China's Countermeasures Against Japan: The Dual Impact of Dual-Use Item Controls and Anti-Dumping Investigations

In the year and month, the Ministry of Commerce of China announced comprehensive export control measures on dual-use items against Japan. This move aims to counter the recent erroneous remarks made by Japanese political figures regarding Taiwan, marking a symbolic action by China to shatter Japan's illusion of "relying on China for the economy and the United States for security." The intensity of these control measures is unprecedented, not only causing significant impacts on Japan's defense industry and overall economy but also profoundly influencing the future trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations. This article will provide a comprehensive analysis from the perspectives of the background of the controls, details of the measures, actual impacts, strategic significance, Japan's response and the latest countermeasures, and the outlook for bilateral relations.

I. Background of Control: Escalation of Japanese Provocation and China's Countermeasure Logic

. Trigger: Japanese Politicians' Remarks on Taiwan and Tendency for Military Adventurism

Japanese politicians have recently made a series of inappropriate remarks regarding the Taiwan issue in public, claiming that "a contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan" and even hinting at possible "military intervention." This move not only crosses China's red line but is also rare in Japan's history. What is even more alarming is that Japan has not retracted these erroneous statements. Instead, it has intensified its efforts to expand military capabilities, revise its pacifist constitution, continuously accelerate militarization, and repeatedly breach the bottom line of its "Peace Constitution." Japanese politicians have recently made a series of inappropriate remarks regarding the Taiwan issue in public, claiming that "a contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan" and even hinting at possible "military intervention." This move not only crosses China's red line but is also rare in Japan's history. What is even more alarming is that Japan has not retracted these erroneous statements. Instead, it has intensified its efforts to expand military capabilities, revise its pacifist constitution, continuously accelerate militarization, and repeatedly breach the bottom line of its "Peace Constitution."

On [Date], Japanese Prime Minister Takashi Sō made a clear statement at the New Year press conference, expressing his goal to revise the three security documents within the year and continue advancing related discussions. At the same time, he stated, "Japan is willing to maintain open dialogue with China." However, there is widespread skepticism in the international community regarding this "dialogue" posture. Some commentators have pointed out that its essence is a strategy to unilaterally force China to tacitly accept Japan's intervention in Taiwan Strait affairs. Additionally, on [Date] (a sensitive date), Takashi Sō had previously announced a so-called "concession" posture of "not visiting the Yasukuni Shrine." However, on [Date], he still visited the Shinto shrine in an official capacity, further highlighting his ambiguity and opportunism on historical issues and his stance toward China.

. China's Preemptive Warnings and Determination to Counteract

In fact, China has repeatedly reminded Japan on multiple occasions that its statements regarding Taiwan have crossed a red line, urging Japan to correct its erroneous stance. However, Japan not only refused to concede or respond but continued to escalate its provocative actions, promoting constitutional amendments and increasing military spending. Against this backdrop, China swiftly implemented stringent export control measures on January 6, 2026, explicitly stating that "they will take effect immediately upon issuance," without granting Japan any buffer period, fully demonstrating China's firm resolve to safeguard its core interests. In fact, China has repeatedly reminded Japan on multiple occasions that its statements regarding Taiwan have crossed a red line, urging Japan to correct its erroneous stance. However, Japan not only refused to concede or respond but continued to escalate its provocative actions, promoting constitutional amendments and increasing military spending. Against this backdrop, China swiftly implemented stringent export control measures on January 6, 2026, explicitly stating that "they will take effect immediately upon issuance," without granting Japan any buffer period, fully demonstrating China's firm resolve to safeguard its core interests.

