Assessment of Casualties in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: The Stalemate of a War of Attrition Behind Nearly 2 Million Military Losses

A research report released by the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on January 27 reveals that since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian military casualties have approached 1.2 million, with fatalities potentially reaching as high as 325,000. Ukrainian military losses are estimated to be between 500,000 and 600,000. This indicates that the war, which is about to enter its fifth year, has resulted in a total of approximately 1.8 million military casualties on both sides, and this number may surpass the 2 million mark by the spring of 2026. Based on interviews with Western and Ukrainian officials, as well as open-source intelligence such as the BBC Russian Service, this analysis paints a picture of a brutal war of attrition unprecedented among major powers since World War II. The scale of casualties far exceeds those of the Soviet Union's ten-year war in Afghanistan and has fundamentally reshaped external perceptions of the cost and pace of modern warfare.

The scale of casualty figures and their historical context.

The CSIS report provides specific figures: approximately 1.2 million casualties on the Russian side (including deaths, injuries, and missing persons), with fatalities ranging between 275,000 and 325,000. On the Ukrainian side, casualties are estimated at 500,000 to 600,000, with deaths ranging from 100,000 to 140,000. These numbers are derived from a combination of data by the Ukrainian battlefield monitoring group DeepState, statistics from Russian independent media Mediazona and BBC Russian Service based on publicly available information such as obituaries, as well as assessments from Western intelligence agencies.

Placing these numbers within a historical coordinate system makes their shock even more pronounced. The report points out that the number of Russian military fatalities in Ukraine is over 17 times greater than the Soviet losses in the Afghan war of the 1980s, 11 times greater than the losses in the First and Second Chechen Wars, and more than five times greater than the total losses from all wars involving Russia and the Soviet Union since World War II. For comparison, the United States suffered approximately 57,000 fatalities in the Korean War and about 47,000 in the Vietnam War. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte mentioned at the Davos Forum this past January that the Russian military was losing an average of about 1,000 personnel per day in December of last year. This implies that Russian casualties in a single month could exceed the total Soviet fatalities over the entire ten-year period in Afghanistan.

Although Ukraine's absolute casualty figures are lower than Russia's, considering its population base (approximately 40 million, less than one-third of Russia's) and mobilization potential, the pressure it bears is equally immense. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told American media in February last year that about 46,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed, but analysts widely believe this number is severely underestimated. Troop replenishment has become a severe challenge for Kyiv, and Zelenskyy has so far refused to further lower the minimum conscription age from 25, a decision that faces complex political pressure domestically.

The battlefield rhythm akin to a "meat grinder" and the meager gains.

In stark contrast to the staggering casualties is the Russian army's extremely slow advance and minimal territorial gains. The report analyzes that this precisely reveals the nature of the current conflict: a typical, high-tech attrition war and positional warfare.

CSIS Report details the advancement speeds of Russian forces on several key fronts: From February 2024 to January 2026, in the direction of Chasiv Yar, Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast, the average daily advance was only 15 meters; from November 2024 to the present, in the direction of Kupiansk, Kharkiv Oblast, the average daily advance was 23 meters; in the direction of Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, the average daily advance was about 70 meters. These speeds are even lower than those of the famous Battle of the Somme in World War I—where the British and French forces advanced less than 90 meters per day on average over five months.

From the perspective of territorial control changes, the report points out that over the past two years (2024-2025), Russian forces have only additionally occupied approximately 1.4% of Ukraine's territory (around 8,400 square kilometers). Since the invasion in 2022, the actual Ukrainian territory controlled by Russian forces through military operations is about 12% (approximately 75,000 square kilometers). Including Crimea, which was annexed in 2014, Russia currently controls a total of about 20% of Ukraine's territory. In other words, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of casualties, over nearly four years, Russian forces have occupied an average daily land area of only about 50 square kilometers—roughly equivalent to the size of a medium-sized town.

