The U.S. Chess Game in the Blueprint for Gaza's Reconstruction: Trump's "Peace Commission" and the Myth of Palestinian Autonomy

On January 16, 2026, a statement from the White House brought a grand plan that had been brewing for months to the forefront. U.S. President Donald Trump announced the establishment of a Peace Commission and revealed the list of members for the executive committee responsible for overseeing the daily governance of the Gaza Strip. This list can be described as a peculiar mix: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner, senior officials from multiple Middle Eastern countries, Wall Street billionaires, and the President of the World Bank. At the same time, a technocratic committee led by former Palestinian Authority official Ali Shaath has held its first meeting in Cairo, officially launching the daily governance of Gaza.

The White House stated that this marks the entry into the second phase of the U.S.-led 20-point Gaza peace plan. The core of this phase is to achieve the demilitarization of Gaza, the deployment of an international stabilization force, and the reconstruction of this war-torn land through the Executive Committee and the Technocratic Committee, under the overall supervision of the Peace Commission. Trump wrote on social media: The people of Gaza have suffered for too long. The time is now.

However, just hours after the plan was announced, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office issued a statement, saying the U.S. move was not coordinated with Israel and goes against Israeli policy. In the Gaza Strip, although bombings have decreased since the ceasefire took effect on October 10, 2025, the conflict has not stopped. According to data from the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 449 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli military operations since the ceasefire, including at least 100 children. Hundreds of thousands of residents are still living in temporary tents, enduring the winter storms and rain.

A Gaza governance plan, designed by the United States, saturated with commercial interests, and attempting to bypass traditional multilateral mechanisms, is striving to forcibly carve out a path amidst ruins and hostility. Will this path lead to peace and reconstruction, or will it merely usher Gaza into another form of control and strategic competition? The answer lies hidden within the details of the plan, the reactions of various parties, and the lingering smoke of conflict that has yet to dissipate over that land.

Power Structure: The Birth of a "Mini United Nations"?

The governance framework designed by the Trump administration for Gaza presents a three-tiered pyramid-like power structure. The top tier is the Peace Commission, chaired personally by Trump, described by external observers as a group composed of world leaders. The middle tier is the Executive Committee, whose members have been announced, responsible for implementing the vision of the Peace Commission. The bottom tier is the Palestinian Technocratic Committee led by Ali Sha'as, tasked with daily municipal services in Gaza, such as sanitation, infrastructure, and education.

This design inherently conveys a strong signal: the highest decision-making authority for the future governance of Gaza will be monopolized by an international institution led by the United States and steered by Trump himself. A draft charter of the Peace Commission obtained by Bloomberg further reveals astonishing details of its operation: member states typically serve a term of three years, but if they contribute at least 1 billion US dollars in cash to the commission within the first year of the charter's effectiveness, they can obtain a permanent seat. All decisions require a majority vote by member states, but final approval rests with the commission's chairperson (i.e., Trump). The chairperson also holds the power to invite member states, design the official seal, and even remove members under specific conditions.

Analysis reveals that this model is almost a disruptive imitation of the current United Nations Security Council system, while incorporating distinct Trump characteristics—linking political influence directly to financial contributions. Western diplomats refer to it as a mini United Nations. Critics worry that this may be an alternative or competitive international organization that Trump is attempting to establish after his long-standing criticism of the UN. Its goals may extend beyond Gaza, as its charter describes its purpose as promoting stability, restoring reliable and legitimate governance, and ensuring lasting peace in regions affected or threatened by conflict, hinting at its potential global ambitions.

Linking the oversight of Gaza's reconstruction to an international institution that requires a paid membership casts the entire plan with a strong transactional hue from the outset. It attempts to leverage capital to drive international participation, but it also risks reducing the most crucial peace process to a competition of financial resources, marginalizing countries that cannot or are unwilling to pay the one-billion-dollar entry fee. Argentine President Javier Milei and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney have publicly accepted the invitation, while countries like Turkey and Egypt have stated they are studying the proposal. However, whether this model of purchasing permanent influence with money can gain broad acceptance from traditional donor countries such as those in Europe remains a significant question.

Personnel Map: A Peculiar Blend of Business, Politics, and Geopolitics

The published list of members of the Executive Committee and the Technocratic Committee serves as an excellent text for interpreting the strategic intentions of the United States. The core characteristic of this list lies in its high degree of Trump-circle affiliation and its pragmatic combination of de-ideologized tools.

