Trump signs the "America First" arms sales policy: Reclassifying allies based on defense investments and strategic value.

On February 7, 2026, in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order titled the America First Arms Transfer Strategy. This document ended the decades-long first-come, first-served principle in U.S. arms sales, establishing instead a new screening mechanism that prioritizes partner countries' own defense investment levels, strategic geographic locations, and contributions to U.S. actions. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Commerce Howard Ratnick were required to submit a prioritized catalog of platforms and systems for sales within 120 days. This is not merely a technical adjustment to the arms sales process; it marks a fundamental shift in the logic of U.S. foreign security cooperation during Trump's second term: transitioning from a relationship-based partner network to a strategic marketplace with clear pricing, measured by investment and utility.

Core of the New Policy: A Paradigm Shift from "Partnership First" to "Investment First"

According to the White House's explanatory document, the new strategy aims to ensure that future arms sales prioritize U.S. interests. Its specific screening criteria are straightforward and quantifiable: priority will be given to partners who have invested in their own defense and capabilities, play a significant role in U.S. plans and operations or hold geographic distribution value, and contribute to U.S. economic security. This essentially sets up a clear ranking system for global arms procurement clients.

The deeper reason is the complete disillusionment of U.S. decision-makers with the efficiency of the existing system. A Pentagon official familiar with the matter disclosed to Reuters that the old "partner-first" model often resulted in mismatches between orders and U.S. manufacturing capabilities in practice, leading to prolonged production backlogs and delivery delays. For example, the production schedule for Javelin anti-tank missiles and 155mm artillery shells ordered by some Eastern European allies in 2023 has already been pushed beyond 2028. The new strategy aims to proactively screen customers, directing limited production capacity precisely toward those countries that can both afford to pay and hold strategic positions critical to the United States. This approach seeks to alleviate pressure on the U.S. defense industrial base and accelerate the arming process in key regions.

The executive order mandates the establishment of a task force to promote U.S. arms sales, whose function is precisely to shift from passively reviewing orders to actively marketing equipment on the priority list. This means that in the future, the procurement queue for high-end platforms such as the F-35 fighter jet, the Patriot air defense system, or the Aegis combat system will no longer be solely based on the contract signing date, but rather on whether the purchasing country meets the investment and strategic contribution thresholds set by the United States.

Geopolitical Calibration: Prioritizing the Eastern Flank of NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region

Although the executive order does not name specific countries, its policy orientation closely aligns with the current U.S. security concerns map. Analysts point out that allies on two fronts will benefit: the eastern flank countries of NATO in Europe, and the frontline partners in the Indo-Pacific region that directly face so-called challenges.

In 2025, NATO allies unanimously agreed to significantly increase the defense spending target from 2% to 5% of GDP. Against this backdrop, countries such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states have been continuously expanding their military capabilities for many years. Between 2023 and 2025, Poland signed U.S. arms procurement contracts worth over $30 billion, including 250 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks, 96 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, and 32 F-35A fighter jets. According to the new standard, countries that have already made substantial investments and are located on the front lines of confrontation with Russia are likely to receive priority for subsequent orders and delivery schedules.

In the Indo-Pacific region, traditional allies such as Japan and Australia maintain stable priority status due to their high defense budgets and deep integration with the U.S. combat system. Notably, partners rapidly increasing their defense investments, such as India, which plans to raise defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2026, and the Taiwan region, which continues to invest in defense autonomy, may face more complex evaluations regarding access to specific sensitive technologies under the new policy. The policy does not merely encourage high spending but requires investments to align with U.S. regional action plans. For instance, partners with key geographical locations in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, and those willing to provide bases or logistical support for U.S. military operations, may see their order priorities significantly elevated.

Dual Drivers of Industry and Strategy: Revitalizing the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

The decision of the Trump administration also carries profound domestic economic and political considerations. The text of the executive order explicitly states the intention to leverage foreign procurement and capital to expand U.S. production and capacity. This reflects America's anxiety over the current state of its defense industrial base.

After the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, global demand for ammunition, drones, and air defense systems surged, exposing the rigidity and production bottlenecks in the U.S. defense industrial base. Last year, a U.S. Army official in charge of procurement admitted that increasing the monthly production of 155mm artillery shells from the pre-war 14,000 to a target of 80,000 by 2026 faces severe challenges in supply chains and labor shortages. The new strategy aims to channel capital from wealthy allies into targeted investments in areas within the United States that urgently need production expansion. If Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates wishes to prioritize access to the THAAD anti-missile system, they may be encouraged to invest in the construction of related missile production lines.

This approach of bundling foreign policy with industrial policy aims to achieve two goals at once: it consolidates security ties with key allies while creating jobs in the United States and enhancing the production capacity for strategic materials. War Secretary Heggeses and Secretary of State Rubio are required to establish new standards for strengthening end-use monitoring within 90 days. One of the objectives is to streamline the transfer process for non-core sensitive equipment, enabling faster delivery of more conventional weapons and thereby revitalizing the production lines for mid- to low-end weaponry.

Potential Impact and Redefinition of Alliance Relations

The ripple effects of this new policy will extend far beyond the arms sales list itself. It essentially introduces a tiered system within the U.S.-led alliance framework. Allies are implicitly categorized into different levels: top-tier investors and strategic pivots, key participants, and ordinary partners. This may erode the delicate principle of sovereign equality in alliance politics and provoke discontent among some allies.

Partners with limited defense budgets but strategically important locations, such as Georgia on the Black Sea coast or Kosovo in the Balkans, may feel marginalized. They might not be able to compete in the arms procurement race with wealthy Middle Eastern allies. Additionally, the traditional first-come, first-served principle, though rigid, offers predictability. Under the new system, the priority of orders may change dynamically with shifts in U.S. strategic focus, increasing uncertainty in the long-term defense planning of partner countries.

From the perspective of the global arms market landscape, this move may indirectly encourage other weapon-exporting countries, such as France, Israel, or South Korea, to compete for clients who score poorly under the new U.S. standards. Dassault Aviation of France may be more motivated to promote the Rafale fighter jet to Egypt if the latter perceives the process of acquiring the F-35 as excessively lengthy and politically stringent.

Ultimately, Trump's "America First" arms sales strategy is a typical manifestation of his transactionalist foreign policy philosophy in the security domain. It partially commodifies military alliance relationships, replacing some ambiguous commitments based on shared values and long-term trust with clear cost-benefit calculations. Whether this mechanism can unite the alliance in times of crisis or create new rifts among allies will be a key window for observing the evolution of the American-style global security architecture in the coming years. Washington is sending a clear signal: in a turbulent world, America's protection and support require partners to pay in advance with real financial resources and strategic assets.