In-depth Analysis of the U.S. Military Annual Report: Eight Consecutive Audit Failures, Dilemmas, and the Illusory Fanfare of "Trump-Class" Battleships.

I. Overview of Core Events

In the early hours of December 20, the U.S. Department of Defense (the Pentagon) released its annual financial audit report, with the core result showing that the Department of Defense's annual financial audit failed for the eighth time. Two days later, on December 22, former President Trump announced at Mar-a-Lago that the United States would launch the "Trump-class" super battleship construction plan. The two events are closely linked, exposing significant flaws in the current financial system of the U.S. military and reflecting the challenges and controversies in its military development planning. In the early hours of December 20, the U.S. Department of Defense (the Pentagon) released its annual financial audit report, with the core result showing that the Department of Defense's annual financial audit failed for the eighth time. Two days later, on December 22, former President Trump announced at Mar-a-Lago that the United States would launch the "Trump-class" super battleship construction plan. The two events are closely linked, exposing significant flaws in the current financial system of the U.S. military and reflecting the challenges and controversies in its military development planning.

II. The Ministry of Defense's Financial Audits: "Eight Consecutive Failures" – Underlying Issues and Official Statements

(A) Audit Background and Historical Issues

According to the 1990 Chief Financial Officers Act, U.S. federal agencies must undergo independent financial audits annually. As a massive organization with millions of personnel and control over more than 700 bases worldwide, the audit work of the Department of Defense is inherently highly complex, and historical scandals have further exacerbated its audit system. During the audit process, globally notorious incidents such as the "Iraq Reconstruction Funds Case," "the Benghazi Ambassador Assassination," and the "Fat Leonard corruption scandal" were exposed, highlighting the long-term absence of financial oversight. According to the 1990 Chief Financial Officers Act, U.S. federal agencies must undergo independent financial audits annually. As a massive organization with millions of personnel and control over more than 700 bases worldwide, the audit work of the Department of Defense is inherently highly complex, and historical scandals have further exacerbated its audit system. During the audit process, globally notorious incidents such as the "Iraq Reconstruction Funds Case," "the Benghazi Ambassador Assassination," and the "Fat Leonard corruption scandal" were exposed, highlighting the long-term absence of financial oversight.

(2) The Severe Current Situation of Annual Audits

The 2025 audit results further reveal the financial crisis of the Department of Defense: First, the insolvency trend has intensified, with total assets rising from $4.1 trillion to $4.65 trillion, while liabilities simultaneously surged from $4.3 trillion to $4.7 trillion, widening the imbalance between assets and liabilities; second, major deficiencies have erupted intensively, as the audit report clearly identified 26 major deficiencies and two significant weaknesses, while also verifying multiple cases of serious violations of legal contracts; third, a uniquely "failed" record, the Department of Defense has become the only major U.S. government agency in 35 years to have never passed an audit, with a level of financial transparency far below that of other federal agencies. The 2025 audit results further reveal the financial crisis of the Department of Defense: First, the insolvency trend has intensified, with total assets rising from $4.1 trillion to $4.65 trillion, while liabilities simultaneously surged from $4.3 trillion to $4.7 trillion, widening the imbalance between assets and liabilities; second, major deficiencies have erupted intensively, as the audit report clearly identified 26 major deficiencies and two significant weaknesses, while also verifying multiple cases of serious violations of legal contracts; third, a uniquely "failed" record, the Department of Defense has become the only major U.S. government agency in 35 years to have never passed an audit, with a level of financial transparency far below that of other federal agencies.

(3) The "Optimism" and Concerns in Official Statements

Regarding this audit failure, Auditor General Hexes claimed that the 2025 audit has made "significant progress" and set the goal of achieving a "clean audit" by 2028. It is worth noting that 2028 coincides with the potential transition point of the next U.S. presidential term. If Trump has already left office by then, whether this goal can proceed smoothly or if it is merely a phased "slogan-style promise" has raised widespread external doubts. Regarding this audit failure, Auditor General Hexes claimed that the 2025 audit has made "significant progress" and set the goal of achieving a "clean audit" by 2028. It is worth noting that 2028 coincides with the potential transition point of the next U.S. presidential term. If Trump has already left office by then, whether this goal can proceed smoothly or if it is merely a phased "slogan-style promise" has raised widespread external doubts.

