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[UA] Economics ongoing updated 2026-06-09

The War Economies & Sanctions

▲ Escalating · since 29 Apr 2026 · 14 events

Assessment

Two war economies are diverging, and the financial front has become as decisive as the battlefield. Russia's wartime model is cracking under its own contradictions: non-performing assets have breached the IMF's 10%-of-loans crisis threshold for a third straight month, leaked Russian internal documents show one oil major shutting ~400 wells, refining down at least 10%, 11 banks queued for liquidation and a federal deficit near $80 billion by month five — even as an Iran-war oil windfall briefly doubled monthly oil-and-gas revenue to ~$19bn. The National Bank of Ukraine reports Russia's GDP shrank for the first time since early 2023 and its National Wealth Fund is depleting fast, while Putin signals openness to peace talks as the economy falters. On the Western side, EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas calls Putin 'weaker than ever' and 'on the back foot' and pushes a 21st sanctions package aimed at Russia's shadow fleet (~30% of seaborne oil exports), banks and stolen-grain sellers. But unity is fraying: the UK's surprise rollback of jet-fuel and diesel sanctions drew an open rebuke from Brussels, and the EU's €90bn Ukraine loan was approved only after abandoning the more aggressive plan to mobilise ~€210bn of frozen Russian assets — a 'reparations loan' the Netherlands and Lithuania are now fighting to revive. Ukraine, meanwhile, runs a ~$52bn external financing gap, an $8.1bn IMF program hostage to a politically toxic tax-reform fight, and a reconstruction bill the World Bank puts at $587.7bn. The binding question is which economy runs out of money first — and whether the West will deploy its single largest lever, Moscow's own frozen reserves.

Theatre

Persian GulfGulf of OmanMediterraneanRed SeaBlack SeaCaspian SeaBaltic Sea IRANIRAQSAUDI ARABIASYRIATURKEYJORDANOMANU.A.E.YEMENUKRAINERUSSIABELARUSPOLANDROMANIA

Events

  1. 29 May 2026 EU ties Ukraine loan disbursements to a politically toxic tax reform as the first €45bn tranche stalls
    Kyiv

    The European Commission's €90 billion loan structure conditions disbursement on unpopular fiscal reforms, potentially linking ~€8.4 billion in macro-financial assistance to changes in Ukraine's preferential small-business tax regime, including a 20% VAT above an income threshold. Ukraine's parliament ratified the €90bn loan agreement on 28 May with 298 votes (€60bn for defence-industrial capacity, €30bn for budget support), and a first €3.2bn macro-financial installment is expected around mid-June, conditional on extending a 5% military levy, ending tax exemptions on international parcels and digital-platform earnings, and tightening the simplified tax system. The same reforms anchor Ukraine's separate $8.1bn IMF Extended Fund Facility, whose June review gates a $685.5m tranche.

    Conditionality bitesLinking ~€8.4bn to a 20% VAT on small business turns Western financing into domestic political risk: Kyiv must impose tax pain on its own population mid-war to unlock the cash that keeps the budget solvent, a trade-off that has repeatedly stalled the relevant bills in the Rada.
    IMF-EU lockstepThe same tax package gating both the EU tranche and the IMF's June review means a single parliamentary failure jams two financing taps at once — the IMF's $8.1bn EFF functions as a credibility anchor, so missing its conditions risks the far larger EU and bilateral flows that key off it.
    Defence vs budget splitSplitting the loan €60bn defence / €30bn budget shows how little of the headline figure is freely spendable cash: most is earmarked for arms production, leaving the contested macro-financial slice as the actual lever on which solvency and reform conditionality turn.
  2. 28 May 2026 Kallas says Russia is 'on the back foot' and pushes another round of sanctions
    Cyprus

    EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas stated that Russia is on the back foot militarily, economically and diplomatically, and that the war's dynamics are shifting in Ukraine's favour. Speaking after an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Cyprus, she insisted an unconditional ceasefire is a prerequisite for peace negotiations, that Europe will never be a neutral mediator, and that Russia must stop sabotage and election interference. Kallas confirmed the EU is working on another round of sanctions against Russia.

