China's Countermeasures Against Japan: The Dual Impact of Dual-Use Item Controls and Anti-Dumping Investigations

In January 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced comprehensive export control measures on dual-use items against Japan. This move aims to counter the recent erroneous remarks made by Japanese political figures regarding Taiwan, marking a symbolic action by China to shatter Japan's illusion of relying on China for economic benefits while depending on the United States for security. The intensity of these control measures is unprecedented, not only causing significant impacts on Japan's defense industry and overall economy but also profoundly influencing the future trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations. This article will provide a comprehensive analysis from multiple dimensions, including the background of the controls, details of the measures, actual impacts, strategic significance, Japan's response and latest countermeasures, and the outlook for bilateral relations.

I. Background of Control: Escalation of Japanese Provocation and China's Countermeasure Logic

. Trigger: Japanese Politicians' Remarks on Taiwan and Tendency for Military Adventurism

Japanese politicians have recently made a series of inappropriate remarks in public regarding the Taiwan issue, claiming that a contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan, and even hinting at possible military intervention. This move not only crosses China's red line but is also rare in Japan's history. More alarmingly, Japan has not retracted these erroneous statements. Instead, it has intensified its efforts to expand military capabilities, revise the pacifist constitution, continuously accelerate militarization, and repeatedly breach the limits of its peace constitution.

On January 5, 2026, Japanese Prime Minister Takashi Hayashi clearly stated at the New Year's press conference that the government aims to revise the three security documents within the year and will continue to advance related discussions. He also expressed Japan's willingness to maintain open dialogue with China. However, there is widespread skepticism toward this gesture of dialogue. Some commentators point out that its essence is a strategy to unilaterally force China to tacitly accept Japan's involvement in Taiwan Strait affairs. Furthermore, on December 26, 2025 (a sensitive date), Takashi Hayashi announced a so-called concession by stating he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Yet, on January 5, 2026, he still visited a major Shinto shrine in an official capacity, further highlighting the ambiguity and opportunism in his stance on historical issues and toward China.

. China's Preemptive Warnings and Determination to Counteract

In fact, China has repeatedly reminded Japan on multiple occasions that its remarks regarding Taiwan have crossed a red line, demanding that Japan correct its erroneous stance. However, Japan not only failed to make concessions or respond but has continued to escalate provocations, promoting constitutional amendments and increasing military spending. Against this backdrop, on January 6, 2026, China swiftly implemented stringent export control measures, explicitly stating that they would take effect immediately upon issuance, without granting Japan any buffer period. This fully demonstrates China's firm determination to safeguard its core interests.

. In-depth Consideration: Maintaining Regional Stability and Gaining Strategic Initiative

From a deeper logical perspective, Japan has frequently engaged in minor maneuvers with the United States in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea in recent years, continuously provoking China's core interests and seriously threatening regional peace and stability. China's implementation of export controls has clear strategic intentions: on one hand, Japan's high-end manufacturing and defense industries heavily rely on critical raw materials such as rare earths from China. Through export controls, China can firmly keep the initiative in its own hands. On the other hand, this move serves both as a direct countermeasure against Japan's increasingly radical stance and as a powerful warning to other countries globally that attempt to impose technological blockades.

II. Detailed Explanation of Control Measures: A Comprehensive "Precision Strike" System

. Core Content of Regulation and Scope of Implementation

The core of the control measures introduced by China this time is to prohibit the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military purposes, and to any other end-users/end-uses that contribute to enhancing Japan's military capabilities. The control list is extensive, spanning as many as 167 pages, covering 10 major categories and over 700 items, including 1030 types of dual-use items, which nearly encompass the core materials and key components in all high-tech fields. The core of the control measures introduced by China this time is to prohibit the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military purposes, and to any other end-users/end-uses that contribute to enhancing Japan's military capabilities. The control list is extensive, spanning as many as 167 pages, covering 10 major categories and over 700 items, including 1030 types of dual-use items, which nearly encompass the core materials and key components in all high-tech fields.

. Key Control Areas and Characteristics of Measures

The key areas of this control include ten major categories: nuclear-related materials and equipment, advanced materials such as special alloys and carbon fiber, high-precision machine tools and printing equipment, advanced semiconductor electronic components, high-performance computers, encryption devices and communication security technologies, infrared sensors and lasers, precision navigation systems and gyroscopes, underwater equipment and submarine-related technologies, aero engines, rocket and satellite technologies.

