Review of Major Global Conflicts in the Year: What Are the Characteristics and Tactics?

As 2025 draws to a close, over the past year, with the United States entering another reshaping cycle and the deepening imbalance in regional power development, the global situation has continued to trend towards medium-intensity conflicts. Amid these ongoing conflicts, some new tactics and methods of warfare have brought new insights as well as new threats. This article will reveal these new changes by summarizing the characteristics of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Iran-Israel conflict, and India-Pakistan conflict. As 2025 draws to a close, over the past year, with the United States entering another reshaping cycle and the deepening imbalance in regional power development, the global situation has continued to trend towards medium-intensity conflicts. Amid these ongoing conflicts, some new tactics and methods of warfare have brought new insights as well as new threats. This article will reveal these new changes by summarizing the characteristics of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Iran-Israel conflict, and India-Pakistan conflict.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Drone Tactics Continue to Evolve

As the most intense regional conflict, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated continuous and rapid strategic evolution amid the slow movement of frontlines, with related tactics and methods quickly being updated. Among these, the most notable is the tactical optimization of drones.

First, both Russia and Ukraine have significantly increased the production scale of unmanned platforms. According to media reports, Ukrainian Defense Minister Shmyhal stated on December 24, 2025, that this year**, the Ukrainian armed forces will receive a total of 3 million first-person view (FPV) drones for precision strikes, nearly 2.5 times the number from last year**. Similarly, Russia's production capacity for various types of drones is also rapidly increasing. In 2024, Russia produced 1.4 million drones of various types annually, and by 2025, it is expected to reach a scale of 3 to 4 million drones. Among these, platforms like the "Shahed"-136 maintain a stable monthly production of around 5,400 units. In the FPV domain, although fiber-optic drones were deployed for combat as early as the beginning of 2024, by 2025, due to cost issues, fiber-optic drones only account for 8% to 10% of the total FPV drone usage. Various radio-controlled drones still dominate the field. First, both Russia and Ukraine have significantly increased the production scale of unmanned platforms. According to media reports, Ukrainian Defense Minister Shmyhal stated on December 24, 2025, that this year**, the Ukrainian armed forces will receive a total of 3 million first-person view (FPV) drones for precision strikes, nearly 2.5 times the number from last year**. Similarly, Russia's production capacity for various types of drones is also rapidly increasing. In 2024, Russia produced 1.4 million drones of various types annually, and by 2025, it is expected to reach a scale of 3 to 4 million drones. Among these, platforms like the "Shahed"-136 maintain a stable monthly production of around 5,400 units. In the FPV domain, although fiber-optic drones were deployed for combat as early as the beginning of 2024, by 2025, due to cost issues, fiber-optic drones only account for 8% to 10% of the total FPV drone usage. Various radio-controlled drones still dominate the field.

Russian "Shahed"/"Geranium" drone production line

Secondly, the increase in quantity has expanded the scope, methods, and organization of drone usage for both Russia and Ukraine. Both sides extensively use FPV drones for various tasks such as reconnaissance, strikes, mine-laying, transportation, arson, and counter-drone operations. Notably, Ukraine employed specially designed FPV drones to launch the "Spider Web Operation" within Russian territory, successfully destroying 10 Russian strategic bombers and transport aircraft, while damaging several others, severely undermining the strategic strike capability of the Russian Aerospace Forces. By the end of 2025, Ukraine utilized various drones and unmanned boats to carry out diverse attacks on Russian-controlled Crimea, the port of Novorossiysk (home to Russia's Black Sea Fleet), and Russia's "shadow fleet" used for oil exports, seriously threatening the security behind Russian front lines. These actions have already taken on significant strategic importance. It can be said that the large-scale use of drones has dramatically increased the pressure on rear-area air security, which may alter the fundamental logic of rear defense and raise the resource requirements for ensuring rear-area security. FPV drones still constitute the main strike force for the Ukrainian military, with approximately 80% of Russian casualties caused by Ukrainian FPV operations. Secondly, the increase in quantity has expanded the scope, methods, and organization of drone usage for both Russia and Ukraine. Both sides extensively use FPV drones for various tasks such as reconnaissance, strikes, mine-laying, transportation, arson, and counter-drone operations. Notably, Ukraine employed specially designed FPV drones to launch the "Spider Web Operation" within Russian territory, successfully destroying 10 Russian strategic bombers and transport aircraft, while damaging several others, severely undermining the strategic strike capability of the Russian Aerospace Forces. By the end of 2025, Ukraine utilized various drones and unmanned boats to carry out diverse attacks on Russian-controlled Crimea, the port of Novorossiysk (home to Russia's Black Sea Fleet), and Russia's "shadow fleet" used for oil exports, seriously threatening the security behind Russian front lines. These actions have already taken on significant strategic importance. It can be said that the large-scale use of drones has dramatically increased the pressure on rear-area air security, which may alter the fundamental logic of rear defense and raise the resource requirements for ensuring rear-area security. FPV drones still constitute the main strike force for the Ukrainian military, with approximately 80% of Russian casualties caused by Ukrainian FPV operations.

