Gaza Peace Plan Enters Deep Waters: The Gulf Between U.S. "Phase Two" Ambitions and Reality

On January 14, 2026, Steve Witkoff, the U.S. President Trump's special envoy for Gaza, posted a brief statement on social media announcing that his 20-point peace plan has officially entered its second phase. The statement outlined a blueprint for transitioning from a ceasefire to governance: establishing a technocratic transitional government, launching comprehensive demilitarization, and initiating large-scale reconstruction. However, this seemingly milestone announcement, like a stone thrown into a calm lake, stirred not celebratory ripples but deep-seated doubts about the plan's feasibility, geopolitical realities, and historical burdens. The future of Gaza now hangs in the balance at the threshold of a U.S.-designed yet uncertain and contradictory second phase.

From "Ceasefire" to "Governance": A Fragile Turning Point

The ceasefire agreement effective on October 10, 2025, is itself a fragile miracle. After more than two years of bloody conflict, resulting in the deaths of over 71,000 Palestinians and approximately 1,200 Israelis, the warring parties reached the first-phase agreement mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, centered on the exchange of detainees and partial troop withdrawals. However, this phase, which Vitkov described as providing historic humanitarian aid and maintaining the ceasefire, has never been truly stable since its inception.

Records from the Gaza Strip Government Media Office indicate that since last October, the Israeli side has violated the ceasefire agreement more than 1,190 times, resulting in the deaths of over 450 Palestinians and creating significant obstacles to the entry of critical humanitarian aid. Although the Israeli military has withdrawn to the so-called yellow ceasefire line, it still controls approximately half of Gaza's territory, and the bombing has not completely ceased. On the other hand, while Hamas has returned all survivors and the majority of the deceased's remains, the body of the last Israeli victim—24-year-old police officer Ran Gvili—has yet to be found, becoming a sharp thorn obstructing the implementation of the agreement. The Israeli Hostage and Missing Persons Families Forum urgently appeals: without Gvili's return, there will be no second phase.

Against this backdrop, the United States' unilateral announcement of entering the second stage appears more like a political fait accompli rather than a natural and seamless transition. In Vitkov's statement, a clear warning was issued to Hamas, demanding full compliance with obligations, including the immediate return of the last deceased hostage, or else face severe consequences. This ultimatum-like tone casts a shadow over the already complex demilitarization negotiations. Analysis indicates that this move by the U.S. aims to maintain the momentum of negotiations, prevent the process from completely stalling due to unresolved individual issues (such as the return of remains), while simultaneously demonstrating the Trump administration's diplomatic capabilities in the Middle East both internally and externally.

"Technocratic Committee": A Blend of Old Faces and New Challenges

One of the core architectures in the second phase is the so-called National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). This is a transitional administrative body composed of 15 Palestinian technocrats, designed to take over daily civil management functions from Hamas. According to the announcement by Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelati, all parties have reached a consensus on the list of committee members. Leading the committee will be Ali Shas, a senior official who previously served as Deputy Minister of Planning in the Palestinian National Authority.

The composition of the committee members is thought-provoking. They are deliberately portrayed as apolitical technical experts, yet many of them are believed to have ties to the Fatah party. For instance, those nominated as the committee chairman, Shaath, and the chairman of the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, Ayeed Abu Ramadan, among others, all carry backgrounds associated with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. This arrangement is clearly intended to align with the long-standing vision of Israel and the United States to exclude Hamas and introduce forces linked to Fatah, attempting to pave the way for the future transfer of Gaza's governance to a reformed Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Presidency has also issued a statement supporting the committee, stating that it reflects Fatah's stance.

However, the power and independence of this committee were constrained by multiple factors from the very beginning. First, it is not a fully sovereign government, and its work will be overseen by a Peace Commission chaired personally by Trump. The primary on-the-ground representative of the Peace Commission is Nikolay Mladenov, the former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and a senior Bulgarian diplomat. This means that the daily governance of Gaza will operate within a complex international oversight framework, leaving limited decision-making space for local technocrats.

Secondly, the committee's ability to smoothly enter and operate depends on unresolved security issues. The Israeli military still controls large areas, and Hamas's influence remains deeply entrenched in the regions under its control. Although Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions issued a joint statement pledging support for the efforts to establish a technocratic committee and to provide a suitable environment for its work, achieving a smooth transfer of power in practice and avoiding violent conflicts will be a significant challenge. In an interview, Sha'ath himself prioritized providing emergency relief and housing for displaced persons, and proposed an ambitious plan for clearing debris. However, all these plans are based on the assurance of security and funding, both of which remain uncertain at present.

"Demilitarization": The Greatest Wishful Thinking in the Plan?

Among all the Phase 2 objectives, comprehensive demilitarization—primarily disarming all unauthorized personnel—is undoubtedly the most critical, yet also the most unrealistic aspect. This directly strikes at the very foundation of Hamas's existence. Witkov's statement places demilitarization alongside reconstruction, but it is clear to any discerning observer that the former is an absolute prerequisite for the latter. The Israeli government has explicitly stated that without achieving the disarmament of Hamas, it will not consider large-scale troop withdrawals or initiate comprehensive reconstruction.

However, Hamas's stance is equally resolute and consistent: they will only consider laying down their arms after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This fundamental divergence in positions cannot be easily bridged through technical negotiations or external pressure. A person familiar with Gaza planning admitted: both Israel and Hamas are seeking to buy time and maintain the status quo. For Hamas, its armed forces represent the last remaining asset to counter Israel, maintain internal control, and exert regional influence. For the Israeli government under Netanyahu, a fully demilitarized Gaza is a necessary outcome for its security narrative and a political bottom line to present to the domestic right-wing camp.

