Al Asad Airbase Changes Hands: The Great Power Game Behind the U.S. Military Withdrawal and the Return of Iraqi Sovereignty.

On Saturday, January 17, 2026, over the desert of Iraq's western Anbar Province, a U.S. Air Force C-17 transport aircraft roared past the runway of Al-Asad Air Base, leaving its final contrail. On the ground, General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, stood in the control tower, watching the last team of American advisors board the aircraft and withdraw. As the cabin door closed, a chapter of military presence lasting over two decades came to an end at this strategic location.

The statement from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was concise and forceful: The U.S. military has withdrawn from the Ain al-Asad Air Base, and the Iraqi armed forces have now fully taken over and are managing the base. General Alaralah personally supervised the assignment of tasks to various military units within the base, marking the Iraqi military's complete control over this strategically significant military facility. On the surface, this appears to be merely a planned handover of the base; but upon deeper analysis, it is a critical execution under the framework of the 2024 U.S.-Iraq Agreement and a watershed moment in the evolution of Iraq's post-war political and security landscape.

From "Temporary Deployment" to "Complete Takeover": The Strategic Adjustment Behind the Timeline

The transfer of Ain al-Asad Air Base was not a sudden operation but rooted in a historical bilateral agreement. In 2024, Washington and Baghdad reached a landmark consensus: the U.S.-led international coalition against ISIS would gradually reduce its combat missions in Iraq and conclude them by September 2025, with U.S. forces withdrawing from their stationed bases accordingly. This agreement itself is a direct outcome of domestic political pressures in Iraq and changes in the regional security landscape.

However, the plan encountered subtle variations during its execution. According to information disclosed by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to journalists in October 2025, the initial proposal required the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Ain al-Asad by September 2025. However, developments in Syria led both sides to agree to temporarily retain a small contingent—approximately 250 to 350 advisors and security personnel. This adjustment highlighted the core contradiction in the U.S. military presence in Iraq: the need to respect Iraq's sovereignty demands while maintaining its strategic foothold for counterterrorism and containing Iranian influence in eastern Syria and across the region.

Analysis indicates that the so-called developments in Syria are a multi-layered expression. It may refer to the activities of ISIS remnants within Syria, hint at the potential threat posed by Iran's military presence in Syria through proxies to Iraq, or more likely relate to the ongoing operations of U.S. forces at bases such as Al-Tanf in Syria, which require rear support. The responsibilities of this small remaining force likely extend beyond mere advisory roles, encompassing critical functions such as intelligence sharing, rapid response support, and regional coordination.

Finally, the remaining garrison was completely withdrawn in January 2026, with all American equipment removed. The U.S. military maintained a meaningful silence on this matter, issuing no statements. This low-key approach stands in stark contrast to the official explanations that typically follow major U.S. military operations. Observations suggest that this may reflect the complex mindset within the U.S. decision-making level regarding this withdrawal—both wanting to demonstrate the fulfillment of commitments to allies and unwilling to overly emphasize the posture of strategic contraction.

Al Asad: More Than Just an Air Base

To comprehend the weight of this handover, one must first understand the Al Asad Airbase itself. This massive military installation, located approximately 180 kilometers west of Baghdad and about 100 kilometers north of Ramadi, is Iraq's second-largest airbase, covering an area exceeding 250 square kilometers. Originally constructed by the Saddam Hussein regime under the name Qadisiyah Airbase, it was taken over and extensively expanded by the U.S. military after the 2003 Iraq War, becoming the most crucial strategic hub for the United States in western Iraq.

The strategic position of this base is reflected in multiple dimensions. Geographically, it controls the land corridor from Iraq to Syria and Jordan, serving as a central node in the vast desert region of Anbar Province. In terms of military function, it features a main runway extending 3.5 kilometers, sufficient for large strategic bombers like the B-52 to take off and land. It is fully equipped with hangars, command centers, barracks, and logistical facilities, having long hosted thousands of U.S. and international coalition troops. During the war against ISIS, it was one of the key forward operating bases for commanding airstrikes, launching special operations, and training Iraqi forces.

