Game on the Ice Sheet: Deep Dive into Trump's Second-Term Push for Control of Greenland

In late August, the Trump administration's series of moves to push for control over Greenland became the most controversial focal point in the global diplomatic arena. From the high-profile appointment of a trusted confidant with no diplomatic experience as a special envoy to the public release of a tough signal that "Greenland must be owned," Trump escalated this "absurd idea," which began in 2019, into one of the core foreign policy agendas of his second term. **This seemingly unconventional diplomatic game is by no means a spur-of-the-moment political stunt. Rather, it is a precise strategy by the United States, grounded in Greenland's unique strategic location, abundant resource reserves, and aligned with the current geopolitical landscape and domestic development needs.** To understand the essence of this game, one must start with Greenland's fundamental attributes, trace its historical context and power dynamics, and then delve into an analysis of the United States' strategic logic, action pathways, and the underlying motivations driven by timing.

I. Greenland: The "Strategic Pivot" and "Resource Treasure Trove" of the Arctic Circle

To understand America's obsession with Greenland, one must first clarify its irreplaceable core value—it is both a key pivot in Arctic geopolitical games and the resource core of global technology and energy competition, all of which are built upon its unique geographical location and natural endowments. To understand America's obsession with Greenland, one must first clarify its irreplaceable core value—it is both a key pivot in Arctic geopolitical games and the resource core of global technology and energy competition, all of which are built upon its unique geographical location and natural endowments.

Strategic Location: The "Strategic Chokepoint" of the Arctic Route and the "Natural Center" of the Northern Hemisphere

Geographically, Greenland is the world's largest island, located in the northeastern part of North America, between the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. Most of its territory lies within the Arctic Circle, making it a "strategic chokepoint" connecting North America, Europe, and the Arctic region. As stated in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, "Whoever controls Greenland, controls the seas, and whoever controls the seas, rules the world." This once ice-covered land is now becoming the focal point of geopolitical competition in the Arctic. With the intensification of global climate change, the Arctic region is warming at a rate four times the global average, leading to accelerated melting of Arctic ice. This has gradually made the previously perennially frozen Arctic shipping routes navigable. Satellite data from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) shows that since 2003, Greenland has been losing an average of 200 billion tons of ice annually. This melting ice not only contributes to a global sea-level rise of approximately 14 millimeters but also gives rise to new maritime areas and shipping value—**Once the Arctic routes are fully opened, they will significantly shorten the maritime transport distances between Europe and Asia, as well as North America, increasing transport efficiency by over 30% and potentially becoming the new core of the global shipping system.** Greenland strategically overlooks the key nodes of the Arctic's Northwest Passage (western sea area) and the Central Passage (eastern sea area). Controlling Greenland is equivalent to seizing the "control" of this emerging strategic route, and its value as a trade hub and supply point will be fully realized. Geographically, Greenland is the world's largest island, located in the northeastern part of North America, between the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. Most of its territory lies within the Arctic Circle, making it a "strategic chokepoint" connecting North America, Europe, and the Arctic region. As stated in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, "Whoever controls Greenland, controls the seas, and whoever controls the seas, rules the world." This once ice-covered land is now becoming the focal point of geopolitical competition in the Arctic. With the intensification of global climate change, the Arctic region is warming at a rate four times the global average, leading to accelerated melting of Arctic ice. This has gradually made the previously perennially frozen Arctic shipping routes navigable. Satellite data from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) shows that since 2003, Greenland has been losing an average of 200 billion tons of ice annually. This melting ice not only contributes to a global sea-level rise of approximately 14 millimeters but also gives rise to new maritime areas and shipping value—**Once the Arctic routes are fully opened, they will significantly shorten the maritime transport distances between Europe and Asia, as well as North America, increasing transport efficiency by over 30% and potentially becoming the new core of the global shipping system.** Greenland strategically overlooks the key nodes of the Arctic's Northwest Passage (western sea area) and the Central Passage (eastern sea area). Controlling Greenland is equivalent to seizing the "control" of this emerging strategic route, and its value as a trade hub and supply point will be fully realized.

More notably, Greenland is one of the closest landmasses to the North Pole, with its northernmost point, Cape Morris Jesup, located at 83°37'39" N, less than 800 kilometers from the North Pole. From a geopolitical perspective, the Northern Hemisphere contains 67.35% of the world's land, 90% of its population, and the vast majority of powerful nations, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. As the "natural center" of the Northern Hemisphere's landmass, Greenland's strategic reach can cover Asia, Europe, and North America. This unique location makes it a natural outpost for military defense and surveillance: the United States has long established the Thule/Pituffik base on the island, which is a crucial component of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), undertaking key missions such as missile warning, space surveillance, and satellite tracking, serving as the "Arctic shield" of the U.S. northern defense system. It is worth noting that Greenland is also a key link in NATO's anti-submarine warfare system, specifically the "Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap." During World War II, the U.S. military relied on this location to combat German submarines, and during the Cold War, it was further developed as a forward position against the Soviet Union—the Thule Air Base, built in 1953, lies precisely at the midpoint of the direct flight path from Washington to Moscow, making it a core node for monitoring Soviet missile launches. In his public statements, Trump has repeatedly emphasized that Russian and Chinese vessels are "everywhere" in the Arctic region, reflecting concerns about the potential decline of Greenland's strategic position, highlighting Greenland's central role in containing Chinese and Russian expansion in the Arctic. More notably, Greenland is one of the closest landmasses to the North Pole, with its northernmost point, Cape Morris Jesup, located at 83°37'39" N, less than 800 kilometers from the North Pole. From a geopolitical perspective, the Northern Hemisphere contains 67.35% of the world's land, 90% of its population, and the vast majority of powerful nations, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. As the "natural center" of the Northern Hemisphere's landmass, Greenland's strategic reach can cover Asia, Europe, and North America. This unique location makes it a natural outpost for military defense and surveillance: the United States has long established the Thule/Pituffik base on the island, which is a crucial component of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), undertaking key missions such as missile warning, space surveillance, and satellite tracking, serving as the "Arctic shield" of the U.S. northern defense system. It is worth noting that Greenland is also a key link in NATO's anti-submarine warfare system, specifically the "Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap." During World War II, the U.S. military relied on this location to combat German submarines, and during the Cold War, it was further developed as a forward position against the Soviet Union—the Thule Air Base, built in 1953, lies precisely at the midpoint of the direct flight path from Washington to Moscow, making it a core node for monitoring Soviet missile launches. In his public statements, Trump has repeatedly emphasized that Russian and Chinese vessels are "everywhere" in the Arctic region, reflecting concerns about the potential decline of Greenland's strategic position, highlighting Greenland's central role in containing Chinese and Russian expansion in the Arctic.