    Three-front framingNaming the economic front alongside the military and diplomatic ones makes sanctions co-equal with battlefield outcomes in the EU's theory of victory — the 'back foot' claim rests on Russia's deficit, banking strain and falling revenue as much as on territory.
    Ceasefire preconditionsInsisting on an unconditional ceasefire before talks is the financial guardrail against Putin's likely play — trading a pause for sanctions relief — so Kallas is pre-committing the bloc to keep the economic pressure on until Russia concedes, not as a bargaining chip.
    Sequenced escalationA second sanctions announcement within seventeen days of the first signals a deliberate tempo: the EU is trying to compound pressure faster than Russia can adapt its shadow-fleet and circumvention networks, treating sanctions as a rolling campaign rather than discrete packages.
  3. 28 May 2026 Ukrainian sea drones strike three Russian shadow-fleet tankers near Turkey's Black Sea coast
    Black Sea

    On 28 May 2026, Ukrainian sea drones struck three tankers linked to Russia's shadow fleet in the Black Sea near Turkey's northern coast. The Palau-flagged James II and Sierra Leone-flagged Altura and Velora were hit while sailing in ballast or conducting ship-to-ship transfers; no casualties were reported. All three had previously been sanctioned for transporting Russian oil. Ukraine's HUR military intelligence stated the shadow fleet accounts for up to 30% of Russia's seaborne oil exports, and the strike marked a significant expansion of Ukraine's maritime strike capability into international waters.

    Kinetic sanctionsStriking already-sanctioned tankers is Ukraine enforcing the sanctions regime militarily where listings alone fail — by physically endangering shadow-fleet vessels Ukraine raises their insurance and crewing costs, attacking the ~30% of seaborne exports that paper sanctions struggle to stop.
    Geographic reachHitting tankers near Turkey's coast extends Ukraine's strike envelope into international waters and onto ship-to-ship transfer points — the exact laundering technique the shadow fleet uses to obscure origin — turning the chokepoints of evasion into points of vulnerability.
    Revenue at the sourceTargeting the 30% of exports moving outside the price cap goes after the highest-value barrels Russia sells above the capped price, so each disrupted cargo dents the marginal revenue that most directly funds the war, complementing the strikes on export terminals.
  4. 1 23 May 2026 Netherlands and Lithuania push the EU to revive the frozen Russian assets debate
    Brussels

    Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys, speaking at the GLOBSEC forum in Prague, called for Europe to return frozen Russian sovereign assets to the political agenda, arguing they are the real resource for Ukraine and the leverage to force Russia to negotiate; he said the €90bn loan deal had merely postponed the issue. The push followed Dutch Finance Minister Eelco Heinen canvassing EU support to resume the discussions, amid warnings that the existing loan covers only about two-thirds of Ukraine's budget shortfall until 2027. Belgium, where most assets are held, has opposed the mechanism over legal and economic risks, and the ECB has cautioned it could deter eurozone investment.

    Asset as leverageBudrys framing the ~€210bn as 'the real resource and leverage' reframes the assets not as a funding line but as a coercive instrument — credibly threatening to lend Ukraine against the principal changes Russia's calculus at the negotiating table in a way the budget-funded €90bn loan does not.
    Belgium's veto riskWith most assets at Euroclear in Belgium, Brussels's national objection — fear of legal liability and capital flight as China or Gulf sovereigns move custody to Dubai or Hong Kong — is the practical chokepoint, so reviving the debate means overcoming one member's exposure under the unanimity rule.
    ECB's spillover warningThe ECB cautioning that confiscation could deter eurozone investment surfaces the systemic cost: weaponising reserves held in euros risks undermining the euro's standing as a reserve currency, the same reserve-status trade-off Belgium invokes to defend caution.
  5. 21 May 2026 NBU: no economic model can predict when Russia's war funds run out, as its GDP shrinks for the first time since 2023
    Kyiv

    The National Bank of Ukraine's April 2026 Inflation Report found Russia's economy stagnating despite high oil revenues from Middle East disruptions, with GDP declining for the first time since early 2023. High prices lifted Russia's seaborne oil export income from $1bn to $2.5bn per week between January and March and narrowed the Urals discount to $5-8, yet oil-and-gas revenues still fell 45.4% year-on-year in Q1 2026 and the budget deficit hit 1.9% of GDP, exceeding the annual target. The NBU described Russia as a 'military-administrative' economy in 'fragile equilibrium' with rapid National Wealth Fund depletion, while cautioning that no model can date the exhaustion of war resources given the irrationality of Russian policy.

