a speech on France's nuclear doctrine in February, expected to elaborate on his previously proposed vision of extending France's nuclear umbrella, potentially involving special cooperation with key European countries, joint exercises, and a framework for shared security interests. While British Prime Minister Starmer emphasizes deepening UK-France nuclear cooperation, stating that any adversary must know they could face our combined strength in a crisis, London's resistance to sovereignty concessions remains an unknown variable.

The Paradox of Strategic Autonomy: The Dilemma of Linkage Between Conventional and Nuclear Issues

Europe's efforts to strengthen strategic autonomy present a complex situation with parallel developments in conventional and nuclear issues. In the field of conventional defense, specific projects have made partial progress but face significant resistance. On February 13, defense ministers from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Sweden signed a letter of intent to jointly advance the European Long-Range Strike Solution (ELSA), aimed at developing deep-strike missiles. On the same day, on the sidelines of the NATO defense ministers' meeting, a coalition of multiple European countries agreed to collaborate on four projects, including ballistic missile defense and air-launched munitions.

However, iconic pan-European projects have repeatedly reached deadlocks. The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) fighter project, jointly developed by France, Germany, and Spain, has remained unresolved for months, with parties unable to agree on the division of work shares among participating companies. Within the European Union, debates over defense projects are consistently accompanied by a tug-of-war over whether participation should be limited to EU companies—France is the staunchest advocate of the "Buy European" clause, while Germany, the Netherlands, and others advocate for a more open model. This divergence reflects a fundamental contradiction in European strategic autonomy: the desire to break free from external dependencies while struggling to integrate technological, industrial, and fiscal resources internally.

The remarks made by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl in Munich are thought-provoking. He reiterated that the U.S. extended nuclear umbrella remains effective for Europe but emphasized that discussions about Europe making greater contributions to NATO's nuclear deterrence must remain clear-headed and cautious, with vigilance against the risks of nuclear proliferation and potential destabilizing effects. This essentially sets an invisible red line for European nuclear cooperation: Washington can accept Europe taking on more in conventional defense, but its dominance in the nuclear domain is not to be challenged.

The stance of Eastern European countries has become a key variable. NATO frontline states bordering Russia, such as Estonia and Latvia, exhibit the highest sensitivity to security commitments. Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa stated: Nuclear deterrence may offer us new options. Why not? However, she also warned that any steps must align with international obligations. This mindset—both eager to enhance the credibility of deterrence and concerned about provoking Russia and triggering escalation—reflects the common dilemma faced by countries on Europe's periphery.

Future Trajectory: Limited Cooperation and Protracted Game

The concept of a European nuclear shield is transitioning from discussion to reality, a process that will be lengthy and filled with variables. The most likely path is to incrementally enhance the coordination and visibility of European nuclear forces within the existing NATO framework, rather than establishing a new nuclear command system independent of the United States. France may take the lead in establishing nuclear consultation mechanisms with core partners such as Germany and Poland, conducting wargames that simulate joint decision-making, and even exploring technical sharing of partial early-warning data in extreme scenarios. The role of the United Kingdom will be more nuanced—while aiming to maintain its special relationship with the U.S., it also needs to demonstrate its value in building the European pillar.

Geopolitical risk is the primary driving factor. The war in Ukraine has entered its fifth year, with Russia being viewed by its European neighbors as an increasingly significant threat. Many European officials believe that Moscow's territorial ambitions will not stop at Ukraine, and other NATO member states could become targets. This perception is prompting Europe to consider the worst-case scenario: if the United States, due to domestic politics or strategic trade-offs, were to refuse to fulfill its NATO Article 5 collective defense commitment, could Europe rely on its own strength to prevent a large-scale conventional invasion or even nuclear blackmail?

Economic and industrial foundations present another layer of constraints. Although European defense spending is growing rapidly, the base is fragmented, with severe duplication in construction. Establishing and maintaining a modern nuclear deterrent requires massive, sustained investments over decades, placing a heavy burden on European economies still grappling with challenges such as energy transition and an aging population. Is France willing to let its taxpayers bear the cost of extending the nuclear umbrella alone? Can other countries accept funding the French nuclear arsenal without having ultimate control?

After the Munich Conference adjourned, private conversations continued in the corridors of the Bayerischer Hof Hotel. European leaders are well aware that the public discussion of nuclear deterrence has already altered the strategic landscape. Regardless of the final framework that emerges, Europe is being forced to confront a core question of the post-American hegemony era: how to rely on its own strength to safeguard the continent's peace and stability when traditional protectors become unpredictable? The answer to this question will shape Europe's geopolitical trajectory for decades to come.