The Old Order is Dead, Menu or Table? The Davos Declaration of Canada's Prime Minister and the Survival Strategy of Middle Powers.

In January 2025, in Davos, Switzerland, the chill of the Alps seemed to seep into the venue of the World Economic Forum. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stood under the spotlight, facing global political and business elites, and delivered a cold, direct assertion: The U.S.-led, rules-based international order has ended, and it is not coming back.

His speech did not mention U.S. President Donald Trump by name, but between the lines echoed the aftershocks of geopolitical earthquakes over the past few years—trade wars, tariff threats, public pressure on allies, and the recent uproar over Greenland's sovereignty. On the very same day as Carney's speech, Trump shared an image on social media showing Canada and Greenland covered by the American flag. This was not a joke, but a blatant display of power.

Kane's speech transcended ordinary diplomatic rhetoric; it was both a diagnosis and a blueprint for action. Quoting the famous metaphor of former Czech president and dissident Václav Havel, he called on nations and businesses to remove the slogans from their shop windows and cease living in the defunct fiction of a rules-based international order. He warned that the world is in a state of rupture, not transition. For middle powers like Canada, the core question is no longer whether to adapt to the new reality, but how—whether to build higher walls or to pursue something more ambitious.

Medium powers must act together, Carney's voice was clear and firm, because if you're not at the table, you're on the menu.

The End of Order: From Fiction to Fracture

Karnik's eulogy for the old order was not a momentary outburst of emotion. Analysis reveals that his arguments are built upon a series of coherent observations: dysfunctional multilateral institutions, the weaponization of economic integration, and major powers blatantly placing their own interests above international norms. He clearly pointed out that over the past few decades, middle powers have thrived within a system partly based on fiction—where there was an unspoken pretense that the rules applied equally to everyone, even though it was widely understood that violations by the strongest often went unpunished.

We know that part of the story about the rules-based international order is false, Carney admits. The most powerful countries exempt themselves from obligations when convenient, trade rules are applied asymmetrically, and the enforcement of international law varies depending on the identity of the accused or the victim. However, this fiction is useful—it provides a certain predictability, and American hegemony in particular offers public goods: open sea lanes, a stable financial system, and collective security.

But now, this tacit understanding has shattered. Carney describes the mechanism of the rupture: major powers have begun to use economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as tools of coercion, and supply chains as vulnerabilities to exploit. When integration becomes the source of your subordination, you cannot live in the lie of mutual benefit achieved through integration. This statement directly points to the core contradiction in current geo-economic competition—the interdependence brought by globalization is transforming from a cornerstone of shared prosperity into a channel for strategic coercion.

This fracture is most dramatically manifested in the Arctic region. The Trump administration's repeated claims that the United States must possess Greenland to ensure security not only challenge Denmark's sovereignty and Greenland's right to self-determination but also subvert the fundamental norms of conduct within the post-World War II NATO alliance. At Davos, Carney made a clear statement: Canada firmly stands with Greenland and Denmark, fully supporting their unique right to determine Greenland's future. He also reaffirmed an unwavering commitment to NATO's Article 5 (the collective defense clause). Such a statement responds to the most unconventional threat within the alliance using the most traditional language of alliance.

The Dilemma of Middle Powers: Between Hegemony and Isolation

Facing the collapse of the old order, the instinctive reaction of nations is to retreat. Carney points out that many countries have concluded that they must pursue greater strategic autonomy in energy, food, critical minerals, and finance. When a nation cannot feed itself, power itself, or defend itself, the options are indeed limited. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.

However, Carney promptly cautioned about the endpoint of this logic: a fortress-like world would be poorer, more fragile, and less sustainable. A purely inward-looking contraction would be costly for medium-sized powers and could prove counterproductive. They lack the market scale, military capabilities, and power to set terms that major powers possess.

This leads to the most classic dilemma for middle powers: in bilateral negotiations with a hegemonic power, they are inherently at a disadvantage. When we engage in bilateral negotiations with only one hegemon, we negotiate from a position of weakness. We accept the terms offered. We compete with each other to see who can be more compliant. This is not sovereignty. This is performing sovereignty while accepting subordination. Carney's words accurately describe the difficult situation faced by many allies under the threat of U.S. tariffs or market access restrictions.

