Japan - In-Depth Analysis: The Imbalance Between Ambition and Capability
05/01/2026
I. Background and Core Argument
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's remarks regarding a Taiwan contingency have exposed Japan's increasingly expanding militaristic ambitions in recent years. The construction and deployment of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (hereinafter referred to as JMSDF) new Mogami-class frigates precisely represent a concrete manifestation of its pursuit of external expansion under the guise of defense.
Core Conclusion: At the highest level, it is a ship with decent performance, but it is the least suitable for Japan's current requirements. It profoundly reflects the significant contradiction between Japan's growing military ambitions and its actual capacity to support them.
II. Comparison of Maritime Power between China and Japan: The Realistic Dilemma of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
Forecast of Warfare Forms and the Structure of the Maritime Self-Defense Force Fleet
From the perspective of the geopolitical strategic landscape, if conflicts occur in relevant regions, maritime and aerial warfare around the first island chain will become the primary form of combat. The existing fleet structure of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is mainly divided into two major components: first, the escort fleet serving as the main force for ocean operations, which follows the classic "Eight-Eight Fleet" configuration, consisting of 1 helicopter carrier, 2 Aegis-equipped destroyers, and 5 multi-purpose destroyers; second, the regional forces responsible for coastal patrol and defense missions, whose vessels are generally outdated, of mixed models, and have limited combat capabilities.
The three major prominent issues of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
First, Insufficient Number of Destroyers and Severe Aging: The Maritime Self-Defense Force possesses only 8 Aegis destroyers, 4 of which are Kongo-class vessels that have been in service for nearly 30 years. Their overall scale and condition are inadequate to meet the demands of high-intensity naval and aerial warfare. Second, Limited Capabilities of General-Purpose Destroyers: General-purpose destroyers, represented by the Asahi-class and Akizuki-class, have anti-submarine warfare configurations that are even inferior to the frequently problematic U.S. Constellation-class frigates, revealing significant gaps in core combat capabilities. Third, High Overall Aging Rate of Vessels: Among the Maritime Self-Defense Force's current fleet, approximately 1/3 to 1/4 are nearing the end of their service life, creating immense pressure for subsequent vessel replenishment.
The significant disparity in naval power between China and Japan.
In recent years, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy has achieved leapfrog development, launching approximately a dozen new medium-to-large destroyers and frigates with blue-water combat capabilities. These include Type 052D destroyers, Type 055 10,000-ton destroyers, and over 40 Type 054A frigates, among other major equipment. In terms of geographical distance, Qingdao is only about 1,000 kilometers away from Sasebo, Japan. Even the extensively deployed Type 056/056A light frigates of China are capable of forward deployment and combat operations.
Conclusion on the Power Balance: At present and for the foreseeable future, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is not only incapable of challenging the People's Liberation Army in large-scale naval and air warfare but would also be at a complete disadvantage in a hot conflict. In the event of war, the PLA would not need to deploy the Dongfeng Express; its vast arsenal of anti-ship missiles alone would provide an overwhelming advantage.
The Supporting Dilemma of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.
Similar to the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (hereinafter referred to as the ASDF) also faces issues of aging equipment and insufficient performance. Its main equipment consists of outdated F-15J and F-2 fighter jets, with only a small number of F-35 stealth fighters deployed. This makes it difficult to effectively counter advanced aircraft such as China's J-20 stealth fighters and J-16 multirole fighters, and it is unable to provide reliable air support for the Maritime Self-Defense Force.
III. The Background of the JMSDF Reform and the Birth of the "Mogami"-class
The practical motivations behind the reform of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
As the Chinese Navy progressively ventures into the open seas, frequently crossing the first and second island chains for training and patrol missions, Japan's coastal defense pressure has surged dramatically. The aging vessels of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's regional fleets are entirely inadequate to address this new situation, putting the coastal defense system at risk of collapse.
Institutional Reform and Core Objectives
To alleviate this predicament, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is promoting a large-scale organizational reform from 2018 to 2025. The core content involves abolishing the original Escort Flotilla and District Unit structures, and unifying all surface vessels under the command of the newly established Surface Fleet, which will be subdivided into multiple Surface Action Groups and Patrol & Surveillance Groups. The primary objective of this reform is to optimize force allocation through centralized resource management, thereby addressing the inefficiencies in coordination among different fleets.