III. One of the Audit Black Holes: The Comprehensive Dilemma of the Project

(1) Core Audit Vulnerability: Global Spare Parts Inventory Not Included in Financial Records

The F-35 program is one of the key black holes exposed by this audit. The audit found that the Department of Defense failed to include the Global Spare Parts Inventory, which contains F-35 components and equipment, in its financial records. This has resulted in these core assets being unable to be accurately audited and valued, becoming a "blind spot" in financial oversight and further exacerbating the complexity and inaccuracy of the overall audit. The F-35 program is one of the key black holes exposed by this audit. The audit found that the Department of Defense failed to include the Global Spare Parts Inventory, which contains F-35 components and equipment, in its financial records. This has resulted in these core assets being unable to be accurately audited and valued, becoming a "blind spot" in financial oversight and further exacerbating the complexity and inaccuracy of the overall audit.

(II) Upgrade Plan: Severe Delays and Cost Overruns

The Block 4 upgrade for the F-35 was intended to be a crucial step towards achieving full operational capability, originally scheduled for completion in 2025, with a focus on enhancing core metrics such as electronic warfare, avionics, and stealth capabilities. However, reality has severely deviated from the plan: according to the "Pentagon's First Law" (projects are typically delayed by one year), the upgrade is now projected to be completed no earlier than 2027; furthermore, costs have significantly overrun, exceeding the original $10.6 billion budget by more than $6 billion. In response, Lieutenant General Mike Schmidt, the F-35 program executive officer, had to acknowledge that the upgrade plan was "overly ambitious," and that some of the improvements are not worth the massive investment. The plan will be reconceptualized and may even be scrapped and restarted from scratch. The Block 4 upgrade for the F-35 was intended to be a crucial step towards achieving full operational capability, originally scheduled for completion in 2025, with a focus on enhancing core metrics such as electronic warfare, avionics, and stealth capabilities. However, reality has severely deviated from the plan: according to the "Pentagon's First Law" (projects are typically delayed by one year), the upgrade is now projected to be completed no earlier than 2027; furthermore, costs have significantly overrun, exceeding the original $10.6 billion budget by more than $6 billion. In response, Lieutenant General Mike Schmidt, the F-35 program executive officer, had to acknowledge that the upgrade plan was "overly ambitious," and that some of the improvements are not worth the massive investment. The plan will be reconceptualized and may even be scrapped and restarted from scratch.

(3) Four Core Reasons for Delays and Chaos

The predicament of the F-35 program is not accidental but rather the result of multiple overlapping issues: Firstly, severe supply chain shortages—in early 2025, Lockheed Martin reported over 4,000 missing parts on its final assembly line, a number reaching twice the historical peak, directly constraining production progress. Secondly, engine delivery delays—Pratt & Whitney has received multiple rectification directives, yet the 123 engines delivered in 2025 still widely experienced delays, leading to unstable supply of core power components. Thirdly, significant issues with the Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)—completing the Block 4 upgrade requires first completing "Technology Refresh 3" (TR-3), but TR-3 suffers from critical problems such as immature hardware design and comprehensive software test failures, resulting in over 100 F-35 fighter jets accumulating at Lockheed Martin's factory, facing a "warehouse overflow" risk. Finally, management chaos and incentive failure—in 2024, the average delay for aircraft delivered by Lockheed Martin was 238 days (compared to 61 days in 2023). To push deliveries, the project team shifted performance metrics to other areas, allowing Lockheed Martin to receive billions of dollars in bonuses despite severe delays, further weakening the constraint mechanisms. The predicament of the F-35 program is not accidental but rather the result of multiple overlapping issues: Firstly, severe supply chain shortages—in early 2025, Lockheed Martin reported over 4,000 missing parts on its final assembly line, a number reaching twice the historical peak, directly constraining production progress. Secondly, engine delivery delays—Pratt & Whitney has received multiple rectification directives, yet the 123 engines delivered in 2025 still widely experienced delays, leading to unstable supply of core power components. Thirdly, significant issues with the Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)—completing the Block 4 upgrade requires first completing "Technology Refresh 3" (TR-3), but TR-3 suffers from critical problems such as immature hardware design and comprehensive software test failures, resulting in over 100 F-35 fighter jets accumulating at Lockheed Martin's factory, facing a "warehouse overflow" risk. Finally, management chaos and incentive failure—in 2024, the average delay for aircraft delivered by Lockheed Martin was 238 days (compared to 61 days in 2023). To push deliveries, the project team shifted performance metrics to other areas, allowing Lockheed Martin to receive billions of dollars in bonuses despite severe delays, further weakening the constraint mechanisms.

