Battle for Critical Minerals: The U.S. Forms Alliances to Exert Pressure, Europe Seeks Alternative Paths, Undercurrents Stir in Global Supply Chains.

On January 11, 2026, at Shimizu Port in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan, the ocean research vessel Chikyu slowly set sail. Its destination was the waters near Minamitorishima, approximately 1,950 kilometers southeast of Tokyo, with a mission to conduct an unprecedented trial mining of rare-earth mud from the seabed at a depth of about 6,000 meters within Japan's exclusive economic zone. Almost simultaneously, in Washington, D.C., USA, an emergency meeting was being prepared, bringing together finance ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) as well as Australia, India, South Korea, Mexico, and other countries. From the deep sea to international conference halls, a global contest centered on critical minerals, aimed at weakening China's dominant position, was unfolding with unprecedented urgency.

Washington's "Urgent" Clarion Call: A Belated Mobilization

The Washington meeting on January 12 was the result of strong advocacy by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent since the G7 Leaders' Summit in Canada in June 2025. At that time, he presented to the attending heads of state a picture of the fragility of the rare earth supply chain. Although the summit resulted in an action plan aimed at strengthening supply chains and economic resilience, Bessent grew increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of follow-up actions. A senior U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, was blunt: urgency is the theme today. This is a very large task, involving many different angles and many different countries, and we really need to speed up.

This sense of urgency is backed by cold, hard data. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China holds an absolute dominance of 47% to 87% in the refining of key minerals, covering copper, lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths. These minerals are the lifeblood of defense technology, semiconductors, renewable energy components, batteries, and refining processes. The countries participating in this Washington meeting collectively account for 60% of global demand for key minerals, yet most of them, except for Japan, remain heavily reliant on China.

Japan's exception stems from a painful lesson in 2010. At that time, China suddenly cut off the supply of critical minerals to Japan, forcing Tokyo to embark on a more than decade-long effort to diversify its supply chains. Meanwhile, other G7 countries, in the view of U.S. officials, have yet to demonstrate sufficient crisis awareness as China threatens to impose stricter export controls. A few days before the meeting, reports emerged that China had begun restricting exports of rare earths and rare earth-containing powerful magnets to Japanese companies, as well as banning the export of dual-use items to the Japanese military. This undoubtedly cast a realistic shadow over the meeting in Washington.

The United States is attempting to play the role of convener and leader. The U.S. is positioning itself to bring everyone together, demonstrate leadership, and share our vision for the future. That U.S. official stated, we are prepared to act with those who feel a similar sense of urgency... others can join once they realize the severity of the issue. However, the meeting is expected to only issue a statement and is unlikely to produce a specific joint action plan. This reveals the reality of misaligned paces and differing interests within the alliance.

Europe's Caution and Divergence: Seeking Both Security and Sovereignty

Across the Atlantic, Europe's response appears more complex and cautious. German Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil clearly drew a red line before flying to Washington. In response to U.S. President Trump's repeated intentions to control Greenland, Klingbeil emphasized: The future of Greenland is solely determined by Denmark and Greenland. Territorial sovereignty and integrity must be respected. These principles of international law apply to everyone—including the United States. He further pointed out that, as NATO allies, we work together to enhance Arctic security, not through mutual confrontation.

Germany's stance reflects the prevailing attitude in Europe: on one hand, they deeply recognize the risks associated with the concentration of critical mineral supply chains and are willing to take joint actions to enhance supply chain security; on the other hand, they remain wary of the United States' unilateral and assertive geopolitical tactics, particularly opposing solutions that come at the expense of undermining international rules and alliances. Klingbeil described the trip to Washington as entering Trump's cave, hinting at the high level of uncertainty and potential risks involved in this visit.

Meanwhile, German Foreign Minister John Wadepool has also departed for the United States, planning to meet with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Wadepool stated that he is traveling not only as Germany's foreign minister but also as Europe's foreign minister. This statement underscores the European Union's efforts to address challenges with a unified stance. His itinerary also includes a stop in Iceland to meet with the Icelandic foreign minister, highlighting the central role of the Arctic region in this strategic contest.

