In-depth Analysis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific "Eagle of Resistance" Strategy - Detailed Explanation of U.S. National Security Strategy (Part 3)
03/01/2026
The document signifies a major U.S. military reform led by H.R. McMaster, with its core being the abandonment of the high-end arms race with China and a shift toward building the Asia-Pacific Resistance Eagle strategy centered on low-cost drones. This strategy not only represents a significant transformation in U.S. military operational philosophy but also reflects the real dilemma of the United States' inability to sustain global hegemony due to its national power constraints. This article will provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategy from six dimensions: the progress of the drone strategy, the advancement and resistance of the reform, the core logic of the strategy, the Asia-Pacific layout, the essence of the reform, and the strategic motivations.
I. Strategic Support: Progress in the Development and Deployment of Low-Cost Drones
The construction of unmanned aerial vehicle combat capabilities serves as the core support for the implementation of the Resistance Hawk strategy. The U.S. military is accelerating efforts to address gaps in the field of low-cost UAVs through measures such as replication, upgrades, and large-scale procurement.
(1) Core Breakthrough: Practical Deployment of Replica Iranian Drones
The United States is putting the vision of a drone-based divine kingdom into practice, with its Resistance Hawk strategy being fleshed out with concrete details. A key example lies in the deployment of drones modeled after Iran's Shahed-136 to the Middle East, serving as a direct warning to Iran. Additionally, the U.S. Central Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has stationed such drone units in the region. This marks the first time the U.S. military has deployed drones similar to the Shahed-136, with the core objective of expanding low-cost combat capabilities and enhancing regional deterrence. From a strategic extension perspective, these low-cost drones, often referred to as "little motorcycles," will ultimately be used to assist allies in the Asia-Pacific region and for the U.S. military's own purposes, forming a deterrent against potential adversaries such as China, Russia, and North Korea.
(II) Development Status: A Coexistence of Performance, Plans, and Lag
The U.S. military's replica of the "Little Motor" drone demonstrates significant cost-effectiveness advantages: with a maximum range of approximately 2,000 kilometers and a per-unit target cost of only $35,000, while a single Tomahawk missile has a factory price of about $5.23 million, which could be exchanged for approximately 150 "Little Motor" drones. To enhance combat effectiveness, the U.S. military plans to equip them with data links, enabling human-in-the-loop control. This will allow them to break through the limitations of fixed-target strikes, equipping them with the capability to engage air defense positions, time-sensitive targets, and perform counter-drone missions.
In terms of procurement, the U.S. military has initiated an emergency project worth $10 billion, planning to purchase hundreds of thousands of small drones, primarily FPV drones. However, it cannot be ignored that the U.S. military's progress in large-scale deployment of low-cost drones has been extremely slow: The People's Liberation Army conducted FPV drone tactical exercises as early as 2022, while the U.S. military did not conduct its first large-scale FPV combat exercise in the Philippines until May 2025. Moreover, there remains a significant gap between the scale of drone application at the grassroots unit level and global trends. In terms of procurement, the U.S. military has initiated an emergency project worth $10 billion, planning to purchase hundreds of thousands of small drones, primarily FPV drones. However, it cannot be ignored that the U.S. military's progress in large-scale deployment of low-cost drones has been extremely slow: The People's Liberation Army conducted FPV drone tactical exercises as early as 2022, while the U.S. military did not conduct its first large-scale FPV combat exercise in the Philippines until May 2025. Moreover, there remains a significant gap between the scale of drone application at the grassroots unit level and global trends.
II. Reform Advancement: Hagseus's Transformation Initiatives and Practical Challenges
The military reform led by Hagesis is a key driver for the implementation of the Resistance Eagle strategy. Its core logic is to create space for the low-cost drone strategy through resource reallocation, but the reform process has encountered significant resistance.
