The Geopolitical Stalemate Behind Russia's Rejection of the U.S. Proposal for Control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

In early February 2026, a diplomatic development disclosed by Reuters revealed a long-standing and unresolved core issue in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russia formally rejected a proposal put forward by the United States, which aimed to place the complete control of Europe's largest nuclear power plant—the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—under a U.S.-led management framework, as part of a potential peace agreement. This power struggle over control of the nuclear facility, taking place in the city of Enerhodar in Ukraine's southeastern Zaporizhzhia region, involves far more than just Moscow, Kyiv, and Washington; it also engages the nerves of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the entire European continent. The significance of this matter extends far beyond typical territorial disputes, directly touching upon red lines of nuclear safety, Ukraine's energy lifeline, and the most challenging issue of asset ownership in any future ceasefire agreement.

The Current Situation and Root Causes of the Stalemate at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Since its takeover by Russian forces on March 4, 2022, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has been operating under abnormal conditions due to military occupation. With six VVER-1000 pressurized water reactors, the plant supplied approximately 20% of Ukraine's electricity before the war. Currently, all reactors are in a cold shutdown state, but maintaining their safety still requires continuous power, water sources, and professional technical personnel. The plant is managed by an administration appointed by the Russian side, while the original employees of Ukraine's state nuclear energy company, Energoatom, continue to perform basic operations under immense pressure and risk.

The proposal put forward by the United States, according to Reuters citing informed sources, centers on establishing a third-party control mechanism led by the U.S. or international institutions. This mechanism would not only be responsible for the physical security and operation of the power plant but, more critically, would control the distribution of its electricity output, allocating it between Ukraine and Russian-controlled areas. The Kremlin's response was straightforward: Russia controls the power plant and is willing to sell electricity to Ukraine. This statement itself carries a strong political signal—it attempts to transform the fact of military occupation into a commercial relationship and an established jurisdictional reality. Mykhailo Podolyak, an advisor to the Ukrainian President's Office, has repeatedly stated that Kyiv will never accept any form of leasing or purchasing energy from its own occupied territories, viewing it as a complete denial of sovereignty.

The deeper reason is that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has become a non-negotiable, principled bargaining chip in the negotiations between the two sides. For Russia, controlling the plant is a crucial physical symbol and strategic asset that supports its claim of sovereignty over the Zaporizhzhia region (which has unilaterally declared its accession to Russia), and it is also key to supplying electricity to the occupied areas in southern Ukraine and maintaining social operations. For Ukraine, accepting Russian control or any form of energy transaction would be tantamount to indirectly acknowledging territorial loss, which is politically and legally impossible. Rafael Mariano Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has personally visited the plant multiple times for inspections, and his team is stationed on-site permanently. However, the agency only has supervisory and advisory authority and lacks the power to alter the control over the facility. This state of presence without power precisely reflects the current awkward dilemma faced by the international community in responding to such hybrid crises.

The strategic intent proposed by the United States and Moscow's calculations

Analyzing Washington's actions, one cannot view the rejected proposal in isolation. It is embedded within the broader U.S. and Western strategy toward Ukraine. From a strategic perspective, this move by the United States involves at least three key considerations. The first is the urgent management of nuclear safety risks. The area around the power plant has been subjected to ongoing shelling and drone attacks. In 2023, backup diesel generators were activated multiple times due to disruptions in the external power grid to prevent a core meltdown. Transferring control to a neutral third party (even if U.S.-led) could, in theory, maximize the isolation of the nuclear facility from the direct threats of military conflict, creating a safer environment for IAEA operations. The second is the energy leverage. The Ukrainian power grid has become exceptionally fragile after multiple rounds of large-scale missile and drone attacks by Russian forces. If the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant could partially resume operations and supply electricity to Ukrainian-controlled areas, it would significantly enhance the resilience of Ukrainian society. The U.S. proposal attempts to bypass sovereignty disputes and provide technical management support to sustain Ukraine. The third is to pave the way for future negotiations. This proposal can be seen as a trial balloon, aimed at testing Russia's flexibility on non-core territorial interests and laying the groundwork for dialogue that could eventually involve international co-management or demilitarization models.

However, Moscow's refusal is also meticulously calculated. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has consistently emphasized in recent statements that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is an asset of the Russian Federation. This characterization rules out any possibility of sovereignty transfer. Russia's calculation lies in bundling the nuclear plant with the issues of Crimea and Donbas, shaping it into part of an established fact, thereby forcing Ukraine and the West to discuss it as a whole package in future negotiations. Accepting the U.S. proposal would mean Russia voluntarily relinquishing a strategic stronghold already in its grasp—one with high symbolic and practical value—which Moscow is absolutely unwilling to accept, especially given that no fundamental reversal has occurred in the current battlefield situation. Additionally, Russia's proposed electricity sales plan itself serves as political propaganda, attempting to shape an image in the international public opinion arena of Russia providing humanitarian energy, even though the electricity originally comes from Ukrainian facilities.