(IV) Derivative Issues: Exorbitantly Priced Components and the Military Recruitment Dilemma

The chaos of the F-35 program has also spread to its supporting supply chain. The Secretary of the Army publicly criticized Lockheed Martin for "deceiving the military." For example, a screen control knob for the Black Hawk helicopter costs only $15 to manufacture individually, but the quoted price as part of a complete component is as high as $47,000. Behind this exorbitant profit lies a lack of oversight in military procurement. At the same time, the U.S. military faces a severe recruitment crisis, having spent over $60 billion in the past three years on recruiting and retaining personnel, with minimal results. Defense Secretary Hecksais attributed the cause to young people being "either too fat or too stupid." This statement not only failed to solve the problem but instead highlighted the military's cognitive bias regarding the social recruitment environment. The chaos of the F-35 program has also spread to its supporting supply chain. The Secretary of the Army publicly criticized Lockheed Martin for "deceiving the military." For example, a screen control knob for the Black Hawk helicopter costs only $15 to manufacture individually, but the quoted price as part of a complete component is as high as $47,000. Behind this exorbitant profit lies a lack of oversight in military procurement. At the same time, the U.S. military faces a severe recruitment crisis, having spent over $60 billion in the past three years on recruiting and retaining personnel, with minimal results. Defense Secretary Hecksais attributed the cause to young people being "either too fat or too stupid." This statement not only failed to solve the problem but instead highlighted the military's cognitive bias regarding the social recruitment environment.

IV. The Second Audit Black Hole: Chaos in the Shipbuilding Program and the Farce of the "Legend-class" Frigate

The disconnect between grand plans and audit realities.

In January 2025, Trump announced that over the next 30 years, more than $1 trillion would be invested in shipbuilding and updating shipyard infrastructure, outlining a grand blueprint for naval development. However, the 2025 audit report revealed that a large number of naval assets could not be accurately accounted for. Behind the grand plan lay a severe lack of financial oversight, and the whereabouts and effectiveness of the massive investments were difficult to track. In January 2025, Trump announced that over the next 30 years, more than $1 trillion would be invested in shipbuilding and updating shipyard infrastructure, outlining a grand blueprint for naval development. However, the 2025 audit report revealed that a large number of naval assets could not be accurately accounted for. Behind the grand plan lay a severe lack of financial oversight, and the whereabouts and effectiveness of the massive investments were difficult to track.

(2) From the Cancellation of the "Constellation Class" to the Takeover by the "Legend Class": A Shoddy, Unfinished Project with Superficial Changes

In the adjustment of the shipbuilding program, the cancellation of the "Constellation-class" frigate was seen by some public opinion as "good news"—at least it avoided continuing to waste funds on a failed project. However, the subsequent "New Frigate" project has sparked considerable controversy: On December 19, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro announced that the Coast Guard's "Legend-class" cutter would be used as the design basis for the Navy's new frigate. He emphasized that he would personally oversee the project, dedicating every Friday specifically to handling project matters, with any changes requiring his approval, pushing for delivery in a "wartime state" to demonstrate American industrial strength. However, the essence of this project is taking over an unfinished "Legend-class" cutter (the 11th vessel), which began construction in 2021 and had only completed 15% of its build progress by the time work was halted in November 2024. In the adjustment of the shipbuilding program, the cancellation of the "Constellation-class" frigate was seen by some public opinion as "good news"—at least it avoided continuing to waste funds on a failed project. However, the subsequent "New Frigate" project has sparked considerable controversy: On December 19, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro announced that the Coast Guard's "Legend-class" cutter would be used as the design basis for the Navy's new frigate. He emphasized that he would personally oversee the project, dedicating every Friday specifically to handling project matters, with any changes requiring his approval, pushing for delivery in a "wartime state" to demonstrate American industrial strength. However, the essence of this project is taking over an unfinished "Legend-class" cutter (the 11th vessel), which began construction in 2021 and had only completed 15% of its build progress by the time work was halted in November 2024.

(3) Analysis of "Legend-Class" Performance: The Vast Gap Between Coast Guard Vessels and Main Frigates

