In-depth Analysis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific "Eagle of Resistance" Strategy - Detailed Explanation of U.S. National Security Strategy (Part 3)

The document signifies a major "military reform" led by the U.S. military, with the core focus on abandoning the high-end arms race with China and shifting toward building an Asia-Pacific "Resistance Eagle" strategy centered on low-cost drones. This strategy not only represents a significant transformation in the U.S. military’s operational philosophy but also reflects the practical dilemma of the United States struggling to sustain its global hegemony due to limitations in national strength. This article will provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategy from six dimensions: the progress of the drone strategy, the advancement and resistance of the reform, the core logic of the strategy, the Asia-Pacific layout, the essence of the reform, and the strategic motivations.

I. Strategic Support: Progress in the Development and Deployment of Low-Cost Drones

The development of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) combat capabilities serves as the core support for the implementation of the "Resistance Eagle" strategy. The U.S. military is accelerating efforts to address gaps in the field of low-cost UAVs through measures such as replication, upgrades, and large-scale procurement.

(1) Core Breakthrough: Practical Deployment of Replica Iranian Drones

The United States is putting the vision of a "Drone Superpower" into practice, with its "Resistance Hawk" strategy being fleshed out with concrete content. A key example is that the U.S. has deployed drones modeled after Iran's Shahed-136 to the Middle East as a direct warning to Iran, and the U.S. Central Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has already stationed such drone units in the region.This marks the first time the U.S. military has deployed drones similar to the Shahed-136, with the core objective of expanding low-cost combat capabilities and enhancing regional deterrence. From a strategic extension perspective, these low-cost drones, referred to as "little motorcycles," will ultimately be used to assist allies in the Asia-Pacific and for the U.S. military's own use, forming a deterrent against potential adversaries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and others. The United States is putting the vision of a "Drone Superpower" into practice, with its "Resistance Hawk" strategy being fleshed out with concrete content. A key example is that the U.S. has deployed drones modeled after Iran's Shahed-136 to the Middle East as a direct warning to Iran, and the U.S. Central Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has already stationed such drone units in the region.This marks the first time the U.S. military has deployed drones similar to the Shahed-136, with the core objective of expanding low-cost combat capabilities and enhancing regional deterrence. From a strategic extension perspective, these low-cost drones, referred to as "little motorcycles," will ultimately be used to assist allies in the Asia-Pacific and for the U.S. military's own use, forming a deterrent against potential adversaries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and others.

(II) Development Status: A Coexistence of Performance, Plans, and Lag

The U.S. military's imitation of the "small motorcycle" drone demonstrates significant cost-effectiveness advantages: with a maximum range of approximately kilometers and a unit target cost of only . million dollars, while a single missile has a factory price of about million dollars, which could be exchanged for approximately "small motorcycle" drones. To enhance combat effectiveness, the U.S. military plans to equip them with data links to achieve "man-in-the-loop" control, enabling them to break through the limitations of fixed target strikes and gain the capability to engage air defense positions, time-sensitive targets, and perform counter-drone missions.

In terms of procurement, the U.S. military has initiated an emergency project worth $10 billion, planning to purchase hundreds of thousands of small drones, primarily FPV drones. However, it cannot be ignored that the U.S. military's progress in large-scale deployment of low-cost drones has been extremely slow: The People's Liberation Army conducted FPV drone tactical exercises as early as 2022, while the U.S. military did not conduct its first large-scale FPV combat exercise in the Philippines until May 2025. Moreover, there remains a significant gap between the scale of drone application at the grassroots unit level and global trends. In terms of procurement, the U.S. military has initiated an emergency project worth $10 billion, planning to purchase hundreds of thousands of small drones, primarily FPV drones. However, it cannot be ignored that the U.S. military's progress in large-scale deployment of low-cost drones has been extremely slow: The People's Liberation Army conducted FPV drone tactical exercises as early as 2022, while the U.S. military did not conduct its first large-scale FPV combat exercise in the Philippines until May 2025. Moreover, there remains a significant gap between the scale of drone application at the grassroots unit level and global trends.