    Windfall masks declineWeekly oil income rising to $2.5bn while year-on-year oil-and-gas revenue falls 45.4% shows the Iran-war spike is a level effect on a falling trend — the comparison base from a stronger 2025 means even doubled weekly takings leave the annual budget short of target.
    Fund depletion clock'Rapid depletion' of the National Wealth Fund (down to ~$52bn liquid from ~$113bn pre-war) is the hard constraint the NBU points to: once the liquid buffer is gone, Moscow's only options are money-printing, deeper devaluation or spending cuts, each of which feeds the inflation already near 7-8%.
    Unmodellable endgameThe NBU explicitly refusing to forecast a collapse date — because the regime disregards citizen welfare — reframes the policy implication: the West cannot wait for an automatic Russian crack-up and must keep enforcing sanctions, since the economic floor is political will, not a calculable reserve number.
  6. 21 May 2026 EU rebukes the UK for a surprise rollback of Russia sanctions on jet fuel and diesel
    United Kingdom

    The EU's economy chief Valdis Dombrovskis publicly criticised the UK for issuing sanctions licences exempting jet fuel and diesel from a ban on importing oil products made from Russian crude but refined in third countries, without prior notice to G7 allies, saying now is not the time to roll back sanctions. The UK — which had already apologised via Trade Minister Chris Bryant for the 'clumsy' handling — defended the move as a temporary, consumer-protecting energy-security measure amid Hormuz supply disruption. Figures from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air showed the two fuels represent 99% of UK imports from refineries processing Russian crude, effectively neutering the policy; Zelenskyy called the issue 'very sensitive'.

    The 99% loopholeCREA's finding that jet fuel and diesel are 99% of UK imports from Russian-crude refineries means the 'technical adjustment' guts the entire third-country ban — the exemption is not a carve-out but the whole substance of the rule, which is why Ukraine and Brussels treat it as a de facto rollback.
    G7 unity crackActing without notifying G7 allies breaks the coordination that makes the price cap and refining ban enforceable: a single member quietly reopening a laundering route through India and Turkey lets Russian-origin product re-enter Western markets, undercutting the leverage the bloc is simultaneously trying to escalate.
    Energy-security wedgeLondon's justification — protecting consumers from Hormuz-driven fuel prices — is exactly the pressure point Moscow exploits: high oil prices make sanctions costlier for the West to maintain, so the war's energy inflation does double duty by funding Russia and tempting its adversaries to defect.
  7. 18 May 2026 pivotal Leaked Russian internal documents: ~400 oil wells shut, 11 banks queued for liquidation, ~$80bn budget hole
    Russia

    Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service obtained internal Russian documents assessing the war's concealed economic damage. They reveal that one Russian oil company shut down about 400 wells, oil refining dropped at least 10% in early 2026, 11 banks are preparing for liquidation, and the federal budget deficit reached nearly $80 billion by the fifth month of the year. President Zelenskyy attributed the damage to Ukrainian long-range strikes and instructed intelligence to share sanitised evidence with international partners to harden the case for sanctions.

    Capacity destructionShutting ~400 wells is a supply hit that compounds the price-cap squeeze: idled wells in cold formations are costly to restart, so the strikes convert a temporary closure into durable lost output, and 'refining down at least 10%' forces Russia to export more crude at capped prices instead of higher-margin products.
    Banking contagionEleven banks 'preparing for liquidation' aligns with the CMACP toxic-asset reading: war lending and sanctioned counterparties are eroding capital, and consolidating the failures into state-backed institutions hides the losses on the federal balance sheet rather than resolving them, deferring a deeper hit.
    Deficit realityA ~$80bn deficit by month five is roughly the full-year 2025 gap ($72bn) reached in under half a year, evidence that the Iran-war oil windfall did not close the structural hole and that the National Wealth Fund drawdown is accelerating toward the point where sequestration or devaluation becomes unavoidable.
  8. 17 May 2026 Russia's banking system crosses the IMF crisis threshold as toxic assets exceed 10% for a third month
    Russia

    A report from Russia's Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMACP) revealed that non-performing assets in Russia's banking system have exceeded the 10% IMF crisis threshold for three consecutive months. The crisis remains latent because state-backed institutions are masking defaults, but economists warn it strains the federal budget. Ukraine's President Zelensky warned that Moscow is seeking sanctions relief — including SWIFT access — to stabilise its financial system.