The destroyed Tu-bomber at the Olenya base ().

On [specific date], Ukraine used semi-submersible unmanned boats to attack the Russian Kilo-class submarine at the port of Novorossiysk.

They still constitute the main striking force of the Ukrainian military, with approximately % of Russian casualties being inflicted by Ukrainian forces.。对有更多远程炮兵、滑翔航空炸弹的俄军而言，FPV对杀伤总量的占比会低一些。俄乌双方对无人机的使用在组织上进行了一定程度的创新，双方都在组建独立无人机部队后在实战中不断摸索作战方式。在2025年年初，俄罗斯方面集中了多支无人机部队，对库尔斯克州苏贾镇至苏梅州苏梅市的公路进行遮断作战，从而有效破坏了乌军突出部的补给态势，为俄军最后夺回库尔斯克做出了重要的贡献。按照乌军的描述，“我们每分钟都能看到两到三架无人机。这太多了……每个人都清楚俄罗斯会试图切断这条公路，但这仍然让我们的指挥官感到意外。”随着独立无人机部队的组建，其集中运用的情况将可能更频繁地出现。

Without access to "Starlink," the Russian military has utilized a portion of "Shahed" drones (referred to by Russia as "Geraniums") to loiter near flight paths for signal relay. This approach transmits Russia's domestic network signals deep into Ukrainian territory, thereby enabling the operational control of drones as they penetrate deeper into Ukraine.. The Russian side has also deepened its improvements to the "Shahed" drones. Downed "Shahed" drones have been found equipped with daytime cameras, thermal imagers, laser rangefinders, mesh modems, and antennas. This indicates that these drones can be directly remote-controlled by operators and are equipped with LTE modems to transmit telemetry data back. Russia's increased production capacity for the "Shahed" series drones has also significantly heightened Ukraine's air defense pressure. By the second half of 2025, the Russian military has been able to sustain drone attacks exceeding 400 per day. If the attack intervals are extended, they can deploy up to 803 drones in a single wave at most. The continuous airstrikes deep into Ukrainian territory will damage Ukraine's infrastructure and production capacity. This forces Ukraine's already scarce air defense resources to be deployed more to the rear, thereby further optimizing the operational environment for the Russian Aerospace Forces' frontline aviation.Without access to "Starlink," the Russian military has utilized a portion of "Shahed" drones (referred to by Russia as "Geraniums") to loiter near flight paths for signal relay. This approach transmits Russia's domestic network signals deep into Ukrainian territory, thereby enabling the operational control of drones as they penetrate deeper into Ukraine.. The Russian side has also deepened its improvements to the "Shahed" drones. Downed "Shahed" drones have been found equipped with daytime cameras, thermal imagers, laser rangefinders, mesh modems, and antennas. This indicates that these drones can be directly remote-controlled by operators and are equipped with LTE modems to transmit telemetry data back. Russia's increased production capacity for the "Shahed" series drones has also significantly heightened Ukraine's air defense pressure. By the second half of 2025, the Russian military has been able to sustain drone attacks exceeding 400 per day. If the attack intervals are extended, they can deploy up to 803 drones in a single wave at most. The continuous airstrikes deep into Ukrainian territory will damage Ukraine's infrastructure and production capacity. This forces Ukraine's already scarce air defense resources to be deployed more to the rear, thereby further optimizing the operational environment for the Russian Aerospace Forces' frontline aviation.

The flight trajectory of the Russian "Shahed"/"Geranium" drones responsible for relaying signals.

Apart from the application of drones in combat, other tactical changes by both Russia and Ukraine have not been significant. Constrained by the uncertain stance of U.S. aid, Ukraine lacks newer equipment to improve its existing tactical system. Similarly, the Russian military has not been able to alter the fundamental characteristic of slow progress on the frontlines, and mechanized combat units at the battalion level or above still face severe losses when concentrated—an unacceptable situation for Russia, which needs to wage an "economically sustainable war." The extensive use of drones enhances reconnaissance and strike capabilities, preventing large mechanized units from effectively assembling, a situation that remains unchanged in substance.

