Winter Under the Nuclear Shadow: The Strategic Intent and Geopolitical Game Behind Russia's Attacks on Ukraine's Energy and Nuclear Facilities
22/01/2026
On the night of January 20 to 21, 2025, the temperature in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, dropped to minus 15 degrees Celsius. The piercing sound of air raid sirens echoed continuously over the city as a mixed barrage of over 330 drones and dozens of missiles tore through the night sky. When dawn arrived, heating was cut off in more than 5,600 residential buildings, leaving over a million people in darkness and cold. The Ukrainian parliament building itself lost power, water supply, and heating. However, the most chilling ripple of this massive attack surfaced far beyond Kyiv, more than 100 kilometers to the north—the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant lost all external power supply.
This is not an isolated incident. Since the winter of 2024, Russia's systematic strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure have entered a new phase, with their scope, frequency, and target selection demonstrating a clear strategic escalation. The attacks are no longer confined to traditional power plants and substations but are increasingly focusing on critical nodes closely related to nuclear safety. As the stalemate on the battlefield persists and diplomatic shuttle diplomacy continues among Davos, Paris, and Moscow, a tactic of nuclear coercion, using the safety of civilian nuclear facilities as a bargaining chip, is pushing this conflict toward a more dangerous edge.
Energy Warfare: From Paralyzing Civilian Life to the Red Line of Nuclear Security.
Analysis reveals that Russia's recent attacks on Ukraine's energy system have exhibited several key evolutions. The scale of the attacks is unprecedented; the assault on January 20 utilized approximately 340 drones and 34 missiles, with an intensity comparable to the concentrated strikes on the energy system during the initial phase of the war in 2022. The target selection has become more precise. Ukrainian Energy Minister Oleksiy Sobolev disclosed in Davos that since the end of October 2024, about 8.5 gigawatts of power generation capacity have been damaged, and the focus of the latest round of strikes has clearly shifted to the power transmission network, particularly the substations and lines supplying nuclear power plants.
This shift signifies a deepening of the attack intent. Early attacks aimed to create widespread difficulties for people's livelihoods and undermine morale; now, the attackers appear to be attempting to paralyze the backbone of the entire national power grid and touch the sensitive nerve of nuclear safety. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha's accusation hits the core: while Russian officials speak of the 'importance' of power lines, their forces deliberately strike substations, directly endangering nuclear safety.
The power outage at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant is a dangerous signal. Although the plant has ceased generating electricity since the 1986 disaster, its spent fuel storage pools still require continuous cooling. A power outage could lead to the failure of the cooling system, posing the risk of radioactive material release. Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), promptly confirmed the power outage and noted that multiple Ukrainian substations critical to nuclear safety had been affected by military activities. Although Ukraine announced a few hours later that the plant had been reconnected to the grid, the incident itself successfully created global nuclear panic.
The broader threat lies in the fact that over half of Ukraine's electricity comes from nuclear power, with multiple operational facilities within its territory, including Europe's largest nuclear power plant—the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The ongoing attacks on the peripheral power grids of these facilities essentially amount to walking a tightrope: avoiding direct attacks on the nuclear plants themselves (which could trigger catastrophic consequences and unpredictable international reactions) while applying extreme pressure by weakening their safety redundancy systems.
Winter Weaponization: Psychological Warfare and Survival Trials
The extreme cold of minus fifteen degrees Celsius has itself become a weapon in Russia's strategic toolbox. The timing of the attack was carefully chosen to coincide with a cold wave hitting Ukraine and even Eastern Europe. Its effects are multifaceted: physically, destroying heating and power systems directly threatens the survival of millions; psychologically, enduring darkness and cold during the long nights continuously depletes the people's will to resist and the emergency response capabilities of state institutions.
The daily reality for Kyiv residents paints a brutal picture. A 29-year-old veteran, Oleksandr Paliy, told the media: I have no electricity and no water. Because of the airstrikes, I couldn't sleep until 3 a.m.—explosions continued throughout the night. Residents have had to resort to portable stoves again, with entire building occupants pooling money to buy generators, setting up tents indoors for warmth, and even tucking hot water bottles into their beds. Parents at kindergartens have collectively purchased insulated containers to cook and store a whole day's meals at once whenever there is occasional electricity. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko revealed that since early January, approximately 600,000 people have left the capital.
This strategy of achieving victory through cold is backed by clear calculations. Ukraine's grid operator, Ukrenergo, points out that repair work is becoming increasingly difficult. After the attack on January 9, technicians worked around the clock to restore heating to most buildings, only for a new wave of strikes to follow immediately, rendering all efforts futile. Energy provider DTEK reported that over 335,000 residents lost power in the latest attacks. This cycle of repair and destruction not only depletes Ukraine's already strained economic and human resources (President Zelensky stated that the cost of intercepting the January 20 attack alone amounted to 80 million euros) but also fosters a sense of helplessness and deep anxiety about the future among the populace.
51-year-old accountant Marina Sergiyenko spoke the minds of many while taking shelter in a subway station: (The goal is) to wear down the people, to push things to a breaking point so that we no longer have any strength left, to break our resistance. This psychological erosion is just as lethal as the physical destruction.
Parallel Games on the Diplomatic Stage: Davos, Moscow, and the Unsigned Document
As Ukrainian cities shiver in the winter cold, global elites are gathering in the warm halls of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The change in itinerary of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has become a microcosm of this diplomatic game. Initially citing the domestic energy crisis, he stated he would not attend Davos, emphasizing, "In this situation, I choose Ukraine, not the economic forum." However, his plans took a turn when former U.S. President Donald Trump revealed he would meet him in Davos.