II. Reform Advancement: Hagseus's Transformation Initiatives and Practical Challenges

The military reform led by Hagesis is a key driver for the implementation of the "Resistance Eagle" strategy. Its core logic is to create space for a low-cost drone strategy through resource reallocation, but the reform process has encountered significant resistance.

(1) Core Reform Measures: Reduce High-Cost Projects and Focus on Low-Cost Combat Capabilities

Hegesis' reform path is clear and radical: on one hand, he vigorously promotes the development of low-cost military capabilities such as drone units and low-cost long-range cruise missiles priced in the tens of thousands of dollars; on the other hand, he decisively cancels multiple traditional high-cost projects, including the next-generation armed reconnaissance helicopter, medium landing craft, and light tanks, and has significantly cut the defense budget. Even more disruptive is his push to restructure the U.S. military command system, planning to reduce the number of top military command institutions from several to a few, cut the number of four-star generals by a certain percentage, and rename the Department of Defense to the "Department of War," all aimed at improving decision-making efficiency and focusing on the strategic priority in the Asia-Pacific region.

Its reform logic directly addresses the reality of U.S.-China confrontation: From the perspective of engaging in high-intensity maritime and air confrontation with China, cutting expensive yet limited large main warships (such as Constellation-class frigates, Arleigh Burke III destroyers) and instead procuring large numbers of low-cost drones is a more pragmatic choice. In essence, it aims to wage a war of attrition against China using "small motorcycles," competing in societal resilience and industrial capacity. Its reform logic directly addresses the reality of U.S.-China confrontation: From the perspective of engaging in high-intensity maritime and air confrontation with China, cutting expensive yet limited large main warships (such as Constellation-class frigates, Arleigh Burke III destroyers) and instead procuring large numbers of low-cost drones is a more pragmatic choice. In essence, it aims to wage a war of attrition against China using "small motorcycles," competing in societal resilience and industrial capacity.

(2) Resistance to Reform: Impeachment Investigations and Interest Group Games

Hegesius's reforms have disrupted the existing interest structure and are now facing severe challenges. Following a "finishing blow" strike on a drug-smuggling vessel near Yemen, he has been accused of violating the laws of armed conflict and military ethics. This has led to impeachment investigations and special oversight by the U.S. Congress, including the Republican Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Additionally, his initiatives to restructure anti-drone agencies and integrate resources across military branches, which encroach upon the exclusive project leadership of each branch, may provoke resistance and encounter systemic obstacles.

III. Strategic Core: The Logic of a War of Attrition—"Inflict Pain, Not Defeat"

The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy document, serving as a programmatic summary of the Hagsais military reforms, clarifies the core logic and ultimate objectives of the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy, revealing the underlying assumptions of the U.S. military regarding military confrontation between China and the United States.

(1) Three Core Logics: Abandon the Quantity Race, Shift to Attrition and Delay

The core logic of this strategy can be summarized into three points: First, it is acknowledged that surpassing China in the numerical competition of large-scale main combat equipment (aircraft, warships) is unattainable by default, which is the premise of the U.S. military's strategic transformation; second, based on this assessment, abandoning head-on catch-up and instead using U.S. military bases and drone fleets to "exchange blood" and engage in attrition with China, buying time to await "changes in the situation"; third, leveraging battlefield geographical advantages to confine conflicts to the Asia-Pacific region—in a Sino-U.S. firepower exchange, China would bear the risk of strikes on its homeland core areas, while the U.S. would only need to shoulder the losses of its Asia-Pacific allies and military bases, thereby reducing the probability of damage to its own core interests. The core logic of this strategy can be summarized into three points: First, it is acknowledged that surpassing China in the numerical competition of large-scale main combat equipment (aircraft, warships) is unattainable by default, which is the premise of the U.S. military's strategic transformation; second, based on this assessment, abandoning head-on catch-up and instead using U.S. military bases and drone fleets to "exchange blood" and engage in attrition with China, buying time to await "changes in the situation"; third, leveraging battlefield geographical advantages to confine conflicts to the Asia-Pacific region—in a Sino-U.S. firepower exchange, China would bear the risk of strikes on its homeland core areas, while the U.S. would only need to shoulder the losses of its Asia-Pacific allies and military bases, thereby reducing the probability of damage to its own core interests.