. In-depth Consideration: Maintaining Regional Stability and Gaining Strategic Initiative

From a deeper perspective, Japan has frequently engaged in "small maneuvers" with the United States in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea in recent years, continuously provoking China's core interests and seriously threatening regional peace and stability. China's implementation of export controls has clear strategic intentions: on one hand, Japan's high-end manufacturing and defense industries heavily rely on critical raw materials such as rare earths from China, allowing China to firmly maintain the initiative through export controls; on the other hand, this move serves as both a direct countermeasure to Japan's increasingly aggressive stance and a strong warning to other countries globally attempting to impose technological blockades.

II. Detailed Explanation of Control Measures: A Comprehensive "Precision Strike" System

. Core Content of Regulation and Scope of Implementation

The core of the control measures introduced by China this time is to prohibit the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military purposes, and to any other end-users/end-uses that contribute to enhancing Japan's military capabilities. The control list is extensive, spanning as many as 167 pages, covering 10 major categories and over 700 items, including 1030 types of dual-use items, which nearly encompass the core materials and key components in all high-tech fields. The core of the control measures introduced by China this time is to prohibit the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military purposes, and to any other end-users/end-uses that contribute to enhancing Japan's military capabilities. The control list is extensive, spanning as many as 167 pages, covering 10 major categories and over 700 items, including 1030 types of dual-use items, which nearly encompass the core materials and key components in all high-tech fields.

. Key Control Areas and Characteristics of Measures

The key areas of this control include ten major categories: nuclear-related materials and equipment, advanced materials such as special alloys and carbon fiber, high-precision machine tools and printing equipment, advanced semiconductor electronic components, high-performance computers, encryption devices and communication security technologies, infrared sensors and lasers, precision navigation systems and gyroscopes, underwater equipment and submarine-related technologies, aero engines, rocket and satellite technologies.

The most notable feature of the measures lies in the breadth and strictness of the control scope: it not only restricts exports to clearly identified military end-users but also extends to "end-users that contribute to enhancing military capabilities"; dual-use items exported to any company in Japan may be prohibited if they involve the enhancement of military potential; even non-Japanese enterprises, if their clients are Japanese military-industrial related enterprises, may also be prohibited from obtaining Chinese dual-use items. This design will force third-country enterprises to make choices between China-Japan trade, producing an effect similar to "secondary sanctions". The most notable feature of the measures lies in the breadth and strictness of the control scope: it not only restricts exports to clearly identified military end-users but also extends to "end-users that contribute to enhancing military capabilities"; dual-use items exported to any company in Japan may be prohibited if they involve the enhancement of military potential; even non-Japanese enterprises, if their clients are Japanese military-industrial related enterprises, may also be prohibited from obtaining Chinese dual-use items. This design will force third-country enterprises to make choices between China-Japan trade, producing an effect similar to "secondary sanctions".

It must be clarified that "dual-use items" refer to goods, technologies, and services that have both civilian and military applications or contribute to enhancing military potential. The core logic behind this control lies in the significant potential threat posed by Japanese militarism. Any seemingly ordinary item could be repurposed by it for military use, necessitating comprehensive regulation.

III. Multidimensional Impacts on Japan: Stagnation in the Military Industry and Economic "Bleeding"

. A "stranglehold" strike on the military-industrial sector.

Japan's defense industry has a deep reliance on China's supply chain. According to a 2025 assessment by the Japan Defense Industry Association, the weighted average dependency of its defense industry on China's supply chain is approximately 72%. Specifically, the dependency on rare earth material supplies reaches 38%, on semiconductors and electronic components 29%, on various chemicals and optical components 15%, and on other precision parts 10%. More critically, 90% of the rare earth permanent magnets used in Japan's defense industry need to be imported from China, and rare earth permanent magnets are core components of many advanced weapon systems. Japan's defense industry has a deep reliance on China's supply chain. According to a 2025 assessment by the Japan Defense Industry Association, the weighted average dependency of its defense industry on China's supply chain is approximately 72%. Specifically, the dependency on rare earth material supplies reaches 38%, on semiconductors and electronic components 29%, on various chemicals and optical components 15%, and on other precision parts 10%. More critically, 90% of the rare earth permanent magnets used in Japan's defense industry need to be imported from China, and rare earth permanent magnets are core components of many advanced weapon systems.

