From "Rojava" to "Damascus": Power Restructuring and Geopolitical Chess Behind the Syrian Ceasefire Agreement
21/01/2026
On the late night of January 18, 2026, the screen of Syrian state television froze on a historic moment. Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa signed a document in front of the camera, with the signature of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi beside it—though the latter was not present in person. This 14-point agreement marked the abrupt end of the intense conflict that had lasted nearly two weeks, and more significantly, signaled the conclusion of over a decade of semi-autonomous status in northeastern Syria.
According to the agreement, the Kurdish-led SDF will completely withdraw from the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, with its armed personnel being integrated into the Syrian national army and security forces as individuals rather than as a whole unit. Damascus will take full control of strategic assets such as border crossings, oil and gas fields, dams, as well as prisons holding thousands of Islamic State (IS) members and camps for displaced persons. In the words of Lara Nelson, policy director of the research institute Etana Syria, this appears to be the end of the SDF.
However, before the ink on the ceasefire agreement had even dried, new gunfire erupted in the suburbs of Raqqa near the IS prison. The Kurdish side warned that this is an extremely dangerous development. The gap between the agreement and reality reveals that behind this seemingly sudden reconciliation lies a complex chess game that has been brewing for a long time, involving multiple forces.
The End of a Decade of Autonomy: From the "Rojava" Experiment to the Consolidation of Power
The rise and fall of the Syrian Democratic Forces is itself a microcosm of Middle Eastern geopolitical history. In 2015, with the support of the United States, the SDF was established with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) as its core, becoming the most effective ground force in the fight against the Islamic State. By March 2019, when the last stronghold of IS was completely defeated, the SDF controlled nearly one-quarter of Syria's territory, establishing an autonomous administration known as Rojava (Western Kurdistan) in the northeast, with independent political governance, an education system, and legal frameworks.
Kurds account for approximately 10% of Syria's pre-war population of 23 million. Over a decade of autonomous practice once gave many Kurds hope for gaining cultural rights and a certain degree of autonomy within the framework of a unified state. However, this hope has always been accompanied by a fundamental contradiction: the central government in Damascus, whether the former Assad regime or the Shara'a interim government that came to power in December 2024, has never truly accepted the possibility of national division.
In March 2025, the SDF and the Syrian government reached a preliminary agreement, agreeing to integrate into the Syrian army by the end of the year. However, negotiations stalled over key details: the SDF sought to merge as an independent unit, preserving its identity and command structure, while Damascus insisted that armed personnel be integrated individually and dispersed. Meanwhile, both sides accused each other of violating the temporary ceasefire, with escalating tensions in areas such as Aleppo.
The real turning point occurred in early January 2026. The government forces launched an offensive in Aleppo, citing the SDF's failure to withdraw to the east bank of the Euphrates River as agreed, and it quickly spread eastward. On January 17, government forces captured the Tabqa Military Airbase; the following day, they took control of the strategically significant Euphrates Dam and two oil fields. In the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, predominantly inhabited by Arab tribes, local armed forces defected to the government side, causing the SDF's defensive lines to rapidly collapse. By the evening of January 18, government forces entered the city of Raqqa without bloodshed. Local residents waved Syrian flags, set off fireworks in celebration, and chanted, "Today, everyone is reborn."
SDF was forced to retreat to its final stronghold—Hasakah Governorate, where the Kurdish population is the majority. The military collapse caused it to lose its most important bargaining chip at the negotiating table. The final agreement was almost entirely scripted according to Damascus's playbook: SDF not only had to withdraw from provinces with an Arab-majority population, but its armed and political entities would also be completely dismantled and integrated into the state apparatus.
The Role Shift of the United States: From Kurdish Ally to Integration Facilitator
In this power restructuring, the most notable role is played by the United States. Over the past decade, the U.S. has been the most important ally and supporter of the SDF, providing training, weapons, and air support to jointly combat IS. This relationship has also been a source of friction between Ankara and Washington, as Turkey views the YPG as a branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization in Turkey.
However, with the military collapse of IS and the reshaping of Syria's political landscape, the United States' strategic considerations appear to have undergone a subtle yet profound shift. Following the downfall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the new government led by former opposition leader Shala'a swiftly moved closer to Washington, even being formally invited to join the U.S.-led international coalition against IS that same month. This move has been widely interpreted as the United States recalibrating its partnerships in Syria.
The figure of U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barak was present throughout the entire negotiation process. On January 17, he met with SDF commander Abdi in Erbil, Iraq; the following day, he held talks with President Sharaa in Damascus. After the announcement of the agreement, Barak described it as a critical turning point on social media, noting that former adversaries had chosen cooperation over division. He clearly stated that the greatest opportunity for the Kurds today lies in full integration into the Syrian state and emphasized that the United States does not support any separatist or federalist projects.
Analysis shows that Washington's shift in stance is based on multiple practical considerations. First, continuing to support a Kurdish entity that confronts the central government could plunge Syria into permanent division, which is detrimental to regional stability and may also hinder post-war reconstruction and the inflow of international aid. Second, managing IS prisoners and camps has become an increasingly heavy burden and security risk, and a unified Syrian government is better positioned (at least in theory) to take on this responsibility. Finally, cooperating with a government that effectively controls most of the country's territory aligns with the United States' long-term interests in counterterrorism and containing Iran's influence.