India-Pakistan Conflict: The Significance of Systematic Warfare Becomes Evident

The brief yet large-scale conflict that erupted between India and Pakistan in [year] is a more typical example of a local war under relatively high-tech conditions. Judging from the performance of both sides, the Pakistani military, despite being at a disadvantage in terms of scale, leveraged its more mature operational system to gain numerous tactical advantages. It managed to keep the intensity of the conflict and the losses within an acceptable range, making it arguably the victor of this conflict and far surpassing its performance in the Kargil conflict of [year].

India's original plan was likely to maintain conflict along the land border while utilizing air power and cruise missiles to strike deep into Pakistani territory, thereby controlling the intensity of the conflict. In response, Pakistan, having long anticipated India's war preparations, actively leveraged its rapidly advancing multi-domain operational capabilities in recent years to counter India's actions.

In the early hours of the morning, India launched "Operation Sindhu," aiming to strike several targets in Pakistan's Kashmir and Punjab regions.. In the first wave, India launched 17 aircraft. The Indian airstrike triggered a large-scale air battle, with 72 Indian and 42 Pakistani aircraft participating. The Pakistani side effectively integrated its reconnaissance satellites, Saab 2000 AWACS aircraft, Air Force Command Center, J-10CE fighter jets, and electronic warfare units using the established Air Force Link 17 data link. They first utilized electronic warfare and cyber warfare capabilities to disrupt and break India's command and control chain. Subsequently, AWACS aircraft designated targets, and J-10CEs launched PL-15E missiles to intercept Indian targets. Due to the breakdown of their command chain and technical deficiencies in their combat aircraft, the Indian side only detected the incoming PL-15E missiles when they entered their terminal acceleration phase. **The Pakistani side claimed to have shot down 3 Indian "Rafale" fighters, 1 Su-30MKI, 1 MiG-29, and 1 "Heron" UAV that day.** Pakistan even stated that it refrained from shooting down more Indian aircraft to control escalation, having even locked onto an A-50I AWACS aircraft queuing at Agra. The integration of multi-domain operational capabilities by the Pakistan Air Force, enabling seamless communication, rapid decision-making, and proficient execution, was the key to its dominance over the Indian Air Force.In the early hours of the morning, India launched "Operation Sindhu," aiming to strike several targets in Pakistan's Kashmir and Punjab regions.. In the first wave, India launched 17 aircraft. The Indian airstrike triggered a large-scale air battle, with 72 Indian and 42 Pakistani aircraft participating. The Pakistani side effectively integrated its reconnaissance satellites, Saab 2000 AWACS aircraft, Air Force Command Center, J-10CE fighter jets, and electronic warfare units using the established Air Force Link 17 data link. They first utilized electronic warfare and cyber warfare capabilities to disrupt and break India's command and control chain. Subsequently, AWACS aircraft designated targets, and J-10CEs launched PL-15E missiles to intercept Indian targets. Due to the breakdown of their command chain and technical deficiencies in their combat aircraft, the Indian side only detected the incoming PL-15E missiles when they entered their terminal acceleration phase. **The Pakistani side claimed to have shot down 3 Indian "Rafale" fighters, 1 Su-30MKI, 1 MiG-29, and 1 "Heron" UAV that day.** Pakistan even stated that it refrained from shooting down more Indian aircraft to control escalation, having even locked onto an A-50I AWACS aircraft queuing at Agra. The integration of multi-domain operational capabilities by the Pakistan Air Force, enabling seamless communication, rapid decision-making, and proficient execution, was the key to its dominance over the Indian Air Force.

The downed Indian military "Rafale" fighter jet was the first "Rafale" received by the Indian Air Force. (Image sourced from the internet; please contact for removal if there is any infringement.)

The overwhelmingly one-sided outcome of the air combat likely led to a setback in India's overall strategic plans. The Indian Air Force did not conduct any operations in the two days that followed, relying instead on land-based long-range munitions and drones for airstrikes, which significantly reduced efficiency. It was not until the [specific date] that the Indian Air Force resumed small-scale airstrikes, while the Pakistani Air Force swiftly retaliated in response. With the air force withdrawn from the battlefield, India's room for escalating the conflict was greatly diminished, effectively losing the initiative in the strategic contest. Pakistan successfully leveraged its limited resources to counter a larger adversary, and this historic large-scale beyond-visual-range air combat thus took on significant strategic importance.