Resource Endowment: The "Untapped Treasure Trove" of Globally Scarce Strategic Resources

From the perspective of resource endowment, Greenland is an underdeveloped "treasure trove of resources." 80% of its area is covered by an ice sheet with an average thickness of 1,500 meters, beneath which lie globally scarce strategic resources. Over 70 types of minerals have been discovered on the island, and 25 of the 34 minerals listed on the EU's "Critical Raw Materials" list have been identified here. The reserves of rare earth elements are particularly noteworthy—the northeastern part of Greenland holds up to 38.5 million tons of rare earth oxides. The Tanbreez rare earth mine alone has proven reserves of 28.2 million tons, while the total rare earth oxide reserves in other parts of the world are approximately 120 million tons, highlighting its undeniable strategic value. Rare earth elements are core raw materials for manufacturing high-tech products such as chips, new energy vehicles, and high-end weaponry. China has long accounted for over 80% of the global rare earth processing capacity, and the United States relies on imports for more than 90% of its rare earth needs. For the United States, which seeks to reduce its dependence on China's supply chain, Greenland's rare earth resources are undoubtedly a "key to breaking the deadlock." From the perspective of resource endowment, Greenland is an underdeveloped "treasure trove of resources." 80% of its area is covered by an ice sheet with an average thickness of 1,500 meters, beneath which lie globally scarce strategic resources. Over 70 types of minerals have been discovered on the island, and 25 of the 34 minerals listed on the EU's "Critical Raw Materials" list have been identified here. The reserves of rare earth elements are particularly noteworthy—the northeastern part of Greenland holds up to 38.5 million tons of rare earth oxides. The Tanbreez rare earth mine alone has proven reserves of 28.2 million tons, while the total rare earth oxide reserves in other parts of the world are approximately 120 million tons, highlighting its undeniable strategic value. Rare earth elements are core raw materials for manufacturing high-tech products such as chips, new energy vehicles, and high-end weaponry. China has long accounted for over 80% of the global rare earth processing capacity, and the United States relies on imports for more than 90% of its rare earth needs. For the United States, which seeks to reduce its dependence on China's supply chain, Greenland's rare earth resources are undoubtedly a "key to breaking the deadlock."

Beyond rare earths, Greenland's energy and mineral reserves are equally astonishing: its coastline is rich in petroleum resources, with estimated reserves potentially as high as 52 billion barrels, including approximately 17.5 billion barrels of untapped oil and natural gas reserves of about 4.15 trillion cubic meters; 260,000 tons of uranium deposits have been discovered in the south, and the Kvanefjeld deposit contains both rare earth and uranium resources, with total resources estimated at about 1 billion tons; there is also a world-class zinc deposit with ore-bearing strata extending over 2,500 kilometers, as well as the Mt Nalunaq gold mine, which began production in 2024. As Arctic ice melts, the difficulty of extracting these previously hard-to-reach resources has significantly decreased, making them a new focal point in global energy competition. Furthermore, the waters around Greenland are rich in fishery resources, with substantial reserves of fish such as cod and salmon. Controlling the island could also meet domestic U.S. demand for fishery products and develop the fishing processing and export industry. Simultaneously, Greenland holds an important position in the global meteorological monitoring network. Establishing observation stations there allows for precise collection of Arctic meteorological data, providing services for aviation, navigation, agriculture, and other sectors, thereby ensuring the stable operation of the U.S. economy and society. Beyond rare earths, Greenland's energy and mineral reserves are equally astonishing: its coastline is rich in petroleum resources, with estimated reserves potentially as high as 52 billion barrels, including approximately 17.5 billion barrels of untapped oil and natural gas reserves of about 4.15 trillion cubic meters; 260,000 tons of uranium deposits have been discovered in the south, and the Kvanefjeld deposit contains both rare earth and uranium resources, with total resources estimated at about 1 billion tons; there is also a world-class zinc deposit with ore-bearing strata extending over 2,500 kilometers, as well as the Mt Nalunaq gold mine, which began production in 2024. As Arctic ice melts, the difficulty of extracting these previously hard-to-reach resources has significantly decreased, making them a new focal point in global energy competition. Furthermore, the waters around Greenland are rich in fishery resources, with substantial reserves of fish such as cod and salmon. Controlling the island could also meet domestic U.S. demand for fishery products and develop the fishing processing and export industry. Simultaneously, Greenland holds an important position in the global meteorological monitoring network. Establishing observation stations there allows for precise collection of Arctic meteorological data, providing services for aviation, navigation, agriculture, and other sectors, thereby ensuring the stable operation of the U.S. economy and society.

It is worth noting that Greenland has a population of only about 57,000. The vast land with sparse population makes it difficult to establish an independent industrial system and national defense capabilities. Its economic development heavily relies on external support, which also creates opportunities for infiltration and influence by external forces. And this attribute of "high strategic value and weak self-defense" is precisely one of the core reasons why the United States lists it as a key target. It is worth noting that Greenland has a population of only about 57,000. The vast land with sparse population makes it difficult to establish an independent industrial system and national defense capabilities. Its economic development heavily relies on external support, which also creates opportunities for infiltration and influence by external forces. And this attribute of "high strategic value and weak self-defense" is precisely one of the core reasons why the United States lists it as a key target.

II. The Historical Context and Power Attribution of Greenland: From Colonial Dependence to High Autonomy

The United States' efforts to control Greenland must also be understood within its unique historical context and power structure—Greenland is not a fully independent sovereign state but an autonomous territory of Denmark, possessing extensive self-governance yet not complete independence. This "semi-independent" power structure becomes the key entry point the United States seeks to exploit. The United States' efforts to control Greenland must also be understood within its unique historical context and power structure—Greenland is not a fully independent sovereign state but an autonomous territory of Denmark, possessing extensive self-governance yet not complete independence. This "semi-independent" power structure becomes the key entry point the United States seeks to exploit.

Historical Evolution: The Power Game from Colonial Dependency to High Autonomy

The history of Greenland is closely linked to Denmark's colonial expansion, and the evolution of its sovereignty is full of contention. In 982 AD, the Norwegian Viking explorer Erik the Red was exiled from Iceland to Greenland due to a murder charge. After discovering ice-free areas, he established Scandinavian settlements and named it "Greenland" to attract immigrants. In the 13th century, Greenland was incorporated into Norway's colonial territory; in 1814, Norway formed an alliance with Denmark, and control of Greenland was transferred to Denmark; in 1953, the revision of the Danish constitution listed it as a state of Denmark, formally bringing it under sovereign jurisdiction. This colonial dependency lasted until the late 20th century. With the rise of global national independence movements, Greenland's demands for autonomy continued to grow. In 1979, Greenland gained internal autonomy; in 2009, Denmark and Greenland signed the "Autonomy Act," granting Greenland extensive autonomy. Except for core powers such as foreign affairs, defense, and justice, which remain under Danish control, powers over economy, resource development, and local governance belong to the Greenland Self-Government, and full independence can be achieved through a referendum. The history of Greenland is closely linked to Denmark's colonial expansion, and the evolution of its sovereignty is full of contention. In 982 AD, the Norwegian Viking explorer Erik the Red was exiled from Iceland to Greenland due to a murder charge. After discovering ice-free areas, he established Scandinavian settlements and named it "Greenland" to attract immigrants. In the 13th century, Greenland was incorporated into Norway's colonial territory; in 1814, Norway formed an alliance with Denmark, and control of Greenland was transferred to Denmark; in 1953, the revision of the Danish constitution listed it as a state of Denmark, formally bringing it under sovereign jurisdiction. This colonial dependency lasted until the late 20th century. With the rise of global national independence movements, Greenland's demands for autonomy continued to grow. In 1979, Greenland gained internal autonomy; in 2009, Denmark and Greenland signed the "Autonomy Act," granting Greenland extensive autonomy. Except for core powers such as foreign affairs, defense, and justice, which remain under Danish control, powers over economy, resource development, and local governance belong to the Greenland Self-Government, and full independence can be achieved through a referendum.

