The Sweden Democrats propose deploying nuclear weapons: a new variable in Nordic security.

On February 18, 2026, a proposal breaking a decades-long taboo emerged during the Swedish Parliament's foreign policy debate. Aron Emilsson, the Sweden Democrats' foreign policy spokesperson, publicly stated that the party is open to the deployment of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, particularly when Sweden is in the gray zone between war and peace. He argued that this would enhance deterrence against Russia. These remarks immediately caused a stir in Stockholm's political circles, touching upon the most sensitive security policy issue since Sweden joined NATO.

A debate that breaks taboos.

This debate took place after Sweden officially became a member of NATO. In parliament, Emilsson pointed out that given the highly unstable security situation, Sweden must break away from the mindset of prohibition policies and not rule out the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons on its own territory in the future. He emphasized that Sweden should become a fully integrated part of NATO's nuclear weapons planning. Currently, Sweden has a long-standing policy: it does not deploy nuclear weapons on its territory during peacetime. This stems from its historical non-aligned stance and its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

Sweden's Foreign Minister, Maria Malmer Stenergard, responded with caution. She reiterated that the government still adheres to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but also stated that, in the face of serious threats from the East and extremely irresponsible rhetoric surrounding the use of nuclear weapons, Sweden must have the capability to deter irresponsible actors from the East. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson had previously stated that Sweden participates in all European discussions on nuclear weapons through NATO. In Europe, only France and the United Kingdom possess their own nuclear arsenals.

The opposition reacted swiftly. Social Democratic MP Morgan Johansson expressed surprise at the Sweden Democrats' statement, emphasizing that the broad consensus previously reached with the government against deploying nuclear weapons on Swedish territory should remain in effect. Left Party spokesperson Håkan Svenneling criticized the ruling coalition and the Sweden Democrats for shifting their stance too quickly and lacking transparency, arguing that they failed to adequately explain to the public the implications of the new military strategy of deterrence during the NATO accession process.

The Strategic Anxiety Behind the "Gray Zone" Rhetoric

Emilsson describes the current security environment as beginning to resemble a gray zone, which is key to understanding his nuclear weapons proposal. The so-called gray zone refers to a state between peace and open war, characterized by hybrid threats, cyber attacks, influence operations, and military brinkmanship. The Sweden Democrats believe that in this ambiguous state, the traditional principle of not deploying during peacetime may be insufficient to counter Russia's incremental coercion.

The deeper reason lies in Sweden's fundamental shift in geopolitical positioning. It is transitioning from being the geographical center of the Baltic Sea to becoming NATO's frontline against Russia. Across the Gulf of Finland lie the Russian Baltic Fleet's bases and St. Petersburg; to the northeast, Finland, which shares a border with Russia, is now a NATO ally; the strategic value of Gotland Island has been increasingly highlighted in recent NATO exercises. Deploying nuclear weapons—whether the U.S. B61-12 tactical nuclear bombs or other systems—would transform Sweden from a protected state into a forward hub within NATO's nuclear sharing framework, significantly shortening response times against Russian strategic targets.

Russia has deployed the nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile system in its Kaliningrad exclave, with a range covering most of Northern Europe. Moscow is also continuously upgrading the nuclear capabilities of the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula. Faced with such asymmetric threat perceptions, some political forces in Sweden believe that relying solely on NATO's extended deterrence commitments may not be sufficiently tangible, and that having physically present nuclear weapons on their own soil would provide a more reliable deterrent guarantee.

The chain reaction of nuclear weapons entering the country.

This proposal will trigger a chain reaction at multiple levels. Firstly, it will test Sweden's relations with NATO allies, particularly the United States. According to NATO's nuclear sharing policy, nuclear warheads are under U.S. control during peacetime and are only transferred to allies and deployed on allied aircraft under extreme circumstances. If Sweden wishes to join this system, it needs to construct dedicated facilities within its territory that meet the security standards for storing nuclear weapons, and modify aircraft such as the F-35A. This involves complex bilateral negotiations and substantial investment.

Secondly, it will alter the security dynamics in the Nordic region. Norway and Denmark, as founding members of NATO, have long adhered to the policy of not deploying nuclear weapons on their territories during peacetime. If Sweden breaks this regional tacit understanding, it may force Oslo and Copenhagen to reassess their respective positions, triggering new challenges in security policy coordination within the Nordic region. The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—may have complex attitudes: on one hand, they welcome the strengthening of NATO's deterrence; on the other hand, they may also worry about becoming higher-priority targets in Russia's retaliation plans.

In the domestic context, this has become a political flashpoint ahead of the 2026 autumn general election. The Sweden Democrats are attempting to solidify their position as a key force within the right-wing bloc by projecting a tough security policy image. The ruling Moderate Party must carefully balance maintaining coalition unity with avoiding social division caused by radical policies. The opposition camp, particularly the Social Democrats and the Left Party, is certain to criticize the government for deviating from Sweden's long-standing tradition of peace and disarmament. Civil society groups, such as Swedish Doctors Against Nuclear Weapons, have swiftly voiced their concerns. Board member Gunnar Westberg wrote in *Dagens Nyheter*, warning that deploying nuclear weapons would only increase Sweden's risk of suffering a nuclear attack, as nuclear arsenals themselves are primary targets.

The New Equation in the Baltic Sea

From a broader geostrategic perspective, Sweden's nuclear weapons debate epitomizes the evolution of the security order in the Baltic Sea region and across Europe. This maritime area has transitioned from a zone of cooperation to a potential conflict zone. Russia's military presence in Kaliningrad, NATO's multinational battle groups in the three Baltic states, and frequent large-scale military exercises such as the Baltic Operations collectively form a highly militarized and tense landscape. The deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon in southern Sweden or on the island of Gotland would fundamentally alter the deterrence calculations in the region.

Analysts believe that Moscow's response is likely to be firm and multi-layered. In addition to diplomatic protests and propaganda accusing NATO of escalating provocations, the Russian military may enhance reconnaissance and countermeasure deployments in the Baltic Sea, including increasing the frequency of naval and air activities with nuclear strike capabilities, and even announcing adjustments to its nuclear targeting policy. From a technical perspective, if Sweden deploys nuclear weapons, the location of its bases, protection levels, and rapid response capabilities will immediately become key focuses for Russian military intelligence and simulated strikes.

The direction of this debate hinges on multiple variables: the outcome of the autumn election, the willingness within NATO—particularly in Washington—the developments on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield, and the acceptance of the Swedish public. What is certain is that with the Sweden Democrats placing the nuclear option on the table, Stockholm has pushed open a strategic door leading to higher risks and greater commitments. Once through that door, there will be no turning back.