    Quantified thresholdThe IMF treats non-performing loans above 10% as a systemic banking-crisis marker; crossing it for three straight months means the 2026 war-lending and high-rate environment has pushed bad debt past the line economists use to date crises like 2008-09, not a one-month blip.
    Hidden, not absentState banks masking defaults converts a market event into a fiscal liability: every concealed bad loan is a future recapitalisation the Finance Ministry must fund from a budget already running an ~$80bn deficit, so the cost migrates from bank balance sheets onto the sovereign.
    SWIFT as the tellZelensky flagging Moscow's bid for SWIFT relief is the diagnostic: a system that did not need re-access to Western payment rails would not put it on the negotiating table, signalling the financial squeeze is biting harder than the Kremlin's public messaging admits.
  9. 17 May 2026 Putin signals willingness for peace talks as the Russian economy falters
    Russia

    Analysis indicates Putin is increasingly interested in peace negotiations because of a deteriorating Russian economy — recession, falling oil prices and mounting sanctions pressure — alongside a worsening battlefield situation and Europe ramping up defence spending. With the US-led peace process seen as dead, the assessment frames a potential opening for European-led talks, with Putin reportedly weighing former German leaders as arbiters. The economic distress is presented as a primary driver pulling Moscow toward the table.

    Economics as leverTying Putin's diplomatic shift to recession and falling oil prices makes sanctions the actual instrument of pressure: if the war chest is the constraint, then tightening the 21st package and enforcing the price cap is the negotiating leverage, not a sideshow to the battlefield.
    Relief as the askA Russia that needs talks because the economy is failing will price sanctions relief — SWIFT, frozen-asset release, oil-trade normalisation — as its core demand, which is exactly why Zelensky warns against a ceasefire that quietly unwinds the financial pressure built over four years.
    Track ownershipA dead US process and a European-led opening shift the financial leverage to Brussels, the holder of the €90bn loan and the ~€210bn in frozen assets — meaning the EU's willingness to deploy or withhold those tools, not Washington, increasingly sets the terms of any settlement.
  10. 2 12 May 2026 pivotal EU approves the €90bn Ukraine loan but abandons the plan to mobilise frozen Russian assets
    Brussels

    The European Union formally approved a €90 billion loan to Ukraine on 23 April after Hungary's new leadership ended its obstruction, to be disbursed over two years for defence and budget support. Analysis argues the EU missed a strategic opportunity by not using frozen Russian sovereign assets (€210 billion) as collateral for a larger 'reparation loan' that would have been more financially robust, legally agile and geopolitically impactful. The decision leaves Ukraine's long-term funding uncertain and fails to link Russia's financial consequences directly to its war, while populist governments in Slovakia and Czechia continue to cast doubt on sustained support.

    Principal untouchedLending €90bn off EU and member budgets instead of against ~€210bn in immobilised Russian reserves means European taxpayers, not Moscow, carry the cost and risk — the 'reparations loan' would have made Russia's own central-bank money the collateral, sidestepping the word 'confiscation' while shifting the burden.
    Two-thirds coverageA €90bn loan covering only about two-thirds of Ukraine's 2026-27 needs structurally guarantees a recurring funding fight; by declining the larger asset-backed option, the EU built in the very shortfall the Netherlands and Lithuania immediately moved to reopen.
    Lost leverageRepayment is contingent on Russian reparations that may never come, so the loan ties Ukraine's solvency to a Russian concession without the enforcement mechanism the frozen assets would have provided — forgoing the single largest piece of financial leverage the West holds over the Kremlin.
  11. 3 11 May 2026 EU prepares its 21st sanctions package targeting Russia's shadow fleet, banks and stolen-grain sales
    Brussels

    The European Union is preparing its 21st sanctions package, expected to be formally proposed in early June. It targets Russia's shadow fleet (about 20 more tankers to be added), banks, military-industrial firms, companies selling stolen Ukrainian grain, and LNG vessels, plus trade restrictions on critical minerals and metals for Russia's aerospace and drone sectors. A full maritime oil-transport ban remains unlikely given opposition from some member states. Hungary's government change has unlocked previously vetoed measures, and a smaller June 15 package will sanction four Chinese firms supplying drone components, with chief diplomat Kaja Kallas pushing for a 'big package'.