It is worth noting that there has always been a rift in the relationship between Greenland and Denmark: Denmark occupied Greenland for 645 years, with Danish immigrants and their descendants numbering only about 5,000, constituting an absolute minority; 90% of the island's population are Inuit, and public sentiment shows very low identification with Denmark. Greenland's economy has long relied on annual subsidies from Denmark (approximately $350 million per year, accounting for over 20% of fiscal revenue), but the inclination towards independence continues to rise. In recent years, as major powers intensify their competition for Arctic resources and shipping routes, Greenland has gradually become aware of its own strategic value and has begun actively seeking greater autonomy — in 2025, negotiations between Greenland's autonomous government and Denmark over "increasing autonomy in resource development" failed, further publicizing the conflict, which also provided an opportunity for external forces to infiltrate. Additionally, Greenland's Inuit people are also distributed in the Alaska region of the United States, and this ethnic connection has become an important entry point for the United States to try to win over Greenland and distance it from Denmark. It is worth noting that there has always been a rift in the relationship between Greenland and Denmark: Denmark occupied Greenland for 645 years, with Danish immigrants and their descendants numbering only about 5,000, constituting an absolute minority; 90% of the island's population are Inuit, and public sentiment shows very low identification with Denmark. Greenland's economy has long relied on annual subsidies from Denmark (approximately $350 million per year, accounting for over 20% of fiscal revenue), but the inclination towards independence continues to rise. In recent years, as major powers intensify their competition for Arctic resources and shipping routes, Greenland has gradually become aware of its own strategic value and has begun actively seeking greater autonomy — in 2025, negotiations between Greenland's autonomous government and Denmark over "increasing autonomy in resource development" failed, further publicizing the conflict, which also provided an opportunity for external forces to infiltrate. Additionally, Greenland's Inuit people are also distributed in the Alaska region of the United States, and this ethnic connection has become an important entry point for the United States to try to win over Greenland and distance it from Denmark.

Mega History Interaction: A Century-spanning Strategic Ambition and Layout

This "highly autonomous but not fully independent" power structure has formed a dual governance model where "the Greenland Self-Government leads internal affairs, and Denmark leads foreign affairs and defense." For the United States, this model provides an opportunity to "exploit loopholes": The Trump administration's appointment of a Special Envoy for Greenland publicly treats Greenland as an entity independent of Denmark, attempting to bypass Denmark and engage directly with the Greenland Self-Government, infiltrating influence through economic aid, resource cooperation, and other means, ultimately aiming to achieve control over Greenland. This move directly touches Denmark's sovereignty bottom line and becomes the core trigger for the US-Denmark diplomatic crisis. This "highly autonomous but not fully independent" power structure has formed a dual governance model where "the Greenland Self-Government leads internal affairs, and Denmark leads foreign affairs and defense." For the United States, this model provides an opportunity to "exploit loopholes": The Trump administration's appointment of a Special Envoy for Greenland publicly treats Greenland as an entity independent of Denmark, attempting to bypass Denmark and engage directly with the Greenland Self-Government, infiltrating influence through economic aid, resource cooperation, and other means, ultimately aiming to achieve control over Greenland. This move directly touches Denmark's sovereignty bottom line and becomes the core trigger for the US-Denmark diplomatic crisis.

From historical interactions, the United States' interest in Greenland did not begin with Trump, but rather represents a century-spanning strategic continuity. As early as the golden age of U.S. territorial expansion, its gaze had already turned to this Arctic island: after purchasing Alaska in 1867, there were plans to acquire Greenland as well, which failed due to Danish opposition. In 1917, the United States bought the U.S. Virgin Islands from Denmark for $25 million, further solidifying its idea of acquiring territory through transactions. During World War II, after Germany annexed Denmark, the United States used the pretext of "protecting Danish territory" to send troops to occupy Greenland, preventing it from falling into German hands. After World War II ended in 1945, Denmark demanded the return of Greenland. The United States not only was unwilling to return it but also offered to purchase it for $100 million, and only after being refused by Denmark was it forced to return the island. From historical interactions, the United States' interest in Greenland did not begin with Trump, but rather represents a century-spanning strategic continuity. As early as the golden age of U.S. territorial expansion, its gaze had already turned to this Arctic island: after purchasing Alaska in 1867, there were plans to acquire Greenland as well, which failed due to Danish opposition. In 1917, the United States bought the U.S. Virgin Islands from Denmark for $25 million, further solidifying its idea of acquiring territory through transactions. During World War II, after Germany annexed Denmark, the United States used the pretext of "protecting Danish territory" to send troops to occupy Greenland, preventing it from falling into German hands. After World War II ended in 1945, Denmark demanded the return of Greenland. The United States not only was unwilling to return it but also offered to purchase it for $100 million, and only after being refused by Denmark was it forced to return the island.

During the Cold War, Greenland's strategic value reached its peak. As the midpoint of the direct flight path between Washington and Moscow, it became the frontline of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation: In 1953, the United States built Thule Air Base in northern Greenland; in 1959, it implemented the "Camp Century" project, constructing an underground camp 240 kilometers east of Thule Base. Its hidden "Project Iceworm" even planned to store 600 nuclear warheads, but was abandoned in 1967 due to engineering quality issues. The exposure of this secret plan later triggered Denmark's "Thulegate scandal." On January 21, 1968, a U.S. military bomber carrying four B28 nuclear bombs crashed in Polaris Bay, 12 kilometers from Thule Base, causing warhead rupture and radioactive contamination. Although no nuclear explosion occurred, one hydrogen bomb with serial number 78252 remains missing to this day, becoming Greenland's "nuclear hidden danger" and severely affecting U.S.-Denmark relations. After the Cold War, geopolitical tensions in the Arctic eased, and U.S. enthusiasm for Greenland significantly waned, even leading to the sale of some military facilities to the Danish government for a lump sum of $1. It was not until the early 21st century, with global warming and the resurgence of the Arctic's strategic value, that the United States once again brought Greenland into its strategic vision, investing $40 million in 2017 to upgrade the missile warning radar at Thule Base, restarting its strategic layout for this Arctic island. During the Cold War, Greenland's strategic value reached its peak. As the midpoint of the direct flight path between Washington and Moscow, it became the frontline of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation: In 1953, the United States built Thule Air Base in northern Greenland; in 1959, it implemented the "Camp Century" project, constructing an underground camp 240 kilometers east of Thule Base. Its hidden "Project Iceworm" even planned to store 600 nuclear warheads, but was abandoned in 1967 due to engineering quality issues. The exposure of this secret plan later triggered Denmark's "Thulegate scandal." On January 21, 1968, a U.S. military bomber carrying four B28 nuclear bombs crashed in Polaris Bay, 12 kilometers from Thule Base, causing warhead rupture and radioactive contamination. Although no nuclear explosion occurred, one hydrogen bomb with serial number 78252 remains missing to this day, becoming Greenland's "nuclear hidden danger" and severely affecting U.S.-Denmark relations. After the Cold War, geopolitical tensions in the Arctic eased, and U.S. enthusiasm for Greenland significantly waned, even leading to the sale of some military facilities to the Danish government for a lump sum of $1. It was not until the early 21st century, with global warming and the resurgence of the Arctic's strategic value, that the United States once again brought Greenland into its strategic vision, investing $40 million in 2017 to upgrade the missile warning radar at Thule Base, restarting its strategic layout for this Arctic island.

