The Arctic Chessboard under Greenland's Sovereignty Consensus: The "Tacit Understanding" between China and Canada and the Deepening of China-Russia Arctic Cooperation.

In January 2026, the winter chill in Ottawa was intense. Inside the Chinese Embassy in Canada, Ambassador Cong Peiwu conveyed a message to the outside world through translation: China shares Canada's view on supporting Greenland's territorial integrity. The backdrop of this statement was the renewed territorial claim over Greenland by former U.S. President Trump, as well as the internal NATO tensions sparked by political rhetoric about making Canada the 51st state of the United States. Cong Peiwu emphasized that China consistently respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and criticized the selective application of international law and the United Nations Charter as unacceptable.

However, just as China and Canada demonstrated diplomatic tacit understanding on the Greenland issue, experts from institutions such as Harvard University and the Center for Naval Analyses issued warnings at another seminar: in the broader Arctic region, military and strategic cooperation between China and Russia is significantly deepening, especially after 2022. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon—raising the banner of rules on the Greenland issue while deepening cooperation with Russia, which is under Western sanctions, in other Arctic regions—outlines the complex landscape of current geopolitical competition in the Arctic. How does China, under its self-positioning as a near-Arctic state, balance its image as a rule-upholder with its growing strategic interests? How is the Arctic, once regarded as a pristine example of global governance and cooperation, evolving into a new frontier for great power competition?

Greenland: The Birth of a Consensus and a Geopolitical Tool

Greenland, the world's largest island, has frequently made international headlines in recent years due to its increasingly prominent strategic value and resource potential. It is under the sovereignty of Denmark but enjoys a high degree of autonomy. In 1951, the United States and Denmark signed a defense agreement concerning Greenland, in which the U.S. pledged to provide defense for the island in the event of a military threat. However, during and after the Trump administration, discussions about the U.S. taking over or purchasing Greenland have repeatedly emerged, citing reasons related to U.S. national security needs. Such territorial claims based on power politics directly challenge the fundamental principles of international law centered on sovereign equality.

China's timing of intervention was remarkably precise. The remarks by Ambassador Cong Peiwu, along with the call for international law by Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, were not isolated incidents. Analysis indicates that Beijing astutely identified the fractures within NATO caused by unilateral U.S. assertions, particularly the concerns of middle powers like Canada over the capricious actions of the superpower. The speech by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the Davos Forum, which called for a coalition of middle powers to oppose economic coercion by major nations—though not explicitly naming any country—was carefully studied by Beijing. Seizing this opportunity, China positioned itself as a responsible and stable force steadfastly upholding the principles of the UN Charter.

This posture holds multiple strategic utilities. Firstly, it diplomatically draws closer to Canada. As one of the eight Arctic nations, Canada possesses direct influence over Arctic affairs and harbors wariness towards the overly assertive Arctic policies of the United States. The formation of a certain consensus between China and Canada on Greenland issues provides a potential cooperative fulcrum for China's participation in Arctic affairs. Secondly, it effectively counters the long-standing Western accusations that China does not comply with international law in the South China Sea. By emphasizing respect for international rules on high-profile occasions, Beijing attempts to construct a consistent narrative of being a rule-upholder, despite significant differences in its specific practices across different maritime regions.

However, the foundation of this consensus is fragile. Canada's Arctic foreign policy document released at the end of 2024 clearly demonstrates deep skepticism toward China's activities in the Arctic. The document points out that China seeks to develop commercial shipping, exploit critical minerals, natural gas, and fishery resources in the Arctic, and that its scientific research activities have dual-use civilian and military implications. It emphasizes that any research conducted by China within Canada's exclusive economic zone must obtain approval from Ottawa, and such requests will be carefully scrutinized. This indicates that the shared perspective on Greenland's sovereignty issue has not translated into Canada's trust in China's full participation in Arctic affairs.