Under this context, control measures directly lead to obstacles in Japan's weapons and equipment production, with new projects such as long-range missiles "only able to worry but not proceed"; core defense contractors like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries have already felt the immense pressure of potential supply chain disruptions at any moment. In fact, in 2021, Sumitomo Heavy Industries, which produced machine guns for the Japan Self-Defense Forces, outsourced some components that were ultimately manufactured by Chinese factories. Without materials provided by China, Japan's high-tech equipment "can only become scrap metal". Under this context, control measures directly lead to obstacles in Japan's weapons and equipment production, with new projects such as long-range missiles "only able to worry but not proceed"; core defense contractors like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries have already felt the immense pressure of potential supply chain disruptions at any moment. In fact, in 2021, Sumitomo Heavy Industries, which produced machine guns for the Japan Self-Defense Forces, outsourced some components that were ultimately manufactured by Chinese factories. Without materials provided by China, Japan's high-tech equipment "can only become scrap metal".

. The comprehensive impact on the overall economy

Japan's economic reliance on China's supply chain is equally significant, with its import dependency on mainland China reaching as high as 40%, second only to the Taiwan region of China (44%); in specific categories such as semiconductor raw materials and fertilizer ingredients, the dependency on China even exceeds 99%. China's regulatory measures have directly impacted Japan's pillar industries like electronics, semiconductors, and automobiles, leading to a sharp rise in production costs and forcing many factories to cut output. Among these, high-end sectors such as new energy vehicles and robotics are "struggling" due to shortages of graphite anodes and rare-earth permanent magnets, resulting in a noticeable decline in the overall competitiveness of the manufacturing industry. Japan's economic reliance on China's supply chain is equally significant, with its import dependency on mainland China reaching as high as 40%, second only to the Taiwan region of China (44%); in specific categories such as semiconductor raw materials and fertilizer ingredients, the dependency on China even exceeds 99%. China's regulatory measures have directly impacted Japan's pillar industries like electronics, semiconductors, and automobiles, leading to a sharp rise in production costs and forcing many factories to cut output. Among these, high-end sectors such as new energy vehicles and robotics are "struggling" due to shortages of graphite anodes and rare-earth permanent magnets, resulting in a noticeable decline in the overall competitiveness of the manufacturing industry.

According to estimates by Nomura Research Institute, the control measures could lead to Japan losing 2.6 trillion yen in one year, with GDP being dragged down by 0.43 percentage points. At the same time, the stock market plummeted, corporate confidence was severely shaken, and related industries such as tourism, study abroad, and the aquatic products industry were all affected. "Almost no industry can escape." In the long run, this measure will cause "long-term bleeding" for the Japanese economy, forcing Japan to import substitutes from other countries at high prices, further weakening its global competitiveness. For some products, there are no alternative sources other than China, which will lead to the bankruptcy of related Japanese companies and accelerate Japan's "de-industrialization" process. According to estimates by Nomura Research Institute, the control measures could lead to Japan losing 2.6 trillion yen in one year, with GDP being dragged down by 0.43 percentage points. At the same time, the stock market plummeted, corporate confidence was severely shaken, and related industries such as tourism, study abroad, and the aquatic products industry were all affected. "Almost no industry can escape." In the long run, this measure will cause "long-term bleeding" for the Japanese economy, forcing Japan to import substitutes from other countries at high prices, further weakening its global competitiveness. For some products, there are no alternative sources other than China, which will lead to the bankruptcy of related Japanese companies and accelerate Japan's "de-industrialization" process.