In terms of specific policies, Europe appears to lean more toward market-based coordination mechanisms. After the Washington meeting, Klimbail revealed that the G7 and partner countries discussed the possibility of setting price floors for critical minerals such as rare earths. He noted that this is not aimed at confronting anyone but rather at strengthening cooperation among partners, with the benefit of providing predictable prices and minimizing the influence of countries attempting to manipulate market prices. However, he also acknowledged that numerous issues remain to be clarified in the coming weeks and believes further consultations among foreign ministers and energy ministers are necessary. While the price floor mechanism appears to be an economic tool, it essentially attempts to establish a non-Chinese producer cartel to counter China's market influence through collective bargaining power. Nevertheless, its feasibility and enforceability remain significant question marks.

Greenland: A Treasure Trove of Resources or a Geopolitical Mirage?

America's obsession with Greenland has thrust the world's largest island into the spotlight. Trump's remarks—"we're going to do something with Greenland, whether they like it or not"—along with concerns about preventing China and Russia from gaining control over the island, have imbued discussions about critical minerals with a strong geopolitical undertone.

The resource potential of Greenland is indeed astonishing. Research indicates that beneath its ice sheet, there are at least three rare earth deposits that could be among the world's largest in terms of reserves. It is estimated that the reserves of dysprosium and neodymium there are sufficient to meet more than a quarter of the world's future demand (approximately tens of thousands of tons). Additionally, it boasts abundant resources of lithium, graphite, oil, and natural gas. The United States Geological Survey estimates that northeastern Greenland may contain around billions of barrels of oil equivalent, comparable to the total proven oil reserves of the United States.

However, potential does not equal capability. Greenland's rare earth mining faces nearly brutal practical challenges. Tracy Hughes, founder of the Critical Minerals Institute, pointed out incisively: The obsession with Greenland has always been more about geopolitical posturing—a narrative of military strategic interests and stock promotion—rather than providing realistic supply solutions for the technology industry. The hype far exceeds the hard science and economics behind these critical minerals.

The challenges are multi-dimensional: extreme remoteness and harsh climate, virtually non-existent infrastructure, lack of roads and railways, electricity must be generated on-site, and skilled labor must be brought in from outside. More critically, there are technological bottlenecks. Greenland's rare earth elements are often encased in a complex rock called eudialyte, and globally, no technology has yet been developed to economically and viably extract rare earths from such rocks. In contrast, rare earths in other parts of the world are mostly found in carbonatites, for which mature extraction methods already exist.

Environmental risks are equally significant. Extracting rare earth elements requires the use of toxic chemicals and is often associated with radioactive uranium, which poses a nightmare for Greenland, which is striving to develop a thriving tourism industry and has an extremely fragile ecological environment. Ian Lange, an economics professor at the Colorado School of Mines specializing in rare earth studies, analogized: Everyone is rushing toward the finish line. But if you go to Greenland, it's like going back to the starting point.

Pragmatic voices within the industry suggest that rather than chasing the mirage of Greenland, the United States should focus on supporting projects with established pathways. For example, investing in the only domestic rare earth mining company in the U.S., or strengthening cooperation with allies such as Australia. In [month] [year], the U.S. signed a project agreement worth billions of dollars with Australia, aimed at leveraging Australia’s strategic reserves to counter China’s [dominance]. Scott Dunn, CEO of Noveon Magnetics, whose company already uses non-Chinese sourced elements at its Texas plant to produce over [number] metric tons of magnets annually, believes that changing the status quo where over [percentage]% of rare earths come from China will take time and should start from areas with a proven track record of successful delivery.

Japan's Role: Technological Reserves and Deep-Sea Ambitions

In this global supply chain restructuring, Japan is regarded by the United States as a key partner, and may even play a central role. This is not accidental, but stems from its unique historical lessons and technological reserves.

The 2010 supply disruption crisis compelled Japan to establish relatively diversified supply channels and a substantial strategic reserve. More importantly, Japan has maintained highly advanced technology in rare earth separation and refining. Professor Kentaro Nakamura of the University of Tokyo pointed out that Japan cannot compete with China on cost, but its high-end separation and refining technologies are valuable assets. He warned that if the industry continues to shrink, talent and know-how will be lost. Japan still retains these capabilities, and timely scaling up is crucial.