Trump's inner circle occupies the central position. Secretary of State Marco Rubio represents the official diplomatic channel; Middle East envoys Steve Witkoff (Trump's close friend and real estate developer) and Jared Kushner (Trump's son-in-law) are extensions of Trump's personal diplomatic approach, especially Kushner, who previously led the promotion of the Abraham Accords. His return signifies the Trump administration's attempt to replicate a regionally focused diplomatic model oriented toward economic cooperation. Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gabriel ensures coordination with the White House national security team.

The deep involvement of commercial forces is particularly striking. Marc Rowan, CEO of Apollo Global Management, Israeli billionaire Yagil Gabbay, along with Kushner and Witkoff, who have strong commercial backgrounds, form a powerful alliance of capital and project management. This directly aligns with Trump's vision of transforming Gaza into the Riviera of the Middle East (a tourism and real estate haven). The addition of World Bank President Ajay Banga provides the endorsement of international financial institutions for large-scale reconstruction financing. This configuration clearly indicates that the United States hopes to use commercial development and infrastructure investment as the primary engine for Gaza's stability, rather than relying solely on political negotiations.

In terms of geopolitical balance, the committee includes all key regional mediators: Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (who maintains good relations with Hamas), Egyptian General Intelligence Director Hassan Rashad (with communication channels to both Israel and Hamas), Qatari diplomat Ali Al-Sawadi (a significant funder and mediator), and UAE Cabinet Minister Reem Al-Hashemi (normalized relations with Israel and well-funded). Their roles are crucial, especially in the most challenging task of persuading Hamas to disarm. The inclusion of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair brings international experience (though he remains controversial in the Arab world due to his history with the Iraq War), and he was initially even considered for a more central coordinating role.

At the technocratic level, the selection of Ali Shash is quite symbolic. He is an engineer, born in Khan Younis, Gaza, and previously served as the Deputy Minister of Transportation in the Palestinian Authority. With both a technical background and local roots in Gaza, along with experience working in the Palestinian Authority, he is theoretically acceptable to all parties. His committee is positioned as technical and apolitical, focusing on restoring basic services. This reflects the United States' attempt to foster a depoliticized local governance entity outside of Hamas and the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority, paving the way for future political arrangements.

However, this seemingly comprehensive list precisely exposes the inherent contradictions within the plan. Israel's strong opposition strikes at the core: the Netanyahu government believes that a supervisory body including representatives from countries such as Turkey and Qatar, which have close ties with Hamas, may have policy orientations unfavorable to Israel's security demands. Israel's far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir even threatened to prepare to return to war. On the other hand, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have also expressed dissatisfaction with the committee's composition, viewing it as reflecting Israel's specifications. The bridge that the United States is attempting to build has shaky foundations at both ends.

Core Obstacles: Demilitarization, Israel, and the Specter of the "Two-State Solution"

No matter how ingeniously the governance structure is designed or how balanced the personnel allocation is, Trump's Gaza plan cannot circumvent three core obstacles as solid as reefs: the demilitarization of Hamas, Israel's continued resistance, and the lingering shadow of the Palestinian statehood issue.

Demilitarization is the most immediate flashpoint at the current stage. According to the U.S. plan, an International Stabilization Force (commanded by U.S. Major General Jasper Jeffers) will be deployed to supervise the ceasefire and ensure Hamas is disarmed and its tunnels dismantled. In his statement, Trump issued a stern warning to Hamas, demanding the return of the last Israeli hostage's remains and the completion of disarmament, whether through simple or difficult means. The White House claimed that Hamas officials had agreed to disarm on the eve of the ceasefire agreement, but Hamas has publicly denied this, insisting on its condition: weapons will only be laid down when the establishment of a Palestinian state becomes a reality.

This leads the contradiction to the third phase of the plan, the most politically explosive part—the United States' intention to ultimately recognize the State of Palestine. This is precisely the red line that Netanyahu has flatly rejected. The Israeli Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that he will never allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. Consequently, the entire plan is caught in a classic deadlock: Hamas links demilitarization to statehood, Israel opposes statehood as an absolute precondition, and the U.S. plan logically requires completing demilitarization and statehood in sequence, making it nearly an impossible mission.