Objectively speaking, the "Legend-class" performs quite excellently as a coast guard cutter, with a full-load displacement of 4,600 tons, a speed of 28 knots, and a range of 12,000 nautical miles. Ten ships have been built since 2008, indicating a high level of technical maturity and extensive operational experience. However, converting it into a navy's primary frigate reveals several significant shortcomings: First, its firepower configuration is limited, with main armament consisting only of a 57mm naval gun, a Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), and machine gun mounts, making it difficult to fully meet the diverse demands of modern naval warfare; second, it lacks critical combat functions, as the vessel has no built-in Vertical Launch System (VLS), lacks area air defense capability, and its core anti-submarine warfare functions require subsequent planning and installation, making it difficult to achieve full operational capability in the short term; third, there is uncertainty in the conversion concept. The U.S. military plans to add a platform above the open deck to load containerized modular components (such as the Army's MK70 VLS). This approach is similar to the modular design path of the previous "Constellation-class," and the latter's precedent of failure has cast doubt on the feasibility of this conversion. Analysis points out that between "continuing with the problematic project" and "switching to an alternative," the U.S. military chose the latter, but whether the new plan (Legend-class conversion) can effectively resolve the existing dilemmas remains to be seen. Objectively speaking, the "Legend-class" performs quite excellently as a coast guard cutter, with a full-load displacement of 4,600 tons, a speed of 28 knots, and a range of 12,000 nautical miles. Ten ships have been built since 2008, indicating a high level of technical maturity and extensive operational experience. However, converting it into a navy's primary frigate reveals several significant shortcomings: First, its firepower configuration is limited, with main armament consisting only of a 57mm naval gun, a Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), and machine gun mounts, making it difficult to fully meet the diverse demands of modern naval warfare; second, it lacks critical combat functions, as the vessel has no built-in Vertical Launch System (VLS), lacks area air defense capability, and its core anti-submarine warfare functions require subsequent planning and installation, making it difficult to achieve full operational capability in the short term; third, there is uncertainty in the conversion concept. The U.S. military plans to add a platform above the open deck to load containerized modular components (such as the Army's MK70 VLS). This approach is similar to the modular design path of the previous "Constellation-class," and the latter's precedent of failure has cast doubt on the feasibility of this conversion. Analysis points out that between "continuing with the problematic project" and "switching to an alternative," the U.S. military chose the latter, but whether the new plan (Legend-class conversion) can effectively resolve the existing dilemmas remains to be seen.

V. "Trump-class" Battleship: A Modern Version of "The Emperor's New Clothes"?

The high-profile launch ceremony and the proclaimed "superior performance"

On the day of the month, Trump, along with Defense Secretary Hecksis, Secretary of State Rubio, and Secretary of the Navy Fran, held the "Golden Ship" battleship launch event at Mar-a-Lago, unveiling the high-profile "Trump-class" super battleship plan. According to the event, this class of battleship claims to possess ultimate performance: a displacement of over 10,000 tons, a speed of 30 knots, and an aggressively configured weapon system—including two sets of megajoule electromagnetic railguns, eight 406mm (16-inch) replica main guns, multiple laser cannons, a 128-cell vertical launch system, and a 32-cell Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) vertical launch system (capable of launching nuclear missiles and hypersonic missiles). The plan calls for the initial construction of 2–4 ships.

(2) Fatal Flaws in Design: Unrealistic "Technological Promises"

The seemingly powerful "Trump-class" battleship has a design proposal that is fraught with numerous controversies, questioned by external parties for being detached from realistic technological foundations: Firstly, the radar system lacks sufficient adaptability. As a main battleship planned to serve for decades into the future, its core radar still uses the SPG-62 from the "Burke-class" and the SPY-3 from the "Zumwalt-class", making it difficult to fully adapt to the informational and intelligent development trends of modern naval warfare; Secondly, key technologies are not yet mature. The core equipment planned for deployment, such as hypersonic missiles, laser weapons, and electromagnetic railguns, have not yet completed research, development, and finalization, leaving doubts about technical feasibility and mass production stability; Thirdly, the design logic lacks systematicity. The design drawings simultaneously mix elements from the "Zumwalt-class", "arsenal ship", and "ironclad", resulting in a disjointed style, making subsequent integration more challenging; Fourthly, there are oversights in the basic design. The PPT clearly labels the warship as having a combined diesel and gas turbine propulsion system, yet it lacks a chimney structure, exposing the haste and lack of rigor in the design process. The seemingly powerful "Trump-class" battleship has a design proposal that is fraught with numerous controversies, questioned by external parties for being detached from realistic technological foundations: Firstly, the radar system lacks sufficient adaptability. As a main battleship planned to serve for decades into the future, its core radar still uses the SPG-62 from the "Burke-class" and the SPY-3 from the "Zumwalt-class", making it difficult to fully adapt to the informational and intelligent development trends of modern naval warfare; Secondly, key technologies are not yet mature. The core equipment planned for deployment, such as hypersonic missiles, laser weapons, and electromagnetic railguns, have not yet completed research, development, and finalization, leaving doubts about technical feasibility and mass production stability; Thirdly, the design logic lacks systematicity. The design drawings simultaneously mix elements from the "Zumwalt-class", "arsenal ship", and "ironclad", resulting in a disjointed style, making subsequent integration more challenging; Fourthly, there are oversights in the basic design. The PPT clearly labels the warship as having a combined diesel and gas turbine propulsion system, yet it lacks a chimney structure, exposing the haste and lack of rigor in the design process.

