Israel issued a unilateral strike warning to Iran: The strategic balance in the Middle East is approaching a critical point.

On February 9, Israel's *Jerusalem Post* cited multiple security sources revealing that Israeli defense officials have formally notified the U.S. Pentagon in the past week: if Iran crosses the red line in its ballistic missile program, Israel is prepared to launch a military strike on Iran's missile production facilities independently, without U.S. involvement. This warning occurred just before Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's planned emergency visit to the United States on February 11 to meet with U.S. President Trump, directly relating to the precarious nuclear negotiation process between the U.S. and Iran.

The specific content of the warning and the strategic context.

According to disclosed information, representatives of the Israel Defense Forces presented multiple strike plans targeting Iran's primary missile production facilities to the United States. A senior Israeli military official, who wished to remain anonymous, described the current moment as a historic opportunity, believing that a significant strike on Iran's missile infrastructure at this time could effectively eliminate the immediate threat to Israel and its neighboring countries. A source quoted an Israeli military official as saying: We told the Americans that if Iran crosses the red line we have set on ballistic missiles, we will carry out the strike alone.

The specific parameters of this red line have not been publicly disclosed, but analysis generally points to the development level of Iran's ballistic missiles in terms of range, accuracy, quantity, and nuclear weapons delivery capability. Israeli security agencies assess that the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile program to its survival is no less than that of Iran's nuclear program itself. Iran currently possesses the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, including the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, with a range of approximately 2,000 kilometers, capable of covering the entire territory of Israel; as well as more advanced solid-fuel missiles such as the Sejjil and the Khorramshahr missile. The Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is responsible for the research, development, and deployment of these missiles.

This warning is not an isolated incident. It occurred following the 12-day direct conflict between Israel and Iran in June 2025. At that time, Iran launched dozens of ballistic missiles and drones from its own territory toward Israel in retaliation for Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria. Some of the missiles penetrated Israel's Arrow-3 and Iron Dome defense systems, causing material damage and psychological impact. This conflict further convinced the Israeli decision-making echelon that it is essential to fundamentally degrade Iran's long-range strike capabilities, rather than relying solely on defense.

Israel's Deep-Seated Anxiety and the Strategic Divergence Between the U.S. and Israel

Israel's high-profile warning of unilateral action this time reflects a deep distrust in strategic coordination with the United States. Several Israeli officials have expressed their concerns to the media: even if the U.S. decides to take military action against Iran, it may only conduct limited and symbolic strikes. An Israeli military source stated bluntly: We are concerned that Washington might choose a few targets, declare success, and then leave Israel to deal with the aftermath, just as they did with the Houthis in Yemen. This refers to the limited U.S. airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen in recent years, which have failed to prevent the Houthis from continuously acquiring missiles and drones provided by Iran and carrying out cross-border attacks.

This concern directly points to the decision-making style of U.S. President Trump. In January, the Trump administration deployed a strike group led by the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier to the Middle East as a deterrent against Iran, publicly calling on Iran to reach a new nuclear agreement or face a stronger attack than in the summer of 2025. However, Trump is also known for preferring to demonstrate force rather than becoming entangled in prolonged wars. Israel worries that the U.S. might be satisfied with a surgical strike to showcase resolve, which would not substantially destroy Iran's dispersed and deeply buried missile production network (such as related facilities in Shiraz, Isfahan, Parchin, etc.), but would instead trigger a full-scale retaliation from Iran against Israel.

Deeper disagreements lie in the negotiation agenda. On February 6, the United States and Iran held talks mediated by Oman, agreeing to continue consultations, but key differences remain unresolved. Iran explicitly refused to include its ballistic missile program in the negotiations, describing it as a defensive issue. Meanwhile, Israel insists that any agreement with Iran must include strict restrictions on its missile program. When announcing his visit to the United States, Netanyahu's office specifically emphasized that any negotiations must include limitations on Iran's ballistic missiles. Israel believes that allowing Iran to retain a powerful conventional missile capability is tantamount to tacitly accepting its ability to maintain a balance of terror against Israel, which is not fundamentally different from allowing Iran to possess nuclear weapons in terms of strategic effect.