In addition to aerial combat, both India and Pakistan have employed tactics such as drone strikes, cyber attacks, long-range artillery strikes, and ballistic missile anti-radiation operations. However, due to the high importance both sides place on information warfare, there has been significant information pollution, making it difficult to confirm many battlefield achievements deep within enemy territory through public channels. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the technological level demonstrated in this short yet intense conflict between India and Pakistan is slightly higher than that seen in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with more diverse tactical applications, making it more significant for reference.

Israel-Iran Conflict: Airstrikes and Ballistic Missile Tactics

Year Month Day, the 12-day conflict that erupted between Israel and Iran further exemplifies the ongoing escalation of conflicts in the Middle East. With the support or acquiescence of countries such as the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Azerbaijan, Israel, Relying on long-term undercover and recently recruited Mossad infiltration teams (approximately individuals) within Iran to carry out sabotage attacks first, followed by sustained aerial strikes, the aim is to disrupt Iran's command structure, air defense systems, missile retaliation capabilities, and nuclear research and development capacity.. Iran, in response, utilized drones and ballistic missiles to retaliate against Israel. Overall, Israel achieved an overwhelming advantage, while Iran suffered significant losses. However, Israel's intention to instigate a regime change in Iran was not realized.Year Month Day, the 12-day conflict that erupted between Israel and Iran further exemplifies the ongoing escalation of conflicts in the Middle East. With the support or acquiescence of countries such as the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Azerbaijan, Israel, Relying on long-term undercover and recently recruited Mossad infiltration teams (approximately individuals) within Iran to carry out sabotage attacks first, followed by sustained aerial strikes, the aim is to disrupt Iran's command structure, air defense systems, missile retaliation capabilities, and nuclear research and development capacity.. Iran, in response, utilized drones and ballistic missiles to retaliate against Israel. Overall, Israel achieved an overwhelming advantage, while Iran suffered significant losses. However, Israel's intention to instigate a regime change in Iran was not realized.

In the realm of intelligence warfare, Israel has successfully recruited over a thousand individuals within Iran, including Iranians as well as Indian and Afghan workers in the country. These operatives employ methods such as drones, remote-controlled missiles, and bomb-making to carry out sabotage from within Iran. Among these covert agents, some collaborate with infiltrating Israeli special forces to strike Iranian air force bases and air defense positions. Others operate in small groups to conduct assassinations, bombings, and drone launches. Israel’s recruitment efforts have been highly effective. In Tehran alone, approximately ten thousand drones or drone components were discovered during the conflict. While Iran successfully thwarted Israeli assassination attempts targeting several high-ranking Iranian officials, a significant number of senior officials and nuclear scientists were still assassinated.

The remote-controlled "Spike" missile launch site used by the Mossad undercover team (image sourced from a social media screenshot, please contact for removal if there is any infringement).

Extensive intelligence support was also a crucial factor that enabled Israel to carry out a successful surprise attack and suppress Iran's counterattack with a small tactical fleet. The head of the Israel Defense Research and Development Directorate stated on the 15th that during the war on the 14th, Israel generated over 10,000 satellite images, covering an area of approximately 2 million square kilometers, providing direct support for strike missions against thousands of targets. Additionally, Israel made over 100 emergency intelligence mission adjustments to its satellites, which made an "extremely high contribution" to the accuracy of intelligence and operations. At the same time, artificial intelligence systems were used to assist in target identification. Israel also conducted high-intensity electronic warfare, with "the entire Tehran area under interference."

On the basis of paralyzing Iran's air force and air defense positions, the Israeli Air Force employed standoff weapons to strike Iran's long-range radar systems and key military-political targets. The weapons used included the "Rampage" air-launched ballistic missiles, the "Popeye" air-to-ground missiles, among others. Strikes by the Israeli Air Force on western regions such as Tabriz were often launched from Iraqi airspace, where support was provided by aerial refueling forces from the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Among the remaining attack routes, some entered from southern Iran, while others passed through Azerbaijan to directly target Tehran. After completing the paralysis of Iran's regional air defense systems and strikes on military branches, the Israeli Air Force conducted sustained attacks on Iran's missile launch bases. According to information released by Israel, Israeli forces struck over military targets in Iran, destroying fighter jets, up to ballistic missiles, and dozens of missile launchers. Of course, this tactic may have been exaggerated, and the size of Israel's tactical fleet is insufficient to fully suppress a country with such vast depth as Iran. For the Israeli Air Force, maintaining a daily sortie scale of sorties over days is already the limit.

The Israeli Air Force attacked a missile site in Tabriz, Iran.

