Warning from Finland's Intelligence Chief: After the Ukraine War, Russia's Threat to the West Is Being Redefined.
25/01/2026
The winters in Helsinki are always long and cold, but this year, Pekka Turunen, the head of intelligence at the Finnish Defense Forces' General Staff, painted a strategic picture in the preface of an annual military intelligence report that is more unsettling than the Baltic Sea's icy winds. His core judgment is direct and clear: After the war in Ukraine ends, Russia could recover in just a few years and once again pose a military threat to the West. These remarks do not come from distant strategic think tanks in Washington or London, but from a country that shares a 1,340-kilometer land border with Russia, has lived under the shadow of the Cold War for decades, and just joined NATO last year. Turunen's warning, therefore, carries a particular weight grounded in geographical and historical experience.
Unlike many alarmist predictions, Turunen's assessment is imbued with a calm sense of nuance. He clearly states that Finland does not currently face an imminent military threat. This cautious expression precisely highlights the seriousness of its long-term warning—it is not an alert about tomorrow or next month, but a strategic judgment on the fundamental evolution of Europe's security order over the next 5 to 10 years. While the world's attention is diverted by the noise of Gaza, the Taiwan Strait, or the U.S. election, this Finnish intelligence chief reminds us that Moscow's long-term strategic patience and adaptability may be encouraged by the political disputes within the West.
Timetable and Strategic Window: A Countdown That Is Not Alarmist
The timeframe provided by Turunin is remarkably specific and thought-provoking. He sets the restoration of Russia's capability to pose a direct challenge to the West by the end of this decade, specifically in the final years of the 2020s. For a potential large-scale conventional war against NATO, his estimated preparation period is 2 to 5 years. This timeline is not conjured from thin air; it is based on a comprehensive analysis of the attrition and reconstruction rate of Russia's war machine, its economic resilience, and its political will.
Analysis indicates that Russia's special military operation in Ukraine has undoubtedly consumed a significant amount of its conventional military assets, particularly personnel, armored vehicles, and precision-guided munitions. However, the war has also served as a brutal yet efficient stress test and a catalyst for modernization. Russia's defense industrial complex has shifted to a wartime footing, with its production capacity expanding at a pace not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turunin's assessment suggests that once the attrition phase on the Ukrainian battlefield concludes, regardless of the form it takes, Moscow will be able to redirect resources and attention to other strategic directions. The day the war ends will mark the acceleration of the Westernization and reconstruction process of Russian military power.
More intriguing is his prediction regarding small-scale crises. Turunin points out that in Central Asia or the North Caucasus region, localized crises instigated or exploited by Russia may emerge earlier than direct confrontation with NATO. This reveals a potential multi-front pressure strategy: Russia may not directly challenge NATO's eastern defense line but could instead create incidents on Europe's flanks or within its traditional sphere of influence, testing Western unity and responsiveness while buying time and space for its longer-term objectives. This salami-slicing tactic has already been demonstrated once in Crimea and Donbas in 2014.
Shadows at the Border: Military Buildup and the Normalization Risk of "Accidents"
The 1,340-kilometer border between Finland and Russia, which mostly traverses sparse forests and lakes, is now one of the most geopolitically sensitive frontlines in Europe. In his report, Turunen clearly states: Russia is preparing to strengthen its military presence near the Finnish border. Once the situation in Ukraine permits, a more significant troop buildup is likely to begin. This is not merely an increase in military forces, but a fundamental shift in strategic posture.
Since February 2022, Finland's security environment has continued to deteriorate. The report indicates that over the past year, Russia's activities in the Baltic Sea have significantly increased. At the same time, Ukrainian forces have extended long-range strikes deep into Russian territory, including regions near the Finnish border, such as Leningrad Oblast and the Republic of Karelia. This expansion of the battlefield space has directly raised the collateral risks faced by Finland.
A passage in the report calmly states a grim reality: as attacks continue and methods become more diverse, the risk of aircraft or air defense weapons deviating from their course and entering the Finnish side is increasing. Turunen further explained to the media: there may be situations where drones accidentally fly into Finnish airspace. Although no such incidents have been officially recorded to date, the rise in risk is systemic. Every time Ukrainian drones strike targets within Russia, especially in the northwest, there is a potential for accidental entry into Finnish airspace. Once such an accident occurs, whether intentional or not, it will immediately trigger a serious diplomatic and military crisis, testing the restraint and communication mechanisms of all parties involved.