    Shadow fleet is the gapAdding ~20 tankers attacks the channel through which the EU estimates ~65% of Russian-oil cargoes evade the price cap; each individually-listed vessel loses insurance and port access, but the incremental 20-at-a-time pace shows how listing-by-listing struggles to keep up with a fleet Russia keeps reflagging.
    Unanimity unlockedHungary's leadership change freeing previously vetoed measures (including on Patriarch Kirill) demonstrates the structural weakness of the regime — a single capital had been blocking the bloc — and why the absent full maritime ban still cannot pass without complete 27-state consensus.
    Third-country chokepointsListing Chinese, Indian, Turkish and Central Asian circumvention firms acknowledges that direct sanctions only work if enforced against the re-export networks; targeting four Chinese drone-component suppliers is an attempt to raise the cost of the supply chain feeding Russia's war production.
  12. 4 11 May 2026 Kallas calls Putin 'weaker than ever' and announces new EU sanctions
    Brussels

    EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas stated that Putin is in a weaker position than ever before, citing battlefield losses, deep strikes into Russia and growing domestic discontent. She urged opening all EU accession negotiation clusters with Ukraine by summer (August) and announced new EU sanctions targeting Russian entities for deporting Ukrainian children. Kallas also warned against broader Russian influence operations in Europe, framing the economic and military pressure on Moscow as an opportunity to escalate, not ease, the squeeze.

    Pressure thesisKallas explicitly linking Putin's weakness to 'deep strikes into Russia' ties the economic-warfare narrative to the kinetic damage on oil and budget infrastructure, building the political case in Brussels that the moment to push sanctions hardest is precisely when the war chest is thinning.
    Accession as a financial signalPushing to open all accession clusters by August is itself an economic commitment: candidate status reshapes investor expectations and reconstruction financing for Ukraine, while signalling to Moscow that the EU is locking in Ukraine's Western integration regardless of any ceasefire terms.
    Diplomatic momentumPairing the 'weaker than ever' assessment with a fresh sanctions announcement keeps the bloc's posture escalatory at a moment when unity is tested — a deliberate counter to capitals (and the UK) drifting toward relief, setting the frame Kallas will repeat as 'back foot' weeks later.
  13. 4 May 2026 Russia's oil revenue surges to ~$19bn on the Iran-war windfall, but every 2026 month undershoots baseline
    Russia

    Russia's oil revenue nearly doubled to $19 billion in March 2026, driven by the Iran war pushing crude above $100 per barrel, up from $9.75 billion in February. Despite the windfall, the Finance Ministry recorded a 234.3 billion ruble ($3.12bn) shortfall against its baseline oil-and-gas projection for March — and every month of 2026 has come in below baseline. Sberbank forecast the ruble weakening to 80-90 per dollar by year-end; Ukrainian drone strikes cut loadings at key ports (Primorsk -13%, Novorossiysk -38%, Ust-Luga -43%). The Kremlin has raised VAT, cut rates despite high inflation, and drained its sovereign wealth fund to plug deficits.

    Windfall below baselineA doubled $19bn haul still missing the Finance Ministry's own baseline by $3.12bn — in a month of >$100 oil — is the clearest sign the 2026 budget was built on assumptions reality cannot meet, so even the best-case price environment widens rather than closes the gap.
    Port chokepointLoadings down 13-43% at Primorsk, Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga show Ukraine attacking the export terminals, not just refineries — hitting the volume side of revenue (barrels that physically leave) which damages the budget more than refinery strikes that only dent domestic product supply.
    Stimulus contradictionsRaising VAT while cutting rates into high inflation and draining the wealth fund are mutually offsetting moves that reveal a Finance Ministry out of clean options — each lever to plug the deficit worsens another constraint, the textbook 'fragile equilibrium' the NBU describes.
  14. 29 Apr 2026 Ukraine launches an International Register of Damage; reconstruction estimated at $587.7bn
    Kyiv

    Ukraine launched the International Register of Damage (RD4U) under the Council of Europe, enabling businesses and state authorities to submit claims for losses caused by Russian aggression. A World Bank-led assessment estimates reconstruction needs at $587.7 billion for 2026-2035, with direct war damages reaching $195.1 billion by end of 2025. The register now spans 43 categories with 21 open for submission and has recorded about 150,000 claims; a compensation mechanism was established by 35 countries and the EU in December 2025, with a future compensation fund to be financed from Russian reparations.