The most notable feature of the measure lies in the breadth and strictness of its regulatory scope: it not only restricts exports to explicitly identified military end-users but also extends to end-users that contribute to enhancing military capabilities; dual-use items exported to any company in Japan may be prohibited if they involve potential military enhancement; even non-Japanese enterprises may be barred from obtaining Chinese dual-use items if their customers are related to Japan's military industry. This design will force third-country enterprises to make a choice between trade with China and Japan, producing an effect similar to secondary sanctions.

It is important to clarify that dual-use items refer to goods, technologies, and services that have both civilian and military applications, or that could contribute to enhancing military potential. The core logic behind this control measure lies in the significant potential threat posed by Japanese militarism. Any seemingly ordinary item could be repurposed by it for military use, necessitating comprehensive regulation.

III. Multidimensional Impacts on Japan: Stagnation in the Military Industry and Economic "Bleeding"

. A "stranglehold" strike on the military-industrial sector.

Japan's defense industry has a deep reliance on China's supply chain. According to a 2025 assessment by the Japan Defense Industry Association, the weighted average dependency of its defense industry on China's supply chain is approximately 72%. Specifically, the dependency on rare earth material supplies reaches 38%, on semiconductors and electronic components 29%, on various chemicals and optical components 15%, and on other precision parts 10%. More critically, 90% of the rare earth permanent magnets used in Japan's defense industry need to be imported from China, and rare earth permanent magnets are core components of many advanced weapon systems. Japan's defense industry has a deep reliance on China's supply chain. According to a 2025 assessment by the Japan Defense Industry Association, the weighted average dependency of its defense industry on China's supply chain is approximately 72%. Specifically, the dependency on rare earth material supplies reaches 38%, on semiconductors and electronic components 29%, on various chemicals and optical components 15%, and on other precision parts 10%. More critically, 90% of the rare earth permanent magnets used in Japan's defense industry need to be imported from China, and rare earth permanent magnets are core components of many advanced weapon systems.

In this context, regulatory measures have directly hindered Japan's weapons and equipment production, leaving new projects like long-range missiles in a state of anxious stagnation. Key defense contractors such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries are already feeling immense pressure from supply chains that could break at any moment. In fact, in 2021, Sumitomo Heavy Industries, which produces machine guns for the Japan Self-Defense Forces, outsourced some components that were ultimately manufactured by Chinese factories. Without materials supplied by China, Japan's high-tech equipment would only become scrap metal.

. The comprehensive impact on the overall economy

Japan's economy also shows significant reliance on China's supply chain, with its import dependency on mainland China reaching as high as 40%, second only to the Taiwan region of China (44%). In specific categories such as semiconductor raw materials and fertilizer ingredients, the dependency on China even exceeds 99%. China's regulatory measures have directly impacted Japan's pillar industries, including electronics, semiconductors, and automobiles, leading to a sharp increase in production costs and forcing many factories to cut production. Among these, high-end sectors such as new energy vehicles and robotics are struggling due to shortages of graphite anodes and rare-earth permanent magnets, resulting in a noticeable decline in the overall competitiveness of the manufacturing industry.

According to estimates by Nomura Research Institute, regulatory measures could lead to an annual loss of 26 trillion yen for Japan, dragging down GDP by 0.43 percentage points. At the same time, the stock market has plummeted, corporate confidence has been severely shaken, and related industries such as tourism, study abroad, and fisheries have all been affected, with almost no industry able to escape the impact. In the long term, this measure will cause long-term bleeding to the Japanese economy, forcing Japan to import substitutes at high prices from other countries, further weakening its global competitiveness. Some products, due to the lack of alternative sources outside China, will lead to the bankruptcy of related Japanese companies and accelerate Japan's deindustrialization process.

IV. Strategic Significance and Historical Positioning: A Landmark Action That Shatters Illusions

This export control on dual-use items to Japan holds significant strategic importance, marking China's complete shattering of Japan's illusion of relying on China's industrial capacity while simultaneously cooperating with the United States to contain China. Through this measure, China compels Japan to face the dual crises of equipment technology iteration gap and insufficient strategic reserves in future geopolitical confrontations.

From a historical perspective, the intensity of this control is unprecedented and targets the world's fourth-largest economy. Japan last faced sanctions of similar intensity in 1940 (before the attack on Pearl Harbor). It is worth noting that these measures were originally prepared for the United States. However, due to the United States yielding too quickly on key issues, China had no choice but to test the waters with Japan first. This also highlights, from another angle, China's strategic flexibility and confidence in its external engagements.

More importantly, this action is not an endpoint but a starting point. In response to Japan's erroneous words and deeds, such as denying the legal validity of the 1972 China-Japan Joint Statement and claiming that the United Nations' enemy state clauses have become invalid, China has clearly hinted that it will take further actions. This means that if Japan does not correct its erroneous historical perception and political stance, it will face more countermeasures in the future.

