The Shadow of Nuclear Proliferation Amid Iran's Changing Landscape: Uncontrolled Uranium Stockpiles and Regional Security Crisis.

Vienna, the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has long been a global information hub for the nuclear non-proliferation system. In November 2022, a report from the agency dropped a depth charge in its quiet corridors. The report revealed that since a 12-day war in June of that year, inspectors could no longer confirm the status and specific location of approximately 441 kilograms of highly enriched uranium at 60% enrichment in Iran. These materials are just one step away from the 90% enrichment level required for weapons-grade material. This technical report was released at a time when the streets of Tehran were in turmoil due to protests and government crackdowns, and the war of words between Washington and Tehran had escalated to an unprecedented level. David Albright, a former U.S. nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, issued a chilling warning: Amid internal chaos, the Iranian government may lose its ability to protect its nuclear assets. This is not alarmism but a grave projection based on historical lessons and real-world data.

Source of Turmoil: From Street Protests to Geopolitical Games

To analyze this potential nuclear security crisis, it must be placed within three intertwined dimensions: the socio-political turmoil within Iran, the decades-long structural confrontation between the United States and Iran, and a recent game-changing military conflict.

In 2022, the wave of protests that swept across multiple regions in Iran exceeded external expectations in both scale and duration. Supreme Leader Khamenei directly targeted the United States, calling then-President Trump a criminal and accusing demonstrators of causing thousands of deaths. Trump responded by publicly calling for an end to Khamenei's nearly four-decade rule. This high-level mutual condemnation escalated tensions far beyond ordinary diplomatic friction. Meanwhile, military dynamics were quietly shifting. A U.S. aircraft carrier, which had been active in the South China Sea just days earlier, passed through Singapore overnight into the Strait of Malacca, heading directly toward the Middle East. The interplay between external pressure and internal instability formed a classic pressure-cooker model.

More crucial changes occurred in June 2022. Israel launched a 12-day war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the United States participating in the bombing of its nuclear-related facilities. This conflict not only caused physical damage but also severely impacted the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) monitoring mechanism. In its report, the agency acknowledged that it had lost continuity of knowledge regarding Iran's previously declared nuclear material inventory at the facilities affected by the war. An anonymous diplomat close to the IAEA confirmed that, as of the report's release, the agency had still not received information from Iran regarding the status or whereabouts of this batch of highly enriched uranium. The rupture in the monitoring chain has opened the door to all uncertainties.

The Most Dangerous Asset: Uncontrolled Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium

How much nuclear material does Iran actually possess? According to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency, it is 440.9 kilograms of enriched uranium at 60% purity. This figure itself carries a dual meaning: on one hand, it clearly demonstrates Iran's rapid advancement in nuclear capabilities after breaching the restrictions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; on the other hand, it quantifies the material foundation of potential risks.

Albright provided a more intuitive and unsettling description: This batch of highly enriched uranium could be packed into approximately 18 to 20 cylindrical transport containers, each weighing about 50 kilograms when fully loaded. "Two people could easily carry one away," he said. This portability is one of the core factors in assessing proliferation risks. Kelsey Davenport, Director of Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association in Washington, offered a more direct assessment: "These stockpiles could be transferred to covert programs or stolen by factions within the government or military who wish to retain weaponization options." She emphasized that as the Iranian government feels threatened or the situation becomes unstable, this risk correspondingly increases.

History is a mirror. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, due to the erosion of the security system and weakened protective capabilities, a significant amount of highly enriched uranium and plutonium that could be used to make nuclear bombs went missing. Over the following two decades, the international community invested heavily in cooperative threat reduction programs, yet still failed to fully eliminate the aftermath. The collapse of internal order in a nuclear state and the resulting management vacuum of its nuclear assets could become a nightmare for global security. Davenport points out that in the event of internal chaos or potential government collapse, some nuclear materials might be smuggled out of Iran or sold to non-state actors. The risk is real, but it is difficult to accurately assess due to the unknown status and whereabouts of the materials.

Currently, the Iranian government insists that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes and claims to maintain control over nuclear facilities. However, the lack of international verification significantly undermines the credibility of such statements. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, the inability to verify itself constitutes a major risk signal.

The Threshold of Weaponization: Technological Feasibility and Political Decisiveness

A naturally arising question is: Will Iran directly use this 60% enriched uranium to manufacture nuclear weapons? From a technical perspective, there exists a theoretical possibility. However, the engineering of nuclear weapons is far from being achievable with just the material alone.