(II) Ultimate Goal: Achieving a "Limited Victory" Through Negotiations

The ultimate goal of this strategy is not to seek the military annihilation of the People's Liberation Army, but to force China to the negotiating table and sign an armistice treaty favorable to the United States by making China bear "unacceptable costs." In short, the core demand of the U.S. military is to "inflict pain" on China rather than to "defeat" China. Its essence is to maximize strategic interests through controlled military pressure.The ultimate goal of this strategy is not to seek the military annihilation of the People's Liberation Army, but to force China to the negotiating table and sign an armistice treaty favorable to the United States by making China bear "unacceptable costs." In short, the core demand of the U.S. military is to "inflict pain" on China rather than to "defeat" China. Its essence is to maximize strategic interests through controlled military pressure.

IV. Regional Layout: Imitation and Shortcomings of the Asia-Pacific "Arc of Resistance"

To implement the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy, the United States has established a layout in the Asia-Pacific region that closely mirrors the "Axis of Resistance" ( ) of its Middle Eastern adversaries, aiming to create an operational system where "allies hold the front lines while the U.S. provides support from the rear."

(1) Role Division in the "Axis of Resistance": Emulating the Iranian Model

In the U.S. strategy of building an "arc of resistance" in the Asia-Pacific, the division of roles is clear: Taiwan is regarded as the "Asia-Pacific Pearl Party," serving as the frontline resistance force; Japan is positioned as the "American Pearl Party," tasked with bearing the brunt of the confrontation; and the U.S. itself plays a role similar to Iran's "Revolutionary Guard," operating from the second line to coordinate various parties and provide firepower support such as long-range missiles and drones. This model, described as "allies bearing the pressure on the frontlines while the U.S. conducts long-range strikes," is referred to as the Asia-Pacific version of the "Octopus Tactics." In essence, it replicates the regional combat experience of Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

(2) Critical Weakness: Questionable Combat Capability of Allies

The core flaw in this arrangement lies in the insufficient combat capabilities of the allies: Taiwan's military strength and will to resist are far inferior to those of Ukraine, Hezbollah, or Hamas; while South Korea possesses stronger capabilities, its commitment to fully engaging in a confrontation is questionable, often perceived as a "more capable but unreliable ally like the UAE." Japan, on the other hand, lacks offensive capabilities and long-range missiles, making it inadequate as a "frontline unit" and ineffective as a "shooting unit," thus struggling to fulfill the strategic role assigned by the United States. Additionally, equipment such as drones and missile systems deployed by the U.S. military in allied regions like the Philippines still face practical challenges, including insufficient adaptability to jungle and archipelago environments.

V. Essence of Reform and Strategic Motivation: A Graceful Contraction Amid Manufacturing Decline

The military reform led by Hagesis and the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy, ostensibly a transformation in combat philosophy, are in fact a passive adjustment following the decline of U.S. national power. Behind this lies a deeper motive: a "final grab" before strategic contraction.

The Essence of Reform: A Pragmatic Shift Driven by the Decline of the Manufacturing Sector

