Iron Fist in Crisis: The Deep Game of Guatemala's "State of Siege" and Gang Warfare

On January 18, 2026, the air in Guatemala City was thick with tension and sorrow. The bodies of eight national police officers lay in pools of blood across different neighborhoods of the capital, in what is believed to be a coordinated retaliatory attack by gangs. Just the day before, three prisons simultaneously erupted in large-scale riots, with 45 prison guards and one psychologist taken hostage. Faced with this nationwide storm of violence, President Bernardo Arévalo made a difficult and decisive decision in his national televised address that evening: to declare a 30-day state of siege across the country.

This is not an ordinary escalation of public security operations. A state of siege means that certain constitutional rights granted to citizens—including the freedoms of assembly and demonstration, as well as the right not to be arrested without a judicial warrant—will be temporarily suspended. The police and military have been granted unprecedented operational authority to conduct warrantless arrests and interrogations nationwide. President Arevalo insists that this is to ensure the protection and safety of Guatemalans and vows not to negotiate with criminals. A direct confrontation between state power and transnational criminal organizations has abruptly begun.

Trigger: From Prison Riots to Street Bloodshed

The immediate trigger of the crisis lies deep within Guatemala's broken prison system. Since mid-2025, two major gang organizations—Barrio 18 and MS-13—have been engaged in fierce confrontations with the government over dissatisfaction with the detention conditions of their leaders.

On July 31 last year, the government transferred multiple gang leaders to the maximum-security prison Reform Unit 1, located in Escuintla, approximately 75 kilometers from the capital, for isolated detention. This measure, aimed at weakening their command capabilities within the prison, triggered continuous riots. The prisoners' demands were straightforward and brazen: transfer their leaders to prisons with weaker security and improve detention conditions, including even the installation of air conditioning and the provision of takeout food.

On Saturday, January 17, the riots escalated into a full-scale hijacking. Simultaneous riots broke out at three prisons—Innovation No. 1, Freiheit No. 2, and another prison in the capital region—resulting in a total of 46 staff members being taken hostage. The gangs used this to pressure the government into meeting their demands. However, the Arevalo government responded with an unusually tough stance. Instead of compromising, they launched a swift and decisive crackdown operation the very next day.

Security forces deployed armored vehicles and tear gas, reclaiming control of the Renovation No. 1 Prison within just 15 minutes. Subsequently, prisons such as Frei Hanes No. 2 were also recaptured one after another, with all hostages safely released. The government publicly released a highly symbolic video: Aldo Dupi, the leader of the 18th Street gang known by the nickname "Wolf," was escorted by armed special police, handcuffed, kneeling on the ground, with bloodstains on his body. The Minister of the Interior declared that the operation, codenamed "Neutralization," successfully subdued the mastermind behind the riot.

The success of the clearance operation directly ignited the gang's retaliatory fury. On the very day the prison was recaptured, a series of coordinated attacks targeting police officers occurred in the capital and surrounding areas, resulting in the deaths of eight officers and injuries to ten others. The gangs used the most brutal methods to challenge state authority. Analysis indicates this was by no means random violence; rather, it was a tactical response by organized criminal groups. After their command structure was struck, they aimed to reverse their decline by creating social panic and demoralizing law enforcement. Interior Minister Marco Antonio Villeda labeled these attackers as terrorists, a designation that far surpasses ordinary criminal activity.

Guatemala in a "State of Siege": Extraordinary Measures and Unprecedented Challenges

Facing such severe challenges, President Arevalo has invoked the most stringent tool within the constitutional framework—the state of siege. According to the law, this state permits authorities to detain anyone without a judicial warrant, aiming to protect society from threats of terrorism or insurgency, while prohibiting any form of assembly or demonstration.

The President attempted to reassure the public in his speech, stating that this measure would not alter the daily lives and freedom of movement for ordinary people, despite the closure of all public and private schools nationwide on Monday, January 19. The government also announced a three-day period of national mourning, with flags flown at half-mast on public buildings. The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala issued a security alert as well, advising its citizens to shelter in place and avoid crowds.

However, this state of emergency decree cannot be maintained unilaterally by the president. According to the Guatemalan Constitution, it must be approved by Congress. In Congress, the opposition holds a majority, adding a layer of political uncertainty to Arévalo's decision. On January 19, Congress ultimately approved this 30-day decree, demonstrating that in the face of a national crisis, the political class temporarily set aside their differences. Congress Speaker Luis Contreras called for unity, stating that the country is facing one of the most painful and difficult moments in its history.

The implementation of the state of siege marks a fundamental shift in Guatemala's security strategy. It is not merely about deploying more military and police forces for street patrols; it represents a temporary restructuring of the legal framework, granting security agencies greater operational freedom to confront criminal organizations that are equally unconventional and flexibly structured. Defense Minister Henry Sáenz stated that the military will remain on the streets, utilizing all the state's strength and monopoly on power to restore the peace and security the public requires.

However, this extreme measure is also accompanied by significant controversy and risks. Suspending constitutional guarantees has always been a sensitive issue in democratic societies. Although the government emphasizes that the goal is to combat criminal organizations, once power expands, ensuring it is not abused and does not harm innocent people will become a severe test for Guatemala's rule of law system. In a street interview, an octogenarian who requested anonymity expressed a radical view: we must return to the past. Criminals who are caught should be dead criminals, because there is no other solution. This sentiment, prevalent among some citizens, reflects despair over the long-term failure of public security and also hints at society's potential tolerance for more severe, even extra-legal measures.

