Sweden Considers Wartime Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: A New Variable in Baltic Sea Security

On February 27, 2026, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonsson stated in an interview with Swedish Radio that the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons on Swedish territory during wartime cannot be ruled out. This statement was not made by chance. Previously, the French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle docked at Malmö Harbor, with Rafale fighter jets capable of carrying nuclear warheads on its deck. Meanwhile, intense discussions are underway within Sweden regarding the expansion of the nuclear umbrella. Against the backdrop of Russia's ongoing military actions in Ukraine and the fundamental changes in the security environment in Northern Europe, this policy shift in Sweden indicates that the country, which has long adhered to the principle of not deploying nuclear weapons during peacetime, is reassessing its national security strategy.

The Shift in Sweden's Nuclear Stance

Sweden has consistently supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has long maintained a domestic consensus that foreign nuclear weapons are not allowed on its territory during peacetime. This stance stems from its historical non-alignment policy and vigilance against the nuclear arms race. However, this consensus is now loosening.

In an interview, Pal Jonson stated: "If war breaks out, we will keep all options open to ensure Sweden's survival and security." His remarks directly touch upon the ambiguous policy area between wartime and peacetime. He pointed out that existing agreements only constrain deployments during peacetime and do not cover a state of war. This legal interpretation opens the possibility for policy adjustments.

In fact, related discussions have persisted in Swedish politics for several weeks. In early February 2026, the Sweden Democrats proposed that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Sweden should be considered in gray-zone scenarios between war and peace. Subsequently, Gulan Avci, the defense policy spokesperson for the Liberal Party, expressed a similar view, stating that no possibilities should be ruled out in the context of Europe strengthening its own capabilities.

Changes in the geopolitical environment are the deeper underlying reasons. After Sweden joined NATO, its strategic frontier directly faces Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad across the Baltic Sea. This maritime area has become a frontline for military confrontation between NATO and Russia. During the visit of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, it was reportedly tracked by suspected Russian drones while passing through the Øresund Strait, prompting the Swedish Armed Forces to conduct electronic countermeasures to drive them away. Although the Kremlin denied the incident, it reflects the highly tense situation in the Baltic region. Sweden is no longer a buffer state but a critical component of NATO's eastern flank.

French Role and European Strategic Autonomy

The discussion in Sweden regarding nuclear weapons is related to the broader issue of how Europe can build an autonomous deterrent force. France is attempting to play a key role in this process.

In February 2026, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson confirmed that Sweden is in discussions with France regarding the extension of France's nuclear umbrella. France is the only nuclear-armed state in the European Union, with its nuclear forces independent of the United States, possessing dual capabilities in sea-based strategic missiles and air-launched tactical nuclear weapons. The ASMP-A supersonic cruise missile, carried by Rafale fighter jets, is capable of delivering nuclear warheads. At that time, multiple Rafale jets in a state of combat readiness were deployed on the deck of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, which was docked in Malmö.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, while meeting with Nordic journalists on the aircraft carrier deck, commented on the controversial remarks made by former U.S. President Trump regarding Greenland at the time: "When an ally makes an unacceptable proposal, it is necessary to respond." These remarks conveyed a signal from Paris to promote European strategic autonomy and reduce dependence on the United States. French President Emmanuel Macron plans to deliver a speech in early March 2026 to update France's nuclear doctrine. French media speculate that the content may include the forward deployment of nuclear-capable Rafale fighter jets to other EU countries while maintaining French command authority.

For Sweden, cooperation with France offers a flexible option. Analysts believe a possible model could be: during peacetime, nuclear weapons are not permanently deployed on Swedish territory, but through allied aircraft carrier visits, rotational deployments of fighter jets, or rapid response capabilities, it ensures that nuclear deterrence coverage can be swiftly obtained in the event of a crisis escalation. French Rafale fighter jets, with aerial refueling from bases in southern France, can reach northern Sweden in less than a day—a capability already validated in joint exercises in 2025. This essentially represents a deterrent posture that is neither permanently present nor ever out of reach.

Risks and Trade-offs

Allowing the wartime deployment of nuclear weapons fundamentally alters Sweden's role within the Baltic Sea security architecture. Strategically, this shift aims to enhance the credibility of deterrence against Russia. Forward-deploying nuclear deterrent assets closer to potential conflict zones can shorten response times and increase the costs and uncertainties for Russia should it consider launching an attack. For Moscow, this means that its Western Military District, Baltic Fleet, and even Kaliningrad would fall within a more immediate strike range.

However, this policy shift also carries significant risks. The first is the target effect. Once Sweden is perceived as a potential forward deployment site for NATO nuclear weapons, its strategic value in a crisis will rise, and it may also become a priority target for preemptive strikes by adversaries. The risk of attacks on places like Malmö Port or air force bases where weapons might be deployed would theoretically increase. Sweden must find a balance between enhancing deterrence and avoiding drawing fire upon itself.

Secondly, this move could intensify the regional arms race. Russia is likely to perceive this as a signal of NATO's increased aggressiveness and may respond by strengthening its missile deployments in Kaliningrad, increasing nuclear submarine patrols, or upgrading its military doctrine. The already fragile military balance in the Baltic region could further tilt.

Finally, there is the challenge of domestic political and social consensus. The Swedish public has long held complex attitudes towards nuclear weapons, with a deep-seated social foundation for anti-nuclear peace movements. Treating nuclear weapons as a wartime option could also trigger intense political debates and social divisions. The government needs to clearly explain to the public: how this option can genuinely enhance national security, and what strict control measures are in place to prevent misuse or escalation of the situation.

Future Direction

The statement by Pål Jonson may reflect a shift in Nordic security thinking. In today's context, where the war in Ukraine is reshaping Europe's security order, traditional taboos are being replaced by practical considerations. Sweden is transitioning from a protected state to a forward pillar in the alliance's collective defense, taking on greater responsibilities and facing increased risks.

The future development depends on several factors. Within NATO, coordination between the United States and France regarding nuclear guarantees will be crucial. The process of defense integration between Sweden and Finland may also involve the coordination of nuclear deterrence policies. Russia's response to the adjustments in Nordic policies will directly influence Stockholm's next steps. Additionally, the content of President Macron's nuclear doctrine speech in March 2026, as well as the outcome of the U.S. election later that same year, will impact the discussion on Europe's nuclear future.

The nuclear debate in Sweden has only just begun. In the chilly winds of the Baltic Sea, the nation is testing the boundaries between strategic ambiguity and strategic clarity, striving to find a narrow path for survival—one that deters powerful neighbors while avoiding self-destruction. The ultimate choice will not only define Sweden's national security but also shape the strategic landscape of the entire Nordic region and the Baltic Sea area for decades to come.