Compared to the Obama and Biden eras, Hagerseis' reforms are more aligned with the mindset of actual combat confrontation. For example, the high-intensity FPV drone confrontation exercise conducted by the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division and Philippine forces on Luzon Island in May 2025 drew lessons from the Chinese grassroots units' combat readiness experience of using 3D printing technology to manufacture drone components on-site. However, the essence of these reforms is not proactive innovation but stems from a fundamental reality: the manufacturing capacity of the United States (the lifeline of the defense industry) has severely declined. Whether it is asking allies to contribute funds, adjusting production lines, or abandoning high-end equipment, these are inevitable consequences of the United States' inability to sustain its global hegemonic ambitions with its national strength. The so-called "arc of resistance" is essentially a transitional form of hegemonic contraction. Compared to the Obama and Biden eras, Hagerseis' reforms are more aligned with the mindset of actual combat confrontation. For example, the high-intensity FPV drone confrontation exercise conducted by the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division and Philippine forces on Luzon Island in May 2025 drew lessons from the Chinese grassroots units' combat readiness experience of using 3D printing technology to manufacture drone components on-site. However, the essence of these reforms is not proactive innovation but stems from a fundamental reality: the manufacturing capacity of the United States (the lifeline of the defense industry) has severely declined. Whether it is asking allies to contribute funds, adjusting production lines, or abandoning high-end equipment, these are inevitable consequences of the United States' inability to sustain its global hegemonic ambitions with its national strength. The so-called "arc of resistance" is essentially a transitional form of hegemonic contraction.

Strategic Motivation: "Limited Conflict" Deployment Prior to Strategic Contraction

A seemingly contradictory inference emerges: precisely as the United States reaffirms its commitment to the "Monroe Doctrine" and retracts its focus to the Americas, the likelihood of a "limited-intensity conflict" with China paradoxically increases. The motivation resembles that of a merchant on the verge of bankruptcy attempting to "make one last grab" before fleeing. The United States needs a conflict with significant propaganda impact, high visibility of the opponent, and one where "win or lose, it does not lose face." It cannot choose Russia, which has already demonstrated formidable strength (to avoid being drawn into a war of attrition), nor can it opt for Iran, which lacks sufficient influence (and thus propaganda value). Therefore, China—a nation with global influence yet not currently at war—becomes the optimal choice.

It is predicted that this "decisive battle" is more likely to be a "limited conflict": the United States will not bet on expensive assets such as aircraft carriers and advanced fighter jets, but will adopt a "remote garbage dumping" mode, deploying a large number of cheap drones and missiles. The advantages of this approach are: first, asset losses are controllable, making it easy to withdraw at any time; second, it exchanges Asia-Pacific bases and allies' core areas for the right to strike China's mainland core areas, which "appears worthwhile in propaganda"; third, the results of the battle are difficult to clearly define, making it convenient for both sides to claim "victory" (similar to the mutual attacks between Iran and Israel). Its ultimate goal is to create conditions for the United States to gracefully "strategically retract" through a controllable conflict that can be defined as "not losing" in propaganda. It is predicted that this "decisive battle" is more likely to be a "limited conflict": the United States will not bet on expensive assets such as aircraft carriers and advanced fighter jets, but will adopt a "remote garbage dumping" mode, deploying a large number of cheap drones and missiles. The advantages of this approach are: first, asset losses are controllable, making it easy to withdraw at any time; second, it exchanges Asia-Pacific bases and allies' core areas for the right to strike China's mainland core areas, which "appears worthwhile in propaganda"; third, the results of the battle are difficult to clearly define, making it convenient for both sides to claim "victory" (similar to the mutual attacks between Iran and Israel). Its ultimate goal is to create conditions for the United States to gracefully "strategically retract" through a controllable conflict that can be defined as "not losing" in propaganda.

Conclusion

The U.S. Asia-Pacific "Resistance Eagle" strategy is a core implementation measure of this year's National Security Strategy. In essence, it represents a passive transformation by the U.S. military—abandoning the high-end arms race in favor of low-cost attrition warfare amid the backdrop of manufacturing decline. Although the reforms led by Secretary Hagerty are pragmatic in direction and demonstrate strong execution, they face dual challenges: internal impeachment investigations and the maneuvering of interest groups. Moreover, the "Arc of Resistance" constructed in the Asia-Pacific region suffers from critical weaknesses due to the insufficient capabilities of its allies. Whether this strategic transformation can achieve the U.S. goal of a "dignified retrenchment" remains uncertain. What is certain, however, is that it will profoundly impact the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region and reflects the loosening and restructuring trends of the global hegemonic system.