The Gaza Peace Plan Enters Deep Waters: The Gulf Between U.S. "Phase Two" Ambitions and Reality

15/01/2026

On [Date], U.S. President Trump's special envoy for Gaza, Steve Witkoff, posted a brief statement on social media announcing the official entry of his "Point Peace Plan" into its second phase. The statement outlined a blueprint for transitioning from a ceasefire to governance: establishing a technocratic transitional government, launching comprehensive demilitarization, and initiating large-scale reconstruction. However, this seemingly milestone announcement, like a stone thrown into a calm lake, stirred not celebratory ripples but deep-seated doubts about the plan's feasibility, geopolitical realities, and historical burdens. The future of Gaza now hangs in the balance, poised on the threshold of a "second phase" designed under U.S. leadership yet fraught with unknowns and contradictions.

From "Ceasefire" to "Governance": A Fragile Turning Point

The ceasefire agreement that took effect on [Year Month Day] is itself a fragile miracle. After more than two years of bloody conflict, which claimed the lives of over [number] Palestinians and approximately [number] Israelis, the warring parties reached the first-phase agreement through mediation by Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, centered on the exchange of detainees and a partial withdrawal of troops. However, this phase, which [Name] described as "providing historic humanitarian assistance and maintaining the ceasefire," has never been truly stable since its inception.

According to records from the Government Media Office in the Gaza Strip, since last month, Israeli forces have violated the ceasefire agreement more than times, resulting in the deaths of over Palestinians and creating significant obstacles to the entry of critical humanitarian aid. Although the Israeli military has withdrawn to the so-called "yellow ceasefire line," it still controls approximately half of Gaza's territory, and the bombing has not completely ceased. On the other hand, while Hamas has returned all survivors and most of the remains of the deceased, the body of the last Israeli casualty—year-old police officer Langevili—has yet to be recovered, becoming a sharp thorn obstructing the implementation of the agreement. The Israeli Hostages and Missing Persons Families Forum has urgently appealed: "Without Gevili's return, there will be no second phase."

It is precisely against this backdrop that the U.S. unilateral announcement of entering the second stage appears more like a political attempt to create a "fait accompli" rather than a natural, seamless transition. In Vitkov's statement, a clear warning was issued to Hamas, demanding it "fully fulfill its obligations, including the immediate return of the final deceased hostage," otherwise it would face "serious consequences." This ultimatum-like tone casts a shadow over the already complex demilitarization negotiations. Analysis indicates that this U.S. move aims to maintain the momentum of the negotiations, preventing the process from completely stalling due to individual unresolved issues (such as the return of remains), while simultaneously demonstrating the "capacity for action" of the Trump administration in Middle East diplomacy to both domestic and international audiences.

"Technocratic Committee": A Blend of Old Faces and New Challenges

One of the core frameworks in the second phase is the so-called "Gaza Management National Committee" (). This is a transitional administrative body composed of Palestinian technocrats, aimed at taking over daily civil administrative functions from Hamas. According to an announcement by Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati, all parties have reached a consensus on the committee's member list. The committee will be led by Ali Shas, a senior official who previously served as Deputy Minister of Planning in the Palestinian National Authority.

The composition of the committee members is thought-provoking. They were deliberately portrayed as "apolitical" technical experts, yet many of them are believed to have ties to the Fatah party. For instance, individuals such as Shaath, who was nominated as the committee chair, and Ayeed Abu Ramadan, the president of the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, both carry backgrounds associated with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. This arrangement is clearly intended to align with the long-standing Israeli and American vision of "excluding Hamas and introducing forces linked to Fatah," in an attempt to pave the way for transferring governance of Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority in the future. The Palestinian Presidential Office also issued a statement in support of the committee, stating that it "reflects the position of Fatah."

However, the power and independence of this committee have been subject to multiple constraints from the very beginning. First, it is not a fully sovereign government, and its work will be overseen by a "Peace Committee" chaired personally by Trump. The primary on-the-ground representative of the "Peace Committee" is the former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the seasoned Bulgarian diplomat Nikolay Mladenov. This means that the daily governance of Gaza will be placed under a complex international oversight framework, and the decision-making space for local technocrats may be quite limited.

Secondly, whether the committee can smoothly "take up its post" and carry out its work depends on unresolved security issues. The Israeli military still controls large areas, and Hamas's influence remains deeply entrenched in the regions it governs. Although Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions have issued a joint statement pledging to "support efforts to form a technocratic committee" and "provide a suitable environment for its work," achieving a smooth transfer of power in practice and avoiding violent conflict will be a significant challenge. In an interview, Shaath himself set the priorities as providing emergency relief and housing for displaced persons, and proposed an ambitious plan for clearing debris. However, all these plans are contingent on the assurance of security and funding, both of which remain uncertain at present.

"Demilitarization": The Greatest Wishful Thinking in the Plan?

Among all the Phase II objectives, "comprehensive demilitarization, primarily the disarmament of all unauthorized personnel" is undoubtedly the most critical and also the most unrealistic element. This directly touches the very foundation of Hamas's existence. Witkow's statement places "demilitarization" alongside "reconstruction," but it is clear to anyone with insight that the former is an absolute prerequisite for the latter. The Israeli government has explicitly stated that it will not consider large-scale troop withdrawals or initiate comprehensive reconstruction without achieving the disarmament of Hamas.