The Pain of Structure: The Gangster Empire and the Specter of the "Bukel Model"

To comprehend Guatemala's current predicament, one must examine its adversaries—Barrio 18 and MS-13. These two transnational criminal organizations, which originated in Los Angeles, USA, and later spread throughout Central America, have been officially designated as terrorist groups by both the United States and Guatemalan governments. Their business model is built on intimidation and violence: extorting protection fees from business owners, transport operators, and ordinary citizens to control territories, while deeply engaging in drug trafficking. Those who refuse to pay often face death.

These gangs established a state within a state inside the prisons. For years, lax prison management, and even systemic corruption, allowed gang leaders to live comfortably in prison and remotely command external criminal activities. A teacher named Erwin Oliva pointed out sharply: We are reaping the bitter fruits of what we have sown over the years, granting privileges to gang members and allowing them to rule comfortably in prison. In October 2025, 20 leaders of Barrio 18 staged a large-scale escape from the Fraijanes II prison. Ultimately, only 6 were recaptured, 1 was killed, and the rest remain at large. This scandal exposed the deep-seated flaws in the prison system and prompted Congress to finally pass a bill designating these two gangs as terrorist organizations and increasing sentences for their members.

Guatemala's homicide rate has remained high for many years, reaching 16.1 per 100,000 residents in 2025, which is more than double the global average. This violent environment has provided fertile ground for strongman politics. In the street talk of Guatemala, one name is repeatedly mentioned: Nayib Bukele.

The President of this neighboring country, El Salvador, is renowned for waging war against gangs. Through a state of emergency, he detained tens of thousands of people without trial in a short period, leading to a significant drop in homicide rates and a surge in domestic approval. Although his methods have drawn international criticism for alleged widespread human rights violations, in the eyes of a populace deeply afflicted by violence, the Bukele model represents efficiency and order. The octogenarian from Guatemala bluntly stated that the government should emulate Bukele, spreading more shocking images like wolves kneeling before powerful nations when captured.

The Arevalo administration is walking a tightrope. On one hand, he must demonstrate a stronger resolve than his predecessor to combat crime, addressing the public's urgent desire for security. On the other hand, as a president who came to power on a platform of reform and anti-corruption, he needs to avoid sliding entirely into the trap of authoritarianism and must operate within the constitutional framework and the rule of law. He claims to know who the masterminds are: the groups profiting from corruption that thrives in the shadows, and he links the current crisis to the planned replacement of the Attorney General in May 2026, as well as the renewal of the Constitutional Court, suggesting that the gang violence is a desperate backlash against judicial system reforms. This indicates that his strategy is not merely about security crackdowns but also aims to address the root cause of crime—corruption.

Where to Go: The Paradox of Short-Term Suppression and Long-Term Governance

The state of siege in Guatemala is a high-stakes political and security gamble. In the short term, it may yield some immediate effects: higher street visibility, more frequent search operations, more direct strikes against gang networks, potentially suppressing the wave of violence temporarily, much like the prison raids that demonstrate state authority.

However, in the long run, a 30-day state of emergency cannot eradicate the deep-rooted structural issues that have accumulated over decades. The proliferation of gangs stems from poverty, social exclusion, youth unemployment, the failure of the judicial system, and the breeding ground provided by corruption. The prison riots and attacks on police officers precisely expose the fragility of state institutions—particularly the judicial and correctional systems. If reliance is placed solely on the forceful intervention of the military and police, without simultaneously advancing judicial reform, creating economic opportunities, implementing youth prevention programs, and dismantling the symbiotic relationship between gangs and corrupt officials, then violence will only temporarily subside and rebound more fiercely once the state of emergency ends.

The international community, particularly the attitude of the United States, is also crucial. The United States has designated these two gangs as terrorist organizations and has extensive cooperation with Central American countries in the field of security. Guatemala's stability aligns with U.S. interests, but the United States will also pay attention to human rights records in anti-crime operations. The Arevalo government needs to strike a balance between obtaining external support and maintaining autonomy in domestic actions.

The crisis in Guatemala epitomizes the persistent security dilemma in the Northern Triangle region of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras). Transnational criminal organizations exploit borders and governance loopholes to move freely, while states are often constrained by insufficient resources, weak institutions, and governance failures. Arevalo's state of siege is a concentrated display of force, attempting to reassert the state's monopoly on violence.

However, true victory does not lie in how many gang members kneel before the barrel of a gun, but in whether a society can be built where young people see more promise than in joining gangs, in whether a judicial system can be established that earns citizens' trust rather than fear, and in whether the deeply intertwined chain of interests between corruption and crime can be severed. Guatemala stands at a crossroads: should it briefly mimic the tough exterior of the Bukele model, or should it take the difficult path of forging a localized approach that combines necessary force with deep social reform, balancing security and human rights? In the next 30 days and beyond, the choices made by this Central American nation will determine whether it plunges deeper into a cycle of violence or catches a glimpse of the dawn of genuine peace.