This meat grinder style of combat stems from Ukraine's meticulously constructed in-depth defense system. The extensive trenches, dense minefields, and anti-tank obstacles, combined with drone reconnaissance and precision artillery fire, have significantly slowed the assault of Russian armored forces. Both sides, particularly the Russian military, appear to have adopted tactics that rely on numerical and firepower superiority for frontal pressure. While incurring high human costs, such tactics struggle to achieve breakthroughs at the operational level.

Dual Consumption of Manpower and Economy: A Perspective on War Potential

Behind the staggering casualty figures lies the prolonged attrition that both sides, particularly Russia, have endured in terms of manpower and economy. The report analyzes the impact of this attrition on Russia's national capabilities from multiple dimensions.

In terms of troop replenishment, Russia relies on high economic incentives and extensive social recruitment to maintain its military size. The enlistment bonuses provided by local governments in some regions reach tens of thousands of dollars, while the Russian military also recruits a large number of foreign contract soldiers from Asia, South America, and Africa, many of whom are attracted by misleading promises or pressured into enlistment. Last week, James Ford, the UK's deputy ambassador to the OSCE, pointed out that the number of casualties (deaths and injuries) in the Russian army has now exceeded sustainable recruitment and replenishment rates. Although the Kremlin denied the CSIS report, calling it unreliable, and insisted that only the Ministry of Defense has the authority to release casualty data, the pressure on troop sources has become an undeniable fact in Russian society.

At the economic level, the report suggests that the war has caused Russia to fall from the ranks of the world's major economies. Russia is becoming a second or third-rate economic power. Data cited in the report shows that Russia's economic growth in 2025 was only 0.6%, with manufacturing shrinking, weak consumer demand, high inflation coexisting with labor shortages. Although arms production has boosted some industrial indicators, items such as ammunition, uniforms, and fortifications, while counted in GDP, do not contribute to long-term welfare or capital formation. In the high-tech sector, Russia has fallen behind comprehensively; there is not a single Russian company among the world's top 100 tech firms. In Stanford University's AI country rankings, Russia ranks 28th out of 36 countries, trailing behind Spain, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia.

At the social level, the impact of the war is equally profound. The report mentions that hundreds of thousands of demobilized soldiers (including a large number of former criminals who obtained pardons through participation in the war) are about to return home, which will pose long-term challenges to Russia's social security system and local stability. Although official propaganda still shows public support for the war, multiple independent surveys have reflected growing fatigue among the populace regarding this seemingly endless conflict.

Strategic Dilemma in a Deadlock and Future Directions

The core conclusion of the CSIS report is that despite Russia's quantitative advantage in troops and resources, it is far from achieving an inevitable victory. The report explicitly states that data shows it is difficult to call Russia the winner, and Ukraine's defensive strategy has achieved significant results in exhausting the opponent.

However, the stalemate itself does not signify that peace is near. The report points out that despite the first talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States in Abu Dhabi since the full-scale invasion last weekend, no breakthrough was achieved. The Kremlin still insists on its maximalist demands regarding Ukrainian territory. The report argues that as long as Putin's regime does not face greater external pressure, he is likely to continue delaying negotiations and persist in fighting, even if it means millions of casualties among Russians and Ukrainians.

For Ukraine, the challenges it faces are equally severe. Continuous personnel losses are testing the nation's limits of endurance, while the sustainability of Western aid remains uncertain. The stalemate on the battlefield could evolve into a prolonged contest of who exhausts their manpower, supplies, or willpower first.

From a broader perspective, this conflict has redefined the form and cost of high-intensity conventional warfare among major powers in the 21st century. It demonstrates that in an era of widespread drones, satellite reconnaissance, and precision firepower, even when facing an opponent with a significant disparity in strength, a resilient defense leveraging modern technology can impose unbearable costs on the attacker and drag the war into a brutal quagmire of attrition. The nearly 2 million military casualties reported by CSIS are not only a tragedy for the two nations involved but also a profound challenge to the international community's understanding of war and peace. How and when this conflict ends will profoundly impact the Eurasian security landscape and global order for decades to come.