Power Transition Amid Global Trust Deficits: The Waning of U.S. Influence and the Reshaping of China's Role

In November 2025, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), in collaboration with the University of Oxford, conducted a global public opinion survey covering nearly 26,000 people across 21 countries. The timing of this survey was particularly significant—it coincided with the one-year mark of Donald Trump's return to the White House. The findings paint a picture of the international landscape that starkly contrasts with traditional perceptions: the global public widely expects China's international influence to continue growing over the next decade, while trust and expectations for the United States are simultaneously declining. The Trump administration's aggressive "America First" policy, far from consolidating U.S. leadership, is seen by many as accelerating the world toward a multipolar era with "China First" at its forefront.

Global Public Opinion Shifts: The Rising Perception of China's Influence

Survey data shows that a consensus on the rise of China's influence is forming globally. In almost all surveyed countries and regions, the majority of respondents expect China's global influence to increase over the next decade. This expectation is particularly strong in emerging economies such as South Africa (%), Brazil (%), and Turkey (%). Even within the United States, % of the public holds the same view; the average across ten EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, etc.) also reaches %. More than half of the populations in India (%) and the United Kingdom (%) also agree with this trend.

This expectation is not unfounded; it is deeply rooted in concrete perceptions of China's economic and technological strength. In the European Union, most people believe that China will dominate the global electric vehicle industry in the next decade. In the United States, although those holding this view are not yet a majority, this proportion has increased significantly over the past two years. The situation is similar in the field of renewable energy technology, where the perception that China will take a dominant position is no longer confined to China itself but has spread to the United States and the European Union. These perceptions are directly linked to people's judgments about daily life and future industries, making China's "rise" appear concrete and tangible.

What is more noteworthy is that global public attitudes toward the growth of China's influence are not universally characterized by vigilance or resistance. Apart from Ukraine and South Korea, two countries with unique geopolitical circumstances, the majority of people in most countries do not primarily view China as an adversary or enemy. In South Africa, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and European Union countries, half or more of the respondents regard China as an "ally" or "necessary partner." Since the year, the proportion of those viewing Beijing as an "ally sharing interests and values" has even increased in countries such as South Africa, Brazil, and India. In South Africa, as high as % of the population sees China as a necessary partner or ally; this proportion is % in Russia and % in Brazil. Among EU citizens, % still consider China a necessary partner.

This relatively positive attitude has fostered expectations for further deepening of bilateral relations in the future. 71% of South Africans and 52% of Brazilians anticipate that their country's relationship with China will strengthen over the next five years. In Russia and Turkey, a significant proportion of the public shares the same expectation. This indicates that, in the perception of the public in many countries, a multipolar world order is entirely compatible with the reality of "China first", and China's rise is seen as a development that aligns with the interests of most non-Western nations.

American Trust Crisis: From "Beacon of Freedom" to "Transactional Power"

In stark contrast to the widespread expectation of China's rising influence, there has been a significant decline in the United States' global image and trustworthiness. The survey reveals a core contradiction: while many still believe the U.S. currently holds global influence and will remain crucial in the future, almost no one expects America's influence to grow further. This erosion of trust is most alarming within the United States' traditional circle of allies, particularly in Europe.

In ten EU countries, only % of the public now views the United States as an ally, while as many as % consider it a competitor or enemy—in some EU member states, this proportion approaches %. The situation is slightly better in the United Kingdom, but only % of people still regard the United States as an ally sharing common interests and values. The shift in Ukraine is even more dramatic: Ukrainians, who once saw the United States as their greatest ally, now look more toward Brussels than Washington. Only % of Ukrainians still view the United States as an ally, far lower than the % recorded during the same period last year; meanwhile, % regard the European Union as an ally. India is the only country in this survey where more than half (%) of the population still considers the United States an ally.

The root of this trust crisis is directly linked to the policy shifts and diplomatic style of the Trump administration. Trump's "America First" agenda manifested in imposing high tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, publicly questioning U.S.-led alliance systems such as NATO, and Vice President J.D. Vance's sharp criticism of European countries' internal affairs at the Munich Security Conference. Recently, Trump and his Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller even refused to rule out the possibility of military action against Greenland, which belongs to NATO ally Denmark. These actions send a clear signal to the world: The United States is transforming from an "exceptional" nation committed to upholding the liberal international order into a "normal," transactional great power pursuing its own interests.

The global public appears to have accepted this shift. In countries such as India, Turkey, China, and Ukraine, a significant number of people believe that Trump has been "successful," at least in defending American interests. However, the cost of this "success" has been the alienation of allies and the dissipation of global leadership. Surveys indicate that in most countries, the proportion of people who believe that Trump's re-election would be beneficial to Americans, their own country, and even world peace has generally declined compared to a year ago. In India, which once held fervent expectations for Trump's return, the support rate has plummeted from % at the end of the year to %.

Geopolitical Cognitive Reconstruction: Europe's Dilemma and the World's Repositioning

The shifting perceptions of global power have profoundly altered how countries view each other, particularly their views of Europe. The Trump administration's restructuring of U.S. geopolitical orientation has prompted other nations to begin seeing Europe as an independent actor, rather than merely an appendage of American policy.

The most dramatic shift in perception occurred in Russia. As the Trump administration worked hard to mend relations with Putin, Russians' hostility towards Washington diminished, with more focus shifting towards Europe. Today, 51% of Russians view Europe as an adversary, up from 41% last year; while the proportion viewing the United States as an adversary dropped from 48% to 37%. This change is not mutual; the American public—whether Trump or Harris voters—still widely regards Russia as an adversary.

