Myanmar's Election Amid Civil War and Ban: A Political Ritual with a Predetermined Outcome

On January 26, 2025, outside a polling station in Mandalay, Myanmar's second-largest city, military junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing faced reporters' cameras and responded firmly to international skepticism about the election: "It is the people living in Myanmar who vote, not outsiders." Behind him, voters quietly lined up to complete a political ritual that had long lost its suspense. Just the day before, the nearly month-long three-phase general election concluded, with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) having secured an overwhelming advantage in the first two rounds of voting. Held against a backdrop of ongoing civil war, large-scale regional disenfranchisement, and the banning of major opposition parties, this election is widely seen as a key step by the junta to cloak its five-year rule in a veneer of democracy. However, the ceremony itself cannot conceal reality: Myanmar is deeply entrenched in the most severe political division and humanitarian crisis since the 2021 coup. A meticulously orchestrated election spectacle remains far from achieving genuine national reconciliation and stability.

A Pre-written Script: The Structural Imbalance of the Election

Analyzing Myanmar's current election cannot be separated from its established institutional framework. This framework itself ensures the absolute dominance of the military and its proxies.

Constitutionally Granted Legal Advantage is the cornerstone of the military government's power. According to the constitution drafted under military leadership in 2008, 25% of the seats in both houses of the national parliament (166 seats in total) are automatically reserved for individuals appointed by the military. This means that any political party or coalition must win at least 329 of the remaining 498 elected seats to achieve a simple majority and form a government. However, this is merely a theoretical threshold. In reality, due to the ongoing civil war, elections cannot be held nationwide at all. Out of the originally scheduled 664 parliamentary seats, voting is completely impossible in 67 townships (approximately one-fifth of the country's 330 townships) because they are under the control of opposition armed groups or due to severe security conditions. Consequently, the number of seats actually contested has been reduced to 586. This further lowers the difficulty for the military-aligned camp to secure victory.

The Overwhelming Victory of the Military Proxy USDP was already a foregone conclusion after the first two rounds of voting. According to data released by the military junta's election commission, in the first two rounds of voting (December 28, 2024, and January 11, 2025) held in 202 townships, the USDP has secured 233 seats in both houses of parliament. Combined with the military's inherent 166 seats, the military camp now controls nearly 400 seats, far exceeding the 294-seat threshold required to form a government. Some analyses point out that the USDP won over 85% of the contested elected seats. This stands in stark contrast to the 2020 general election—in that election, which the military overturned citing electoral fraud, the USDP secured only about 6% of the parliamentary seats, while Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) achieved an overwhelming victory.

Systematic Exclusion of Opposition Forces is the core allegation that this election is neither free nor fair. The National League for Democracy, the party that won consecutive elections in 2015 and 2020, was forcibly dissolved in 2023 for refusing to re-register under the new rules set by the military. Its iconic leader, 80-year-old Aung San Suu Kyi, remains imprisoned, serving a 27-year sentence on charges widely regarded by the international community as politically motivated. Many other opposition parties also refused to participate or register, believing the conditions were unfair. Meanwhile, opposition groups launched a widespread boycott campaign. The military government has strongly suppressed this through the newly enacted Election Protection Law, which imposes severe penalties for most public criticism of the election. Over 400 people have been prosecuted on related charges, such as distributing leaflets or online activities.

This structural imbalance renders the election outcome predictable even before voting begins. As stated by the Chairman of the People's Party, Ko Ko Gyi: Here, the government is entirely elected by the parliament. If a single party dominates the legislature, the political system becomes a winner-takes-all scenario. Although his party secured one seat, its ability to act as a check and balance is minimal in the face of the overwhelming dominance of the USDP and the military.

Voting Under the Shadow of Civil War: The Missing One-Fifth

If institutional design ensured the military's victory, then the ongoing civil war fundamentally eroded the legitimacy and representativeness of the elections. The coup in February 2021 was like a massive stone thrown into a calm lake, with the waves of resistance it stirred rapidly evolving into multi-front armed conflicts sweeping across the nation, plunging Myanmar into a deep civil war.