Japan's seabed rare earth mud mining plan is a radical attempt to secure supply chain autonomy. The rare earth mud in the waters around Minamitorishima is rich in rare earth elements, with the key advantage of containing almost no radioactive substances such as uranium and thorium. This means that the entire chain from mining to refining could potentially be completed within Japan, avoiding significant environmental regulatory hurdles and geopolitical risks. Japan plans to assess commercial feasibility through this trial, aiming to commence large-scale mining experiments starting next February, with the capacity to extract up to tons of rare earth-bearing sediment per day.

Japan's path selection reveals a reality: the decoupling of supply chains from China is not merely a substitution of production locations, but a comprehensive trade-off involving technological routes, environmental standards, cost structures, and geopolitical risks. Deep-sea mining presents extremely high technical difficulty and cost, yet if successful, it will open up a completely new supply chain entirely independent of traditional land-based mines. This is both a technological adventure and a strategic investment.

The Paradox of Refactoring and the Uncertain Future

The Washington Conference and the global actions it triggered mark a paradigm shift in critical mineral supply chains from prioritizing efficiency to prioritizing security. However, this restructuring is full of paradoxes.

First, the conflict between urgency and complexity. The United States calls for accelerating the pace, but whether it is the pioneering efforts in Greenland, the exploration of deep-sea mining, or the construction of new smelting capacity, these are all capital-intensive, long-cycle, and technologically uncertain massive projects that cannot be accomplished overnight. Establishing alternative supply chains requires a decade or even longer, while geopolitical frictions can change in an instant.

Secondly, the contradiction between alliance coordination and interest differentiation. Although the G7 and its partner countries share common anxieties, their respective interest demands differ. The United States focuses on great power competition and global leadership; Europe seeks a balance between security and sovereignty, as well as environmental standards; resource-rich countries like Australia and Greenland (through Denmark) aim to maximize resource value; Japan pursues technological self-reliance and supply chain control. Establishing cooperation such as price floors requires extremely delicate interest balancing and enforcement mechanisms, which is no easy task. Secondly, the contradiction between alliance coordination and interest differentiation. Although the G7 and its partner countries share common anxieties, their respective interest demands differ. The United States focuses on great power competition and global leadership; Europe seeks a balance between security and sovereignty, as well as environmental standards; resource-rich countries like Australia and Greenland (through Denmark) aim to maximize resource value; Japan pursues technological self-reliance and supply chain control. Establishing cooperation such as price floors requires extremely delicate interest balancing and enforcement mechanisms, which is no easy task.

Third, Contradiction Between Environmental Goals and Mining Reality. Promoting the energy transition requires a large amount of critical minerals, but the extraction of these minerals itself may cause severe environmental damage, especially in ecologically sensitive areas like Greenland. This creates a dual ethical and practical dilemma: Does accelerating extraction to save the global climate come at the cost of destroying fragile local ecosystems?

Finally, the Dual Nature of China's Role. China is both a source of single-point-of-failure risk in the supply chain and the largest supplier and market that cannot be bypassed at present. Even amid tensions, China continues to fulfill its commitments to purchase American soybeans and deliver critical minerals to U.S. companies. This interdependence is difficult to sever completely in the short term.

In the future, the competition for critical minerals will unfold across multiple fronts: technological front (deep-sea mining, new extraction processes, recycling technologies), diplomatic front (building like-minded supply alliances), financial front (government subsidies, price support, project investments), and standards front (environmental, labor, and transparency standards). China cannot respond passively, as its market influence, complete industrial chain, and cost advantages remain powerful weapons.

Global supply chains are becoming politicized and factionalized, yet economic laws and physical realities will ultimately set boundaries for this competition. The true test for nations lies in whether they can find that delicate and challenging balance between ensuring security and maintaining efficiency, pursuing autonomy and preserving openness, accelerating transformation and protecting the environment. The rare-earth mud on the ocean floor, the mineral deposits beneath ice caps, and the negotiating tables in Washington together sketch a new 21st-century landscape where resources, technology, and power intertwine—and its final form is far from being settled.