The Limitations of Reform and the Positioning of the "Top-Tier" Level.
However, this organizational adjustment did not address the fundamental issue: as a batch of ships built in the late 1990s gradually enter their decommissioning phase, the core contradictions of the Maritime Self-Defense Force—shrinking fleet size, shortage of multi-functional vessels, and insufficient service ships—cannot be resolved through command structure reforms. It is precisely against the backdrop of a significant gap between ambition and capability that the Mogami-class frigate emerged as the solution proposed by the Maritime Self-Defense Force, with its very birth marked by strong compromises.
IV. In-depth Analysis of the Technology and Performance of the "Mogami"-class Frigate
Design Objectives and Inherent Contradictions
The core missions set by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force for the Mogami-class frigates include: first, to free mainstay Aegis-equipped vessels such as the Kongō, Atago, and Maya classes from tedious coastal patrol, surveillance, and miscellaneous duties, allowing them to concentrate on open-sea engagements; second, to serve as a support pivot between surface combatants and coastal defense forces; third, to provide limited medium-to-short-range air defense coverage for surface action groups when necessary; and fourth, to enhance open-sea mine-sweeping and anti-submarine capabilities.
Contradiction: It embodies the grandest ambitions, the most comprehensive requirements, the most radical technology, the most helpless compromises, and the most abstract product all at once. Multiple conflicting goals have resulted in inherent flaws from the very beginning of its design.
Power System: Resource Misallocation of "Using a Big Horse to Pull a Small Cart"
The top-level adopts a Combined Diesel-Electric and Gas (CODLAG) configuration, specifically consisting of 1 Rolls-Royce MT-30 gas turbine (primarily used for acceleration) + 2 MAN 12V 28/33D STC diesel engines (primarily used for cruising). This power combination provides it with an extremely abundant power reserve, with a total power output approximately 2.5 times that of the Chinese Type 054A frigate of the same class. According to official data, its speed can reach 30 knots, and its actual maximum speed is certain to exceed this value, while also offering a long-range capability of 6,000 nautical miles.
Contradiction: As a frigate that should emphasize economy and suitability for coastal waters, it is equipped with the top-tier MT-30 gas turbine typically used for large destroyers or aircraft carriers. This configuration of using a big horse to pull a small cart profoundly reflects Japan's covetous ambitions for a presence in distant oceans and others' seas.
Weapon System: The Fatal Flaw of "Saving Where It Shouldn't Be Saved, Spending Where It Shouldn't Be Spent"
The top-tier weapon configuration exhibits a clear imbalance in trade-offs. The initially planned weapon system included one 127mm naval gun, two 8-cell Mk 41 vertical launch systems, two triple 324mm torpedo tubes, two quadruple Type 17 anti-ship missile launchers, one SeaRAM close-in weapon system, and one helicopter hangar. However, based on actual deployment, the first six ships of the top-tier class did not install the Mk 41 vertical launch system. This directly resulted in the loss of capability to launch anti-submarine missiles and area air defense missiles, limiting anti-submarine warfare to reliance solely on 324mm torpedoes, which significantly degraded combat effectiveness.
Even when analyzed according to the full configuration (equipped with a 16-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launching System), its firepower level remains relatively limited: if it carries 8 anti-ship missiles, the remaining VLS cells can only accommodate 32 Evolved SeaSparrow Missiles (ESSM) or 8 Type 03 medium-range air defense missiles. Among these, the ESSM primarily uses semi-active radar guidance, with a single-shot hit probability of only 50%–75% in complex electronic countermeasure environments. Even when supplemented with the SeaRAM close-in weapon system, it can engage at most 10–12 aerial targets. In comparison, the VLS system on China's Type 052D destroyer can accommodate larger, longer-range air defense missiles (the export version claims a range of up to 160 kilometers), giving it a firepower suppression capability far exceeding that of the Mogami-class.
Core Strengths: Precision Enhancement of Mine Countermeasures and Anti-Submarine Capabilities
Anti-mine and anti-submarine capabilities are the most prominent core advantages of the Mogami-class, which are directly related to the security of Japan's maritime lifeline. In terms of anti-mine operations, the Mogami-class adopts a remote mine-sweeping mode using unmanned vehicles (USV/UUV), equipped with the OZZ-5 unmanned self-propelled vehicle, and integrates the French Thales SAMDIS dual-frequency sonar system (high frequency for detecting conventional mines, low frequency for detecting buried mines). This enables automatic identification and remote detonation of mines, significantly improving mine-sweeping efficiency and safety.