Large-scale Regional Election Absence stands out as the most significant flaw in this election. Due to security reasons, more than one-fifth (67) of the 330 townships across the country were completely unable to conduct voting. Most of these areas are active control zones of ethnic armed organizations or anti-coup People's Defense Forces. This means that millions of Myanmar citizens living in these regions were deprived of their right to vote. Their political will and demands were entirely overlooked in this electoral process. The election being forced to proceed in three stages itself is a helpless measure directly caused by armed conflict, highlighting the military government's weak control over vast stretches of the country.

Violence and Fear in the Voting Process follow like a shadow. Even in areas where voting is held, the security situation remains extremely tense. The independent media Irrawaddy reported that in at least one township where voting took place, clashes occurred on election day, resulting in five injuries. The military junta stated that during the first two rounds of voting, armed groups opposing military rule attacked polling stations and government buildings in multiple townships, leading to the deaths of at least two administrative officials. Observations by BBC reporters in Shan State depict an atmosphere of fear: while order was maintained inside polling stations, the campaign period before election day was filled with fear and intimidation, with the public almost too afraid to express any views on the election due to concerns over potential retaliation. Wherever the reporting team went, they were closely monitored and followed by dozens of police and military personnel.

The Sharp Decline in the Voter Base reflects widespread public apathy and resistance. The military government announced approximately 24 million eligible voters, a reduction of about 35% compared to the 2020 general election. The voter turnout for the first two rounds of voting was reportedly between 50% and 60%. In Dagon Township, the largest urban area in Yangon, 86-year-old voter Soe Thein expressed that voting was done in the hope of national peace and development, while 62-year-old Lae Lae Yi frankly admitted to having no expectations, as there was no motivation. This coexistence of hope and disillusionment is precisely a microcosm of the complex mentality in contemporary Myanmar society. Many voters either abstained from voting due to boycott calls, were unable to vote due to displacement from conflict, or had completely lost confidence in this manipulated election.

The indifference of the international community and the military government's pursuit of "legitimacy."

Faced with a tidal wave of criticism both domestically and internationally, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's response appears isolated yet resolute: "We do not care whether this gains foreign recognition. We acknowledge the people's vote. That is as it should be." This statement precisely encapsulates the dual objectives of the military government's election strategy: internally, to craft a narrative of returning power to the people, while externally, projecting an indifference toward international recognition. However, behind this indifference lies a profound desire for legitimacy approval.

ASEAN's Explicit Rejection is the most severe blow to the military government's election plan. Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hassan clearly stated after the vote that ASEAN would not send observers nor certify this election, citing concerns over the lack of inclusiveness and free participation. This marks the first time that the ten ASEAN member states have issued such a clear signal of rejection regarding Myanmar's election. Since the coup, ASEAN has been struggling to mediate within the framework of the Five-Point Consensus, but with little progress. Refusing to recognize the election results signifies that ASEAN formally characterizes this political maneuver by the Myanmar military government as non-compliant internal affairs, running counter to the inclusive political dialogue it advocates. This could further solidify Myanmar's isolation within ASEAN.

The Politicization of the Observer List reveals the practical choices in Myanmar's diplomacy. Countries that came to observe the election include Russia, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Cambodia, among others—many of which are viewed by the West as authoritarian states. Additionally, India and Japan also sent observers. This list clearly reflects the current main international supporters and partners of Myanmar's military junta. Observers from Western democracies were collectively absent. This sharply divided diplomatic landscape means that the election results will gain recognition from some countries, but in the broader international community, particularly the Western world, their legitimacy will not be accepted. This does not help break Myanmar's diplomatic deadlock; instead, it may deepen its confrontation with certain countries.