Zelensky set clear conditions for this meeting: meetings with the United States should always conclude with concrete results, either strengthening Ukraine or advancing the end of the war. If the documents are ready, we will meet. The documents he referred to are agreements regarding security guarantees for Ukraine and post-war reconstruction plans. However, until the eve of the meeting, it remained unclear whether any documents were ready for signing after Ukraine's chief negotiator, Rustem Umerov, held multi-day talks in Davos with U.S. representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Umerov only stated that the discussions focused on the familiar themes of security guarantees and post-war recovery.
A more dramatic diplomatic move occurred in the direction of Moscow. Almost simultaneously, Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Putin will meet with Trump's envoys Witkov and Kushner in Moscow on January 22. Putin himself hinted through Russian media that he would discuss with the American envoys the potential use of frozen Russian assets. This is seen as a preemptive move against a key initiative by the European Union—which is struggling to determine how to utilize approximately 300 billion euros in frozen Russian assets held by Belgium to aid Ukraine's defense and reconstruction. Putin proposed using these funds to restore [territories] damaged during military operations, but deliberately left ambiguous whether these territories belong to Ukraine, Russia, or Russian-controlled areas.
This parallel diplomacy highlights the complexity of the current situation. On one hand, European countries led by France and the United Kingdom gathered 35 nations in Paris to promote concrete security guarantees for Ukraine. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Zelensky signed a relevant declaration of intent. On the other hand, the United States is engaging with both Russia and Ukraine simultaneously through former presidential channels, attempting to outline some form of peace plan. However, its contours remain vague, and the U.S. and Ukraine do not fully align on core issues such as territory. Meanwhile, Russia is seizing every opportunity to divide the Western camp and attempting to regain the initiative on key economic issues like asset freezes.
Nuclear Risk as a Tool of Coercion: An Uncrossable Red Line and Ambiguous Tactics
The most profound warning from the Chernobyl power outage incident lies in its indication of a dangerous shift in conflicts toward a pattern of nuclear risk coercion. This does not refer to the use of nuclear weapons, but rather to achieving political and military coercion by creating the risk of a nuclear accident.
From a tactical perspective, attacking the external power grid of a nuclear power plant is a borderline action. Unlike directly shelling a nuclear reactor, which would immediately trigger a disaster, it is sufficient to strike the most sensitive nerve of the international community. The International Atomic Energy Agency must intervene urgently, and global media headlines are dominated by nuclear panic, which undoubtedly significantly increases the pressure on Ukraine and its supporters. For Russia, this may be a relatively low-cost but highly effective strategic signal: the risk of escalation in the conflict is real and multi-dimensional.
However, this tactic is playing with fire to the extreme. Nuclear safety is a globally recognized red line that must not be crossed. Any action leading to a severe nuclear accident, whether intentional or accidental, could trigger unpredictable chain reactions, including more direct military intervention by NATO, global political isolation, and unprecedented severe economic sanctions. Russian officials have consistently claimed that their targets are military-industrial, energy, and transportation facilities supporting the Ukrainian army, and deny targeting civilians or nuclear safety. However, such justifications appear feeble in the face of the fact that substations are directly linked to the safety of nuclear power plants.
The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for two senior Russian military officers on charges of war crimes, accusing them of attacking Ukraine's energy network and intentionally harming civilians. This sets the stage for future legal accountability. From a broader strategic perspective, involving the safety of nuclear facilities in the conflict not only endangers Ukraine and neighboring countries but also erodes the potential foundation for any form of postwar coexistence, making the resolution of the conflict even more distant.
This winter in Ukraine is a test of survival on multiple fronts: physically enduring the severe cold and darkness, militarily intercepting waves of drones and missiles, diplomatically securing crucial security commitments and aid, and ultimately, on the level of human safety, safeguarding the stability of nuclear facilities to prevent a new ecological disaster.
Russia's systematic attacks on energy and nuclear-related facilities are a calibrated combination of strikes. They aim to maximize the suffering of Ukrainian civilians, test the endurance and unity of Western aid, and create a sense of urgency and leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The talks in Davos, the engagements in Moscow, and the declarations in Paris—all this diplomatic shuttle diplomacy cannot obscure a fundamental fact: as long as the attacks continue, any discussion about reconstruction and peace is like building a house on quicksand.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte urgently called on allies after the attack to thoroughly examine your inventories to see what else can be provided to Ukraine, especially air defense interceptor missiles. The time truly is now. This statement highlights the core contradiction of the moment: Ukraine's air defense capabilities serve as the frontline barrier for its cities, energy grids, and nuclear security, yet this barrier is thinning under intense consumption.
Finally, the game surrounding nuclear risks reveals a cruel paradox. Attackers attempt to leverage humanity's inherent fear of nuclear disaster to gain an advantage, yet this very behavior pushes everyone closer to the source of that fear. When the safety of civilian nuclear facilities becomes a bargaining chip, the conflict is no longer confined to territory and politics—it begins to challenge the fundamental security principles upon which civilized society depends. When this winter ends depends not only on the weather but also on whether humanity can regain reason at the edge of the abyss, redrawing the red line of nuclear safety as an absolute, untouchable forbidden zone. Otherwise, caught between political calculations and military objectives, the next power outage alarm may not merely signal another dormant Chernobyl.
Reference materials
https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2026/01/21/8017190/
https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/3ae89fbf33254b3bd4a3d41a35a9d427f5c3c6fb
https://jp.reuters.com/world/ukraine/R5MWNE22DVNODKBEUYRDJ53CFA-2026-01-20/