Japan - In-Depth Analysis: The Imbalance Between Ambition and Capability

I. Background and Core Argument

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's remarks concerning "contingencies in Taiwan" reveal Japan's growing militaristic ambitions in recent years. The construction and deployment of the new "Mogami"-class frigates by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) are a concrete manifestation of its pursuit of external expansion under the guise of "defense."

Core Conclusion: The "Mogami"-class is a vessel with decent performance, but it is "the least suitable for Japan's current requirements." It profoundly reflects the significant contradiction between Japan's growing military ambitions and its actual capacity to support them.Core Conclusion: The "Mogami"-class is a vessel with decent performance, but it is "the least suitable for Japan's current requirements." It profoundly reflects the significant contradiction between Japan's growing military ambitions and its actual capacity to support them.

II. Comparison of Maritime Power between China and Japan: The Realistic Dilemma of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

Forecast of Warfare Forms and the Structure of the Maritime Self-Defense Force Fleet

From a geopolitical perspective, if conflicts occur in the relevant region, maritime and aerial warfare centered around the "First Island Chain" will become the primary form of combat. The current fleet structure of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is primarily divided into two major components: first, the Escort Fleet, which serves as the main force for blue-water operations, featuring the classic "Eight-Eight Fleet" configuration consisting of helicopter carriers, Aegis-equipped destroyers, and general-purpose destroyers; second, the Regional District Forces, responsible for coastal patrol and defense missions, which are generally equipped with older, mixed-model vessels with limited combat capabilities.

The three major prominent issues of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

其一，The number of destroyers is insufficient and they are severely outdated.：海自仅拥有8艘宙斯盾舰，其中4艘“金刚”级已服役近30年，整体规模和状态难以适应高强度海空战的需求。其二，The performance of the general-purpose destroyer is limited.：以“朝日”级、“秋月”级为代表的通用驱逐舰，其反潜配置水平甚至不及美国问题频出的“星座”级护卫舰，核心作战能力存在短板。其三，The overall aging rate of the vessels is high.：海自现有舰艇中，约1/3至1/4已处于寿命末期，后续舰艇补充压力巨大。

The significant disparity in naval power between China and Japan.

In recent years, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy has achieved leapfrog development, launching approximately a dozen new medium-to-large destroyers and frigates with blue-water combat capabilities. These include Type 052D destroyers, Type 055 10,000-ton destroyers, and over 40 Type 054A frigates, among other major equipment. In terms of geographical distance, Qingdao is only about 1,000 kilometers away from Sasebo, Japan. Even the extensively deployed Type 056/056A light frigates of China are capable of forward deployment and combat operations.

Conclusion on the Force Balance: The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is currently and will remain, for the foreseeable future, not only incapable of challenging the People's Liberation Army in large-scale naval and aerial warfare but would also be at a significant disadvantage in any armed conflict. In the event of war, the PLA would not need to deploy its "DF Express" systems; its vast arsenal of anti-ship missiles alone would provide an overwhelming advantage.

The Supporting Dilemma of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.

Similar to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) also faces issues such as aging equipment and insufficient performance. Its main equipment consists of outdated F-15 and F-2 fighters, with only a limited number of F-35 stealth fighters in service. This makes it difficult to effectively counter advanced Chinese aircraft such as the J-20 stealth fighter and the J-16 multirole fighter, and it is unable to provide reliable air support for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

III. The Background of the JMSDF Reform and the Birth of the "Mogami"-class

The practical motivations behind the reform of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

As the Chinese Navy progressively ventures into the open seas, frequently crossing the first and second island chains for training and patrol missions, Japan's coastal defense pressure has surged dramatically. The aging vessels of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's regional fleets are entirely inadequate to address this new situation, putting the coastal defense system at risk of collapse.

Institutional Reform and Core Objectives

To alleviate this predicament, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force promoted a large-scale organizational reform from year to year. The core of this reform was to abolish the original escort fleet and regional unit structures, and to place all surface vessels under the command of the newly established "Surface Fleet," which includes multiple surface combat groups and patrol and surveillance groups. The primary goal of this reform is to optimize the allocation of forces through "resource integration" and address the inefficiencies in coordination among different fleets.

The Limitations of Reform and the Positioning of the "Top-Tier" Level.

However, this organizational adjustment did not address the fundamental issue: as a batch of vessels built in the late 1990s gradually enter their decommissioning phase, the core contradiction of the Maritime Self-Defense Force—The scale of naval vessels is shrinking, there is a shortage of multi-functional ships, and service vessels are insufficient.—cannot be resolved through command structure adjustments. It is precisely against the backdrop of this significant gap between ambition and capability that the "Mogami"-class frigate emerged as the "solution" introduced by the Maritime Self-Defense Force, with its very birth bearing a strong sense of compromise. However, this organizational adjustment did not address the fundamental issue: as a batch of vessels built in the late 1990s gradually enter their decommissioning phase, the core contradiction of the Maritime Self-Defense Force—The scale of naval vessels is shrinking, there is a shortage of multi-functional ships, and service vessels are insufficient.—cannot be resolved through command structure adjustments. It is precisely against the backdrop of this significant gap between ambition and capability that the "Mogami"-class frigate emerged as the "solution" introduced by the Maritime Self-Defense Force, with its very birth bearing a strong sense of compromise.