(1) Core Reform Measures: Reduce High-Cost Projects and Focus on Low-Cost Combat Capabilities
Hagerseus's reform path is clear and radical: on one hand, vigorously advancing the construction of low-cost combat capabilities such as drone units and $150,000-class cheap long-range cruise missiles; on the other hand, decisively cutting multiple traditional high-cost projects, including the new-generation armed reconnaissance helicopter, medium landing craft, M10 Booker light tank, among others, and having significantly reduced the defense budget. More disruptively, he is driving a reorganization of the U.S. military command structure, planning to reduce the 11 highest military command agencies to 8, cut 20% of four-star generals, and rename the Department of Defense to the Department of War, aiming to enhance decision-making efficiency and focus on the Asia-Pacific strategic priority.
The reform logic directly addresses the reality of U.S.-China confrontation: From the perspective of engaging in high-intensity maritime and air confrontations with China, cutting expensive yet limited large main warships (such as Constellation-class frigates and Arleigh Burke III destroyers) and instead procuring large quantities of low-cost drones is a more pragmatic choice. Essentially, it aims to engage in a war of attrition with China using small drones, competing in societal resilience and industrial capacity.
(2) Resistance to Reform: Impeachment Investigations and Interest Group Games
The reforms initiated by Hagesis have disrupted the existing interest structure and are currently facing severe challenges. Due to a "finishing blow" strike on a drug-trafficking vessel near Yemen, he has been accused of violating the laws of armed conflict and military ethical standards, leading to impeachment investigations and special oversight by the U.S. Congress (including the Republican Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee). Additionally, measures such as the reorganization of anti-drone agencies and the integration of cross-service resources, which he has promoted, may encounter resistance and institutional obstacles as they encroach upon the dominance of exclusive projects within each military branch.
III. Strategic Core: The Logic of a War of Attrition—"Inflict Pain, Not Defeat"
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy document, serving as the programmatic summary of the Hagesis military reform, clarifies the core logic and ultimate objectives of the Resistance Eagle strategy, demonstrating the U.S. military's underlying assessment of the military confrontation between China and the United States.
(1) Three Core Logics: Abandon the Quantity Race, Shift to Attrition and Delay
The core logic of this strategy can be summarized into three points: First, it is assumed that the United States cannot surpass China in the numerical competition of large main combat equipment (such as fighter jets and warships), which serves as the premise for the U.S. military's strategic transformation; second, based on this assessment, the U.S. abandons direct competition and instead opts to engage in attrition with China using military bases and drone fleets, aiming to buy time and wait for changes in the situation; third, leveraging geographical advantages on the battlefield to confine the conflict to the Asia-Pacific region—in a potential exchange of fire between China and the U.S., China would face the risk of strikes on its core mainland areas, while the U.S. would only bear the losses of its Asia-Pacific allies and military bases, thereby reducing the probability of damage to its own core interests.
(II) Ultimate Goal: Achieving a "Limited Victory" Through Negotiations
The ultimate goal of this strategy is not to seek the military annihilation of the PLA, but to force China to the negotiating table by imposing unacceptable costs, leading to the signing of an armistice treaty favorable to the United States. In short, the core objective of the U.S. military is to inflict significant pain on China rather than to achieve total victory over China; its essence is to maximize strategic interests through controlled military pressure.
IV. Regional Layout: Imitation and Shortcomings of the Asia-Pacific "Arc of Resistance"
To implement the Eagle Resistance Strategy, the United States has established a layout model in the Asia-Pacific region that highly mimics its Middle Eastern counterpart's Axis of Resistance. This approach aims to create an operational system where allies hold the frontline while the U.S. provides support from the rear.
(1) Role Division in the "Axis of Resistance": Emulating the Iranian Model
In the U.S. Asia-Pacific resistance arc layout, the roles are clearly defined: Taiwan is regarded as the Asia-Pacific Hezbollah, serving as the frontline resistance force; Japan is positioned as the U.S. Hezbollah, tasked with bearing the brunt of frontline engagements; the United States itself plays a role similar to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), operating from the second line, coordinating various parties, and providing long-range missile, drone, and other fire support. This model, where allies bear frontline pressure while the U.S. conducts long-range strikes, is referred to as the Asia-Pacific version of the octopus strategy, essentially replicating the regional combat experience of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
(2) Critical Weakness: Questionable Combat Capability of Allies
The core flaw of this layout lies in the insufficient combat effectiveness of allies: Taiwan's military hard power and will to resist are far inferior to those of Ukraine, Hezbollah, or Hamas. Although South Korea possesses relatively strong capabilities, its determination to fully engage in confrontation is questionable and is considered potentially a more capable "cheating Shangguan UAE." Japan lacks both offensive capabilities and long-range missiles, making it unqualified as a frontline unit and ineffective as a firing unit, thus struggling to fulfill the strategic role assigned by the United States. Additionally, equipment such as drones and missile systems deployed by the U.S. military in allied regions like the Philippines still faces practical challenges, including insufficient adaptability to jungle and archipelago environments.