However, Hamas's stance is equally resolute and consistent: Only after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state will they consider laying down their arms. This fundamental divergence in positions cannot be easily bridged through technical negotiations or external pressure. A person familiar with Gaza planning admitted, "Both Israel and Hamas want to buy time and maintain the status quo." For Hamas, armed force is its final capital to counter Israel, maintain internal control, and regional influence. For the Netanyahu government in Israel, a completely demilitarized Gaza is a necessary conclusion for its security narrative and a political bottom line to present to its domestic right-wing camp.

The negotiation approach disclosed by U.S. officials is: discussing demilitarization with Hamas and exploring "what kind of amnesty plan could be offered if Hamas takes such steps" with Israel. This concept sounds like a transaction, but its feasibility is extremely low. Could an amnesty plan attract enough mid- and lower-level members of Hamas? Would Israeli society accept granting amnesty to armed individuals who have attacked its citizens? More importantly, would the Hamas leadership abandon the military pillar of the entire organization for uncertain political prospects and partial amnesty for some members? Historical experience shows that forcing a deeply rooted resistance organization to completely disarm through external pressure has a minimal chance of success, with Lebanon's Hezbollah serving as a cautionary example.

Furthermore, the formation of the "International Stabilization Force" mentioned in the plan also faces an uncertain future. The size, composition, authorization rules (especially regarding the use of force), command structure, and how it will interact with the remaining Hamas armed forces or any potential future Palestinian security forces are all unresolved challenges. Western and Muslim countries generally hold cautious or even resistant attitudes toward deploying peacekeeping forces to a region that remains under semi-occupation and has active armed factions.

"David Kempinski Hotel" and "Sunrise Project": An Elite Design Detached from Reality?

A closer look at the core team driving this complex plan may help explain why it is imbued with such a strong sense of idealism. According to multiple sources, the actual planning work was not led by traditional diplomatic or military institutions but revolved around a tight-knit circle. This circle was centered around Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and a key architect of Middle East policy, and included members such as envoy Steve Witkoff and senior envoy to Israel Aryeh Lightstone. It also worked closely with a group of unofficial advisors around Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, including venture capitalist Michael Eisenberg and tech entrepreneur Leland Tankman, among others.

This team, composed of diplomats, businesspeople, and informal advisors, operates from the luxurious David Kempinski Hotel on the Mediterranean coast in Tel Aviv, Israel, rather than from traditional government offices. An Israeli official remarked with a hint of sarcasm, "The Civilian-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) is just for show... the real work gets done at the Kempinski Hotel." This working style reflects an unconventional approach to governance during Trump's second term: policies are driven by private entrepreneurs employing tech industry methodologies and "unofficial official" envoys.

This backdrop gave rise to the grand vision known as the "Sunrise Plan"—a multi-page, multi-billion-dollar blueprint aimed at transforming Gaza into a futuristic, AI-driven luxury enclave within a decade. First disclosed by The Wall Street Journal, the plan’s imagination is astonishing, yet it stands in stark contrast to Gaza’s current devastated reality, where over % of buildings lie in ruins and people are sheltering in tents. One individual involved in Gaza affairs pointedly remarked, "They are focused on the 'Sunrise Plan' and then working backwards, but there is nothing in between that can bridge the gap from Gaza’s current state to that blueprint." Another regional diplomat offered an even more biting assessment: "The people who designed the 'Sunrise' plan 'think the sun rises because they woke up.'"

The team's track record has also heightened external concerns. Several U.S. and Israeli officials among them were deeply involved in last year's operation of the "Gaza Humanitarian Foundation" (). This private aid distribution initiative was originally intended to weaken Hamas's economic control over Gaza but ultimately became mired in chaos and violence. According to health officials in Hamas-controlled areas, hundreds of Palestinians were shot dead by Israeli forces while on their way to distribution points. Despite claims of distributing 100 million free meals, its effectiveness and moral costs remain highly controversial. Now, the same individuals are turning to design the post-war transition for the entire Gaza Strip, raising inevitable concerns about their approach and execution capabilities.

The Path Ahead: The "Only Game" Trudging Through the Mud

Despite facing numerous doubts, a harsh reality remains: for now, this plan by the Trump administration is "the only game in town." As that regional diplomat said: "You can call it a bad plan or an insufficient plan, but unless someone has a better idea, this is what will happen." Regional mediators such as Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, have shown a cooperative attitude because they are also eager to break the deadlock and prevent Gaza from descending into complete collapse and humanitarian disaster.

Funding is another major obstacle. Reconstructing Gaza may require hundreds of billions of dollars, while the funds currently raised amount to only about one billion dollars. U.S. officials hope to leverage this month's World Economic Forum in Davos to secure financial and political support. Meanwhile, Israel's restrictions on the entry of aid supplies remain in place, and its decision this month to ban over thirty nonprofit organizations from operating in Gaza has further increased the risks associated with aid distribution.

For the United States, the real test lies in whether Washington is willing and able to exert substantive pressure on its close ally Israel when the Netanyahu government, driven by domestic political needs, refuses to make concessions on the issue of demilitarization, or when Hamas firmly insists on maintaining its armed forces. Some analysts believe that both sides of the conflict may be content to see the "second phase" stagnate, as this could alleviate the pressure on them to make genuine concessions.

The "second phase" in Gaza has already set sail, yet it resembles more of a voyage into uncharted waters. On board, there is a map depicting a utopian island, but whether the captain and crew truly have control over the hidden reefs, storms, and the deep-seated animosity among the passengers remains a significant question. The success of the peace plan ultimately does not depend on grandiose declarations on social media, nor on future blueprints drawn in luxurious hotels. Instead, it hinges on the ability to confront the harsh realities of politics and security, and to carve out a credible path toward normalcy for desperate people amid the ruins. This path, for now, remains shrouded in thick fog.

Reference materials

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