The New START Treaty is on the verge of expiration: risks of a nuclear arms race and the evolution of the global security landscape.

In February 2026, the last nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will officially expire. Currently, there are no indications that either side is prepared to renew or negotiate a new agreement. This means that the nuclear arms control system built over half a century since the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 may completely collapse. Moscow and Washington each possess over 3,500 nuclear warheads, accounting for more than 90% of the global nuclear arsenal. After the treaty expires, these devastating weapons will, for the first time, be completely unrestricted, pushing global strategic stability into uncharted waters.

Technical Details and Military Implications of Treaty Invalidation

The specific provisions of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty are far more intricate than commonly understood by the public. The treaty not only sets a cap of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads for both sides but also imposes strict limits on delivery vehicles: the total number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers must not exceed 700, while the combined total of deployed and non-deployed launchers must not exceed 800. Behind these numbers lies a complex verification mechanism.

In August 2022, Russia unilaterally suspended on-site inspections as stipulated by the treaty. According to data from the U.S. Department of State, the two sides have not exchanged complete nuclear force data since then. The National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center outside Moscow, once a place where U.S. and Russian officers jointly monitored the nuclear situation, now only has Russian staff. In November last year, Russia formally withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, completing a reciprocal action with the United States—the U.S. Congress has never ratified the treaty.

Changes at the military level have already begun to emerge. In March of this year, General Anthony Cotton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, confirmed during a Senate hearing that Russia is accelerating the production of the RS-28 Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile. This missile can carry 10 independently targetable nuclear warheads and has a range covering the entire Northern Hemisphere. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force has deployed the first batch of new B-21 Raider stealth strategic bombers at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. NATO intelligence assessments indicate that Russian tactical nuclear weapons have been forward-deployed, with some Iskander-M missile systems observed transporting special warhead containers.

How Geopolitical Rifts Undermine the Foundations of Arms Control

The Ukraine war has completely altered the logic of U.S.-Russia strategic interaction. Before February 24, 2022, despite tense relations, both sides maintained basic channels for nuclear dialogue. The U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva was still ongoing just one week before the outbreak of the war. After the war began, all these mechanisms came to a halt.

The deeper issue lies in the fact that arms control treaties have never been merely technical agreements. They are built upon a foundation of shared security perceptions. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) — the idea that any nuclear attack by one side would invite a devastating retaliation, meaning there could be no winner in a nuclear war. This balance of terror, in turn, created stability.

The current situation is entirely different. Russia officially withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in June 2023, completing the systematic dismantling of the European security architecture. Kremlin spokesperson Peskov has repeatedly stated publicly that Russia no longer views the United States as a potential partner, but as a direct threat. This characterization has closed off any room for compromise.

The Chinese factor has further complicated the situation. The Pentagon's "2023 China Military Power Report" estimates that China's nuclear warhead count has increased from 350 in 2021 to over 500. Beijing refuses to join any U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control negotiations, citing that the nuclear arsenals of the two countries are ten times larger than China's. However, General Glen D. VanHerck, commander of U.S. Northern Command, warned that China is constructing at least three new intercontinental ballistic missile launch sites and could surpass 1,500 nuclear warheads within the next decade. For Russia, limiting its own nuclear arsenal in parallel with the growth of China's nuclear capabilities no longer aligns with its strategic interests.

The domino effect of nuclear proliferation.

The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Grossi, stated frankly at the Davos Forum in January this year: We are witnessing the most severe erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation system. Data shows that more than 40 countries worldwide possess the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, and over 20 of them have seriously considered the nuclear option.

The Middle East is particularly vulnerable. In an interview in March 2023, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman explicitly stated that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will have to follow suit. Tehran's current uranium enrichment level has reached 60%, just one step away from the weapons-grade level of 90%. Israel, which has never officially acknowledged but is widely believed to possess approximately 90 nuclear warheads, can cover the entire Middle East with its Jericho ballistic missiles.