Iran retaliated using ballistic missiles and drones, but due to multi-layered interception by U.S., Jordanian, and Israeli forces along their flight paths, the overall penetration effectiveness fell short of expectations. Based on publicly available information, during the conflict, Iran launched approximately missiles toward Israel, with around directly hitting their targets, resulting in an interception rate of % to .%. This figure may be somewhat inflated, as Iran targeted five Israeli military bases, air defense positions, and intelligence centers, while Israel’s information controls have made it difficult to verify the actual damage to its military bases through open-source intelligence. Iran also deployed over drones, of which reached Israeli territory, though reports indicate only one successfully evaded interception, leading to an interception rate exceeding .%. According to calculations by Haaretz based on videos captured by Jordanian photographers, approximately Arrow- , Arrow- , and were intercepted. In mid-, it was reported that the United States expended approximately to interceptors during the days of the Iran-Israel conflict, accounting for roughly % of its inventory.

Iran's counterattack models primarily include the "Emad" missile, the "Haj Qasem" missile, the "Fortress Breaker" (also known as the "Kheibar Shekan") missile, and the "Fateh"-110 missile, among others. Notably, as Israel's air defense system ammunition has been depleted, the penetration efficiency of Iranian missiles has increased. The penetration rate of Iranian missiles was 50% the day before yesterday, rising to 70% the day after tomorrow. By October 7, 110 out of the 120 ballistic missiles launched by Iran successfully penetrated defenses. This occurred despite the suppression of Iran's western missile positions by the Israeli Air Force and the outdated equipment of its eastern missile forces, which made it difficult for them to undertake major counterattack missions. According to overseas open-source intelligence statistics, Iran has a total of 320 missile shelters, of which 59 were damaged and 261 remained undamaged (above-ground sections). After the conflict, Iran stated that it had only used 7% to 10% of its missile reserves.

Iranian ballistic missiles hit Tel Aviv.

However, the air defense system that Iran invested heavily in building before the war quickly became ineffective during the conflict. The core reasons remain the paralysis of the system and a severe shortage of troop density, with the interior infiltrated by Mossad covert attack teams. Of course, Iran’s air defense forces gradually restored some capabilities within about an hour after the airstrikes, relying on optically guided weapons and anti-aircraft drones originally prepared for the Houthis to achieve some successes in drone combat. Iran claimed to have shot down over Israeli drones, and Iranian air defense personnel suffered casualties in the war.

Iran's air defense capabilities are increasingly reliant on air defense systems utilizing electro-optical detection, such as the "Majid" (optical/infrared composite guidance) short-range air defense system.

The activities of the Iranian Air Force have been limited. On the [specific dates], Iranian Air Force F-14 and MiG-29 fighter jets appeared over Tehran and Tabriz, likely involved in intercepting Israeli drones and loitering munitions. According to Iranian sources, Iranian Air Force F-14 fighters engaged in an aerial battle with Israeli fighter jets lasting up to [specific duration] hours, with multiple instances of mutual radar lock-ons, though conditions for an attack were not met. All losses suffered by the Iranian Air Force occurred on the ground, and neither side managed to shoot down the other's fixed-wing combat aircraft during the aerial engagements.

Overall, the Iran-Israel conflict once again proves many traditional understandings. First, First, domestic control remains a critical foundational condition for waging war. Second, relatively outdated radar systems and a limited number of advanced air defense systems are insufficient to ensure air defense security; air defense systems must involve aviation forces. Third, the number of interceptor missiles available for anti-missile operations is crucial. Exhausting the stockpile of anti-missile interceptors means the attacking side will gain a greater advantage.. Finally, the Israeli Air Force still largely relies on drones to monitor and suppress Iranian missile launch sites in practice. The extensive use of drones can significantly enhance the sensing, control, and strike efficiency of small-scale manned aircraft fleets. Overall, the Iran-Israel conflict once again proves many traditional understandings. First, First, domestic control remains a critical foundational condition for waging war. Second, relatively outdated radar systems and a limited number of advanced air defense systems are insufficient to ensure air defense security; air defense systems must involve aviation forces. Third, the number of interceptor missiles available for anti-missile operations is crucial. Exhausting the stockpile of anti-missile interceptors means the attacking side will gain a greater advantage.. Finally, the Israeli Air Force still largely relies on drones to monitor and suppress Iranian missile launch sites in practice. The extensive use of drones can significantly enhance the sensing, control, and strike efficiency of small-scale manned aircraft fleets.

Given the ongoing tense standoff between Israel and Iran, the possibility of a new round of conflict between the two sides in the coming year cannot be ruled out.