III. The U.S. Layout Path: From "Verbal Proposals" to "Systematic Advancement"

The Trump administration's approach to Greenland has evolved from "verbal probes" in 2019 to "systematic advancement" by 2025, with its action path becoming increasingly clear—shifting from diplomatic statements and internal discussions to concrete personnel appointments and strategic pressure, demonstrating a strong determination to push forward. The Trump administration's approach to Greenland has evolved from "verbal probes" in 2019 to "systematic advancement" by 2025, with its action path becoming increasingly clear—shifting from diplomatic statements and internal discussions to concrete personnel appointments and strategic pressure, demonstrating a strong determination to push forward.

Phase One (Year): Verbal Probing, Gauging the Bottom Line

The first phase was the "verbal probe" in 2019. During his first term, Trump publicly proposed the idea of "purchasing Greenland" for the first time, a suggestion that caused a global uproar at the time. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen directly dismissed it as "absurd" and canceled Trump's state visit to Denmark; the Greenlandic autonomous government also clearly stated that Greenland was "not for sale." Although this probe ended in failure, it provided the Trump administration with critical information: clarifying the basic stance of Denmark and Greenland, and gauging the international community's reaction. Subsequently, the U.S. government did not give up but shifted related discussions internally, continuously assessing the feasibility of acquiring/controlling Greenland, setting the stage for escalated actions in a potential second term. The core objective of this phase was "testing the bottom line," not substantive advancement. The first phase was the "verbal probe" in 2019. During his first term, Trump publicly proposed the idea of "purchasing Greenland" for the first time, a suggestion that caused a global uproar at the time. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen directly dismissed it as "absurd" and canceled Trump's state visit to Denmark; the Greenlandic autonomous government also clearly stated that Greenland was "not for sale." Although this probe ended in failure, it provided the Trump administration with critical information: clarifying the basic stance of Denmark and Greenland, and gauging the international community's reaction. Subsequently, the U.S. government did not give up but shifted related discussions internally, continuously assessing the feasibility of acquiring/controlling Greenland, setting the stage for escalated actions in a potential second term. The core objective of this phase was "testing the bottom line," not substantive advancement.

Phase Two (Beginning of the Year): Strategic Upgrade, Building the Foundation

The second phase is the "strategic upgrade" after returning to the White House in 2025. At the beginning of Trump's second term, the Greenland issue was listed as a foreign policy priority, with a series of specific actions taken to advance the layout: first, forming a core team and incorporating close associates into the decision-making system to ensure the agenda could proceed smoothly; second, strengthening private communication with the Greenland autonomous government, attempting to drive a wedge between Denmark and Greenland through economic aid and resource cooperation; third, promoting an upgrade in military deployment, planning to transfer the jurisdiction of the Pituffik Base to the U.S. Northern Command to enhance military control over Greenland. The core objective of this phase is "laying the foundation," paving the way for subsequent substantive progress. The second phase is the "strategic upgrade" after returning to the White House in 2025. At the beginning of Trump's second term, the Greenland issue was listed as a foreign policy priority, with a series of specific actions taken to advance the layout: first, forming a core team and incorporating close associates into the decision-making system to ensure the agenda could proceed smoothly; second, strengthening private communication with the Greenland autonomous government, attempting to drive a wedge between Denmark and Greenland through economic aid and resource cooperation; third, promoting an upgrade in military deployment, planning to transfer the jurisdiction of the Pituffik Base to the U.S. Northern Command to enhance military control over Greenland. The core objective of this phase is "laying the foundation," paving the way for subsequent substantive progress.

The third stage (year, month): public breakthrough, strong pressure

The third phase is the "Public Breakthrough" in December 2025. On December 21-22, the Trump administration made a significant move: announcing the appointment of Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as the "Special Envoy for Greenland." This appointment is highly symbolic: Landry is a "staunch ally" of Trump, having fully supported him in the 2024 U.S. election, yet he has no diplomatic experience. This appointment clearly carries the dual attributes of "political reward" and "control by close associates." More notably, after accepting the appointment, Landry publicly stated that he was "honored to serve in a voluntary position to make Greenland a part of the United States," directly escalating the U.S. goal from "cooperation" to "annexation." Trump later emphasized in his statements that Landry "understands the essential importance of Greenland to national security" and bluntly stated that the United States "must have it." Previously, after returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump repeatedly reinforced his claims over Greenland, even suggesting that the use of military force to seize control was not off the table, claiming that "the Greenland campaign would be the shortest war in the world," as its military strength is only equivalent to that of the New York Police Department. The third phase is the "Public Breakthrough" in December 2025. On December 21-22, the Trump administration made a significant move: announcing the appointment of Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as the "Special Envoy for Greenland." This appointment is highly symbolic: Landry is a "staunch ally" of Trump, having fully supported him in the 2024 U.S. election, yet he has no diplomatic experience. This appointment clearly carries the dual attributes of "political reward" and "control by close associates." More notably, after accepting the appointment, Landry publicly stated that he was "honored to serve in a voluntary position to make Greenland a part of the United States," directly escalating the U.S. goal from "cooperation" to "annexation." Trump later emphasized in his statements that Landry "understands the essential importance of Greenland to national security" and bluntly stated that the United States "must have it." Previously, after returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump repeatedly reinforced his claims over Greenland, even suggesting that the use of military force to seize control was not off the table, claiming that "the Greenland campaign would be the shortest war in the world," as its military strength is only equivalent to that of the New York Police Department.

In response to the United States' tough stance, reactions from various parties have been intense: Greenland's Prime Minister Múte Egede clearly stated that "Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders, it is not for sale, and will never be for sale," while also revealing that "dialogue with Trump has begun to explore cooperation opportunities, with the door wide open in the mining sector," demonstrating a balanced consideration between sovereignty and economic interests; Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen not only dismissed the U.S. proposal as "absurd," but also jointly issued a statement with Egede, emphasizing that "one cannot annex other countries, Greenland decides its own future," even modifying the national flag design to assert sovereignty; European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also voiced support, stating that "territorial integrity and sovereignty are fundamental principles of international law," with Nordic countries like Norway explicitly backing Denmark's position. Notably, the U.S. actions have also triggered a shift in Denmark's domestic security perception. In a report released in 2025, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service for the first time listed the United States as a potential security threat, pointing out that the shift in U.S. strategic focus and pressure on allies are increasing uncertainty in Denmark's national security. In response to the United States' tough stance, reactions from various parties have been intense: Greenland's Prime Minister Múte Egede clearly stated that "Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders, it is not for sale, and will never be for sale," while also revealing that "dialogue with Trump has begun to explore cooperation opportunities, with the door wide open in the mining sector," demonstrating a balanced consideration between sovereignty and economic interests; Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen not only dismissed the U.S. proposal as "absurd," but also jointly issued a statement with Egede, emphasizing that "one cannot annex other countries, Greenland decides its own future," even modifying the national flag design to assert sovereignty; European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also voiced support, stating that "territorial integrity and sovereignty are fundamental principles of international law," with Nordic countries like Norway explicitly backing Denmark's position. Notably, the U.S. actions have also triggered a shift in Denmark's domestic security perception. In a report released in 2025, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service for the first time listed the United States as a potential security threat, pointing out that the shift in U.S. strategic focus and pressure on allies are increasing uncertainty in Denmark's national security.