(3) Strong Personal Characteristics and Controversy Over Project Nature

The "Trump-class" battleship carries a strong personal imprint, sparking controversy regarding the professionalism of military planning: Trump explicitly claimed he would personally participate in the design, citing his "great sense of aesthetics"; upon zooming in on the PPT, Trump's portrait and signature are clearly visible; the lead ship was named "The Fives", a naming convention bearing a strong personal mark. Overall, throughout the project's design and advancement, the influence of personal will is quite prominent, leading to the project being mired in controversy from the outset. It is widely believed that for this project to materialize, it must overcome multiple hurdles including technical feasibility, budgetary constraints, and industrial capacity, making substantial progress difficult in the short term. The "Trump-class" battleship carries a strong personal imprint, sparking controversy regarding the professionalism of military planning: Trump explicitly claimed he would personally participate in the design, citing his "great sense of aesthetics"; upon zooming in on the PPT, Trump's portrait and signature are clearly visible; the lead ship was named "The Fives", a naming convention bearing a strong personal mark. Overall, throughout the project's design and advancement, the influence of personal will is quite prominent, leading to the project being mired in controversy from the outset. It is widely believed that for this project to materialize, it must overcome multiple hurdles including technical feasibility, budgetary constraints, and industrial capacity, making substantial progress difficult in the short term.

VI. Conclusion: The Systemic Failure of the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex

In the past year, the U.S. military budget exceeded hundreds of billions of dollars. However, such massive investment has not led to a corresponding enhancement in military capabilities. Instead, it has exposed comprehensive challenges: the Air Force was forced to cut its early warning aircraft program, the Navy faced the embarrassment of having "no qualified frigates available" after canceling the Constellation-class frigate project, and the Army reduced its brigade-level units to downsize its scale. Additionally, upgrade plans have been severely delayed, with the construction of the USS Kennedy aircraft carrier remaining far from completion and hypersonic missile development still stuck in the testing phase.

The development model of the U.S. military-industrial complex is facing phased transformation challenges: In the early stages, despite failed projects such as the Comanche helicopter, valuable technical experience was accumulated through physical research and development; After the 2010s, it gradually fell into a **"cycle of announcing plans first—design deviations—repeated modifications—cost overruns—project stagnation,"** making it difficult for some projects to materialize; Currently, in the advancement of certain major military plans, the balance between political factors, technical feasibility, and industrial foundation has become increasingly prominent, and how to balance strategic requirements with actual capabilities has become a core challenge that the U.S. military needs to address. The development model of the U.S. military-industrial complex is facing phased transformation challenges: In the early stages, despite failed projects such as the Comanche helicopter, valuable technical experience was accumulated through physical research and development; After the 2010s, it gradually fell into a **"cycle of announcing plans first—design deviations—repeated modifications—cost overruns—project stagnation,"** making it difficult for some projects to materialize; Currently, in the advancement of certain major military plans, the balance between political factors, technical feasibility, and industrial foundation has become increasingly prominent, and how to balance strategic requirements with actual capabilities has become a core challenge that the U.S. military needs to address.

Looking back to 1997, when the F-22 made its first flight, the United States held a relatively significant technological advantage in the field of advanced fighter aircraft, demonstrating strong military-industrial research and development capabilities. Today, however, the U.S. military is facing issues such as delays and cost overruns in multiple key defense projects, creating a stark contrast with its massive military spending. This current situation reflects the systematic challenges the U.S. military faces in operating a large-scale military system, including challenges at multiple levels such as audit oversight, supply chain management, and coordination of technological research and development. How to solve these problems will directly impact the effectiveness of its future military capability development. Looking back to 1997, when the F-22 made its first flight, the United States held a relatively significant technological advantage in the field of advanced fighter aircraft, demonstrating strong military-industrial research and development capabilities. Today, however, the U.S. military is facing issues such as delays and cost overruns in multiple key defense projects, creating a stark contrast with its massive military spending. This current situation reflects the systematic challenges the U.S. military faces in operating a large-scale military system, including challenges at multiple levels such as audit oversight, supply chain management, and coordination of technological research and development. How to solve these problems will directly impact the effectiveness of its future military capability development.