Transformation of "Near-Arctic States": From Investment-Driven to Scientific Research and Security Cooperation

For many years, China has referred to itself as a near-Arctic state, even though its northernmost territory is still approximately 1,500 kilometers away from the Arctic Circle. This self-positioning was once closely linked to the grand initiative of the Polar Silk Road, aiming to deeply integrate into Arctic development through investments and infrastructure projects. However, observations by Jennifer Spence, head of the Arctic Initiative at Harvard University, reveal a significant shift: China has scaled back its direct investments in the Arctic and reduced the frequency of using terms such as "near-Arctic state" and "Polar Silk Road."

Spence pointed out that it was the shift in the policy responses of Arctic nations that led to this outcome. Initially open to Chinese commercial investment, Arctic countries later largely reversed their stance. Due to concerns over the loss of strategic assets and national security risks, nations such as Canada and the United States tightened foreign investment reviews, particularly in critical minerals and infrastructure sectors. This forced China to adjust its Arctic engagement strategy.

Investment faces obstacles, scientific research and security cooperation become new focal points. China's Arctic activities have clearly shifted focus towards scientific research. This includes deploying icebreaker research vessels (such as the Xue Long) for polar expeditions and achieving breakthroughs in seabed technology and space technology. Ambassador Cong Peiwu also emphasized that China's goal in the Arctic is to promote regional development and maintain stability and peace in the area, specifically mentioning support for addressing climate change.

However, the issue lies in the fact that as pointed out by Elizabeth Wishnick, a China expert at the Center for Naval Analyses in the United States, these cutting-edge technologies are almost all dual-use. Scientific research capabilities such as seabed mapping, remote sensing, and satellite communication can be seamlessly transformed into military applications for submarine navigation, missile targeting, and battlefield awareness. This is precisely the core reason why Arctic countries like Canada have expressed concerns in official documents. Consequently, China's Arctic scientific research activities are shrouded in a veil of strategic ambiguity.

Meanwhile, the cooperative relationship between China and Russia in the Arctic has undergone a qualitative change. According to Vishnik's analysis, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, international sanctions led to a massive withdrawal of Western capital and technology from Russia's Arctic projects. Isolated Moscow had almost no other options, and its dependence on China deepened sharply. Russia, which previously was reluctant to grant China observer status in the Arctic Council, has now turned to actively seeking cooperation with Beijing.

This cooperation quickly expanded from the economic sphere to the security domain. After 2022, you will see deepened military collaboration between China and Russia, including in the Arctic region. According to Vishnik's description, in the Bering Strait—a crucial waterway connecting Alaska and Siberia—the coast guards and militaries of China and Russia have conducted various joint exercises. The fundamental driving force lies in shared strategic interests: the Northern Sea Route is increasingly gaining commercial and strategic value for China, while Russia requires China's capital, technology, and market to develop this route. For China, it serves as a strategic passage that shortens the shipping distance between Europe and Asia and avoids traditional chokepoints; for Russia, it is a lifeline for developing its Far East and generating revenue.

The Sino-Russian Arctic Axis: Motivations, Forms, and Regional Responses

The rapprochement between China and Russia in the Arctic is not merely a temporary expedient, but is grounded in profound geopolitical strategic complementarity. This cooperation exhibits characteristics of being multi-layered and spanning multiple domains.

Economically and logistically, the Northern Sea Route serves as a crucial link. With the accelerated melting of the Arctic ice cap, the navigable window for this route along Russia's northern coastline has extended. China has already become one of the most significant users of this route, primarily transporting energy (liquefied natural gas) and minerals. China's investments and technical support in route infrastructure (such as ports, icebreakers, and navigation systems) directly aid Russia's Arctic development strategy. In turn, a stable and efficient Northern Sea Route aligns with China's goals of diversifying energy imports and extending the Belt and Road Initiative.