V. Japan's Response Dilemma and Passive Situation

In response to China's regulatory measures, Japan has attempted to adopt various countermeasures, yet all face numerous challenges:

First, the feasibility of seeking alternative sources is low. Japan attempted to acquire critical materials such as rare earths from Australia, South Asian island nations, and other locations, but the cost of alternative sources is several times higher than that of China. Moreover, commercialization can barely be achieved by 2028 at the earliest, meaning distant water cannot quench immediate thirst. Promoting supply chain diversification and seeking new resource supply locations in Australia, Vietnam, and Africa also face challenges such as high costs, long timelines, and high technical barriers.

Secondly, domestic pressure continues to escalate. Control measures have led to rising industrial costs and product prices in Japan, causing business difficulties, economic decline, and intensifying domestic conflicts. This has resulted in street protests by the public, fierce criticism from opposition parties, and widespread complaints from the business community.

Third, diplomatic efforts have repeatedly encountered setbacks. Japan's attempt to organize a delegation to negotiate with China was put on hold; seeking assistance from the United States and its allies proved futile, as even the U.S. itself cannot fill the supply gap. Currently, Japan is in a passive situation of talking tough while scrambling to put out fires everywhere. Some opinions sarcastically point out that Japan's only way out is to relocate all its companies to China. Although this statement is extreme, it highlights the reality of Japan's inadequate response.

From the perspective of trade data comparison, China's exports to Japan account for only about 4% of China's total exports, while Japan's exports to China account for about 17% of Japan's total exports. Japan is highly dependent on China in terms of military, economic, and technological aspects. The series of provocative actions by Prime Minister Takashi are undoubtedly lifting a stone only to drop it on their own feet.

VI. Latest Countermeasure: The Strategic Signal of China's Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imported Dichlorodihydrosilicon from Japan

. Investigation Initiation: Legal Basis and Core Information

. Core factors influencing the direction of a relationship

The dumping investigation period for this survey is from July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025. The scope of the investigation covers imported dichlorodihydrogensilane originating from Japan. This product, also known as dichlorosilane, is a colorless, flammable, toxic gas with a distinctive odor under normal temperature and pressure. It is soluble in organic solvents such as benzene and ether, with a purity greater than or equal to 99%. It is primarily used for thin-film deposition in the chip manufacturing process and is a key material for producing various types of chips, including logic chips, memory chips, and analog chips. As required, interested parties should register with the Ministry of Commerce's Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau within 20 days from the date of the announcement to participate in this investigation and provide relevant information. The dumping investigation period for this survey is from July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025. The scope of the investigation covers imported dichlorodihydrogensilane originating from Japan. This product, also known as dichlorosilane, is a colorless, flammable, toxic gas with a distinctive odor under normal temperature and pressure. It is soluble in organic solvents such as benzene and ether, with a purity greater than or equal to 99%. It is primarily used for thin-film deposition in the chip manufacturing process and is a key material for producing various types of chips, including logic chips, memory chips, and analog chips. As required, interested parties should register with the Ministry of Commerce's Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau within 20 days from the date of the announcement to participate in this investigation and provide relevant information.

The website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce confirmed that on December 8, it received an anti-dumping investigation application submitted by Tangshan Sanfu Electronic Materials Co., Ltd. on behalf of the domestic dichlorodihydrosilane industry. The applicant requested an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the "Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China," the Ministry of Commerce reviewed the applicant's qualifications, the situation of the product under investigation, the situation of similar products in China, the impact of the product under investigation on the Chinese industry, and relevant information about the country under investigation. Based on the evidence provided by the applicant and the preliminary review by the Ministry of Commerce, the applicant's dichlorodihydrosilane production meets the requirements of the relevant regulations, and the application contains the necessary content and evidence for filing a case. Therefore, it has been decided to initiate an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan starting from January 7, 2026. The website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce confirmed that on December 8, it received an anti-dumping investigation application submitted by Tangshan Sanfu Electronic Materials Co., Ltd. on behalf of the domestic dichlorodihydrosilane industry. The applicant requested an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the "Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China," the Ministry of Commerce reviewed the applicant's qualifications, the situation of the product under investigation, the situation of similar products in China, the impact of the product under investigation on the Chinese industry, and relevant information about the country under investigation. Based on the evidence provided by the applicant and the preliminary review by the Ministry of Commerce, the applicant's dichlorodihydrosilane production meets the requirements of the relevant regulations, and the application contains the necessary content and evidence for filing a case. Therefore, it has been decided to initiate an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan starting from January 7, 2026.