The negotiation approach disclosed by U.S. officials is as follows: discuss demilitarization with Hamas, and with Israel, discuss what kind of amnesty plan could be offered if Hamas does so. This idea sounds like a transaction, but its feasibility is extremely low. Can the amnesty plan attract enough mid- and lower-level members of Hamas? Can Israeli society accept granting amnesty to armed individuals who have attacked its own citizens? More importantly, would the Hamas leadership abandon the military pillar of the entire organization for uncertain political prospects and amnesty for some of its members? Historical experience shows that forcing a deeply rooted resistance organization to completely disarm through external pressure has a minimal chance of success, with Lebanon's Hezbollah serving as a cautionary example.

Additionally, the formation of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) mentioned in the plan also faces an uncertain future. The size, composition, rules of engagement (especially regarding the use of force), command structure, and how it will interact with remaining Hamas armed forces or potential future Palestinian security forces are all unresolved challenges. Western and Muslim countries generally hold cautious or even resistant attitudes toward deploying peacekeeping forces to a region that remains semi-occupied and has active armed factions.

"David Kempinski Hotel" and "Sunrise Project": An Elite Design Detached from Reality?

A closer look at the core team driving this complex plan may help explain why it is imbued with such a strong sense of idealism. According to multiple sources, the actual planning work was not led by traditional diplomatic or military institutions but revolved around a tight-knit circle. This circle was centered around Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and a key architect of Middle East policy, and included members such as envoy Steve Witkoff and senior envoy to Israel Aryeh Lightstone. It also worked closely with a group of unofficial advisors around Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, including venture capitalist Michael Eisenberg and tech entrepreneur Leland Tankman, among others.

This team, composed of diplomats, businesspeople, and informal advisors, operates from the luxurious David Kempinski Hotel on the Mediterranean coast in Tel Aviv, Israel, rather than from traditional government offices. An Israeli official remarked with a hint of sarcasm: the Civilian-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) is merely for show... the real work gets done at the Kempinski Hotel. This working style reflects an unconventional approach to governance during Trump's second term: policies are driven by private entrepreneurs employing tech industry methodologies and unofficial official envoys.

This backdrop gave rise to an ambitious vision known as the Sunrise Plan—a 32-page, $112 billion proposal aimed at transforming Gaza into an AI-driven, futuristic luxury enclave within a decade. First disclosed by The Wall Street Journal, the plan’s imagination is astonishing, yet it stands in stark contrast to Gaza’s current devastated reality, where over 80% of buildings are destroyed and people are living in tents. A person involved in Gaza affairs pointedly remarked: "They focus on the 'Sunrise Plan' and then work backward, but there is nothing in between that can bridge the gap from Gaza’s current state to that blueprint." Another regional diplomat offered an even sharper critique: "The people who designed the 'Sunrise' plan 'think the sun rises because they woke up.'"

The team's past track record has also raised external concerns. Several of the U.S. and Israeli officials were deeply involved in the Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF) that operated last year. This private aid distribution initiative was intended to weaken Hamas's economic control over Gaza but ultimately became mired in chaos and violence. According to health officials in Hamas-controlled areas, hundreds of Palestinians were shot dead by Israeli forces while heading to GHF distribution points. Although GHF claimed to have distributed 187 million free meals, its effectiveness and ethical costs remain highly controversial. Now, the same individuals are shifting their focus to designing the post-war transition for the entire Gaza Strip, raising inevitable concerns about their approach and execution capabilities.

The Path Ahead: The "Only Game" Trudging Through the Mud

Despite facing numerous doubts, a harsh reality remains: for now, the Trump administration's plan is the only game in town. As the regional diplomat said: You can call it a bad plan or an inadequate plan, but unless someone has a better idea, this is what will happen. Regional mediators such as Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, have shown a cooperative attitude because they are also eager to break the deadlock and prevent Gaza from descending into complete collapse and humanitarian disaster.

Funding is another major obstacle. Reconstructing Gaza may require hundreds of billions of dollars, while the funds currently raised amount to only about one billion dollars. U.S. officials hope to leverage this month's World Economic Forum in Davos to secure financial and political support. Meanwhile, Israel's restrictions on the entry of aid supplies remain in place, and its decision this month to ban over thirty nonprofit organizations from operating in Gaza has further increased the risks associated with aid distribution.

For the United States, the real test lies in whether Washington is willing and capable of exerting substantive pressure on its close ally Israel when the Netanyahu government, driven by domestic political needs, refuses to make concessions on demilitarization, or when Hamas firmly insists on maintaining its armed forces. Some analysts believe that both sides of the conflict may be content to see the second phase stall, as this could alleviate the pressure on them to make genuine concessions.

The second phase in Gaza has already set sail, yet it resembles more of a voyage into uncharted waters. On board, there is a map depicting a utopian island, but whether the captain and crew truly have control over the hidden reefs, storms, and the deep-seated animosity among the passengers remains a significant question. The success of the peace plan ultimately does not depend on grandiose declarations on social media, nor on future blueprints drawn in luxury hotels. Instead, it hinges on the ability to confront the harsh realities of politics and security, and to carve out a credible path toward normal life for those in despair amidst the ruins. This path, for now, remains shrouded in thick fog.