The Internal-External Distinction of Legitimacy is the core paradox facing the military government. By holding elections to produce a civilian parliament and government, the junta aims to complete the formal transition from direct military rule to a military-dominated constitutional order. This helps it construct a new narrative of governance domestically, downplay the nature of the coup, and claim the normalization of the political process. Although Min Aung Hlaing himself has not explicitly stated it, it is widely anticipated that he will resign from his military post and be elected president by the new parliament, thereby achieving a change of uniform to rule. However, this construction of internal legitimacy heavily relies on strict control of information, the forceful suppression of opposition, and absolute control over the electoral process. It cannot resolve the underlying political contradictions fueling the civil war, nor can it gain recognition from key external actors; its fragility is self-evident.

After the Election: Deeper Divides and an Uncertain Future

As the voting concludes, Myanmar's political clock appears to be moving towards a new cycle—the parliament will convene in March, and the new government is expected to take office in April. However, rather than serving as a starting point for national reconciliation, this election may become a catalyst that deepens existing divisions.

The Complication of the Civil War Situation is the most direct challenge brought by the election. Armed groups opposing the military junta, including numerous People's Defense Forces and some ethnic armed organizations, clearly view this election as a provocation and a legitimacy fraud. They have expressed resistance through actions such as attacking polling stations. The holding of the election, along with the subsequent self-coronation of legitimacy by the military junta, may prompt opposition armed groups to take more intense military actions to prove that the military junta is not the sole ruler of the country. Although the military junta reclaimed some lost territories in 2024 with external support, it is far from gaining the initiative on the battlefield. After the election, to consolidate the authority of its so-called elected government, the military may adopt more aggressive clearance operations, leading to further escalation of conflicts. According to statistics from the conflict monitoring organization ACLED, the civil war has resulted in over 90,000 deaths, and the United Nations estimates that nearly half of Myanmar's population lives below the poverty line. The election cannot bring peace; instead, it may add fuel to the flames of war.

Further Consolidation of the Political Landscape and Underlying Tensions warrant attention. The alliance between the USDP and the military will completely dominate the new parliament and government, forming an unprecedented single center of power. This situation, lacking effective checks and balances, may facilitate the military government's policy implementation in the short term, but could breed new risks in the long run. On one hand, the extreme compression of political space may force more moderate opposition figures to turn radical or fall silent. On the other hand, the high concentration of power may also trigger potential conflicts within the military or between the USDP and the military. The winner-takes-all system that Gegeji is concerned about often bases its stability on overwhelming dominance and control. Once that control loosens, the system itself lacks the resilience for a buffer.

The Escalation of Humanitarian and Economic Crises is the harsh backdrop that the election cannot avoid. The ongoing civil war has already displaced millions of people, brought the economy to the brink of collapse, and made humanitarian aid difficult to deliver due to the conflict and restrictions. The earthquake disaster in March 2025 and the reduction in international funding have further exacerbated the situation. After the new government takes office, if it cannot achieve substantial breakthroughs in security and humanitarian access, the international community's stance of isolation and sanctions is unlikely to change, and economic recovery will remain a distant prospect. The sustainability of a government that is not widely recognized, cannot effectively control its territory, or provide basic services will always face severe challenges.

The election spectacle unfolding in Myanmar amidst gunfire and prohibitions ultimately paints a contradictory political landscape: a military junta attempting to end its rule through meticulously controlled voting; a democratic ceremony that loses its representativeness due to the large-scale exclusion of citizens; a political maneuver aimed at seeking legitimacy yet inviting more international rejection. The election may alter the seating arrangements in the halls of power in Yangon and Naypyidaw, but it can hardly shift the battle lines on the front or address the fundamental desires for safety and survival among millions of displaced people.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing may soon enter the new parliamentary hall as president, but the new government he leads has carried original sin since its inception—born from a coup, shaped by a flawed vote, and set to exercise power amid an ongoing war. For Myanmar, the true way forward lies not in a formal transfer of power, but in initiating substantive political dialogue that includes all parties, finding a path to national reconciliation that stops the bloodshed and heals the wounds. This path is clearly far more difficult and distant than organizing an election.