In fact, this game also reflects the fundamental divergence between the two sides regarding the definition of security guarantees. The West believes that control by international institutions is the only security guarantee; Russia, on the other hand, considers its own military control to be the best safeguard against Ukraine sabotaging or attacking the power plant. This chasm of mutual distrust shows no sign of being bridged in the short term.

Regional Security Risks and Europe's Energy Anxiety

The stalemate at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant poses a continuous and variable threat to regional security. Geographically, it is located on the banks of the Kakhovka Reservoir of the Dnieper River, less than 50 kilometers from the front line at its closest point. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023 has already highlighted the extreme vulnerability of critical infrastructure in the region during wartime. In the event of a severe accident at the nuclear power plant, radiation impact models indicate that not only would Ukraine and southern Russia suffer devastating consequences, but radioactive fallout could also drift with prevailing winds toward Southeastern European countries, including Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and even affect more distant regions. This potential cross-border disaster is a source of extreme anxiety for EU and NATO member states.

From the perspective of energy security, the continuation of the stalemate means that Ukraine has permanently lost its largest baseload power source and has to rely more on thermal power, renewable energy, and electricity imports from the European Union. This exacerbates the burden on Ukraine's wartime economy and makes its power grid more vulnerable to targeted attacks by the Russian military. For Europe, a stable and secure Ukrainian power grid helps reduce refugee pressure and the burden of economic assistance, and it is also a key component of the eastern defense line of the European Energy Union. Therefore, although the EU officially fully aligns with Ukraine's stance on the issue of power plant control and refuses to recognize Russian control, there is extensive private yet intense discussion within the EU on how to break this deadlock and effectively reduce nuclear risks.

The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency is both crucial and highly limited in this context. The expert teams dispatched by the agency can provide professional assessments, early warnings, and limited coordination, such as facilitating partial agreements between the two sides on staff rotations and equipment supplies. However, they have neither armed forces to protect the power plant nor the authority to order any party to cease military activities in the surrounding areas. Director General Grossi acts more like a shuttle diplomat and a risk whistleblower, with each of his reports reminding the world that a Sword of Damocles hangs over this place.

Future Direction: Variables in the Stalemate and Possible Ways Out

In the short term, the current control status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is highly likely to remain unchanged. As long as the frontline remains deadlocked and Russian forces are not forced to retreat on a large scale, Moscow will not make concessions on substantive control. Ukraine and its Western allies will absolutely not recognize Russia's claims at the legal and sovereignty levels. This frozen state of conflict will become the norm in the region.

However, several variables may influence the course of events. The primary variable is the battlefield situation. If significant changes occur on the front lines in the future—for instance, if Ukrainian forces gain the capability to threaten the vicinity of Enerhodar City—the safety situation at the nuclear power plant will become drastically more complex, potentially triggering a more severe crisis or even an accident. The second variable is the risk of a nuclear incident itself. A serious nuclear safety event, proven to be caused by military actions (even if it does not reach the level of a leak), could generate immense political shockwaves, compelling the international community, particularly influential neutral countries like China and India, to adopt more active mediation efforts, pushing for the establishment of a genuine demilitarized zone or a mandatory international protection mechanism. The third variable is the progress of secret diplomacy between Russia and the West. If breakthroughs are made in broader ceasefire negotiations, the nuclear power plant could be included as a technical issue in a comprehensive solution—for example, by placing it under the temporary trusteeship of a special committee composed of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus the IAEA and Ukraine. However, this would require an extremely high level of political mutual trust, which currently seems far from attainable.

A more realistic middle path might be to gradually advance functional demilitarization. This differs from a transfer of control, focusing instead on establishing a Security Zone around the power plant, supervised by the IAEA and jointly observed by the conflicting parties, strictly prohibiting any military equipment and operations within a specific radius. The IAEA is currently promoting a similar initiative, but it requires strong political and security guarantees from major powers. This path is also difficult, but it at least shifts the focus of discussion from who controls the facility temporarily to how to ensure safety, buying time and space for an eventual political resolution.

The lights of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant may have dimmed, but what they illuminate is the sharp conflict between the logic of war and international rules, between national security and the common security of humanity. Every valve and every cable here is connected to the nerves of geopolitics. Until a way out is found, the world can only continue to hold its breath and watch.