The physical closure of the border (since the end of 2023) and the escalation of military activities present a contradictory reality: the flow of people is nearly frozen, yet the risk of mutual security infiltration is increasing. Finland's concern lies in the fact that the military buildup on the other side of the border is not merely a temporary adjustment in response to the war in Ukraine, but rather a long-term deployment aimed at the post-Ukraine war era, designed to exert sustained strategic deterrence against Helsinki and the NATO alliance behind it.
The "encouragement effect" of the political climate: Internal divisions in the West are Moscow's strategic asset.
Turing's analysis was not confined to a purely military balance; he astutely identified key shifts in the political-psychological dimension. He directed his critique toward the political turmoil within the transatlantic alliance, particularly the political noise generated by remarks from former U.S. President Trump. He noted that actions such as the revival of Trump's attempt to purchase Greenland diverted international attention away from Ukraine.
At least at the political level, this likely served as an encouragement to Russia, Turunin told AFP. In other words, Russia views this political climate as a sign that the West, NATO, and Europe are in chaos and on the brink of collapse.
This is a crucial judgment. It signifies that Russia's assessment of Western threats is not only based on the quantity of tanks and missiles but also on the political cohesion and strategic resolve of Western societies. Kremlin strategists have long believed in and exploited the narrative of Western decline. When political polarization emerges in the United States, Europe stumbles in aiding Ukraine, and NATO members quarrel over military spending, these scenes are interpreted by Moscow as confirmation that its strategy can succeed. Turunin's warning essentially states: Our greatest risk may not be Russia's military, but the signals of weakness we ourselves send to the adversary.
This encouraging effect is bidirectional. It could embolden Moscow in its decision-making, leading to more aggressive brinkmanship; it could also make the West more hesitant in its responses, fearing that overreaction might trigger uncontrollable escalation. Finland, as a newly joined NATO member, is particularly sensitive to such shifts in the alliance's internal cohesion. Its security relies 100% on the credibility of NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause. Any political disputes that weaken this credibility directly translate into heightened security anxiety for Helsinki.
Finland's Response: The Shift in Thinking from Armed Neutrality to Forward Defense
Understanding the comprehensiveness of Tuominen's warning allows one to grasp the underlying logic behind Finland's series of strategic choices in recent years. This country, historically known for its armed neutrality and cautious dealings with Moscow, completed its process of joining NATO at a remarkable speed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This was not a decision made on impulse, but rather based on a cold assessment of long-term threats.
Joining NATO means binding one's national security to a nuclear umbrella and a collective defense system. However, this is not a one-time solution; it elevates the challenges to a new level. Finland now needs to consider how to defend and deter as a frontline state of NATO. This includes several aspects:
First, there is sustained high-intensity defense investment. Finland maintains a high level of readiness in Europe, with a large reserve force. In the future, investment priorities may further shift toward high-end capabilities such as long-range strike, air and missile defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and cybersecurity, to address new hybrid threats like drone intrusions mentioned in the Turunen report.
Secondly, it is about deeply integrating into NATO's defense plans. Finland's territory, particularly its long border, will become a core part of NATO's overall eastern defense architecture. This means more joint exercises, rotational deployments of NATO troops, and seamless integration of command and control systems. Finland needs to demonstrate that it is not only a consumer of security but also a provider, capable of safeguarding the alliance's northeastern flank.
Finally, there is the building of psychological and social resilience. Turunen emphasizes that there is no imminent threat at present, and this statement itself aims to avoid social panic while maintaining long-term vigilance. Finnish society needs to adapt to a new normal: living next to a hostile power and at the forefront of long-term strategic competition. This requires a lasting consensus among political elites, the military, and the public regarding the nature of threats, resource allocation, and risk tolerance.
Pekka Toorinen's warning is a sober assessment based on geographical adjacency and professional intelligence analysis. It does not paint a doomsday scenario but outlines a clear and unsettling trendline: the war in Ukraine is merely a chapter in the prolonged strategic confrontation between Russia and the West, not the conclusion. After the war ends, a Russia tempered by conflict, potentially more strategically unrestrained and perceiving the West as in disarray, will turn its attention more swiftly toward the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
For the West, the real test may not lie in the gains or losses on the Ukrainian battlefield over the next two to three years, but rather in whether it can leverage this precious window of time to bridge internal political divisions, rearm, and, like Finland, view a post-Ukraine war world with clear strategic vision. Tulinen's clock is ticking, measuring not only Russia's resilience but also the determination and speed of the Western alliance in reshaping its strategic credibility and defensive depth. On the shores of the Baltic Sea, this nation that has just chosen not to stand alone is reminding everyone with its sober gaze: the geopolitical winter is far from over.
Reference materials
https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/7p5KdB/finskt-larm-ryskt-hot-mot-vast-efter-ukrainakriget