From the trajectory of the United States' strategic layout, it is evident that its approach exhibits a distinct "Trump-style": abandoning the circuitousness and restraint of traditional diplomacy, adopting a method of "high-profile pressure + trusted confidants taking the lead + public opinion shaping," attempting to break the deadlock through "unconventional means". The advantage of this strategy lies in its ability to quickly attract global attention and exert maximum pressure on Denmark and Greenland; however, its disadvantages are equally apparent, as it completely undermines mutual trust between the United States and its allies, provoking widespread disapproval from the international community. From the trajectory of the United States' strategic layout, it is evident that its approach exhibits a distinct "Trump-style": abandoning the circuitousness and restraint of traditional diplomacy, adopting a method of "high-profile pressure + trusted confidants taking the lead + public opinion shaping," attempting to break the deadlock through "unconventional means". The advantage of this strategy lies in its ability to quickly attract global attention and exert maximum pressure on Denmark and Greenland; however, its disadvantages are equally apparent, as it completely undermines mutual trust between the United States and its allies, provoking widespread disapproval from the international community.

IV. Why the End of the Year? The Motivations Behind the Timing Window for the US's Advancement of Actions

The Trump administration's decision to concentrate efforts on gaining control over Greenland by the end of 2025 is not coincidental; it is driven by a "window of opportunity" formed by the convergence of multiple factors, including shifts in the global geopolitical landscape as well as domestic development needs and political cycle considerations within the United States. The Trump administration's decision to concentrate efforts on gaining control over Greenland by the end of 2025 is not coincidental; it is driven by a "window of opportunity" formed by the convergence of multiple factors, including shifts in the global geopolitical landscape as well as domestic development needs and political cycle considerations within the United States.

Global Drivers: Geopolitical Competition in the Arctic Intensifies, Seizing Strategic Opportunities

First, the Arctic geopolitical game has entered a "white-hot stage," and the United States needs to seize the initiative. In recent years, as the melting of Arctic ice has accelerated, the strategic value of the Arctic region has become increasingly prominent. Countries such as Russia and China have increased their investments in the Arctic, advancing scientific research expeditions, resource development, and shipping cooperation. Russia established its Arctic Strategic Command as early as 2014, and in 2025, it announced plans to deploy more advanced weapons and equipment in the Arctic region. Its powerful nuclear submarine fleet can pose a threat to the capitals of European countries and the U.S. mainland from the Arctic. China, through the "Polar Silk Road" initiative, has strengthened scientific research cooperation and participation in energy projects with Arctic countries like Russia, steadily enhancing its influence in the Arctic region. It has previously opened the China-Europe Arctic route to the United Kingdom. According to the Arctic Council, over the 10 years leading up to 2023, the number of ships in Arctic navigable waters increased by 37%, with the Northeast Passage now having an annual navigable window of 120 days. The United States believes its dominant position in the Arctic is being challenged, and Greenland, as the gateway to the Arctic Ocean, is a "key leverage point" to contain the Arctic expansion of China and Russia. The end of 2025 coincides with a critical juncture for the improvement of Arctic route navigability. The United States is eager to consolidate its advantage by controlling Greenland to avoid falling behind in this emerging geopolitical game. First, the Arctic geopolitical game has entered a "white-hot stage," and the United States needs to seize the initiative. In recent years, as the melting of Arctic ice has accelerated, the strategic value of the Arctic region has become increasingly prominent. Countries such as Russia and China have increased their investments in the Arctic, advancing scientific research expeditions, resource development, and shipping cooperation. Russia established its Arctic Strategic Command as early as 2014, and in 2025, it announced plans to deploy more advanced weapons and equipment in the Arctic region. Its powerful nuclear submarine fleet can pose a threat to the capitals of European countries and the U.S. mainland from the Arctic. China, through the "Polar Silk Road" initiative, has strengthened scientific research cooperation and participation in energy projects with Arctic countries like Russia, steadily enhancing its influence in the Arctic region. It has previously opened the China-Europe Arctic route to the United Kingdom. According to the Arctic Council, over the 10 years leading up to 2023, the number of ships in Arctic navigable waters increased by 37%, with the Northeast Passage now having an annual navigable window of 120 days. The United States believes its dominant position in the Arctic is being challenged, and Greenland, as the gateway to the Arctic Ocean, is a "key leverage point" to contain the Arctic expansion of China and Russia. The end of 2025 coincides with a critical juncture for the improvement of Arctic route navigability. The United States is eager to consolidate its advantage by controlling Greenland to avoid falling behind in this emerging geopolitical game.

Meanwhile, the competition for resources in the Arctic among major powers has fully unfolded: Canada claims that the new shipping route passes through its territory, asserting control; Russia directly planted its flag on the Arctic seabed, reinforcing its sovereignty declaration; while the United States invests heavily in building icebreakers to ensure Arctic patrol capabilities. As a core node of the Arctic route, the ownership of Greenland directly affects the distribution of interests among countries in the Arctic, which is also one of the core motivations behind the United States' urgency to advance control actions. Meanwhile, the competition for resources in the Arctic among major powers has fully unfolded: Canada claims that the new shipping route passes through its territory, asserting control; Russia directly planted its flag on the Arctic seabed, reinforcing its sovereignty declaration; while the United States invests heavily in building icebreakers to ensure Arctic patrol capabilities. As a core node of the Arctic route, the ownership of Greenland directly affects the distribution of interests among countries in the Arctic, which is also one of the core motivations behind the United States' urgency to advance control actions.

Domestic Motivation: Urgent Need for Supply Chain Autonomy, Tied to Political Cycles

Secondly, the United States' domestic "de-Sinicization" of supply chain construction has entered a critical phase, urgently requiring the support of Greenland's resources. In recent years, the U.S. has regarded China as a "major competitor" and has vigorously promoted "autonomous and controllable supply chains" in high-tech industries, defense sectors, and other fields, with rare earth resources being a core bottleneck in this effort. China currently controls over % of the global rare earth processing capacity, while the U.S. relies on imports for more than % of its rare earth needs. In , the U.S. introduced a series of policies, including the "CHIPS and Science Act" and the "Inflation Reduction Act," to strongly support the development of domestic semiconductor and new energy industries, significantly increasing the demand for rare earth resources.