IV. Strategic Significance and Historical Positioning: A Landmark Action That Shatters Illusions

This export control on dual-use items to Japan holds significant strategic importance, marking China's complete shattering of Japan's illusion of relying on China's industrial capacity while simultaneously cooperating with the U.S. to contain China. Through this measure, China forces Japan to face the dual crises of "equipment technology iteration gap" and "insufficient strategic reserves" in future geopolitical confrontations. This export control on dual-use items to Japan holds significant strategic importance, marking China's complete shattering of Japan's illusion of relying on China's industrial capacity while simultaneously cooperating with the U.S. to contain China. Through this measure, China forces Japan to face the dual crises of "equipment technology iteration gap" and "insufficient strategic reserves" in future geopolitical confrontations.

From a historical perspective, the intensity of this round of controls is "unprecedented and unrepeatable," targeting the world's fourth-largest economy. Japan last faced sanctions of similar intensity in the year (before the attack on Pearl Harbor). It is worth noting that these measures were originally prepared for the United States, but because the U.S. "knelt too quickly" on key issues, China had to use Japan first as a "test case," which also highlights China's strategic flexibility and confidence in its external engagements.

More importantly, this action is not an end but a beginning. In response to Japan's erroneous words and deeds, such as denying the legal validity of the 1972 China-Japan Joint Statement and claiming that the United Nations' "enemy state clauses" have become invalid, China has clearly hinted that it will take further action. This means that if Japan does not correct its erroneous historical perceptions and political stance, it will face more countermeasures in the future.

V. Japan's Response Dilemma and Passive Situation

In response to China's regulatory measures, Japan has attempted to adopt various countermeasures, yet all face numerous challenges:

First, the feasibility of seeking alternative sources is low. Japan has attempted to acquire critical materials such as rare earths from Australia, South Asian island nations, and other regions. However, the cost of these alternative sources is "several times higher" than that of China, and commercialization can only be barely achieved at the earliest by 2025, which is a case of "distant water cannot quench immediate thirst." Promoting supply chain diversification by exploring new resource supply locations in Australia, Vietnam, and Africa also faces challenges such as high costs, long timelines, and high technical barriers.

Secondly, domestic pressure continues to escalate. Control measures have led to rising industrial costs and product prices in Japan, causing business difficulties, economic decline, and intensifying domestic conflicts. This has resulted in street protests by the public, fierce criticism from opposition parties, and widespread complaints from the business community.

Third, diplomatic efforts have repeatedly encountered setbacks. Japan's attempt to form a delegation to negotiate with China was put on hold; seeking assistance from the United States and its allies proved futile, as the U.S. itself is unable to fill the supply gap. Currently, Japan is in a passive situation of "talking tough while scrambling to put out fires everywhere." Some opinions sarcastically point out that Japan's only "way out" is to relocate all its companies to China. While this statement is extreme, it highlights the reality of its inadequate response. Third, diplomatic efforts have repeatedly encountered setbacks. Japan's attempt to form a delegation to negotiate with China was put on hold; seeking assistance from the United States and its allies proved futile, as the U.S. itself is unable to fill the supply gap. Currently, Japan is in a passive situation of "talking tough while scrambling to put out fires everywhere." Some opinions sarcastically point out that Japan's only "way out" is to relocate all its companies to China. While this statement is extreme, it highlights the reality of its inadequate response.

From a comparison of trade data, China's exports to Japan account for only about 4% of China's total exports, while Japan's exports to China account for about 17% of Japan's total exports. Japan is "highly dependent" on China militarily, economically, and technologically. The series of provocative actions by Prime Minister Takashi are undoubtedly "shooting oneself in the foot." From a comparison of trade data, China's exports to Japan account for only about 4% of China's total exports, while Japan's exports to China account for about 17% of Japan's total exports. Japan is "highly dependent" on China militarily, economically, and technologically. The series of provocative actions by Prime Minister Takashi are undoubtedly "shooting oneself in the foot."