However, the other option—complete dependence on a major power—also signifies a substantial loss of sovereignty. Carney's speech reveals that Canada has painfully realized that geographical proximity and historical alliances no longer automatically guarantee security and prosperity. Recent disclosures in Canadian media indicate that the country's military has, for the first time in over a century, developed theoretical simulation plans to respond to a potential invasion by the United States. While this represents extreme preventive planning, it symbolically reveals the depth of eroded trust.

Kani's Prescription: Building Domestic Strength and Forming "Issue-Based Alliances"

So, where is the way out for middle powers? Carney outlines a path for Canada, as well as for like-minded countries, which he calls value-based realism. This path has two pillars: building strength domestically and constructing flexible, diverse alliances abroad.

First is the cornerstone of domestic strength. Carney does not mince words, stating that building a strong domestic economy should be the top priority of every government. He lists Canada's assets: its status as an energy superpower, vast reserves of critical minerals, one of the most highly educated populations globally, the world's largest and most sophisticated group of pension fund investors, significant fiscal capacity for action, and an effective multicultural society. These are not empty boasts but the material foundation that reduces vulnerability to external coercion. When a country is more economically resilient and diversified in its supply chains, it has greater confidence to uphold principles in its foreign policy.

Observations indicate that Canada is advancing along this path: significantly increasing defense spending, investing in space-based radar, submarines, and fighter jets; breaking down internal trade barriers; and accelerating large-scale investments in energy, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals. These measures aim to transform traditional resource advantages into geopolitical and economic resilience for the new era.

Secondly, the diplomatic issue-based alliance network. Carney's proposal is not to rebuild a rigid multilateralism, but to construct a flexible, issue-specific, and interest-based alliance network. He calls it building functional coalitions issue by issue. This means cooperating with different partners on different issues: closely coordinating with Nordic and Baltic countries on Arctic security; promoting the connection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership with the European Union on trade to create a new trade bloc covering 1.5 billion people; forming a G7-anchored buyers' club on critical minerals to diversify supply chains; and collaborating with like-minded democratic nations on artificial intelligence.

The core of this approach is to create a dense network of trade, investment, and cultural ties, so that it can be relied upon when facing challenges and opportunities in the future. Carney takes the recent cooperation with China as an example: China agreed to reduce tariffs on Canadian agricultural products, while Canada lowered tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles. He acknowledges that not all partners share all values, but within clear guardrails, there are significant opportunities for mutual benefit. This clear-eyed engagement is precisely the embodiment of pragmatism—drawing red lines on core interests and values, seeking cooperation in feasible areas, while harboring no illusions about returning to the past.

The Path Ahead: Collective Action or Ending Up on the Menu?

Karny's Davos speech ultimately boiled down to a powerful call to action. He urged middle powers to cease their silence, to stop selective criticism, and to act in a manner that matches their words. This means applying standards consistently, whether dealing with allies or adversaries. When middle powers criticize economic coercion from one direction yet remain silent about coercion from another, they are still keeping slogans in the shop window.

The strong have their power. But we also have something: the ability to stop pretending, to face reality, to strengthen ourselves domestically, and to act together. Carney's closing remarks are full of determination.

The profound significance of this speech lies in its marking of a shift in the strategic narrative of Canada, and even of a certain category of nations. From the optimistic globalism of the post-Cold War era, to the anxious adaptation to the return of great power competition, and now to the open acknowledgment of the demise of the old paradigm and the proactive planning of a new path. This is no longer a passive reaction, but an active effort to shape the environment.

Whether Carney's vision can be realized depends on numerous variables: whether other middle powers (such as Australia, South Korea, Brazil, and some European countries) resonate and take coordinated action; whether entities like the European Union can overcome internal divisions and become reliable pillars of the alliance; and whether great power competition moves toward a certain dangerous stability or continues to escalate, eroding the space for cooperation.

But one thing is clear: the tectonic plates of the world order have shifted. The rules-based liberal order may have been a useful fiction, but its pillars have been eroded. Middle powers now stand at a crossroads—either go their separate ways, scrambling for scraps under the shadow of hegemony, or find new ways to unite, leveraging their collective economic weight, diplomatic networks, and normative influence to write a different script for this fractured age—one less dominated by raw power and still leaving room for cooperation, rules, and shared prosperity.

Karni has chosen an ambitious and risky path for Canada. This path rejects nostalgia and refuses to submit. It is based on a sober realization: securing a seat at the table no longer requires an invitation, but rather the strength one brings, along with a new menu co-created with those already seated. The old world is dead, and the table of the new world is being set. Whether to become a diner or end up as the dish—the choice may well be now.