Greenland's rare earth resources have become a "lifeline" for the United States to break its supply chain dependence, and China's attempts to cooperate with Greenland have further heightened American anxiety. In 2017, Greenland planned to build a large airport and sought loans and technical support from China due to high costs. China proposed that Chinese-funded companies undertake the construction, but this met with strong opposition from the United States. The U.S. was concerned that China might use loans to control critical infrastructure, even for military purposes, and ultimately pressured Denmark to fund the majority of the project, blocking China's involvement. Additionally, Chinese companies attempted to invest in and develop mines in Greenland, but these efforts were repeatedly thwarted by joint obstruction from the United States and local governments. Under this "zero-sum game" mindset, the United States is eager to bring Greenland's resources under its own control, both to meet domestic industrial upgrading needs and to curb China's resource deployment in the Arctic region. Greenland's rare earth resources have become a "lifeline" for the United States to break its supply chain dependence, and China's attempts to cooperate with Greenland have further heightened American anxiety. In 2017, Greenland planned to build a large airport and sought loans and technical support from China due to high costs. China proposed that Chinese-funded companies undertake the construction, but this met with strong opposition from the United States. The U.S. was concerned that China might use loans to control critical infrastructure, even for military purposes, and ultimately pressured Denmark to fund the majority of the project, blocking China's involvement. Additionally, Chinese companies attempted to invest in and develop mines in Greenland, but these efforts were repeatedly thwarted by joint obstruction from the United States and local governments. Under this "zero-sum game" mindset, the United States is eager to bring Greenland's resources under its own control, both to meet domestic industrial upgrading needs and to curb China's resource deployment in the Arctic region.

Once again, the "political cycle" of Trump's second term is forcing policies to be implemented quickly. Trump successfully secured re-election in the 2024 U.S. presidential election and officially took office in January 2025. The first two years of his second term represent a "golden period" for policy advancement, during which domestic political approval remains relatively stable, and Republican forces in Congress are more concentrated, providing support for policy implementation. If this period is missed, as the midterm elections approach, domestic political divisions may intensify, significantly increasing the difficulty of advancing policies. Therefore, the Trump administration is eager to push forward the Greenland-related agenda by the end of 2025, aiming to quickly achieve "political accomplishments" and accumulate capital for subsequent political maneuvering. Once again, the "political cycle" of Trump's second term is forcing policies to be implemented quickly. Trump successfully secured re-election in the 2024 U.S. presidential election and officially took office in January 2025. The first two years of his second term represent a "golden period" for policy advancement, during which domestic political approval remains relatively stable, and Republican forces in Congress are more concentrated, providing support for policy implementation. If this period is missed, as the midterm elections approach, domestic political divisions may intensify, significantly increasing the difficulty of advancing policies. Therefore, the Trump administration is eager to push forward the Greenland-related agenda by the end of 2025, aiming to quickly achieve "political accomplishments" and accumulate capital for subsequent political maneuvering.

Finally, a rift emerged in the "power game" between Denmark and Greenland, which the United States attempted to exploit for infiltration. In recent years, Greenland's inclination toward independence has continued to rise, and its conflicts with the Danish central government have gradually become more pronounced. Greenland hopes to break free from its financial dependence on Denmark and achieve economic autonomy, while Denmark aims to maintain its sovereign control over Greenland. The two sides have numerous disagreements on issues such as resource development and financial subsidies. In 2025, the Greenlandic autonomous government negotiated with the Danish central government over "increasing autonomy in resource development," but no agreement was reached, further publicizing the conflict between them. The United States believed this was the best opportunity to "drive a wedge between Denmark and Greenland," attempting to win the support of the Greenlandic autonomous government by offering economic aid and promising benefits from resource development, thereby bypassing the Danish central government to gain control over Greenland. Finally, a rift emerged in the "power game" between Denmark and Greenland, which the United States attempted to exploit for infiltration. In recent years, Greenland's inclination toward independence has continued to rise, and its conflicts with the Danish central government have gradually become more pronounced. Greenland hopes to break free from its financial dependence on Denmark and achieve economic autonomy, while Denmark aims to maintain its sovereign control over Greenland. The two sides have numerous disagreements on issues such as resource development and financial subsidies. In 2025, the Greenlandic autonomous government negotiated with the Danish central government over "increasing autonomy in resource development," but no agreement was reached, further publicizing the conflict between them. The United States believed this was the best opportunity to "drive a wedge between Denmark and Greenland," attempting to win the support of the Greenlandic autonomous government by offering economic aid and promising benefits from resource development, thereby bypassing the Danish central government to gain control over Greenland.

Additionally, changes in the global energy landscape also present opportunities for the United States. In 2025, the global energy market remains volatile. Europe faces tight energy supply due to its energy transition and geopolitical conflicts, leading to a significant increase in demand for oil and gas resources from the Arctic region. If the United States can control Greenland's oil and gas resources, it will not only meet its own energy needs but also strengthen economic ties with its European allies by exporting energy to Europe, while simultaneously weakening Russia's influence in the European energy market. Additionally, changes in the global energy landscape also present opportunities for the United States. In 2025, the global energy market remains volatile. Europe faces tight energy supply due to its energy transition and geopolitical conflicts, leading to a significant increase in demand for oil and gas resources from the Arctic region. If the United States can control Greenland's oil and gas resources, it will not only meet its own energy needs but also strengthen economic ties with its European allies by exporting energy to Europe, while simultaneously weakening Russia's influence in the European energy market.

V. The Core Contradictions and Potential Risks of the Game: Diplomatic Crises and Challenges to the International Order

The series of actions by the Trump administration have triggered multiple core contradictions, not only deteriorating the relationship between the United States and its allies but also posing challenges to the existing international order, carrying many unpredictable risks. The series of actions by the Trump administration have triggered multiple core contradictions, not only deteriorating the relationship between the United States and its allies but also posing challenges to the existing international order, carrying many unpredictable risks.

Core contradiction: intense collision of multiple interests

One of the core contradictions: The "crisis of mutual trust between allies" between the United States and Denmark. Denmark is a NATO member state and a traditional ally of the United States in Europe, with both sides maintaining close cooperation in areas such as defense and security over the long term. However, the Trump administration's recent move to advance control over Greenland completely disregards Denmark's sovereignty, treating Greenland as an "entity independent of Denmark," directly touching upon Denmark's core interests. The Danish government reacted strongly to this: The Danish Foreign Minister explicitly stated that the U.S. appointment was "completely unacceptable" and urgently summoned the U.S. Ambassador to Denmark to demand an explanation; the Danish Prime Minister and the Premier of Greenland jointly issued a statement, bluntly stating, "You cannot annex other countries... Greenland belongs to the Greenlandic people, and we decide our own future." This crisis not only damages U.S.-Denmark bilateral relations but may also affect NATO's unity—the core principles of NATO are "collective defense" and "mutual trust among allies." The U.S. disregard for an ally's sovereignty may raise concerns among other NATO member states and weaken NATO's cohesion. One of the core contradictions: The "crisis of mutual trust between allies" between the United States and Denmark. Denmark is a NATO member state and a traditional ally of the United States in Europe, with both sides maintaining close cooperation in areas such as defense and security over the long term. However, the Trump administration's recent move to advance control over Greenland completely disregards Denmark's sovereignty, treating Greenland as an "entity independent of Denmark," directly touching upon Denmark's core interests. The Danish government reacted strongly to this: The Danish Foreign Minister explicitly stated that the U.S. appointment was "completely unacceptable" and urgently summoned the U.S. Ambassador to Denmark to demand an explanation; the Danish Prime Minister and the Premier of Greenland jointly issued a statement, bluntly stating, "You cannot annex other countries... Greenland belongs to the Greenlandic people, and we decide our own future." This crisis not only damages U.S.-Denmark bilateral relations but may also affect NATO's unity—the core principles of NATO are "collective defense" and "mutual trust among allies." The U.S. disregard for an ally's sovereignty may raise concerns among other NATO member states and weaken NATO's cohesion.