The possibility of military operations and complex challenges.

From a purely military perspective, Israel possesses the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against targets within Iran. The F-35I Adir stealth fighters operated by the Israeli Air Force can theoretically penetrate Iran's air defense network, and with aerial refueling support, their range is sufficient to cover most of Iran's territory. Israel also possesses advanced Rampage supersonic air-to-ground missiles and the Spice series of precision-guided bombs. Additionally, Israel's Jericho series of ballistic missiles and the rumored long-range cruise missiles provide another strike option.

However, the challenges of unilateral action are immense. Firstly, the strike would need to traverse the airspace of multiple countries, primarily Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, involving complex diplomatic and military coordination and potentially even sparking conflicts with transit nations. Secondly, Iran's missile facilities are widely dispersed, with many key production workshops and R&D centers located deep within underground bunkers, such as potential missile component factories near the Fordo uranium enrichment facility and the Natanz nuclear site. Achieving the goal of substantially degrading these capabilities would require large-scale, multi-wave sustained airstrikes, far exceeding the scale of the Israeli Air Force's conventional cross-border strikes (such as the hundreds of airstrikes on targets within Syria).

Third, Iran is bound to retaliate. Means of retaliation include: launching ballistic missiles and drones from its own territory; firing tens of thousands of rockets from the north into Israel via Hezbollah in Lebanon; attacking Israeli or U.S. targets through its proxy forces in Syria and Iraq; and launching asymmetric attacks in cyberspace and at sea. The 2025 conflict has already demonstrated Iran's willingness and capability to strike directly at Israel's homeland. A full-scale confrontation could drag the entire Middle East into war and severely impact the global energy market.

It is noteworthy that in this communication, Israel was represented by the newly appointed commander of the Israeli Air Force, Brigadier General Omer Tishler, who accompanied Netanyahu on his visit to the United States. This is because the position of Israel's military attaché to the United States is currently vacant—the Israeli Defense Minister has not yet approved a candidate for the position for unknown reasons. The unconventional nature of this personnel arrangement also suggests a high level of involvement and urgency on the part of the Israeli military in this matter.

The Chain Reaction and Future Direction of Regional Security Landscape

Israel's warnings are reshaping the security calculus in the Middle East. Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while engaging in implicit cooperation with Israel in countering Iran, are extremely cautious about a war that could ignite a regional conflagration and provoke Iranian attacks on their oil facilities. They prefer the United States to take the lead. European powers, on the other hand, fear that any unilateral military action would completely undermine the already fragile nuclear diplomacy and trigger a new wave of refugee crises and terrorism risks.

For Iran, this is a stress test of its strategic patience policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei has consistently maintained that the development of missile capabilities is a non-negotiable red line. In the face of threats from Israel, Iran may adopt a dual-track strategy: on one hand, accelerating the dispersal and concealment of critical missile technologies and components; on the other hand, increasing the activities of proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to raise Israel's security costs and signal to the United States the risk of the situation spiraling out of control.

The key milestone in the coming weeks lies in the Netanyahu-Trump meeting on February 11. How will Trump strike a balance between reassuring his closest Middle Eastern ally and avoiding entanglement in another Middle East war? Will he authorize a broader U.S. military strike plan to address Israel's concerns, or insist on a limited deterrence strategy? Another focal point is the military dynamics in the Persian Gulf. Any close-range friction between the U.S. Navy's Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, along with its accompanying B-52 strategic bomber task force, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy near the Strait of Hormuz could become a trigger for miscalculation.

The Middle East stands on a familiar precipice: the risks of deterrence, brinkmanship, and miscalculation have never been higher. Israel's warning is not a new strategy, but it has been given unprecedented urgency in a new context—one where the United States may prefer negotiation over confrontation, Iran is closer to the nuclear threshold, and regional nations have reached their limits of endurance. Historical experience shows that when one side publicly draws a red line, the probability of conflict silently rises. This time, the world needs to focus not on whether conflict will erupt, but on whether the parties can find a narrow path of retreat before taking the final step.