Iran Strikes Gulf States, Shattering Neutrality Strategy and Forcing Security Reassessment

Iran retaliated against Gulf Arab states on February 28 by striking airports, seaports, oil installations, and desalination plants, after the United States and Israel began their war on Iran that same day—a war Gulf governments had lobbied against. The attacks effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, fully blocking exports of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, and impeding those of Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although U.S. forces helped intercept some attacks on the Gulf states, damage was done to the region’s reputation as a safe haven for global business, which the Iranian regime intended.

For roughly a decade, Gulf states maintained their security by trying to appear neutral in confrontations involving Iran, cultivating deep defense relationships with Washington, and keeping an open line of communication with Tehran to prevent military escalation. Gulf governments are now reconsidering, if not abandoning, all three strategies. They are also rejecting an assumption, held by the United States and Israel, that Gulf states could be incorporated into a regional security architecture premised on Israeli dominance—one in which Israel retains decisive military superiority over its neighbors, freedom of action across borders, and the ability to set terms that others must accommodate.

In spring 2024, Iran directly attacked Israeli territory for the first time, launching more than 300 drones and missiles at its adversary. U.S., British, French, and Jordanian forces rapidly intercepted them. The message was hard to miss in Gulf capitals: when Iran attacks Israel, the U.S.-led response will be immediate and collective. But an unspoken question lingered: What would happen if Iran attacked the Gulf? That question has now been answered.

Israel’s response to Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack further eroded its standing in the region. Israel killed over 70,000 Palestinians in its campaign in Gaza, moved to annex the West Bank, bombed Lebanon and Syria, and launched incursions into both countries. In September 2025, Israel violated Qatari sovereignty by launching lethal strikes on a residence in Doha. Its goal was to kill Hamas members who were there to take part in U.S.-facilitated negotiations.

Gulf leaders believe Israel persuaded the Trump administration to attack Iran on February 28—ultimately forcing Gulf countries to pay the price of a war they never wanted. In the months leading up to the conflict, Gulf governments advised the United States to refrain from attacking Iran and to instead negotiate with Iranian leaders. They clearly communicated, both publicly and through backchannels, that they would not let their territories be used as a staging ground against Iran. Riyadh, for example, signed a détente with Tehran in 2023, after nearly a decade of tensions. But such efforts did not translate into protection from Iranian strikes. Within hours of the first U.S.-Israeli salvos, Iran attacked every Gulf country.

As the conflict hardened into a war of attrition, Gulf states separated into three broad camps. Oman’s approach most clearly reflects restraint. Despite Iranian strikes on the port of Duqm, Muscat formally congratulated Iran’s new supreme leader, who took over after his predecessor was killed in U.S.-Israeli strikes, and issued a statement condemning attacks from all belligerents. Oman’s foreign minister said that “Israel—not Iran—is the primary source of insecurity in the region.” The UAE, facing the highest volume of Iranian strikes of any Gulf state, has banned most Iranian passport holders from entering or transiting its territory, signaled an openness to joining U.S. military efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz, and made clear its intention to deepen bilateral ties with the United States and Israel. Bahrain, which normalized relations with Israel, has broadly aligned with the UAE’s more assertive posture. Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have taken an approach that lies in between those of Oman and the UAE.

Gulf governments are diversifying their partnerships. In 2024, the UAE formed joint ventures with Turkish drone manufacturers. Last year, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement. Gulf states are also starting to seek alternatives to American materiel: Turkish fighter jets, South Korean missile defense systems, Ukrainian drones, Japanese Patriot interceptors, and British low-cost anti-drone missiles. In April, the president of the European Council said that Europe was a “reliable partner for the Gulf countries” and “ready to contribute.” The EU is negotiating a free trade deal with the UAE and could sell the Gulf drone technology. Gulf states will probably pursue economic and technology deals with China but avoid explicit defense guarantees so as not to cross U.S. redlines.

To carve out real autonomy, Gulf states will need to strengthen defense ties with one another—for example, by sharing early-warning radar data, coordinating air defenses, and pooling stockpiles of common anti-drone technology. On paper, the Gulf Cooperation Council, a body made up of the six Gulf states, has a unified military command, but rivalries among the members have blocked meaningful defense integration. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already made efforts to form state-owned defense companies, such as Saudi Arabian Military Industries (which aims to localize 50 percent of the kingdom’s military spending by 2030) and Edge Group, an Emirati conglomerate that has already begun to produce large numbers of precision-guided munitions. But throughout the war, Gulf countries have faced acute shortages of interceptor missiles that no domestic industry can yet fill.