The Second Core Contradiction: The "Sovereignty vs. Public Opinion" Confrontation Between the United States and Greenland. Although Greenland seeks independence, it absolutely does not wish to become a "territory" of the United States. According to polling data from Greenland, approximately 85% of Greenlanders oppose joining the United States, with the vast majority supporting independence from Denmark but insisting on "determining their own future". Greenlanders' attitudes towards various countries differ; about half view China's global rise as positive, but some oppose Chinese investment. Behind this complex mentality lies a wariness of "great power interference." The United States' forceful pressure has not only failed to win public support but has instead fueled nationalist sentiment. Local residents even plan to organize large-scale demonstrations when the U.S. Special Envoy for Greenland, Landry, visits Nuuk. The Second Core Contradiction: The "Sovereignty vs. Public Opinion" Confrontation Between the United States and Greenland. Although Greenland seeks independence, it absolutely does not wish to become a "territory" of the United States. According to polling data from Greenland, approximately 85% of Greenlanders oppose joining the United States, with the vast majority supporting independence from Denmark but insisting on "determining their own future". Greenlanders' attitudes towards various countries differ; about half view China's global rise as positive, but some oppose Chinese investment. Behind this complex mentality lies a wariness of "great power interference." The United States' forceful pressure has not only failed to win public support but has instead fueled nationalist sentiment. Local residents even plan to organize large-scale demonstrations when the U.S. Special Envoy for Greenland, Landry, visits Nuuk.

More importantly, the attitude of the Greenlandic autonomous government exhibits a "contradictory nature": on one hand, it clearly defends sovereignty, emphasizing that "Greenland's independence and territorial usage are determined by itself"; on the other hand, due to economic difficulties, it is compelled to seek external cooperation. Aleqa Hammond once stated, "We must do business with the United States, and the door is wide open in the mining sector." This contradiction stems from Greenland's economic reality—the local economy relies mainly on the public sector, fisheries, and subsidies from Denmark, with only two active mining sites, urgently requiring investment in resource development. The United States attempts to leverage this economic demand to infiltrate influence, but Greenland's "sense of autonomy" has significantly increased, and it is unwilling to become a vassal of any major power. This mentality of "needing cooperation while remaining vigilant against control" becomes a major obstacle to the advancement of U.S. actions. More importantly, the attitude of the Greenlandic autonomous government exhibits a "contradictory nature": on one hand, it clearly defends sovereignty, emphasizing that "Greenland's independence and territorial usage are determined by itself"; on the other hand, due to economic difficulties, it is compelled to seek external cooperation. Aleqa Hammond once stated, "We must do business with the United States, and the door is wide open in the mining sector." This contradiction stems from Greenland's economic reality—the local economy relies mainly on the public sector, fisheries, and subsidies from Denmark, with only two active mining sites, urgently requiring investment in resource development. The United States attempts to leverage this economic demand to infiltrate influence, but Greenland's "sense of autonomy" has significantly increased, and it is unwilling to become a vassal of any major power. This mentality of "needing cooperation while remaining vigilant against control" becomes a major obstacle to the advancement of U.S. actions.

Core Contradiction Three: The "Geopolitical Interest Conflict" between the United States and the European Union. Although the EU is not an Arctic state, the security, resources, and shipping issues in the Arctic region are closely linked to its interests. Although Greenland has not joined the EU, it maintains close economic and trade ties with the Union. The United States' attempts to control Greenland are viewed by the EU as "an infringement on European geopolitical interests." Following the outbreak of the crisis, the EU swiftly stated that it "fully supports the people of Denmark and Greenland," clearly affirming that "Denmark's territorial integrity is of utmost importance to the entire European Union." Nordic countries such as Norway also followed the EU's lead, publicly supporting Denmark. The escalation of contradictions between the United States and the EU will further deepen the divisions across the Atlantic, affecting cooperation between the two sides in areas such as trade and security. Core Contradiction Three: The "Geopolitical Interest Conflict" between the United States and the European Union. Although the EU is not an Arctic state, the security, resources, and shipping issues in the Arctic region are closely linked to its interests. Although Greenland has not joined the EU, it maintains close economic and trade ties with the Union. The United States' attempts to control Greenland are viewed by the EU as "an infringement on European geopolitical interests." Following the outbreak of the crisis, the EU swiftly stated that it "fully supports the people of Denmark and Greenland," clearly affirming that "Denmark's territorial integrity is of utmost importance to the entire European Union." Nordic countries such as Norway also followed the EU's lead, publicly supporting Denmark. The escalation of contradictions between the United States and the EU will further deepen the divisions across the Atlantic, affecting cooperation between the two sides in areas such as trade and security.

Potential Risks: Challenges to International Order and Regional Security

Beyond the core conflict, the actions of the United States also harbor multiple risks: First, the risk of violating international law. According to the United Nations Charter, national sovereignty and territorial integrity are inviolable, and "annexation of another country's territory" is a clear violation of international law. The relevant actions by the United States have already drawn widespread criticism from the international community and are seen as a return to "imperialism" and "bullying." If the United States insists on proceeding, it may face sanctions and isolation from the international community. Second, the risk of instability in NATO's northern defense line. Denmark is a crucial component of NATO's northern defense line. Deteriorating U.S.-Denmark relations will directly impact NATO's defensive coordination in the northern region, providing opportunities for Russian expansion. Third, the risk of China and Russia seizing the opportunity to expand their influence. The escalation of conflicts between the United States and its allies will provide more opportunities for China and Russia to cooperate with Denmark, Greenland, and the European Union. China and Russia may further enhance their influence in the Arctic region by strengthening scientific research cooperation and providing economic assistance, which would ultimately be detrimental to the United States' Arctic strategy. Beyond the core conflict, the actions of the United States also harbor multiple risks: First, the risk of violating international law. According to the United Nations Charter, national sovereignty and territorial integrity are inviolable, and "annexation of another country's territory" is a clear violation of international law. The relevant actions by the United States have already drawn widespread criticism from the international community and are seen as a return to "imperialism" and "bullying." If the United States insists on proceeding, it may face sanctions and isolation from the international community. Second, the risk of instability in NATO's northern defense line. Denmark is a crucial component of NATO's northern defense line. Deteriorating U.S.-Denmark relations will directly impact NATO's defensive coordination in the northern region, providing opportunities for Russian expansion. Third, the risk of China and Russia seizing the opportunity to expand their influence. The escalation of conflicts between the United States and its allies will provide more opportunities for China and Russia to cooperate with Denmark, Greenland, and the European Union. China and Russia may further enhance their influence in the Arctic region by strengthening scientific research cooperation and providing economic assistance, which would ultimately be detrimental to the United States' Arctic strategy.