Israel's resistance is not only verbal but also reflected in actions. Despite the ceasefire being in effect, the Israeli military still controls over half of Gaza's territory and has not fully reopened the Rafah crossing to Egypt to ensure smooth humanitarian aid. Ongoing military operations and violence in the West Bank (such as the killing of a 14-year-old Palestinian boy in early 2026) continue to erode the fragile calm. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Israeli military has already formulated plans to resume ground operations in Gaza. The remarks by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich represent the views of hardliners within the country: those nations that allowed Hamas to survive cannot be the ones to replace it. This directly targets Turkey and Qatar.

Observations indicate that the United States plans to attempt to circumvent core contradictions by politicizing and economizing technical issues. It extensively discusses reconstruction, investment, and governance, yet remains ambiguous about the ultimate political status. However, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, economic measures have never been able to replace political resolution. Without a clear and just political prospect, any reconstruction may be like building a tower on sand. Hamas may be willing to relinquish municipal administrative authority, but it will never easily abandon its armed forces—the foundation of its survival and political influence. Israel will also never accept a neighboring state that could threaten its existence before its own security demands (including control over the Jordan Valley, etc.) are absolutely guaranteed.

The Game on the Ruins: The Path to Reconstruction and the Reshaping of Regional Order

The reconstruction needs in Gaza are astronomical, and they also represent the hopeful vision that the Trump plan attempts to vividly depict. Ali Shaath estimates that the reconstruction will take three years, with the primary focus being on addressing the housing needs of hundreds of thousands of displaced people. However, reconstruction is not merely a matter of funding and technology; it is an intense political and geopolitical game.

First, whoever pays for the reconstruction holds the influence. Trump's billion-dollar model for permanent seats attempts to bundle reconstruction funding with governance power for sale. This could lead to power struggles among donor countries, as well as between donors and local institutions. The roles of traditional and emerging financial backers like the World Bank and the UAE will be pivotal. However, this may also divert reconstruction efforts away from the most urgent humanitarian needs, shifting instead toward commercial projects with higher investment returns, thereby exacerbating social inequality.

Secondly, the reconstruction process is deeply intertwined with the security situation. As long as the demilitarization process remains stalled, Israel's military operations and blockades are likely to persist, the deployment of international stabilization forces will also be hindered, and large-scale reconstruction projects simply cannot proceed safely. Whether the troops commanded by Major General Jeffers can effectively separate the conflicting parties is itself a significant challenge. More subtly, the composition of this force (expected to include troops from countries such as Egypt and Turkey) may also raise concerns in Israel.

From a broader perspective, Trump's Gaza plan is a bold attempt by the United States to reshape the order in the Middle East. It seeks to bypass the traditional international consensus based on the United Nations and the two-state solution, establishing a new crisis management mechanism directly led by the United States, under the name of pragmatic cooperation, integrating commercial capital and selective allies. If this mechanism succeeds (even if only in achieving initial stability in Gaza), it could become a template for handling other regional conflicts in the future, further weakening the role of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations.

However, its risks are equally enormous. It heavily relies on Trump's personal authority and deal-making art, raising doubts about its institutional sustainability. It has intensified open conflicts with Israel, one of its closest allies. It fails to truly address the core of the Palestinian issue—the right to national self-determination and legitimate political representation. The so-called Palestinian autonomy, under the current framework, resembles more of a municipally managed system under international supervision rather than a substantive step toward independent statehood.

The winter in Gaza remains bitterly cold. Families in tents struggle against wind and rain, and the souls of the innocent beneath the rubble have yet to rest in peace. Trump's Peace Commission arrives on this land with a blueprint filled with commercial calculations and political gambles. It paints an illusion of stability built with dollars and bulldozers, yet it has still not found the key to unlock the hearts that have been imprisoned on both sides for decades. The plan has already been set in motion, but the most likely outcome may be this: Gaza will enter a frozen period—managed by an international commission, superficially calm yet undercurrent with turbulence, with limited economic recovery but a political deadlock that persists. To break this stalemate, what is needed is no longer intricate structural designs or financial leverage, but the political courage to confront history and justice—precisely the element most scarce in the current plan. The path to Gaza's reconstruction is destined to traverse a political minefield more complex than the ruins themselves.