VI. Latest Countermeasure: The Strategic Signal of China's Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imported Dichlorodihydrosilicon from Japan

. Investigation Initiation: Legal Basis and Core Information

. Core factors influencing the direction of a relationship

The dumping investigation period for this survey is from July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025. The scope of the investigation covers imported dichlorodihydrogensilane originating from Japan. This product, also known as dichlorosilane, is a colorless, flammable, toxic gas with a distinctive odor under normal temperature and pressure. It is soluble in organic solvents such as benzene and ether, with a purity greater than or equal to 99%. It is primarily used for thin-film deposition in the chip manufacturing process and is a key material for producing various types of chips, including logic chips, memory chips, and analog chips. As required, interested parties should register with the Ministry of Commerce's Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau within 20 days from the date of the announcement to participate in this investigation and provide relevant information. The dumping investigation period for this survey is from July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025. The scope of the investigation covers imported dichlorodihydrogensilane originating from Japan. This product, also known as dichlorosilane, is a colorless, flammable, toxic gas with a distinctive odor under normal temperature and pressure. It is soluble in organic solvents such as benzene and ether, with a purity greater than or equal to 99%. It is primarily used for thin-film deposition in the chip manufacturing process and is a key material for producing various types of chips, including logic chips, memory chips, and analog chips. As required, interested parties should register with the Ministry of Commerce's Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau within 20 days from the date of the announcement to participate in this investigation and provide relevant information.

The website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce confirmed that on December 8, it received an anti-dumping investigation application submitted by Tangshan Sanfu Electronic Materials Co., Ltd. on behalf of the domestic dichlorodihydrosilane industry. The applicant requested an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the "Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China," the Ministry of Commerce reviewed the applicant's qualifications, the situation of the product under investigation, the situation of similar products in China, the impact of the product under investigation on the Chinese industry, and relevant information about the country under investigation. Based on the evidence provided by the applicant and the preliminary review by the Ministry of Commerce, the applicant's dichlorodihydrosilane production meets the requirements of the relevant regulations, and the application contains the necessary content and evidence for filing a case. Therefore, it has been decided to initiate an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan starting from January 7, 2026. The website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce confirmed that on December 8, it received an anti-dumping investigation application submitted by Tangshan Sanfu Electronic Materials Co., Ltd. on behalf of the domestic dichlorodihydrosilane industry. The applicant requested an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the "Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China," the Ministry of Commerce reviewed the applicant's qualifications, the situation of the product under investigation, the situation of similar products in China, the impact of the product under investigation on the Chinese industry, and relevant information about the country under investigation. Based on the evidence provided by the applicant and the preliminary review by the Ministry of Commerce, the applicant's dichlorodihydrosilane production meets the requirements of the relevant regulations, and the application contains the necessary content and evidence for filing a case. Therefore, it has been decided to initiate an anti-dumping investigation into dichlorodihydrosilane imported from Japan starting from January 7, 2026.

This anti-dumping investigation is widely regarded as a clear signal that China is imposing restrictions on Japanese chips and related production materials. Analysis suggests that during South Korean Prime Minister Lee Jae-myung's visit to China, an agreement may have been reached to replace Japanese products with South Korean alternatives—if Japanese products were irreplaceable, China would not have initiated such an investigation lightly. The current trend clearly indicates that China is pushing Japanese products to gradually exit the Chinese market while positioning South Korean products as the core alternative.

. Geopolitics and Industrial Logic: The Substitution Layout of Replacing Japan with South Korea

. A Clear Warning to Japan and Its Underlying Strategic Considerations

This alternative layout has a solid industrial foundation: after Japan imposed export controls on key materials such as photoresists and hydrogen fluoride to South Korea in 2019, South Korea accelerated the localization process of semiconductor materials. Through the "K-Semiconductor Strategy," South Korea invested trillions of Korean won, continuously focusing on tax incentives, financial support, and talent cultivation to build an independent semiconductor supply chain. Industry giants such as Samsung and SK Hynix have deepened cooperation with material companies like Dongjin Semichem and Soulbrain, promoting the localization of multiple products. Currently, South Korean companies have achieved localization in areas such as photoresists for mature processes, while breakthroughs are being pursued in high-end fields like advanced photoresists. Some high-purity hydrogen fluoride products have passed verification, and the local supply capacity in areas such as silicon wafers and polishing materials continues to improve.