More importantly, Al-Asad Airbase has consistently been the epicenter of regional geopolitical friction. In January 2020, following the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force, by a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad, Iran and its supported Iraqi militia groups launched a large-scale ballistic missile attack on Al-Asad Airbase. This resulted in traumatic injuries, including concussions, to over a hundred U.S. military personnel. That assault thrust the base into global headlines and transformed it into a symbolic stage for Iran to demonstrate its retaliatory capabilities and for the United States to showcase its defensive resilience.

Admiral Alarakh's directive to fully utilize its capabilities and strategic position after taking over is by no means an empty statement. For the Iraqi military, gaining full control of Ain al-Assad means, for the first time, the ability to independently operate a top-tier air force combat center meeting NATO standards. The base's comprehensive radar systems, command and control networks, and logistical support facilities will significantly enhance the Iraqi Air Force and Army Aviation's capabilities in long-range projection, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as rapid response. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense specifically mentioned in its statement that dedicated headquarters have been allocated for the Air Force and Army Aviation commands, indicating that this base will become a key platform for the future integration and modernization of Iraq's air power.

Withdrawal Logic: The Triangular Balance of Domestic Politics, Regional Rivalry, and Counterterrorism Needs

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Ain al-Asad should not be simply viewed as a military redeployment, but rather examined within the dynamic balance formed by Iraq's domestic politics, the strategic competition among regional powers, and the ongoing need for counterterrorism.

Firstly, this represents a major victory for Iraq's domestic sovereignty narrative. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the prolonged presence of foreign troops in Iraq has consistently been a politically sensitive issue. Particularly after the rise of ISIS in 2014, the U.S.-led international coalition returned to Iraq in an invited capacity. While it helped the Iraqi government forces recapture lost territories, it also gave rise to new anti-American militia groups and intensified domestic debates over compromised sovereignty. Since taking office, the government led by Prime Minister Sudani has been navigating a delicate balancing act: it requires American support in intelligence and air power to prevent the resurgence of ISIS, while simultaneously having to respond to strong domestic political demands for the withdrawal of foreign troops, especially under pressure from political factions within the Coordination Framework, which maintains close ties with Iran.

In an interview with the Associated Press in July 2025, Sudani highlighted the government's key strategic consideration: once the coalition's troop withdrawal is completed, 'there will no longer be any necessity or justification for any group to carry weapons outside the national framework.' This essentially strategically ties the withdrawal of U.S. troops with the disarmament of domestic armed groups. For a long time, some Iran-backed Iraqi militia groups, such as certain factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), have refused to fully integrate into the country's regular security forces, citing resistance to occupation as their reason, thereby maintaining independent military structures and operational capabilities. The presence of U.S. troops has been their most powerful excuse for perpetuating this status. As U.S. forces withdraw from major bases like Ain al-Asad, the Baghdad government will gain stronger moral and political leverage when demanding that these non-state armed groups submit to unified national command and surrender heavy weapons. The handover of bases thus becomes a crucial move by the Sudani government to advance the state's monopoly on the use of force and strengthen central authority.

Secondly, the withdrawal reflects the ongoing adjustment of the U.S. Middle East strategy. Starting from the strategic pivot initiated during the Obama administration to the Biden administration's emphasis on avoiding large-scale ground wars, U.S. policy in the Middle East has increasingly favored a model reliant on air power, special forces, intelligence cooperation, and partner nation proxies. The withdrawal of combat troops from Ain al-Asad while maintaining a military presence in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (such as near Erbil) and in northeastern Syria precisely embodies this model. Bases in the Kurdish region focus more on strategic surveillance, intelligence gathering, and support for the Kurdish Peshmerga forces; the garrison in Syria directly targets ISIS remnants and aims to contain Iran's land corridor. Although the geographical location of Ain al-Asad is significant, its traditional model of large-scale garrisoning no longer aligns with the current U.S. strategic preference for a light footprint and high mobility. Returning the base to Iraq not only saves substantial maintenance costs but also secures political cooperation from the Iraqi government, allowing resources to be concentrated on more critical strategic nodes.