"Midnight Hammer": A typical long-range strike by the U.S. military.

On [Month] [Day], the United States launched Operation "Midnight Hammer" ( ) targeting Iran's nuclear facilities, carrying out airstrikes on nuclear sites in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Amid the conflict between Israel and Iran, the U.S. needed to conduct a "symbolic intervention" to deter Iran's nuclear threshold policy, placate domestic Jewish interest groups, and avoid being drawn into a new strategic quagmire in Iran as much as possible. Therefore, the U.S. required a military operation with a performative nature.

The U.S. military deployed a total of various types of aircraft for combat operations. It is estimated that tanker aircraft accounted for approximately ～, with ～, possibly including ～, and ～. The remaining aircraft consisted of tactical planes such as ～, ～, and ～. The U.S. military’s deployment began on the ～th of the month, with some of the tanker aircraft stationed in the Azores and Italy, while others passed through U.S. bases in Germany and Spain on the European continent before finally arriving at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. The deployment continued until the ～th.

Flying in formation with fighter jets from RAF Lakenheath.

While mobilizing troops, according to a new report citing an unnamed Israeli official, the United States provided Israel with a list of air defense targets it hoped to be destroyed before Operation Midnight Strike. Consequently, during the U.S. military’s preparatory efforts, the Israeli Air Force also conducted targeted strikes on air defense positions near key Iranian targets.

On a certain date, the U.S. military carried out a meticulously planned feint operation. In the early morning, two flight formations, with call signs and , took off from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Their destination was confirmed to be Andersen Air Force Base on the Pacific island of Guam. This feint leveraged the influence of numerous open-source intelligence analysts online and drew international attention to the Pacific region.

Another group that actually carried out the strike mission flew eastward carrying bunker-buster bombs. The B-2 bombers involved in the airstrike belonged to the 509th Bomb Wing, with approximately a certain number of aircraft, some of which were responsible for the attack while others served as backups. Through the released images and video clips, we can see that among the B-2 bombers participating in the mission were the "Spirit of Indiana" (tail number), "Spirit of Nebraska" (tail number), and "Spirit of Louisiana" (tail number). Based on the maximum payload capacity of the B-2, each aircraft would need to carry a certain number of GBU-57A/B Heavy Penetrator Munitions.

Photos from the "Midnight Hammer" operation—setting out for the strike.

The B-2, along with its backup aircraft, departed from Missouri. Due to the weight of the bombs—each exceeding one ton—the B-2 could not take off with a full fuel load. After taking off from Whiteman Air Force Base, it completed its first aerial refueling off the East Coast of the United States, covering a distance of approximately 1,600 kilometers during this phase. The B-2 formation then crossed the Atlantic Ocean and conducted its second aerial refueling near the Azores, covering a distance of about 6,000 to 7,000 kilometers. Afterward, it performed its third aerial refueling over the eastern Mediterranean, flying an additional distance of roughly 3,000 kilometers. Following the third refueling, the B-2s entered Iraqi airspace to rendezvous with tactical aircraft and, under their cover, proceeded into Iranian territory. By this point, the total flight distance was approximately 13,000 kilometers, and about 14 hours had passed since takeoff. U.S. officials described the aircraft as "flying silently eastward with minimal communication throughout the entire process." Shortly before the B-2s entered Lebanese or Israeli airspace, tactical aircraft deployed at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia began taking off, and the formation later assembled near the western border of Iraq and Syria. Simultaneously, the USS Georgia, a nuclear submarine stationed in the Arabian Sea, launched a Tomahawk cruise missile to strike ground-based nuclear facilities in Isfahan.

Schematic diagram of the "Midnight Hammer" operation strike.

After assembling, the aircraft formation entered Iranian airspace under the lead of tactical aircraft. Fourth and fifth-generation aircraft surged ahead of the strike team at high altitude and high speed, clearing threats from Iranian fighter jets and air defense missiles along the flight path. According to information released on November 24, the F-35A from the 34th Fighter Squadron of the 388th Fighter Wing, stationed at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, was the first aircraft to enter Iranian airspace, tasked with executing SEAD missions.In addition to stealth aircraft, the United States employed various deception techniques and tactics, including decoys. Overall, during the "Midnight Hammer" strike operation, U.S. tactical aircraft provided continuous escort and conducted suppression of enemy air defenses, while Iran's air defense systems did not engage in counterattacks.After assembling, the aircraft formation entered Iranian airspace under the lead of tactical aircraft. Fourth and fifth-generation aircraft surged ahead of the strike team at high altitude and high speed, clearing threats from Iranian fighter jets and air defense missiles along the flight path. According to information released on November 24, the F-35A from the 34th Fighter Squadron of the 388th Fighter Wing, stationed at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, was the first aircraft to enter Iranian airspace, tasked with executing SEAD missions.In addition to stealth aircraft, the United States employed various deception techniques and tactics, including decoys. Overall, during the "Midnight Hammer" strike operation, U.S. tactical aircraft provided continuous escort and conducted suppression of enemy air defenses, while Iran's air defense systems did not engage in counterattacks.