Although Japan has a deep accumulation of material patents and process technologies, making it difficult for South Korea to fully replace them in the short term, the substitution process is irreversible and the trend is clear. From the perspective of strategic competition, China holds core initiative: the Chinese market is crucial for Japanese semiconductor material companies, while Japan's production of key materials also relies on Chinese resources such as rare earths and specialty gases. There is mutual demand between China and Japan, but China has clearly demonstrated the option and capability to "decouple." If China and Japan move toward confrontation, Japanese semiconductor material companies will face severe consequences from market loss, with capital and technology likely to further flow to South Korea or China, dealing a fatal blow to Japan's related industries.

This anti-dumping investigation sends a clear warning signal to Japan: China has initiated an alternative plan (primarily relying on South Korea), and if Sino-Japanese relations continue to be tense, China will completely abandon Japanese products. This move not only exerts pressure on Japan's domestic industries and government, aiming to force the Japanese government to abandon its strategy of following the United States in confronting China, but also serves as a "warning card" played by China in the semiconductor supply chain competition.

VII. The Future Direction of Sino-Japanese Relations: Coexistence of Competition and Cooperation Under Controllable Tensions

From a deeper security perspective, Japan's "resurgence of militarism" is regarded as the core issue. Analysis indicates that if Japan aims to engage in future aggression or wage war against China, it would be impossible for China to continue normal commercial relations with Japan, providing funding and technological support for weapons manufacturing. Currently, Japan has tense relations with all its neighboring countries (China, South Korea, Russia, North Korea) and is fully bound to the U.S. war machine, yet its military strength cannot match the conventional and nuclear capabilities of China and Russia. In this geopolitical environment, if Japan persists in reviving militarism, its economy will ultimately face difficulties due to isolation and containment by neighboring nations. The conclusion is clear: Japan's current policies are forcing its enterprises to make difficult choices, and the ultimate loser will be Japan itself.

The future trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations will be constrained by four core factors: First, Japan's political direction. The new cabinet is increasingly "right-leaning," continuously amending the constitution and expanding its military, adopting an ambiguous stance on historical issues, and taking risky actions on the Taiwan issue, which will lead to sustained tensions. Second, economic and trade relations. Japan's economy is highly dependent on China, and the business community hopes to continue cooperation, with the China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement negotiations being a significant variable. Third, Sino-U.S. relations. U.S. policy direction will directly influence Japan's stance toward China. Fourth, people-to-people exchanges. Although there are signs of improvement, trust at the societal level remains relatively fragile.

In the short term, due to changes in Japan's political situation and its tough stance, Sino-Japanese relations will be in a relatively tense state, but both sides will hold the bottom line of "no comprehensive confrontation." From a medium-term perspective, the relationship will present a complex state of "cooperation within competition," and there may still be opportunities for partial cooperation in new areas or global issues such as new energy and global economic governance. However, it needs to be clear that some fundamental contradictions (such as historical perception, the Taiwan issue) are difficult to resolve in the short term, and structural contradictions will persist in the long term. In the short term, due to changes in Japan's political situation and its tough stance, Sino-Japanese relations will be in a relatively tense state, but both sides will hold the bottom line of "no comprehensive confrontation." From a medium-term perspective, the relationship will present a complex state of "cooperation within competition," and there may still be opportunities for partial cooperation in new areas or global issues such as new energy and global economic governance. However, it needs to be clear that some fundamental contradictions (such as historical perception, the Taiwan issue) are difficult to resolve in the short term, and structural contradictions will persist in the long term.