IV. In-depth Analysis of the Technology and Performance of the "Mogami"-class Frigate

Design Objectives and Inherent Contradictions

The core missions assigned by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to the "Mogami"-class frigates include: first, freeing mainstay Aegis-equipped destroyers such as the "Kongo," "Atago," and "Maya" classes from tedious coastal patrol, surveillance, and other "miscellaneous" duties, allowing them to concentrate on open-sea confrontations; second, serving as a support link between surface combatants and coastal defense forces; third, providing limited medium-to-short-range air defense coverage for surface action groups when necessary; and fourth, enhancing open-sea mine-sweeping and anti-submarine capabilities.

Contradiction: The "Mogami"-class embodies "the grandest ambitions, the most comprehensive requirements, the most cutting-edge technologies, the most unavoidable compromises, and the most abstract product." Its multiple conflicting objectives resulted in inherent flaws from the very beginning of its design.

Power System: Resource Misallocation of "Using a Big Horse to Pull a Small Cart"

The Mogami-class adopts a Combined Diesel and Gas (CODAG) propulsion configuration, specifically consisting of two LM2500 gas turbines (primarily used for acceleration) and two MAN 12V28/33D STC diesel engines (mainly for cruising). This power combination provides exceptionally abundant power reserves, with a total output approximately 1.5 times that of Chinese frigates of a similar class. According to official data, its speed can reach 30 knots, and its actual maximum speed is certain to exceed this figure. Additionally, it boasts a long-range cruising capability of 6,000 nautical miles.

Contradiction: As a frigate that is supposed to emphasize cost-effectiveness and suitability for coastal operations, it is equipped with top-tier gas turbines typically used for large destroyers or aircraft carriers. This configuration of "using a big horse to pull a small cart" profoundly reflects Japan's ambitions for a "blue-water presence" and its aspirations in "the seas of others."

Weapon System: The Fatal Flaw of "Saving Where It Shouldn't Be Saved, Spending Where It Shouldn't Be Spent"

The weapon configuration of the "Mogami"-class exhibits a clear issue of "imbalanced trade-offs." The initially planned weapon system included one 127mm naval gun, two 8-cell Mk 41 vertical launch systems, two triple 324mm torpedo tubes, two quadruple Type 17 anti-ship missile launchers, one "Sea RAM" close-in weapon system, and one helicopter hangar. However, based on the actual deployment status, the first six ships of the "Mogami"-class The vertical launch system is not installed., which directly results in the loss of capability to launch anti-submarine missiles and area air defense missiles. Anti-submarine warfare can only rely on 324mm torpedoes, leading to a significant reduction in combat effectiveness. The weapon configuration of the "Mogami"-class exhibits a clear issue of "imbalanced trade-offs." The initially planned weapon system included one 127mm naval gun, two 8-cell Mk 41 vertical launch systems, two triple 324mm torpedo tubes, two quadruple Type 17 anti-ship missile launchers, one "Sea RAM" close-in weapon system, and one helicopter hangar. However, based on the actual deployment status, the first six ships of the "Mogami"-class The vertical launch system is not installed., which directly results in the loss of capability to launch anti-submarine missiles and area air defense missiles. Anti-submarine warfare can only rely on 324mm torpedoes, leading to a significant reduction in combat effectiveness.

Even when analyzed with the full configuration (including the vertical launch system), its firepower level remains relatively limited: if equipped with anti-ship missiles, the remaining vertical launch units can only accommodate either "Improved Sea Sparrow" (ESSM) missiles or medium-range "Type" air defense missiles. Among these, most rely on semi-active radar guidance, with a single-shot hit probability of only %-% in complex electronic countermeasure environments. Even with the addition of the "SeaRAM" close-in weapon system, it can only engage up to - aerial targets at most. In comparison, the vertical launch system on China's Type destroyer can accommodate larger and longer-range air defense missiles (with the export version claiming a range of up to kilometers), giving it far superior firepower suppression capabilities over the "Mogami"-class.