VI. The Future Direction of the Game: Limited Room for Compromise Amid Strong Confrontation

Judging from the current situation, Denmark, Greenland, and the EU have taken a firm stance, making the U.S. "annexation" goal almost impossible to achieve. However, this power struggle will not end easily. It is highly likely to enter a phase of "strong confrontation + limited compromise" in the future. Both sides may seek a new balance under the framework of "weakening sovereignty claims and strengthening cooperative control." Judging from the current situation, Denmark, Greenland, and the EU have taken a firm stance, making the U.S. "annexation" goal almost impossible to achieve. However, this power struggle will not end easily. It is highly likely to enter a phase of "strong confrontation + limited compromise" in the future. Both sides may seek a new balance under the framework of "weakening sovereignty claims and strengthening cooperative control."

First, the United States' "annexation" objective is difficult to achieve. From the perspective of international law, "annexing the territory of another country" violates the general consensus of the international community. If the United States insists on advancing this, it will face immense international pressure. From the public opinion perspective, 85% of Greenland's population opposes joining the United States, indicating an extremely weak public support base. From the allies' reaction perspective, Denmark and the European Union have formed a united front, publicly resisting the United States' actions, making it difficult for the U.S. to bypass its allies to achieve its goal. Therefore, it is highly likely that the United States will subsequently adjust its rhetoric, changing "annexation" to more moderate terms such as "deep cooperation" or "strategic control," thereby reducing the radical nature of the objective. First, the United States' "annexation" objective is difficult to achieve. From the perspective of international law, "annexing the territory of another country" violates the general consensus of the international community. If the United States insists on advancing this, it will face immense international pressure. From the public opinion perspective, 85% of Greenland's population opposes joining the United States, indicating an extremely weak public support base. From the allies' reaction perspective, Denmark and the European Union have formed a united front, publicly resisting the United States' actions, making it difficult for the U.S. to bypass its allies to achieve its goal. Therefore, it is highly likely that the United States will subsequently adjust its rhetoric, changing "annexation" to more moderate terms such as "deep cooperation" or "strategic control," thereby reducing the radical nature of the objective.

Secondly, Denmark and Greenland will further strengthen their sovereign defense. In response to pressure from the United States, Denmark has announced a significant increase in defense investment in Greenland to demonstrate its sovereign resolve; the Greenlandic autonomous government may accelerate discussions on the independence process, resisting external pressure by strengthening its own sovereign status. Additionally, Denmark and Greenland will further enhance cooperation with countries and regions such as the European Union, Russia, and China, using "multilateral cooperation" to diversify risks and reduce dependence on the United States. Secondly, Denmark and Greenland will further strengthen their sovereign defense. In response to pressure from the United States, Denmark has announced a significant increase in defense investment in Greenland to demonstrate its sovereign resolve; the Greenlandic autonomous government may accelerate discussions on the independence process, resisting external pressure by strengthening its own sovereign status. Additionally, Denmark and Greenland will further enhance cooperation with countries and regions such as the European Union, Russia, and China, using "multilateral cooperation" to diversify risks and reduce dependence on the United States.

Finally, both parties may seek "limited compromise" in the areas of resource development and military cooperation. The core demand of the United States is to control Greenland's resources and strategic location, while Greenland's core demand is to achieve economic autonomy and sovereignty integrity. In the future, the two sides may engage in limited cooperation under the premise of "not involving sovereignty transfer": for example, U.S. companies participate in the development of Greenland's rare earth resources through fair competition, both sides strengthen scientific research and environmental protection cooperation in the Arctic region, and the United States continues to maintain its presence at Pituffik Base while committing to respect Greenland's sovereignty. This kind of "limited compromise" can partially meet the strategic needs of the United States and also bring economic benefits to Greenland, making it the most likely outcome of the current game theory scenario. Finally, both parties may seek "limited compromise" in the areas of resource development and military cooperation. The core demand of the United States is to control Greenland's resources and strategic location, while Greenland's core demand is to achieve economic autonomy and sovereignty integrity. In the future, the two sides may engage in limited cooperation under the premise of "not involving sovereignty transfer": for example, U.S. companies participate in the development of Greenland's rare earth resources through fair competition, both sides strengthen scientific research and environmental protection cooperation in the Arctic region, and the United States continues to maintain its presence at Pituffik Base while committing to respect Greenland's sovereignty. This kind of "limited compromise" can partially meet the strategic needs of the United States and also bring economic benefits to Greenland, making it the most likely outcome of the current game theory scenario.

It is worth noting that the ultimate direction of this game will also be influenced by U.S. domestic politics. If the actions of the Trump administration trigger widespread opposition within the United States, or if the Republican Party loses its congressional advantage after the midterm elections, the relevant agenda may be forced to be shelved. Conversely, if a "consensus" is formed domestically in the United States, the push for a tougher strategy may continue. Additionally, the attitudes of countries such as China and Russia will also affect the direction of the game. If China and Russia increase their support for Greenland, the United States may further escalate pressure, leading to a more tense situation.

Conclusion: A Game Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape of the Arctic

The Trump administration's push to control Greenland is, in essence, a geopolitical game centered around the Arctic's strategic location and resources, driven by the United States' reassessment of the global geopolitical landscape and its efforts to maintain its own dominance. While this game may seem absurd, it profoundly reflects the deep-seated contradictions within the current global order: the conflict between traditional alliances and emerging geopolitical interests, the confrontation between unilateral hegemony and multilateral consensus, and the struggle between resource competition and sovereign equality. The Trump administration's push to control Greenland is, in essence, a geopolitical game centered around the Arctic's strategic location and resources, driven by the United States' reassessment of the global geopolitical landscape and its efforts to maintain its own dominance. While this game may seem absurd, it profoundly reflects the deep-seated contradictions within the current global order: the conflict between traditional alliances and emerging geopolitical interests, the confrontation between unilateral hegemony and multilateral consensus, and the struggle between resource competition and sovereign equality.

Regardless of the final outcome, this game will have a profound impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic: on one hand, geopolitical competition in the Arctic region will become more intense, and the struggle among nations for Arctic resources and shipping routes will further escalate; on the other hand, Greenland's independence process may accelerate, and the power structure in the Arctic region will become more diversified. For the United States, this game is a "major test" of its alliance system and global influence; for Denmark, Greenland, and the European Union, it is a "defensive battle" to safeguard sovereignty and geopolitical interests; for the global community, it is a "challenge and test" to the existing international order. Regardless of the final outcome, this game will have a profound impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic: on one hand, geopolitical competition in the Arctic region will become more intense, and the struggle among nations for Arctic resources and shipping routes will further escalate; on the other hand, Greenland's independence process may accelerate, and the power structure in the Arctic region will become more diversified. For the United States, this game is a "major test" of its alliance system and global influence; for Denmark, Greenland, and the European Union, it is a "defensive battle" to safeguard sovereignty and geopolitical interests; for the global community, it is a "challenge and test" to the existing international order.

The game on the ice continues. This seemingly unreasonable diplomatic incident will ultimately become a key event reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic, and will also add a new footnote to the global geopolitical game.