The chain reaction in Asia is equally concerning. Within Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, there have been calls to re-discuss nuclear sharing policies. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol hinted in January this year that if North Korea's threats intensify, South Korea might seek the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. In Pyongyang, the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea announced an exponential increase in nuclear warhead production, with satellite images clearly showing new tunnel construction at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Hamgyong Province.

The situation in Africa and South America is also not optimistic. South Africa voluntarily abandoned its nuclear weapons program in the 1990s, but Pretoria's strategic research community is now revisiting the nuclear option. The Brazilian Navy is constructing a nuclear-powered submarine in Ipero, São Paulo. Although officially described as defensive in nature, the technology can be directly converted into a submarine-launched missile platform.

Failure of Crisis Management Mechanisms and Risk of Miscalculation.

The most dangerous is often not deliberate attacks, but miscalculations. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union came close to nuclear war at least three times: a U.S. U-2 spy plane mistakenly entered Soviet airspace, a Soviet submarine commander nearly launched a nuclear torpedo, and U.S. air defense forces misjudged radar signals. Each time, disaster was averted by last-minute communication.

The current crisis management mechanism is more fragile than before. There is still a red phone between the United States and Russia—actually an encrypted document transmission system, but it was interrupted for 72 hours last year. More critically, the two sides no longer share missile launch warning data. Russia's Voronezh-DM early warning radar near Moscow and the United States' Pave Paws radar in Alaska both monitor each other's territories, but interpretation relies entirely on their own algorithms.

The introduction of artificial intelligence brings new risks. The U.S. Strategic Command is testing AI systems to analyze nuclear attack warning data, and Russia has similar projects. In September 2023, during NATO's Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, a Russian Tu-95 bomber approached Norwegian airspace, prompting Norwegian F-35 fighter jets to conduct an emergency interception. The entire process was analyzed in real-time by both sides' AI systems, where any algorithmic error could lead to escalation.

The militarization of space has heightened uncertainty. Both Russia's nesting satellites and the U.S. X-37B spaceplane possess anti-satellite capabilities. If the satellite links for nuclear command and control are attacked, the targeted side might misinterpret it as a prelude to a full-scale nuclear strike. General James Dickinson, commander of U.S. Space Command, acknowledges: "We have not yet established clear escalation control rules for space conflicts."

Three Possible Scenarios for the Next Five Years

The first scenario is to freeze the status quo. After the treaty expires, the actual nuclear capabilities of the United States and Russia remain at current levels, but without legal constraints. This situation may last for 2-3 years, similar to the transition period after the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. The problem is the lack of verification, as both sides would suspect the other of secretly expanding. The United States would worry about Russia hiding missiles deep in the Ural Mountains, while Russia would suspect the U.S. of deploying intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Guam.

The second scenario is a limited arms race. Both sides increase their nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 and redeploy intermediate-range missiles. The United States may deploy nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles in the Philippines or Japan, while Russia deploys nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missiles in Kaliningrad or Crimea. This competition has a clear upper limit, similar to the situation in the mid-1980s.

The third scenario is the most perilous: comprehensive competition. It is unrealistic for Russia to restore its nuclear warheads to the Cold War peak level of 45,000, but increasing them to 5,000 is technically feasible. The United States would follow suit and drive the expansion of NATO nuclear sharing. China, France, and the United Kingdom would be compelled to join in, potentially pushing the global total number of nuclear warheads beyond 20,000. Even more alarming is the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons re-entering operational doctrine. The U.S. Army is developing the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile, capable of carrying nuclear warheads with a range of 2,775 kilometers, clearly intended for battlefield use.

Arms control is not a charitable endeavor, but a survival necessity based on cold calculation. Since 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used in war—not because humanity has grown kinder, but because the balance of fear has played its role. Now, that balance is tilting. Politicians in Moscow and Washington need to understand that when the last nuclear brake line snaps, the runaway train will not distinguish between passengers and drivers. February 2026 is not the end, but the start of the countdown.