Core Strengths: Precision Enhancement of Mine Countermeasures and Anti-Submarine Capabilities

Anti-mine and anti-submarine capabilities are the most prominent core strengths of the "Mogami"-class, both of which are directly related to the security of Japan's maritime lifelines. In terms of anti-mine operations, the "Mogami"-class employs an unmanned vehicle (/) remote mine-sweeping mode, equipped with autonomous unmanned surface vehicles, and integrates the dual-frequency sonar system from France's Thales (high frequency for detecting conventional mines, low frequency for detecting buried mines). This enables automatic mine identification and remote detonation, significantly enhancing both the efficiency and safety of mine-sweeping operations.

In terms of anti-submarine warfare, the configuration of the Mogami-class is also highly targeted: the sonar system employs a combination of a main/passive sonar (primarily for anti-submarine detection) and a hull-mounted low-frequency sonar (with additional mine detection capabilities). In terms of aviation facilities, the hangar can accommodate one anti-submarine helicopter, while the deck can host one mine-sweeping helicopter, providing robust aviation anti-submarine and mine-sweeping support capabilities.

Hull and Electronic Systems: The Misleading "Advanced" Label

The "integrated mast" adopted by the Mogami-class is often regarded by external observers as a symbol of its technological advancement. However, in reality, this mast only achieves physical integration and stealth design optimization. The radar, electronic warfare, and communication antennas remain physically separated in layout, failing to reach the advanced level of "multi-functional phased array integration" (where radar, electronic warfare, and communication functions are fused within the same aperture). Compared to the integrated radio frequency mast of Chinese destroyers, which achieves radar-electronic warfare integration, there exists a significant generational gap.

Its Combat Information Center (CIC) adopts a circular layout and a wraparound display system, which appears advanced but has actually been exposed as merely a simple splicing of multiple display screens. Although the center has achieved full digitization, integrating functions such as combat command, navigation control, electromechanical monitoring, damage control, and unmanned vehicle control, thereby diminishing the role of the traditional bridge and electromechanical compartments, a core contradiction remains: The practical significance of a wraparound display system for beyond-visual-range combat is limited. It primarily provides better visibility for peacetime missions such as standoffs and surveillance, and its relevance to actual combat needs is not high.. Its Combat Information Center (CIC) adopts a circular layout and a wraparound display system, which appears advanced but has actually been exposed as merely a simple splicing of multiple display screens. Although the center has achieved full digitization, integrating functions such as combat command, navigation control, electromechanical monitoring, damage control, and unmanned vehicle control, thereby diminishing the role of the traditional bridge and electromechanical compartments, a core contradiction remains: The practical significance of a wraparound display system for beyond-visual-range combat is limited. It primarily provides better visibility for peacetime missions such as standoffs and surveillance, and its relevance to actual combat needs is not high..

The dual contradiction between construction standards and costs.

The Mogami-class adopts civilian shipbuilding standards rather than military standards, a choice that directly reduces its construction cost—the export version to Australia costs less than a billion dollars per unit, even lower than that of British frigates. However, at the same time, the ship presents a peculiar state of "a large horse pulling a small cart" and "Lü Bu riding a dog": on one hand, it equips the frigate with top-tier gas turbines, pursuing blue-water capabilities; on the other hand, it "scales down" the critical vertical launch system, causing the first ships to lose core combat capabilities, yet it piles on advanced phased array radars, electronic warfare systems, and high-end configurations like Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).

The root cause lies in: The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's positioning of the "Mogami"-class is extremely ambiguous. It is required to undertake the missions of a littoral combat ship while also expected to function as a general-purpose destroyer, all while maintaining air defense capabilities and cooperative engagement capabilities. However, the limited budget cannot support these conflicting demands, ultimately resulting in a distorted configuration where "costs are cut where they shouldn't be, and resources are spent where they shouldn't be."

V. Overall Evaluation

The "Mogami"-class is not a mature vessel that aligns with conventional naval development logic. It is essentially the product of long-term imbalances among Japan's expanding strategic ambitions, limited industrial capabilities, constrained budgetary resources, and the need to balance political demands. It can be described as a piece of equipment that is "inherently contradictory and structurally flawed." The deployment of this vessel has not only failed to resolve the core challenges facing the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force—such as fleet size reduction and functional imbalances—but has also laid bare the chaos in its military strategic planning, the recklessness in resource allocation, and the disconnect from practical operational needs.

From the perspective of the core principles of modern naval development, a powerful navy with practical combat effectiveness must be built on an equipment system characterized by "functional specialization and coordinated division of labor"—each type of warship carries a clear core mission, forming combat synergy through systematic cooperation. Conversely, if multiple conflicting functions are forcibly integrated into a single vessel without regard for actual needs, it inevitably leads to the dilemma of being "comprehensive but not specialized, advanced yet impractical." The *Mogami*-class frigate, which attempted to balance multiple roles such as coastal defense, open-sea support, air defense, anti-submarine operations, mine clearance, and reconnaissance, ultimately resulted in significant shortcomings in key capabilities and a misallocation of resources. This serves as a typical example of violating this principle.