In terms of anti-submarine warfare, the configuration of the Mogami-class is also highly targeted: the sonar system adopts a combination of the OQQ-25 main/passive sonar (primarily used for anti-submarine detection) and the OQQ-11 hull-mounted low-frequency sonar (also capable of mine detection). Regarding aviation facilities, the hangar can accommodate 1 SH-60K anti-submarine helicopter, and the deck can park 1 MCH-101 mine-sweeping helicopter, providing strong aviation anti-submarine and mine-sweeping support capabilities.
Hull and Electronic Systems: The Misleading "Advanced" Label
The integrated mast adopted by the most advanced destroyer is often regarded by the outside world as a symbol of its technological advancement. However, in reality, this mast only achieves physical integration and stealth design optimization. The radar, electronic warfare, and communication antennas remain physically separated in layout and have not reached the advanced level of multifunctional phased array integration (where the same aperture achieves the integration of radar, electronic warfare, and communication functions). Compared to the integrated radio frequency mast of China's Type 055 destroyer, which achieves radar-electronic warfare integration, there is a clear generational gap.
Its Combat Information Center (CIC) adopts a circular layout and a surround-view display system, which appears advanced but has been exposed as merely a simple splicing of multiple display screens. Although the center has achieved full digitalization, integrating functions such as combat command, navigation control, electromechanical monitoring, damage control, and unmanned vehicle control, thereby diminishing the role of the traditional bridge and engine room, a core contradiction remains: the surround-view display system has limited practical significance for beyond-visual-range combat; it primarily provides better visibility for peacetime missions like standoffs and surveillance, with low relevance to actual combat needs.
The dual contradiction between construction standards and costs.
The top-level design adopts civilian shipbuilding standards rather than military standards, a choice that directly reduces its construction cost—the export version to Australia is priced at less than $600 million per unit, even lower than the British Type 31 frigate. However, at the same time, the vessel presents a peculiar combination of "a large horse pulling a small cart" and "Lü Bu riding a dog": on one hand, it equips the frigate with top-tier gas turbines, pursuing blue-water performance; on the other hand, it compromises on the critical vertical launch system, resulting in the loss of core combat capabilities for the first six ships, yet it is still outfitted with advanced phased array radar, electronic warfare systems, CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability), and other high-end configurations.
The root cause lies in: The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has an extremely confused positioning of the Mogami-class, requiring it to undertake Littoral Combat Ship missions while also expecting it to possess the functions of a general-purpose destroyer, along with air defense capabilities and cooperative engagement capabilities. However, the limited budget cannot support these conflicting requirements, ultimately leading to a distorted configuration where savings are made where they shouldn't be, and expenditures occur where they shouldn't.
V. Overall Evaluation
The Izumo-class is not a mature warship that conforms to conventional naval construction logic. Its essence is the product of long-term imbalances among multiple factors, including Japan's expanding strategic ambitions, limitations in industrial capabilities, constraints on budgetary resources, and the balancing of political demands. It can be described as an equipment type that is inherently contradictory and malformed in its development. The deployment of this warship has not only failed to resolve the core dilemmas of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force—such as the shrinking scale and functional imbalance of its fleet—but has also laid bare the chaos in its military strategic planning, the blindness in resource allocation, and the disconnect from actual operational needs.
From the core principles of modern naval development, a powerful navy with practical combat effectiveness must be built upon an equipment system characterized by functional specialization and coordinated division of labor—each type of warship carries a clear core mission, forming combat synergy through systematic cooperation. Conversely, if multiple conflicting functions are forcibly integrated into a single warship platform without considering actual needs, it inevitably falls into the predicament of being all-encompassing yet lacking specialization, appearing superior but practically useless. The Mogami-class frigate attempted to balance multiple roles such as coastal defense, open-sea support, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, mine sweeping, and surveillance, ultimately leading to obvious shortcomings in key performance and misplaced resource allocation. This serves as a typical example of violating this principle.