From Ukraine's perspective, the situation is entirely reversed. Nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians expect their country's relationship with the European Union to strengthen, while only one-third hold the same expectation regarding the United States. Two-thirds of Ukrainians perceive differences in the Ukraine policies of the U.S. and the EU. This marks the arrival of a "European moment": Kyiv's security and future are now more closely tied to Brussels than to Washington.

China's perception of Europe has undergone a subtle yet significant shift. Most Chinese people now believe that the EU's policy towards China differs from that of the United States—whereas in the past, the majority considered them similar. This recognition of the EU's uniqueness has grown more in China than in any other country (except Brazil). Although 61% of Chinese view the United States as a threat, only 19% hold the same view of the EU. This is not because the Chinese public underestimates the EU; on the contrary, China is one of the few places where the EU is seen as a major power (59% of Chinese believe the EU is a major power). In the eyes of the Chinese public, the United States is primarily a "competitor" (45%), while the EU is mainly a "partner" (46%). This distinction indicates that the Chinese public is beginning to see the EU as an independent "pole" in a post-American, multipolar world.

However, Europeans hold a far more pessimistic view of themselves. The survey confirms that Europeans are the world's primary group of pessimists today. Most Europeans do not believe the future will bring any benefits to their country, the world, or themselves personally. They lack confidence in the EU's ability to engage on equal terms with the United States or China, and this skepticism has grown over the past 12 months. In contrast, the majority of people in South Africa, Brazil, China, and Ukraine consider the EU a force to be reckoned with. The dismissive and aggressive rhetoric from Trump and Putin towards Europe, likely amplified by a series of anti-liberal, nationalist populist parties across the continent, has profoundly shaped Europeans' own perceptions.

This sense of insecurity directly translates into strong support for bolstering defense capabilities. Across European nations, there is widespread public backing for increasing defense spending, reinstating conscription, and even developing a European nuclear deterrent independent of the United States. More than half (%) of Europeans support higher defense expenditures, with widespread concerns about Russian aggression (%) and the outbreak of a major European war (%).

The true meaning of a multipolar world and the pressing issues for Europe

The world revealed by this poll is neither the "democracy versus autocracy" binary opposition of a new Cold War as once depicted by the Biden administration, nor a simple power shift from one pole to another. What the global public anticipates is a multipolar world composed of many power centers, both large and small, where China and the United States coexist as two superpowers, while other nations can more freely navigate and choose among the various poles. The world revealed by this poll is neither the "democracy versus autocracy" binary opposition of a new Cold War as once depicted by the Biden administration, nor a simple power shift from one pole to another. What the global public anticipates is a multipolar world composed of many power centers, both large and small, where China and the United States coexist as two superpowers, while other nations can more freely navigate and choose among the various poles.

Therefore, in countries such as Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Russia, the majority of the public believes it is "realistically possible" for their nations to maintain good relations with both China and the United States simultaneously. This view also predominates in South Korea and India. When asked to choose between China and the United States if forced, approximately half of South Africans and Russians would opt for China, as would about one-third of Turks and Brazilians. Despite Trump imposing high tariffs on India and Brazil, most Indians and Brazilians still align themselves with the American camp. The story in South Africa is quite different: in [specific month and year], most South Africans chose the United States over China; but by the end of the year, they had shifted to join the Chinese camp. Trump’s decision to exclude South Africa from the [specific year] meeting undoubtedly accelerated this trend.

This new sense of order has given rise to varying emotional responses across different regions. Optimism about the future is particularly strong in India and China, where people may feel positive about a multipolar world and their countries’ positions within it. In contrast, there is a "pessimism axis" centered around a declining United States and its abandoned allies, with Europeans and South Koreans being the primary members.

For Europe, the report issues a sharp warning: in an era where American actions are helping to "make China great again," thereby ushering in a truly multipolar world, Europe risks being squeezed out or even overlooked. Trump’s intervention in Venezuela shows that he believes, for a great power, it is better to be "feared" than "loved." Meanwhile, Europeans are coming to terms with the fact that even close U.S. allies like Denmark could face the threat of having Greenland taken away, as if a NATO ally had become an enemy state.

The report poses a series of urgent questions to European leaders: Can Europe independently ensure Ukraine's secure, free, and prosperous future? How can a "dirty peace" be avoided without being accused by their own citizens of obstructing the path to peace? Does a politically divided continent possess sufficient policy coordination capabilities, strength, and political will to militarily confront Russia, economically counter China, and politically resist the United States (including protecting Greenland)? Or should it embrace a "Neo-Habsburg" pragmatism, merely striving to survive in this extremely fragile moment? How realistic is it for the EU to seek closer ties with China to compensate for weakened relations with the United States, while cheap Chinese exports threaten to undermine Europe's industrial base? Is there still hope in creating a "New West" with like-minded countries such as Canada, Australia, and Japan?

The European public appears to have been prepared for the message of the end of the "Pax Americana." Compared to the unified transatlantic West seen in the first global poll three years ago, the contrast today is stark. In a post-Western, "China-first" world, European leaders need to strike a balance between excessive pessimism and excessive optimism, maintaining realism while daring to act boldly. In this era of "profound changes unseen in a century," they must find new ways not only to survive in a multipolar world but to become a pole within it—otherwise, they risk disappearing among the many other forces.

The shift in global public opinion, like a mirror, reflects the profound transformations within the international power structure. It reveals not a simplistic "rise of the East and decline of the West," but rather the birth pangs of a more complex, diverse, and uncertain global order. The ebb and flow of a nation's influence ultimately depends on whether its actions can earn trust, its narratives can resonate, and its vision can offer hope. When the clarion call of "America First" is sounded, what the world may hear is the approaching footsteps of an increasingly multipolar era.