SDF clearly sensed this shift. In his video statement following the signing of the agreement, Abdi's tone revealed a sense of helplessness and pragmatism: To prevent this war from leading to a new civil war, we agreed to withdraw from the Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa regions to Hasakah. Kurdish doctor Golan Ibrahim expressed the widespread ambivalence in Qamishli, the capital of Hasakah province: The Kurds have become victims of international agreements and international deception... But as for this agreement, the positive side is that the fighting between Arabs and Kurds in the region has ended.
Unexploded Bombs: Prisoners, Tribal Conflicts, and Fragile Peace
Although the agreement has been signed, peace in northeastern Syria is far from stable. The most urgent danger stems from the prisons holding approximately 9,000 IS members, as well as the Al-Hol and Roj camps, which house tens of thousands of individuals associated with IS, mostly women and children. For years, these facilities have been guarded by the SDF under extremely difficult conditions.
According to the agreement, the management rights of prisons and camps will be transferred to the Damascus government, which will be fully responsible for their legal and security affairs. However, the handover process is fraught with risks. On January 18, shortly after the ceasefire was announced, the SDF reported that militants were attacking the Shaddadi prison, which holds thousands of IS members. Later, it stated that its fighters had repelled several attacks, but the prison had fallen out of its control. Unconfirmed reports indicate that approximately 200 prisoners have been released in Raqqa and Tabqa.
This risk is exacerbated by President Salar's personal historical background. Salar once led the opposition armed group Liberation of Sham Front (HTS), whose predecessor, the Nusra Front, was regarded as al-Qaeda's branch in Syria a decade ago. Although Salar later broke ties with al-Qaeda, many religious and ethnic minorities in Syria, including the Kurds, remain skeptical of him. Handing over IS prisoners to a country led by a former jihadist has raised profound concerns about the potential resurgence of extremism.
Another factor of instability is the deeply rooted tribal conflicts. In Arab provinces such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, many tribes have long been dissatisfied with the Kurdish-led SDF administration. The rapid advance of the government forces was largely attributed to the armed support from local Arab tribes. After the agreement, Hisham Bashir, the chief of the Begara tribe, declared, "It is our duty to see Syria unified. We were once allies of the SDF because the Assad regime was the only option. Now there is an alternative."
However, the cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation has begun to show signs. On January 18, reports emerged that the SDF carried out killings targeting Arabs in Hasakah Governorate, with estimated casualties ranging between 20 and 200, possibly including members of the Begara tribe. Sheikh Bashir warned that if such actions continue, it could provoke a response. In Qamishli, thousands of Kurdish families who fled their homes during the government forces' offensive are crowded into temporary shelters, filled with uncertainty and fear about the future.
The Future of Syria: Challenges Beneath the Surface of Unity and the Test of Governance in the Sharaa Era
For Ahmed Sharaa and his interim government, this agreement undoubtedly represents a significant political and military victory. Just over a year after overthrowing Assad, Sharaa has successfully brought the last armed group not under central government control under his command, at least formally restoring the state's sovereignty over almost all territory. He has gained control over the lifeline of the national economy—the oil and gas fields and agricultural resources in the northeast—which is crucial for the survival of his regime and post-war reconstruction.
To appease the Kurds, two days before signing the ceasefire agreement, Shalaa issued a presidential decree recognizing Kurdish as an official national language alongside Arabic and designating the Kurdish New Year, Nowruz, as a national holiday. This marks the first official recognition of Kurdish national rights since Syria's independence in 1946. In his televised address, he called on the Kurds to actively participate in national construction.
However, whether these concessions can secure the genuine allegiance of the Kurds remains uncertain. Although the agreement allows the SDF to nominate some military and civilian officials for senior positions in the central government and stipulates that the governor of Hasakah Province must be appointed through consensus, the political and military framework of the Kurdish autonomous administration has been dismantled. The militia organization, which the Kurds had hoped to retain as an independent unit, was not accepted by Shala'a. Syrian Ambassador to the United Nations Ibrahim Orabi stated that now is the time for Syrians to demonstrate their ability to set aside differences and move forward... This is a victory for Syria. Yet, the taste of victory is bound to differ significantly among different ethnic groups.
The greater challenge lies in governance. After nearly 15 years of civil war, Syria's infrastructure is shattered, its economy is in decline, and deep social and sectarian divisions persist among ethnic and religious groups. In March 2025, when government forces entered provinces inhabited by minority groups such as the Alawites and Druze, deadly sectarian conflicts erupted, resulting in the deaths of nearly 1,500 Alawites and hundreds of Druze. How to establish inclusive governance in such a divided nation and prevent new violence from erupting in the northeast due to the transfer of power presents the ultimate test of Sharaa's political wisdom and nation-building capabilities.
From a broader geopolitical perspective, Syria is struggling to gradually transition from a stage of multi-party proxy warfare toward a sovereign state with a single power center. Turkey welcomed the agreement, emphasizing the importance of Syria's unity, integration, and solidarity. Allies from the Assad era, such as Russia and Iran, are observing from the sidelines. The United States appears to have placed its bets on Shala'a, hoping he can become a partner capable of stabilizing the situation, cooperating in counterterrorism, and potentially balancing Iran's influence to some extent.
The ceasefire and integration agreement of January 2026 is not the end of the story, but the beginning of a new chapter fraught with risks. It marks the end of an era—the chaotic period defined by the Kurdish Rojava experiment, U.S. military presence, and localized armed factions. However, what it ushers in is a long and uncertain process of rebuilding a nation, healing societal divisions, and preventing a descent back into the abyss on the ruins of a Syria that is unified in form yet deeply scarred. Fireworks light up the night sky over Raqqa, celebrating the temporary departure of war, but the path ahead remains shrouded in mist.
Reference materials
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