At the security and military level, cooperation has entered the practical implementation stage. In addition to joint exercises in the Bering Sea, the potential for coordination between the two countries in areas such as intelligence sharing, satellite surveillance, and anti-submarine warfare has raised concerns among Western analysts. Vishnik refuted Trump's claims about Chinese and Russian vessels encircling Greenland, pointing out that the hotspots of their activities are more concentrated in the eastern Arctic near Russian territory and the Pacific entrance. However, this cooperation alone is sufficient to alter the security landscape in the Arctic. It implies that Russia's military presence in the Arctic could be enhanced with China's technological support, while China gains operational experience and situational awareness in critical waters.

Changes in the role of the Arctic Council serve as another observation point. As the core multilateral mechanism for Arctic governance, the Arctic Council has effectively come to a standstill due to the war in Ukraine (the G7 nations refuse to cooperate with Russia). This provides greater room for activity for China, a non-Arctic state. Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation, to some extent, bypasses the traditionally Arctic Eight-dominated multilateral framework and is shaping a new, more exclusive model of regional cooperation.

The reaction of Arctic nations is contradictory and anxious. On one hand, they are uneasy about the deepening military cooperation between China and Russia, viewing it as a threat to the peaceful and stable environment in the Arctic. Official documents from both Canada and the United States list China and Russia together as challenges. On the other hand, as Vishnick suggests, a rational response should focus on actual threats (such as hypersonic missiles) by strengthening defenses through upgrading the radar systems of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, rather than excessively hyping symbolic threats like naval circumnavigations. She believes that once cooler heads prevail, this could open up new dialogue. However, this precisely reveals the current Arctic dilemma: the spiral of the security dilemma is squeezing the space for rational cooperation.

Rules, Double Standards, and the Future Order of the Arctic

Ambassador Cong Peiwu's speech in Ottawa and Prime Minister Carney's address in Davos coincidentally pointed to the same keyword: double standards. Cong Peiwu called for China and Canada to jointly uphold international fairness and justice, avoiding double standards and the law of the jungle in geopolitics. Carney, on the other hand, criticized many countries for adopting double standards when discussing the rule-based, disintegrating global order.

This actually touches on the core contradictions in the current governance of the Arctic and even the world. China criticizes the United States' territorial claims in Greenland as selectively applying international law, packaging itself as a defender of the rules. Meanwhile, the West accuses China's actions in the South China Sea of violating international law rulings, and its dual-use activities in the Arctic also conceal an intention to change the rules. Both sides are using the discourse of rules to package their own interests and accuse each other of hypocrisy.

Against the backdrop of such mutual distrust, the future of the Arctic may witness the emergence of two parallel and opposing orders. One is the traditional order based on the sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction of the eight Arctic states, which emphasizes the rights granted to coastal states by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and adopts a cautious and restrictive stance towards activities by non-Arctic states. Canada's policy of meticulously reviewing Chinese scientific research applications precisely reflects this order.

The other is an order based on functional cooperation and de facto existence, which may be driven by bilateral cooperation between China and Russia, as well as cooperation between China and some Arctic countries in specific areas such as climate change and scientific research. This order is more pragmatic in nature and may bypass complex multilateral negotiations to directly shape the actual landscape of activities in the Arctic.

For China, its Arctic strategy appears to be adopting a refined approach of divide and conquer, differentiated treatment. On the Greenland issue, it seeks consensus with countries like Canada, raising the banner of sovereignty and rules to divide the Western camp and establish a responsible image. In terms of overall Arctic engagement, faced with investment obstacles, it has shifted to deepening scientific research. Additionally, leveraging the strategic opportunity of Russia's isolation, it has deepened practical cooperation with Russia in shipping routes and security areas to substantially expand its presence and influence.

The Arctic, this frozen land, is becoming a mirror that reflects the flexibility and fragility of international rules in the era of great power competition, as well as the intricate dance between strategic narratives and real interests. The face-off between China and Canada over Greenland's sovereignty may be just a brief harmony; while the quietly deepening cooperation between China and Russia beneath the Arctic ice may be composing a melody with far-reaching implications. The future stability of the Arctic will not depend on the declarations of any single country, but on whether the relevant parties can find a fragile balance between competition and coexistence within the labyrinth of intertwined vigilance and interests.