Former U.S. intelligence analyst and current Vice President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Eric Brewer, explained the technical obstacles involved. Compared to the typical 90% weapons-grade enrichment level, using uranium enriched to 60% directly to create a nuclear device requires a larger quantity of nuclear material. This results in a weapon that is bulkier and heavier, which may be less suitable for missile delivery. However, he added that such a device could still be used for other purposes, such as detonation in a desert.

Brewer's analysis reveals the complexity of the issue. On one hand, the possibility that the current Iranian government might take this path cannot be entirely ruled out; on the other hand, most information indicates that this batch of highly enriched uranium was buried in tunnels due to U.S. airstrikes, making it potentially difficult for the regime to access; at least, it would be hard to retrieve under the significant risk of detection by another U.S. or Israeli airstrike. This creates a physical constraint.

Perhaps more crucial is the political resolve. Brewer points out that recent events also indicate that the Supreme Leader has set an extremely high threshold for any decision regarding weaponization. Developing nuclear weapons is an irreversible political decision that would fundamentally alter Iran's international standing, trigger unpredictable regional arms races, and invite external military intervention. When the regime faces internal challenges, the motivation for making such an ultimate choice may be exceptionally complex—it could be aimed at rallying nationalist sentiment and consolidating power, or it might stem from the fear of regime collapse in an attempt to retain a final bargaining chip. Currently, this threshold for weaponization remains the primary barrier preventing the worst-case scenario, but its height is becoming increasingly blurred amid the turbulent situation.

Secondary Disasters: The Bushehr Reactor and Regional Ecological Crisis

Nuclear risk is not limited to weapons proliferation. In hypothetical scenarios of internal turmoil, Iran's only commercial nuclear power plant—the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, located approximately 750 kilometers south of Tehran—could also become a target of sabotage or attack, aimed at creating havoc or expressing a political stance. The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant uses uranium fuel produced in Russia, rather than domestic Iranian materials, but any accident there would have regional consequences.

Albright cited historical precedent: In 1982, the armed wing of the African National Congress of South Africa attacked the Koeberg nuclear power plant near Cape Town during the intensification of anti-apartheid resistance. That act of sabotage caused significant damage but did not lead to a nuclear leak. However, this does not guarantee luck for the next attack.

If a major accident occurs at the Bushehr reactor, Albright simulated the consequences, with wind carrying radioactive fallout to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Oman within 12 to 15 hours. The densely populated and economically active coast of the Persian Gulf would face a nuclear disaster triggering humanitarian, economic, and environmental catastrophes, with impacts extending far beyond Iran's borders and reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the entire Middle East. This possibility adds a grave dimension to regional countries' assessments of Iran's situation—they are not only concerned about the direction of the Tehran regime but must also pay close attention to the safety of hazardous facilities within its territory.

Conclusion: Building a Defense Line in the Fog

The turmoil within Iran and the security status of its nuclear assets have formed a chain of risks with global significance. The current situation exhibits several clear characteristics:

First, the risks are multifaceted, encompassing multiple levels such as national weaponization, internal faction theft, transnational smuggling and trafficking, as well as ecological disasters caused by attacks on key nuclear facilities.

Secondly, information is in a black box state. The interruption of supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency is at the core of the issue. In the field of nuclear safety, uncertainty amplifies fear and may lead to misjudgments and preemptive actions.

Moreover, historical lessons are crystal clear. The aftermath of nuclear material dispersal in the post-Soviet era demonstrates that when a country possessing nuclear materials experiences internal collapse, the cleanup costs will be borne by the entire world.

Faced with this situation, the international community's response must be multi-layered and pragmatic. In the short term, restoring and strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency's continuous verification and monitoring in Iran is the most urgent step to reduce uncertainty. This requires difficult diplomatic efforts, but there is no substitute. Regional countries, especially those along the Persian Gulf coast that may be directly affected by a nuclear incident, need to establish crisis communication and emergency response mechanisms. In the long run, the fundamental solution to the Iranian nuclear issue still lies in finding a path that balances Iran's legitimate rights and interests with international security concerns, alleviating the geopolitical pressures that lead to its continuous breaches of restrictions.

Iran's nuclear materials will not disappear on their own, and the risks will not resolve automatically. Beyond the street protests in Tehran and the tough rhetoric from Washington, a silent struggle over how to prevent the most dangerous substances from falling into the most dangerous hands is intensifying in Vienna's meeting rooms, intelligence agencies, and diplomatic channels across nations. The outcome of this struggle will not only determine Iran's future but also largely define the stability of the global nuclear non-proliferation system over the next decade. Time may be more pressing than imagined.