This anti-dumping investigation is widely regarded as a clear signal that China is imposing restrictions on Japanese chips and related production materials. Analysis suggests that during South Korean Prime Minister Lee Jae-myung's visit to China, an agreement may have been reached to replace Japanese products with South Korean alternatives—if Japanese products were irreplaceable, China would not have initiated such an investigation lightly. The current trend clearly indicates that China is pushing Japanese products to gradually exit the Chinese market while positioning South Korean products as the core alternative.

. Geopolitics and Industrial Logic: The Substitution Layout of Replacing Japan with South Korea

. A Clear Warning to Japan and Its Underlying Strategic Considerations

This alternative layout has a solid industrial foundation: After Japan imposed export controls on key materials such as photoresist and hydrogen fluoride to South Korea in 2019, South Korea accelerated the localization process of semiconductor materials. Through the K-Semiconductor Strategy, South Korea invested trillions of won, continuously focusing on tax incentives, financial support, and talent cultivation to build an independent semiconductor supply chain. Industry giants such as Samsung and SK Hynix have deeply collaborated with material companies like Dongjin Semichem and E&F TECS, promoting the domestic substitution of numerous products. Currently, South Korean companies have achieved localization in areas such as KrF photoresist for mature process nodes, while breakthroughs are being pursued in high-end fields like EUV photoresist. Some high-purity hydrogen fluoride products have passed verification, and the domestic supply capabilities in areas such as silicon wafers and CMP polishing materials are also continuously improving.

While Japan has accumulated profound expertise in material patents and processes, making it difficult for South Korea to fully replace in the short term, the substitution process is already irreversible and the trend is clear. From a strategic perspective, China holds core initiative: the Chinese market is crucial for Japanese semiconductor material companies, while Japan's production of key materials also relies on Chinese resources such as rare earths and specialty gases. There is mutual demand between China and Japan, but China has clearly demonstrated the option and capability for decoupling. If China and Japan move toward confrontation, Japanese semiconductor material companies will face severe consequences from market loss, and capital and technology may further flow to South Korea or China, dealing a fatal blow to Japan's related industries.

This anti-dumping investigation sends a clear warning signal to Japan: China has initiated an alternative plan (primarily relying on South Korea). If Sino-Japanese relations continue to be tense, China will completely abandon Japanese products. This move serves both as pressure on Japan's domestic industries and government, aiming to force the Japanese government to abandon its strategy of following the U.S. in confronting China, and as a warning card played by China in the semiconductor supply chain competition.

VII. The Future Direction of Sino-Japanese Relations: Coexistence of Competition and Cooperation Under Controllable Tensions

From a deeper security perspective, the resurgence of Japanese militarism is regarded as the core issue. Analysis indicates that if Japan aims to engage in aggression or wage war against China in the future, China cannot continue to maintain normal commercial relations with it, providing funds and technological support for weapon manufacturing. Currently, Japan has tense relations with all its neighboring countries (China, South Korea, Russia, North Korea) and is fully bound to the U.S. war chariot, yet its military strength cannot compete with the conventional and nuclear forces of China and Russia. In this geopolitical environment, if Japan persists in reviving militarism, its economy will ultimately face difficulties due to isolation and containment by neighboring countries. The conclusion is clear: Japan's current policies are forcing its enterprises to make difficult choices, and the ultimate loser will be Japan itself.

The future trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations will be constrained by four core factors: First, Japan's political direction. The new cabinet is increasingly leaning to the right, continuously amending the constitution and expanding its military, adopting an ambiguous stance on historical issues, and taking risky actions on the Taiwan issue, which will lead to ongoing tensions. Second, economic and trade relations. Japan's economy is highly dependent on China, and the business community hopes to continue cooperation; the negotiations for the China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement are a significant variable. Third, Sino-U.S. relations. The direction of U.S. policy will directly influence Japan's stance toward China. Fourth, people-to-people exchanges. Although there are signs of improvement, trust at the societal level remains relatively fragile.

In the short term, due to political changes in Japan and its tough stance, Sino-Japanese relations will remain relatively tense, but both sides will adhere to the bottom line of avoiding comprehensive confrontation. In the medium term, the relationship will present a complex state of cooperation amid competition, and there may still be opportunities for partial cooperation in new areas or global issues such as new energy and global economic governance. However, it should be clarified that some fundamental contradictions (such as historical perceptions and the Taiwan issue) are difficult to resolve in the short term, and structural contradictions will persist over the long term.