V. Essence of Reform and Strategic Motivation: A Graceful Contraction Amid Manufacturing Decline
The military reform led by Hagesis and the Resistance Eagle strategy, while ostensibly a transformation in combat doctrine, are in fact a passive adjustment following the decline of U.S. national power. Behind this lies a deeper motive: making a final gain before strategic contraction.
The Essence of Reform: A Pragmatic Shift Driven by the Decline of the Manufacturing Sector
Compared to the Obama and Biden eras, Hagerseis' reforms are more aligned with practical combat confrontation thinking. For example, the high-intensity FPV drone confrontation exercise conducted by the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division and Philippine forces on Luzon Island in May 2025 drew on the Chinese grassroots units' combat readiness experience of using 3D printing technology to manufacture drone components on-site. However, the essence of these reforms is not proactive innovation but stems from a fundamental reality: the U.S. manufacturing capacity (the lifeline of the defense industry) has severely declined. Whether it involves making allies foot the bill, adjusting production lines, or abandoning high-end equipment, these are inevitable outcomes of the United States' inability to sustain its global hegemonic ambitions. The so-called "arc of resistance" is essentially a transitional form of hegemonic contraction.
Strategic Motivation: "Limited Conflict" Deployment Prior to Strategic Contraction
A seemingly paradoxical inference emerges: precisely when the United States firmly adopts the Monroe Doctrine and retreats to the Americas, the likelihood of engaging in a limited-intensity conflict with China paradoxically increases. The motivation resembles that of a merchant on the brink of bankruptcy making one last grab before fleeing: the U.S. needs a conflict with significant propaganda value, high visibility of the opponent, and one where winning or losing does not result in a loss of face. It cannot choose Russia, which has already demonstrated formidable strength (to avoid being drawn into a war of attrition), nor can it opt for Iran, which lacks sufficient influence (and thus propaganda value). Therefore, China, which has not yet gone to war but wields global influence, becomes the optimal choice.
Predicting that this decisive battle is more likely to be a limited conflict: the United States will not bet on expensive assets such as aircraft carriers and advanced fighter jets, but will instead adopt a "remote garbage-dumping" model, deploying large numbers of cheap drones and missiles. The advantages of this approach are: first, asset losses are controllable, making it easy to withdraw at any time; second, it trades Asia-Pacific bases and allied core areas for the right to strike China's mainland core areas, which appears worthwhile in terms of propaganda; third, the results of the battle are difficult to clearly define, making it convenient for both sides to claim victory (similar to the mutual attacks between Iran and Israel). Its ultimate goal is to create conditions for the United States to strategically withdraw with dignity through a controllable conflict that can be defined in propaganda as not a loss.
Conclusion
The U.S. Asia-Pacific Resistance Hawk Strategy is a core implementation measure of the 2025 National Security Strategy. In essence, it represents a passive transformation of the U.S. military—abandoning high-end arms races in favor of low-cost attrition warfare amid the backdrop of manufacturing decline. Although Haigesaisi's reforms are pragmatic in direction and demonstrate strong execution, they face dual pressures from internal impeachment investigations and interest group maneuvering. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific Resistance Arc it aims to build suffers from critical weaknesses due to insufficient capabilities among allies. Whether this strategic transformation can achieve the goal of a dignified U.S. retrenchment remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that it will profoundly impact the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region and reflects broader trends of loosening and restructuring within the global hegemony system.