Furthermore, the practical need for counterterrorism has not disappeared; it has merely changed in form. Although ISIS has lost territory in Iraq and Syria, its dormant cells continue to pose an ongoing threat. The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Ain al-Asad does not mean that the United States has abandoned its involvement in Iraq's counterterrorism efforts. The future cooperation model is likely to shift to: U.S. forces being stationed in locations outside Iraq or within the Kurdistan Region that are less likely to trigger political controversy, while continuing to support Iraqi security forces through intelligence sharing, air support (potentially launched from aircraft carriers or other regional bases), advisor training, and joint special operations. This model is more sustainable for the Iraqi government, as it can obtain the necessary security guarantees while preserving sovereign dignity.

Future Vision: Iraq's Security Autonomy and Regional Power Restructuring

The handover of Ain al-Asad Air Base provides a clear lens for observing the future security architecture of Iraq and the Middle East.

For the Iraqi military, taking over such a large modern base in its entirety is an unprecedented test of capability. General Yalal emphasized the need to strengthen joint operations and coordinate all garrison units, hinting at the challenges ahead: the Iraqi Army, Air Force, Special Forces, and other security agencies possibly deployed here must establish an efficient joint command and control system. In the past, the base was led by the U.S. military, with Iraqi units playing more supportive roles; now the roles have reversed, with the heavy responsibilities of command coordination, logistics support, facility maintenance, and air defense security all falling on the shoulders of Iraqi commanders. Successfully operating Ain al-Asad will serve as a rite of passage for the Iraqi security forces toward achieving true professionalism and autonomy.

The future role of this base is also noteworthy. It is likely to transform into a comprehensive security command center for the western region of Iraq, targeting not only the remnants of ISIS but also potentially monitoring and intercepting drug smuggling (which has become one of the major security threats in the area) and weapons trafficking infiltrating from the Syrian border. Furthermore, it may also become a venue for Iraq to conduct joint security training with regional countries such as Jordan, thereby enhancing Iraq's proactive stance in regional security affairs.

From a regional perspective, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Ain al-Asad has subtly shifted the balance of influence within Iraq. Iran will undoubtedly view this as a victory for its resistance axis narrative and diplomatic efforts. However, this does not mean Iran can completely fill the vacuum. The balanced diplomacy that the Iraqi government strives to maintain in domestic politics also applies in the security domain. Baghdad does not want its territory to become a proxy battlefield for conflicts between Iran and Israel or the United States. Full control over key bases like Ain al-Asad actually enhances the Iraqi government's ability to say no—whether to demands for permanent U.S. military presence or to pressures from Iran and its proxy groups seeking excessive influence.

Finally, this handover also sets the tone for the subsequent withdrawal process leading up to the final deadline in September 2025. The smooth transfer of Ain al-Assad, a base of high symbolic and practical significance, serves as a positive signal, indicating that both the United States and Iraq can maintain basic cooperation amid a complex security transition. However, the handover of other bases, particularly those located in more sensitive areas, may face different challenges. Whether the entire withdrawal process can be completed on schedule and smoothly will ultimately test the resilience of the 2024 agreement and determine whether Iraq can sustain its hard-won security and stability in the post-coalition era.

The U.S. aircraft on the Ain al-Asad runway have flown away, but the runway itself remains. Today, it will be the commanders in Baghdad who decide which planes take off from here, where they fly, and what missions they carry out. This massive desert military camp has transformed from a symbol of temporarily suspended sovereignty into a testing ground for a nation reclaiming its security and autonomy. Its future will be defined not only by Iraqi fighter jets on the runway but also by the wisdom of Iraq’s political elite, the professionalism of its military, and the diplomatic art of maintaining balance amid great-power rivalries.