In the early hours of Iran time, B-2 bombers began dropping bombs on Iranian nuclear facilities. The deeper underground facility at Fordow likely suffered strikes from two GBU-57 bombs, while Natanz was hit by two similar bombs. Subsequently, cruise missiles arrived around Iran time, completing a comprehensive attack on the ground facilities in Isfahan. The entire assault on three different locations was completed within minutes. The U.S. military publicly claimed to have used a total of munitions. After deducting the two GBU-57 bombs and up to cruise missiles, the number of other precision-guided weapons consumed by the U.S. military in this operation should be between and . Following the attack, the U.S. aircraft fleet withdrew westward from Iranian airspace without any losses, while the B-2 bombers returned to Whiteman Air Force Base after three aerial refuelings, with the entire flight lasting hours.

According to satellite imagery assessments following this operation, The surface-level large buildings at the Isfahan nuclear facility have suffered severe damage.. At the Natanz nuclear facility, a crater approximately 5.5 meters in diameter is visible in the soil directly above the underground complex section, but the extent of damage to the underground portion remains unclear. At Fordow, the U.S. military employed an attack method nearly akin to "multiple bombs on a single point," targeting the ventilation shafts of the underground facility, but the actual damage to the underground facility is unknown. The White House claimed that this operation set back Iran's nuclear program by two years. However, on June 24, CNN and The New York Times reported that **a confidential preliminary bombing damage assessment report released by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) indicated that the airstrikes damaged surface buildings and sealed the entrances to two targets but did not destroy the relevant underground facilities or the centrifuges required for producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.** The report concluded that the United States did not destroy Iran's nuclear program but delayed it by several months. According to satellite imagery assessments following this operation, The surface-level large buildings at the Isfahan nuclear facility have suffered severe damage.. At the Natanz nuclear facility, a crater approximately 5.5 meters in diameter is visible in the soil directly above the underground complex section, but the extent of damage to the underground portion remains unclear. At Fordow, the U.S. military employed an attack method nearly akin to "multiple bombs on a single point," targeting the ventilation shafts of the underground facility, but the actual damage to the underground facility is unknown. The White House claimed that this operation set back Iran's nuclear program by two years. However, on June 24, CNN and The New York Times reported that **a confidential preliminary bombing damage assessment report released by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) indicated that the airstrikes damaged surface buildings and sealed the entrances to two targets but did not destroy the relevant underground facilities or the centrifuges required for producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.** The report concluded that the United States did not destroy Iran's nuclear program but delayed it by several months.

Satellite images after the Fordow bombing.

In retaliation, on a certain date, Iran launched ballistic missiles targeting a U.S. military base in Qatar. Although Qatar closed its airspace before the missiles arrived and claimed to have intercepted all of them, photos revealed that one Iranian missile struck a U.S. military contractor-owned AN/TSC-156 strategic satellite communication antenna. This incident demonstrates the high accuracy of Iran’s short-range solid-fuel missiles.

Allegedly a satellite communication radar for a U.S. military contractor.

In this operation, the U.S. military deployed a number of aircraft and achieved success by sustaining no losses during the offensive. At the same time, this strike was a relatively rare long-range operation since the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, which validated the current fleet's capability for large-scale, long-range deployments and the U.S. military's ability to plan complex campaign missions. While the action carried strong political implications, it remains the largest penetrating air superiority operation conducted by the U.S. military in recent years, and its characteristics are still worthy of reference.

Looking Ahead

In addition to the aforementioned conflicts, the conflicts that erupted in the year include the Sudanese civil war, regional conflicts between Rwandan-backed movements and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and two rounds of Thai-Cambodian clashes, among others. Although these conflicts are not technologically advanced, they have significant implications for regional order. A series of large-scale armed conflicts have seen a notable increase in intensity compared to previous years, indicating that the world order is already in a period of restructuring. Therefore, in the coming year, various regional conflicts may develop along the following trajectories.