    The reparations linkA formal register designed to feed a compensation fund 'financed from Russian reparations' is the legal scaffolding that would justify mobilising the ~€210bn in frozen assets — building a documented $587.7bn claim is how the West converts an abstract reparations argument into an enforceable basis for seizing reserves.
    Scale vs financingA $587.7bn reconstruction bill dwarfs the €90bn loan and even the ~€210bn frozen assets, making clear that current Western financing covers wartime survival, not rebuilding — the gap is the structural case for tapping Russian money rather than open-ended donor commitments.
    Claims infrastructureRecording ~150,000 claims across 43 categories via Ukraine's Diia portal builds the evidentiary backbone that any future tribunal or asset-confiscation mechanism requires, so the register is less an aid program than the documentary precondition for the reparations-loan endgame.

Background

Russia's war economy: the slow squeeze

Russia's oil-and-gas revenue fell ~24% in 2025 to 8.48 trillion rubles — its lowest since 2020 and the weakest commodity dependence in two decades — pushing the federal deficit to ~5.65 trillion rubles ($72bn), the highest since 2009, even as military spending hit a record ~13.5 trillion rubles ($145bn). The cushion is thinning fast: the National Wealth Fund's liquid assets fell to ~$52bn by 1 January 2026 from ~$113bn pre-war, with roughly 60% of its gold sold. The central bank has been cutting from a 21% peak (to ~16%) to relieve strangled borrowers while inflation runs near 7-8%. The Iran-war oil spike was a temporary reprieve, not a fix; the structural trend — sanctions, a G7 price cap and Ukrainian 'kinetic sanctions' on export terminals — bends downward.

The frozen assets: ~€210bn and the 'reparations loan'

Roughly €200bn of Russian central-bank reserves have been immobilised in the EU since 2022, of which ~€185-190bn sits at the Euroclear securities depository in Belgium. The European Commission has pushed a 'reparations loan' (sized around €140bn) that would lend Ukraine against those assets, repayable only if Russia ever pays war reparations — deliberately sidestepping the word 'confiscation'. Belgium, where the assets are custodied, resists touching the principal: it fears legal liability, Russian retaliation against Western property, and capital flight as China, Saudi Arabia or BRICS sovereigns move custody to Dubai, Hong Kong or rival depositories. The compromise so far has been to use only the windfall interest profits, not the principal.

How EU sanctions packages are made

Each new EU sanctions package requires unanimity among all 27 member states, which lets a single capital (long Hungary, sometimes Slovakia) hold the whole bloc hostage and forces watered-down measures. The packages have grown numbingly incremental — the 20th was adopted in April 2026 — focusing on listing shadow-fleet vessels (the EU estimates ~65% of Russian-oil tankers violate the price cap), energy-sector firms, banks and third-country circumvention networks in China, India, Turkey and the UAE. A full maritime-services ban on Russian crude has repeatedly failed for lack of unanimity. The oil price cap runs on a dynamic mechanism pegged below average Urals prices, but enforcement leaks through the shadow fleet.

Ukraine's budget on a Western drip

Ukraine cannot self-finance the war: it needs ~$52bn of external money in 2026 alone and projects a $136.5bn financing gap through 2029, with state and state-guaranteed debt set to top 100% of GDP. The plumbing runs through the EU's €90bn loan (covering roughly two-thirds of 2026-27 needs), the G7 ERA mechanism that lends against frozen-asset proceeds, bilateral aid, and a new $8.1bn 48-month IMF Extended Fund Facility approved in February 2026 that acts more as a credibility anchor than as the bulk of the cash. Every tranche is conditioned on reform — above all a politically explosive tax package (VAT on small business, ending parcel and digital-platform exemptions, extending the military levy) that Ukraine's parliament has repeatedly stalled. World Bank-led assessments put reconstruction at $587.7bn over 2026-2035.

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