• The global security landscape is undergoing profound transformations.

The strategic transformation of the United States will have a significant impact on the global security order. Although there are still disagreements between the White House and Congress regarding the new version of the U.S. National Security Strategy, and its actual positioning remains unclear, considering the ideological stance and fundamental approach of the U.S. government, its foreign strategy is likely to evolve, albeit with fluctuations, toward controlling the Western Hemisphere and pursuing offshore balancing in the Eastern Hemisphere. This could not only lead to decreased stability in Latin America but also increase internal conflicts within the Eastern Hemisphere. The fragmentation and regionalization of the global system, as well as the intensity of specific conflicts, are likely to further intensify.

The strategic retraction of the United States with limited intervention will still leave new power gaps, which will ultimately be filled by major powers within the region. Consequently, the shift in U.S. security strategy will transmit to the regional level, inducing new instabilities. In the coming year, global hotspot conflicts are likely to undergo certain transformations, with varying dynamics across different regions.

• Regional conflicts are moving towards division.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is set to continue, yet signs of its eventual conclusion are emerging. Russia’s model of "affordable warfare" and Ukraine’s reliance on external aid are unlikely to change fundamentally. However, Ukraine’s current support primarily depends on Europe, which is not in a state of war. Meanwhile, Russia, leveraging its resource resilience and tactical experience, remains more likely to achieve a "pyrrhic victory" than any other outcome. Both sides may gradually move toward ceasefire negotiations, potentially facilitated by external mediation.

The risk of conflict in the Middle East remains persistently high. The fundamental tensions between Israel and Iran remain unresolved, and Israel is highly likely to maintain its pressure on Iran's nuclear program. A new round of large-scale conflict between the two sides cannot be ruled out. Hotspot issues such as the situation in Syria and the civil war in Yemen may see new developments due to great-power competition and the realignment of regional forces. This will involve heavyweight regional players such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and the Levant region in the Middle East will continue to be the area with the highest concentration of global conflicts.

The situation in South Asia is trending toward stability, with the India-Pakistan conflict likely to return to a managed state. The systemic shortcomings exposed in India during the recent conflict will be difficult to address in the short term, and domestic political pressure and economic burdens will limit its appetite for external adventurism. Pakistan, on the other hand, will consolidate its advantages in systematic warfare to maintain a balance of deterrence. Both sides may reestablish conflict management mechanisms through diplomatic channels, making large-scale military confrontation unlikely.

Latin America may become a new hotspot for conflicts. As the U.S. national security strategy shifts toward "deepening control over the Western Hemisphere," political forces in Latin America, such as left-wing movements that do not align with the ideology of the Trump administration, will face greater external pressure. The United States may reshape the regional order through direct intervention, economic coercion, and other means, potentially triggering localized instability and confrontations.

The landscape in Africa may become further complicated, with the likelihood of the United States intervening in the continent's resource development also on the rise. Africa is poised to become a key region for major powers vying for influence, potentially leading to an increase in proxy wars.

• New trends in tactical development.

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) warfare remains a key focus area for technological development. Countries will continue to advance research and development in UAV empowerment and swarm combat technologies. The depth of coordination between unmanned platforms, manned equipment, and network systems will further increase. The proliferation of UAV technology may exacerbate asymmetric warfare risks, placing higher demands on rear-area defense systems.

Systematic confrontation will permeate into medium and low-intensity conflicts. Beyond major powers and regional powers, some medium-sized countries will advance the integrated development of command and control, intelligence reconnaissance, and electronic warfare systems. The disparity in systematic capabilities will further widen the gap in military effectiveness among nations.

The development of air and missile defense systems is likely to focus on enhancing their capability to sustain prolonged, high-intensity operations. Lessons from the Iran-Israel conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war will drive countries to increase investment in air and missile defense systems. Key priorities will include upgrading radar technology, developing specialized counter-drone equipment, building reserves of anti-missile munitions, and strengthening regeneration capabilities. Additionally, emphasis will be placed on preventing internal infiltration and cyberattacks from undermining the integrity of air defense systems.

The competition for intelligence and cyberspace will intensify. Major military powers will further enhance their capabilities in areas such as special infiltration, cyber reconnaissance, and satellite intelligence. The application of artificial intelligence in intelligence analysis, target identification, and command decision-making will become more widespread.

It is foreseeable that with the end of the stable cycle of the international order, geopolitical shifts and realignments have already begun, and the future will present more complex situations and new trends. Maintaining strategic composure and keenly observing the evolving dynamics are essential to remaining invincible in this historical cycle.